

PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Foreword.

This annual presents the psychoanalytic point of view on all subjects ranging from anthropology to sociology. Recent years have brought about cooperation formerly unknown, especially between anthropology and psychoanalysis.

While psychoanalysis has, to some extent, been accepted by anthropology, the essence of what it is all about is still an alien way of thinking for the anthropologist. On the other hand modern anthropology has influenced dissident psychoanalysis, i e., the Horney, Kardiner, and similar groups, to a considerable degree. My stand on these questions is well known and I would like to see a further clarification of these problems from the Freudian point of view in future issues. While this is an exclusively psychoanalytic publication — in the sense that Freud would have called psychoanalytic — I will welcome mainly factual contributions by anthropologists on subjects that are of especial interest to the psychoanalyst (childhood, sexuality, dreams, personality, neurosis or psychosis among primitives) even if the author's point of view is not completely psychoanalytic.

I find it necessary to explain the sub-sections. Psychoanalysis has so far been successful chiefly in interpreting the data collected by the following social sciences: I. Anthropology, II. Folklore, III. Mythology, IV. Religion, V. Art, VI. Literature, VII. History, VIII. Sociology.

This sequence presents an ascending scale from the simpler to the more integrated phenomena. By *folklore* we mean the study

of the culture of European or American village communities or their "lore" such as superstitions, customs, folk-tales, ballads and the like. It is also necessary to say a few words on *mythology*.

Myth, according to our definition, is a narrative, not a belief. Therefore I would classify a paper on Apollo as religion, not mythology. Moreover myths are narratives of a specific kind, i. e., they are believed to be true and this distinguishes them from the folk-tale, i.e., from primitive literature. The section on *religion* has its obvious boundaries in so far as "higher" religions are dealt with; but a treatise on North American Indian guardian spirits could be classified either as religion or as anthropology. *Sociology* is the same for New York or London that anthropology is for a foodgathering tribe. It may also be regarded as equivalent to the social sciences in general and include any attempts to explain the behavior or emotion of human beings in groups. Finally we may include papers on general (non-medical) psychology (e. g. subjects like the superego or symbolism) as these are closely interrelated with all the social sciences. I intend to introduce each volume, (if possible), with a short essay on psychoanalysis as related to one of the fields in which it has been used as a method of interpretation. The present volume discusses *Psychoanalysis and Anthropology*.

The Editor.

September 1, 1947.

New York.

Introduction

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ANTHROPOLOGY

By GÉZA RÓHEIM, Ph.D (New York)

Before Freud we knew very little about psychology. By analyzing neurotics, Freud first found that they were saying one thing and meaning something quite different and then evolved a technique which made it possible to find what this "different" meaning was.

One of Freud's most outstanding discoveries about human beings was the oedipus complex, i.e., the fact that at a certain age the boy loved his mother and regarded his father as a hated rival. It seemed self-evident that if this constellation was found in patients it would also explain the myth of King Oedipus¹ and that having once understood man in his role of a patient we could also attempt to explain human behavior, beliefs, myths and customs which in their irrational aspects show much that is manifestly similar to the ways of the neurotics.

Karl Abraham, in his first psychoanalytic discussion of myth², starts from this undeniable analogy. If Oedipus and Jokaste are not, as mythologists would assume, the sun and the earth or the like, but representatives of human trends or desires, then this

1. S. Freud. *Traumdeutung*. Gesammelte Schriften, II, p. 263. (Original edition, 1900, p. 180.)

2. Karl Abraham: *Traum und Mythos*. F. Deuticke (Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde) Vienna, 1909 *Dream and Myths*, Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 15, Washington, D. C., 1913.

method may be successfully applied to mythology in general. Actually, Abraham did not have to go far beyond what Kuhn had already said before Freud to recognize the sexual symbolism in the myth of Prometheus. The difference, of course, was that the mythologist could only point out that this sexual symbolism existed, but could not give us any information on the why and wherefore³. Previously, Riklin⁴ had published a study on wish-fulfilment and symbolism in folktales. To this, an English psychologist naively objected that as a child when he heard the stories, he had no idea that the snake was a penis.⁵ Nowadays, I believe, few would dispute the validity of Riklin's interpretations. But these were only the forerunners. The door was thrown wide open for a psychoanalytic interpretation of anthropology, human history, religion and sociology by Freud.

Totem and Taboo is really a building based on several cornerstones: (a) Sacred and accursed are both *taboo*, we desire what we pretend to abhor. (b) The phobic attitude of primitive people regarding incest is a protection against the gratification of this desire. (c) The survivors through mourning punish themselves for their evil wishes directed against the dead, (even the enemy's ghost must be placated), and kings are first exalted to the rank of divinities and then killed. (d) In anthropology or sociology as well as in the consulting room it is well to bear in mind that all human relationships are *ambivalent*.

In compulsive neurotics we find that no hard and fast line is drawn between thinking and acting. An obsessional patient of Freud's had the idea that whenever he thought of a person that person would suddenly appear and if he inquired about the state

3. Ad. Kuhn: *Mythologische Studien*. I. Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks. C. Bertelsmann, Gutersloh, 1886.

4. F. Riklin: *Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen*, F. Deuticke, (Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde, 2) Vienna, 1908. *Wishfulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales*. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 21, Washington, D. C., 1915.

5. F. C. Bartlett: *Psychology in Relation to the Popular Story*, *Folk Lore*, 1920, pp. 264-293.

of health of an acquaintance he was sure to hear that the person had just died. For this state of things the patient coined the word "omnipotence of thought". Thence Freud realized the analogy with primitive magic where a wish, an incantation, or the acting out of a certain situation, for instance, is supposed to bring about the desired result.

Chapter IV of *Totem and Taboo* contains Freud's theory of totemism and the primal horde. Certain primitive tribes are organized in clans. These clans practice *exogamy*, i.e., they do not marry any woman who is a member of their own clan. Moreover they regard themselves as in some way related to or descended from the members of an animal species, (i.e., kangaroos, bears, or the like) and usually abstain from killing and eating these animals. Periodically, however, these very animals whom primitives also believe to be their fathers, are killed and eaten ceremonially.⁶

Considering that we have studied animal phobias of children psychoanalytically, and found that the animal (horse, or cock, or dog) symbolizes the father, we only have to accept literally the statements made by primitives and we have the key to the riddle of totemism. The totem animal is a symbol of the father. The male members of the clan are his sons, the females whom they must not marry are his wives. Totemism, therefore, is based on the oedipus complex. Robertson-Smith explained sacrifice by analogy with Christian communion: for instance, a bull is sacrificed to a bull-god and by eating the flesh of the bull the worshippers are united. The members of the totem clan eat the totem father. Freud then suggests that all this is really a repetition of a prehistoric experience. In the primal horde (Atkinson) the ancestors of mankind lived in groups from which the young males were excluded. The group was really one powerful male with his harem and the father prevented the sons from obtaining sexual

6. Cf. Brill's comment on the American totem bird, the turkey (similar to the bald eagle) eaten ceremonially on Thanksgiving day. A. A. Brill: *Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry*. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1944, p. 187.

satisfaction. When by united efforts they managed to kill him they ate and introjected him and what was his will before became their own will or partly their own will, the basis of law and order, i.e., the superego.

It is well known that it is this last part of the Freudian theory that has been rejected by the anthropologists, and sociologists, and has given rise to violent controversy. The difficulty lies in envisaging a kind of unconscious of the human species in which engrams of the past can be carried over to the present.⁷ Alternative theories have been suggested, namely that the situation itself survives in modified forms and gives rise to "primal horde" myths or rituals.

But whatever conclusion we may arrive at regarding this particular aspect of "applied" psychoanalysis, the fact remains that *Totem and Taboo* is the book that created psychoanalytic anthropology. In it the central position of the oedipus complex for understanding human society has been definitely established, not to mention such "minor" items as the roles of ambivalence, magic, projection and the origin of ghosts.

Another very important and now well-nigh forgotten publication of the early days was Otto Rank's book on the incest-theme in poetry and myth.⁸ It contains, among others, an analysis of some aspects of the oedipus myth (pp. 256-276) and the Cain

7. Cf. for the theory that attenuated forms of the primal horde battles survived as ritual and that this again was nourished by the oedipal and sibling situation of the individual: Géza Róheim: *The Riddle of the Sphinx*. London, Hogarth Press, 1934, p. 234. For actual survival of primal-horde-like situations in the present, Idem, *The Primal Horde and Incest in Central Australia*. *J. Crim. Psychopath.* 3, 1942, pp. 454-460. For both points of view see Feldman's paper in *this volume* (Notes on the Primal Horde), p. 171. Biologists in general do not admit the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Cf. R. E. Money Kyrle; *Aspasia*. London, Kegan Paul, 1932, p. 33. J. Huxley: *Evolution, the Modern Synthesis*. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1942, p. 457. For arguments in favor of phylogenetic inheritance, cf. A. A. Brill: *Some Peculiar Manifestations of Memory with Special Reference to Lightning Calculators*. *J. Nerv. Ment. Dis.* 92, 1940, pp. 709-726. Idem, *The University of Symbols*. *Psy. Review*. Vol. 30, 1943, pp. 1-18. On the same subject from a different point of view cf. G. Róheim: *Myth and Folk-tale*. *Amer. Imago* 2, pp. 266-279.

8. Otto Rank: *Das Inzest Motiv in Dichtung und Sage*. F. Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1912.

myth (p. 451). Rank had also made other attempts to apply what we had learned by studying neurotics and dreams to the understanding of myths and folk-tales. These essays are still well worth reading, especially the paper on "Myth and Folk-Tale."⁹

Theodor Reik, another pupil of Freud's, published a volume of four papers on ritual. Two of these are devoted to primitives and two to Jewish religion. Reik's study of puberty rites is especially stimulating.¹⁰ From the point of view of present-day knowledge, we must say that the emphasis in these studies is sometimes too much on the historical side, as if there was nothing else to find in psychoanalytic anthropology beyond the primal horde.

An early attempt had been made by Rank and Sachs to summarize the results of psychoanalysis as applied to the "humaniora" or "humanities". The authors write: "The stimulus that might be given to anthropology by psychoanalysis is mainly something to be expected in the future. Up to the present, the fact that many collective phenomena have been shown as closely related to the unconscious has been chiefly exploited to confirm the findings of psychoanalysis. In the customs of various people we can find the exact replica of the symbolism we have ascertained in interpreting dreams."¹¹ The authors visualize this future task mainly from the point of view of a reconstruction of pre-historic phases of human history (Haeckel's law of biogenetic parallelism).¹²

Anthropologists were quick to reject and slow to accept the viewpoints of this new psychology. As far as I know the present writer was¹³ the only anthropologist who accepted psychoanalysis

9. Otto Rank: *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung*. Int. Psa. Bibliothek. No. 4, Leipzig and Vienna, 1919. pp. 381-420.

10. Theodor Reik: *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*. Int. Psa. Bibliothek. No. 5, Leipzig and Vienna, 1919. (*Psychological Problems of Religion. I. The Ritual*, New York, Farrar, Straus & Co., 1946.)

11. Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs: *Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften*, Grenzfragen des Nerven-und Seelenlebens; Heft 93. Wiesbaden, T. F. Bergmann, 1913, p. 70.

12. Ibid p. 71.

13. And perhaps still is? (With the exception of the Dutch anthropologist Dr. Münsterberger.)

without any reservations. The first papers on the subject were published in Hungarian in the *Ethnographia*.¹⁴

In 1914 the writer interpreted certain Finno-Ugrian beliefs about the bear and the twins on the basis of the oedipus complex. It is rather interesting that in a series of papers on "Psychoanalysis and Anthropology"¹⁵ published at this early period, I now find the first indications of what later became the *ontogenetic theory of culture*. Various peoples sacrifice the "first fruits" to the gods. This is interpreted as meaning that the mother tastes the food (or pre-masticates it?) before she gives it to the child.

The German anthropological periodical, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, also contains one paper with a Freudian point of view. The Mexican parallel to the Garden of Eden myth is interpreted on the basis of the primal horde and the sexual symbolism of the myth of the culture hero of the Prometheus-Loki type is clearly recognized.¹⁶

Nothing similar followed in Germany; but in England leading anthropologists were beginning to take an interest in the viewpoints of psychoanalysis. Their influence was decisive in shaping the future course of these studies. W. H. Rivers in a pamphlet on *Dreams and Primitive Culture*¹⁷ regards certain processes of primitive culture as analogous to the secondary elaboration, condensation and dramatization as observed by Freud in analyzing dreams. What he accepts of Freudian theory is very little and what he rejects is much more and the cultural parallels are open to criticism. Yet by this publication psychoanalysis had been removed from the sphere of "untouchable" subjects and methods. In 1924, the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* con-

14. For references cf. G. Róheim: *Ethnologie und Völkerpsychologie*. Berichte über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse 1914-1919. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1919, pp. 164-194.

15. Psychoanalysis és ethnologia. *Ethnographia*. 1918.

16. John Löwenthal: Zur Mythologie des jungen Helden und des Feuerbringers. *Ztschr. f. Ethnol.* 1918, p. 42.

17. W. H. R. Rivers: *Dreams and Primitive Culture*. Longmans, Greene and Co., Manchester, 1917, 1918 (Reprinted from the Bulletin of the John Ryland Library, 1918).

tained a Presidential Address by C. G. Seligman on "Anthropology and Psychology" and a paper by Ernest Jones on "Psychoanalysis and Anthropology" dealing mainly with symbolism and repression.

In view of recent developments one sentence (Seligman) should be quoted: "The final answer to the question raised above, however, lies in the nature of the findings themselves. These are of such fundamental character, that, roughly speaking, *they can only be true of mankind in general or else not true at all.*"¹⁸

We have thus far followed the development of psychoanalytic anthropology. Partly owing to post-war developments¹⁹ in Central Europe, sociology turned toward psychoanalysis. Kolnai,²⁰ like any well behaved sociologist, regards the statement that sociological phenomena are *sui generis* (and therefore not psychologically conditioned) as axiomatic (p. 5). Being evidently a disciple of Durkheim, he goes on to assert that Freud's discoveries corroborate Durkheim's views. The whole building collapses very neatly when he (correctly) derives the idea of society from fatherhood (p. 35). But in many other respects he is really a forerunner of modern culturalism. For instance, he regards repression as a phenomenon that depends entirely on sociological conditions, i.e., economics, clan, status, and so forth (p. 75).

In 1925, the present writer's book on *Australian Totemism* was published²¹ and with it the first attempt to use psychoanalysis not in a generalized way but as applied to a definite area of culture. There is much too much of Rivers in this book to suit my present views; also too much historical speculation. But the actual interpretation of myths and rituals has been strikingly confirmed by my own field work and shows clearly what can and what cannot be done by the "armchair" anthropologist.

We have now brought our historical survey to the gates of

18. p. 51. My italics.

19. World War I.

20. Aurel Kolnai: *Psychoanalyse und Soziologie*. Int. Psa. Bibliothek, Nr. 9. 1920.

21. London, Allen and Unwin.

the present as represented by the field-work of Bronislaw Malinowski. Malinowski was doing field-work on the Trobriand Islands and had never heard of psychoanalysis before. It goes without saying that he had not been analyzed. On the basis of literature sent him by Seligman he proceeded to test Freud's theory of dreams.²² (I do not think it is necessary to explain why this is an absurdity.) He observed that his informants did not have many dreams and thought this was so because "the complex" is "weak" in a "non-repressed" society. Quite apart from the theoretical confusion in all this, he overlooked one possible reason, namely, that they did not care to tell him their dreams.

Despite these basic misunderstandings his work resulted in the surprising finding that the Trobrianders have a nuclear complex different from peoples in patrilineal cultures. People in a matrilineal culture want to kill their mother's brother and to marry their sister, whereas in a patrilineal culture it is as Freud has found; the mother is the desired object and the father the enemy rival.²³ If Malinowski himself had had any understanding of psychoanalysis²⁴ he would have refuted his own view with his own words. For he tells us: "So far *tama* does not differ essentially from 'father' in our sense. But as soon as the child begins to grow up and take an interest in things outside the affairs of the household and his own immediate needs, certain complications arise and change the meaning of *tama* for him. He learns that he is not of the same clan as his *tama*, that his totemic appellation is different and that it is identical with that of his mother. . . . Another man appears on the horizon and is called by the child *kadaju* (my mother's brother) . . . He also sees as he grows up

22. Bronislaw Malinowski: *The Sexual Life of Savages in North Western Melanesia*. London, Routledge and Sons, 1929 p. 325.

23. Bronislaw Malinowski: *Mutterrechtliche Familie und Oedipus-Komplex*. *Imago*, 10, p. 273. (Complex and Myth in Mother Right *Psyche*, 5, p. 194.)

24. He confesses this lack himself: "I have come to realize since the above was written that no orthodox or semi-orthodox psychoanalyst would accept my statement of the 'complex' or of any aspect of the doctrine." Bronislaw Malinowski: *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*. London, Kegan Paul, 1927. p. 75. Furthermore he writes (in 1927) that he is not able to adopt any of the recent developments of psychoanalysis or even to understand their meaning. (p. 22.)

that the mother's brother assumes a gradually increasing authority over him, requiring his services, helping him in some things, granting or withholding his permission to carry out certain actions; while the father's authority and counsel become less and less important".²⁵ In other words, the role of the father in the first five to eight years of life is the same as in any patrilineal society.

I myself have reported a case of Kabisha of Omarakana (Trobriand) who had intercourse with his mother and who, when his little brother surprised him in the act, tried to bury the child alive; but the child climbed out and shouted and people came to the rescue.²⁶

I also happen to have studied the matrilineal society of Normanby Island which is closely related ethnologically to the Trobriand area and even more strictly matrilineal. I have published analyzed dreams of this area which clearly prove the existence of the oedipus complex.²⁷ I have also published data on play analysis with children.²⁸ This ought to convince any *bona fide* critic. Nobody has refuted all this, but authors calmly go on quoting Malinowski's "results". Here we have the "solid cornerstone" of what was destined to develop into the "culturalist" point of view. But, although this means a deviation from the main line of the argument, it would be exceedingly unfair to leave matters at that and create a false impression of Malinowski's significance. He is not to blame for these mistakes, but the psychoanalysts who take him at face value are very much to blame. Malinowski has given us field monographs of unsurpassed value and has introduced the functionalist point of view, i.e., the emphasis on the present as distinguished from the past and on the

25. Bronislaw Malinowski. *The Sexual Life of Savages*, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1929, pp 5-6

26. Géza Róheim: Society and the Individual, *Psy. Quart.* 9, p. 543.

27. Géza Róheim: The Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types, Doketa. *Int. J. Psy.* 13, p. 151 Idem, *War Crime and the Covenant Dream of Bulema*, J. Crim Psychopath Monograph Series No. 1, 1945, p. 73 Dream Analysis and Field Work in Anthropology, *this volume*, p. 87

28. Play Analysis with Normanby Island Children *Amer J Orthopsych.*, 11, No. 3, 1941, p. 524

interrelatedness of the parts in a culture. He was the first field anthropologist who really described sex life and in general gave us pioneer field-work of such intensity as was not even attempted before his days.

The next step in the evolution of the relationship between anthropology and psychoanalysis was my own field-work.²⁹ The outlines of what has now become the theory of *basic personality* (Kardiner, Linton, et al) dawned upon me in the process of field-work. I had analyzed dreams in which the *alknarintja* (woman who turns her eyes away) was revealed as the mother; I had drawings of children's dreams which showed that they dreamt of phallic female demons. I knew that in "official" dream interpretation the "alknarintja" was supposed to have intercourse with a man in his dream by sitting on his penis, and finally I was told by a Ngatatara woman that women customarily would lie on their children as a sleeping habit, "like a man on a woman in coitus". This was the nucleus of the ontogenetic theory of culture. The general, although merely foreconscious, conceptual background was derived from Bastian. According to this veteran and chaotic German anthropologist, mankind always produced the same ideas by a kind of *generatio aequivoca*. This was what he called *Elementargedanke*. The *Elementargedanke*, however, varies with different emphasis in different cultural areas. "In every organism, the governing laws have been firmly established; they have also been firmly established in the ethnic frames of reference (*Weltanschauungen*) within which we see emerging everywhere, on the five continents, the same universal ideas (*Menschheitsgedanken*). If circumstances are alike, they emerge from inescapable necessity, in identical form or, inasmuch as they vary under the impact of local modifications, they will emerge in similar form."³⁰

According to Bastian, the first task of anthropology is to find

29. Géza Róheim: *Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types*. *Int. J. Ps.*, 13, 1932.

30. Adolf Bastian, *Die Vorgeschichte der Ethnologie*. Dummlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin, 1887, p. 89.

the elementary laws of the growth-process of mankind in general, the second to study the modifications caused by the *milieu* or *monde ambiant*, and the third to study modifications caused by history, i.e., by contact with other cultures.³¹

Translating these views into psychoanalytic terminology, this would mean that we can explain any specific ritual or custom on the basis of trends that are universally human and of such specific ones that occur in a given area.³² Thus the *alknarintja* complex of Central Australia is a sub-variant of the universally human fate of transition from passivity to activity as the cardinal process of growth, but can also be described in terms of what happens in that specific area, i.e., mothers sleeping on their children; and as a reaction to this passivity we find in the males of the tribe an overemphasis on male sadism, phallic symbolism, and male solidarity.

Nor was I unaware, as one of my recent critics supposes, of the fact that cultures as a whole had a certain orientation of their own.³³ "Specific forms of culture must, of course, develop after the period in which the superego has evolved for it is only with the superego that human beings, properly so called, begin. We may say, then, that every culture takes its specific color from a compromise arrived at between the superego, as a more or less constant unit, on the one side, and the governing trauma on the other. This compromise is embodied in a group ideal. The strongest impression which the Australian native retains from his childhood is his love for the "phallic" mother. Accordingly, a society develops whose group ideal is a father endowed with a vagina (i.e., the chief with the subincised penis; penis *churunga* covered with concentric circles symbolizing the vagina). The group ideal of Papuan society is the mother's brother (i.e. mother

31. Ad. Bastian: *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*. Leipzig, Otto Wiegandt, 1860, Vols. 1-3

32. For the purpose of this analogy, Bastian's second and third task must be regarded as identical.

33. Bastian called this *Völkergedanke*.

plus father) who is portioned out and eaten up at the feast; behind this figure, however, lurks the devouring father. Amongst the Yuma, the child is allowed to witness his parents' coitus. As a result of a systematic building up of the superego this memory is powerfully repressed and in group ideal there appears the shaman who dares to dream of the primal scene and to reproduce this dream in real life".³⁴

I would include another note in retrospect on my field-work and the theory evolved. In those days the concept of trauma was being re-introduced into psychoanalytic thinking by S. Ferenczi. Ferenczi had found many cases in which the "normal" evolution of the child had been shunted off into a different direction owing to adult libidinal traumatization.³⁵

In 1927 and 1928, before I left Budapest these views were already known and discussed in the Budapest psychoanalytic society. Undoubtedly, they had something to do with the fact that, in my field-work, I found the ontogenetic trauma, and also with the mistake I made, namely, I emphasized only libidinal (seduction) traumata. This has already been corrected in some of my papers and will again be corrected in forthcoming publications.³⁶

In the meanwhile anthropology in America was moving in the same direction; that is, somewhat in the same direction. Sapir was emphasizing the necessity of cooperation between anthropology and psychiatry, but he was far from accepting psychoanalysis.³⁷

In 1935, Ruth Benedict published her now famous book on

34. Géza Róheim: Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types. *Int. J. Ps.* 13, 1932, p. 197.

35. Sándor Ferenczi: Relaxationsprinzip und Neokatharsis. *Int. Ztschr. Ps.* 16, 1930, p. 160. Idem, Kinderanalysen mit Erwachsenen. *Int. Ztschr. Ps.* 17, 1931, p. 161. Idem, Sprachverwirrung zwischen dem Erwachsenen und dem Kind. *Int. Ztschr. Ps.* 19, 1933, p. 5.

36. Cf. Play with Normanby Island Children. *Amer. J. Orthopsych.*, 11, p. 524. Children's Games and Rhymes in Duau. *Amer. Anthropol.*, 45, 1943, pp. 99-119.

37. E. Sapir: The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures. *J. Soc. Psychol.* 5, 1934, pp. 408-415.

Patterns of Culture.³⁸ This book is based mainly on Gestalt psychology and Spengler but has little to do with psychoanalysis. That certain cultures are oriented toward different goals than others, that certain biologically given possibilities (for instance, puberty) may be overstressed in some cases and minimized in others, is justly emphasized by Benedict. But we also have the curious, partly myopic and partly mystic trend of the anthropologist and sociologist to make a deep bow of obeisance to the God called society. As this question is relevant for further issues, I want to quote a characteristic passage:

"In all studies of social custom the crux of the matter is that the behavior under consideration must pass through the needle's eye of social acceptance and only history in its widest sense can give an account of these social acceptances and rejections. It is not merely psychology that is the question; it is also history, and history is by no means a set of facts that can be discovered by introspection. Therefore those explanations of custom which derive our economic scheme from human competitiveness, modern war from human combativeness and all the rest of the ready explanations that we meet in every magazine and modern volume have for the anthropologist a hollow ring." Benedict thinks that instead of trying to understand the blood-feud from vengeance, it was necessary rather to understand vengeance from the blood-feud. In the same way it is necessary to study jealousy from its conditioning by local sexual regulations and property institutions.³⁹

It is here that we definitely part company. Maybe I am an archaic survival of the nineteenth century, but I regard these views as gravely misleading and one-sided. To say that we could have war without combativeness or economic competition without competitiveness, and so forth, just seems to me not to make any sense. When I analyze a patient, I find he is vengeful for certain reasons conditioned by his childhood. I refuse to attribute his vengefulness

38. Ruth Benedict: *Patterns of Culture*. London, George Routledge, 1935.

39. *Op. cit.* p. 232.

to the institution of the blood-feud which itself remains unexplained. As an analyst I ought to know something about jealousy and I can assure the anthropologists that the driving forces are not local sexual regulations or property institutions.

In the days of Herbert Spencer and after, it was generally understood that sociology had to be based on psychology; the more integrated had to be derived from the simpler phenomenon and not the other way round. In 1909, this still seemed to be self-evident.⁴⁰ I am fully aware that an individual does not exist in the void, that, in a sense, the individual is as much an abstraction as society is. Therefore if we say that the psychology of the individual is, up to a certain degree, conditioned by society it is also true that society is conditioned by the psychological apparatus plus environment plus history. Lest we forget, however, it is well to observe that history is a series of facts which we interpret and in our interpretation, consciously or unconsciously, psychology plays a decisive role.

Two authors of great importance should now be discussed: one is an anthropologist who has learned much from psychoanalysis, the other is a psychoanalyst who has decisively influenced anthropology.

Margaret Mead's name is well known beyond the frontiers of the profession. Her first three major publications show her interest in the inter-relatedness of culture and the infantile situation.⁴¹ Only in her last book, written with Bateson, do we find that psychoanalysis forms the backbone of the whole structure.

In *Balinese Character* we find the description of the childhood situation with the mother behaving as a witch and the subsequent witch drama as derived from this situation. The book

40. Cf. Michael M. Davis. Psychological Interpretations of Society, *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*. Vol. 33, No. 2, Columbia University, 1909.

41. Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, William Morrow, 1928. *Growing Up in New Guinea*, New York, William Morrow, 1930 *Sex and Temperament in three Primitive Societies*, New York, William Morrow, 1945.

is a masterpiece of field-work and also of psychoanalysis.⁴² In pointing out certain aspects of the material, about which a psychoanalyst might have something more to say, I am doing this with a specific purpose in mind, and definitely not in an attempt to criticize the authors. If anywhere we have here both a peculiar childhood trauma—the curious taunting, flirting, sexually stimulating and then suddenly rejecting behavior of the mother—and a peculiarly introverted type of personality.

Margaret Mead gives us the following very significant description of the courtship dance: "Little skilled girls especially decked out and trained are taken from village to village by an accompanying orchestra and dance in the street; sometimes with partners who have come with them but more excitingly with members of the crowd. The little *djoget* coquettes and flirts, follows faithfully in pattern and rhythm the leads given by the villager who dances with her, but always fends him off with her fan, always eludes him, approaches, retreats, denies in a fitful unrewarding sequence, tantalizing and remote. Sometimes in the very midst of such a scene the tune played by the orchestra changes to the music of Tjalonarang (the Witch play), a cloth or a doll appears as if by magic, and the little dancer, *still looking her part as the cynosure of all male eyes*,⁴³ suddenly becomes the Witch. She strikes the characteristic attitudes, waves her cloth and dances, balanced on one foot, tentatively threatening to step on the baby doll which she has just flung upon the ground—a pantomimic statement that witches feed on newborn babies. And after the Witch scene, the *djoget* will again return to the role of the desirable and remotely lovely girl. The dance sums up the besetting fear, the final knowledge of each Balinese male that he will, after all, no matter how hard he seeks to find the lovely and unknown beyond the confines of his familiar village, marry the Witch,

42 Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead. *Balinese Character* Special Publication of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 2, 1942

43. My italics.

marry a woman whose attitude toward human relations will be exactly that of his own mother."⁴⁴

The psychoanalyst will here say that all this shows good insight and must be correct. But he will also go one step further and, using his deeper insight gained from a more intensive study of the individual, he will remember that even men who have very bad mothers and protest that they would hate to have a wife like their mother, are unconsciously looking for just those qualities in their wives that they condemn in their mothers.

What follows in Bateson's and Mead's presentation is very interesting: "There is a conflict which recurs in each generation in which parents try to force the children of brothers to marry each other; to stay within the family line and to worship the same ancestral gods while the young people themselves rebel and if possible marry strangers. Fathers and brothers may help a boy to carry off a girl who is not kin but no male relative of a girl nor the girl herself can admit complicity in any such scheme. An abduction-elopement is staged, but the boy fears that he will not succeed and this is dramatized in the theater in a frequent plot; that of the prince who attempts to abduct a beautiful girl but through accident gets instead the ugly sister; the "Beast" princess who is always dressed in the distinctive costume worn by mothers and mothers-in-law."⁴⁵

Of course, we know that psychoanalysts are such suspicious beings that they will ask "through accident?" and they will say there is no such thing and what the boy gets is just what he desires, i.e., the mother. The theatrical plot may be compared to the dramatized plot of European marriage customs.

Among the Palóc group of Hungarians in northern Hungary when the groom comes to ask for the bride they show him another girl dressed as a ragged old hag and they ask his representative: "Mr. Spokesman, is this the girl you are looking for?"

44. *Op. cit.* p. 36.

45. *Op. cit.* pp. 36-37.

"Who the hell wants her, a toothless old woman,"⁴⁶ he replies. The Székelys in Csik offer a "mask", i.e., an old woman to the bridegroom before he gets the bride.⁴⁷

On the Hungarian plain (Alföld) the pseudo-bride is said to be a widow and she promises to take good care of the young man who marries her "to bathe him in milk and butter"⁴⁸ ("tejbe vajba fürösztetni," proverbial expression for loving care). The psychological significance of these customs is obvious,⁴⁹ the young man rejects the old widow, i.e., disclaims his oedipal desires. In some cases the young man is so embarrassed that he says: "Yes, this is the one I want", and this breakthrough of the unconscious is, of course, welcomed as great fun by the spectators.⁵⁰ At Vogelsberg in Hessen they first offer an awful looking old hag. The groom says he does not know this ghost; take the old witch back immediately.⁵¹ In Bavaria they first offer him "the wild woman" (a supernatural being) and only then the real bride.⁵² Among the Germans in Czechoslovakia the rejected old woman is identified with Holle⁵³ the supernatural mother who is followed by the ghosts of unbaptized infants. The old woman declares that she has had an affair with the groom; he has left her with child (a doll).⁵⁴

The two dramas have a different ending; in the theatre at Bali it is regressive (the hero receives the mother). In the marriage rite of European folklore it is progressive (from mother to

46. Istvánffy Mátraalji palóc lakodalom (Palóc marriage customs from the Mátra) *Ethnographia*, 5, p. 45.

47. E. László, Csiki Székely népszokások (Folk customs of the Székelys from Csik.) *Ethnographia*, 7, p. 387.

48. Rész Ensel: *Magyarországi Népszokások* (Hungarian Folk Customs) 1867, pp. 39, 40.

49. These data are part of an unpublished paper of the writer's

50. L. L. Novák, Adatok Bény község néprajzához. (Contributions to the Ethnography of Bény) *Néprajzi-Ertejtő* 1913, p. 44.

51. H. Hepding Die falsche Braut *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, 5, p. 162.

52. Georg Buschan: *Sitten der Völker*. Stuttgart, 1922, 4, p. 154.

53. A. John. *Sitte, Brauch und Volksglaube im deutschen Westböhmen*. 1905, p. 152. On Holle cf. Waschnitius: *Percht, Holda und verwandte Gestalten*. Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien, Phil. Hist. Kl., 194, 1913.

54. John, *op. cit.* pp. 127, 128.

wife). We have here a clear justification of the modern anthropological method of dealing with separate cultural areas; the behavior of mothers in Bali conditions this regressive or negative trend.⁵⁵ But at the same time it is also an argument for old-style comparative anthropology. How could we understand the specific without the general? Black is only black when compared to white.

The behavior of the girl in the courtship situation is similar to that of the mother in the mother-child situation. And now—if any of my readers are modern American anthropologists, I want to prepare them gently—something shocking is going to happen. I am going to commit the original sin of the psychoanalyst⁵⁶ and am actually quoting one of these untouchables—the representative of the English school of evolutionary anthropology. We know that this coy, enticing, retreating behavior is typical for the male-female relationship for humanity at large (or at least for many cultures) but quite atypical for the mother-child relationship.

Ernest Crawley writes: "We have noticed the impulse in animals and mankind to guard the sexual centres against the undesired advances of the male. This is carried on into desire and female animals are known to run after the male and then turn to flee, perhaps only submitting with much persuasion. Modesty thus becomes an invitation. The naturally defensive attitude of the female is in contrast with the naturally aggressive attitude of the male in sexual relationships." Crawley then quotes from various sources ceremonial bride captures with seemingly resisting brides.⁵⁷

What has happened in Bali therefore is evidently a displacement of a more or less (i.e. potentially) universal male-female

55. Cf. "In some of the old written versions of this plot the Witch is killed but attempts to introduce this form onto the stage have failed." Bateson Mead, *op. cit.* p. 35.

56. Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn: Psychiatry and Anthropology in: *One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry*. Columbia University Press, 1944, p. 615.

57. Ernest Crawley: *The Mystic Rose*. London, Methuen and Co., 1927, pp. 81-92. (Quoting H. H. Ellis; *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*. 1910, 1, p. 39.

relationship to the mother-child situation. The mother behaves as if her son were her lover and this explains the phallic symbolism of the infant, so ably discussed by Bateson and Mead. The process itself is one that has probably a far-reaching significance in the evolution of mankind in connection with our biologically conditioned delayed infancy.

The phallic significance of the child (an equation familiar to psychoanalysts) explains the meaning of gods, dancers and puppets in Bali.

The gods address the people as father and mother and newborn babies are addressed with honorific terms like the gods. In the child trances, adolescent men and women take great pleasure in adoring the little dancer. "The little dancers are put into trance by incense and singing and by holding on to vibrating sticks connected by a string from which are suspended puppets. The god first enters the puppets setting up a violent commotion of the string. The girls then grasp the strings and are entered by the same gods."⁵⁸

In interpreting the meaning of the Witch drama, Bateson and Mead clearly show how the behavior of the bad Witch corresponds to that of the mother and that of the Dragon to the behavior of the father. The real explanation of the situation is given in a paper by Lewin:

"The drama of the Witch and the Dragon seems not fully explained as a revenge on the bad mother by the good father for what she has done to the child. The young men approach the witch with knives and when they turn these against their own breasts, 'play dead' and go into a trance, the Witch and the Dragon keep up the fight. This suggests a primal scene." "A suspicion rises"—Lewin says—"that the child is also present during parental sexual intercourse, and that this occurs while he is in the hypnagogic state that precedes sleep or that in

58. Bateson and Mead, *op. cit.* pp. 29, 30.

some other way sleep and erotic excitement combine. At the theatre we are told the spectators identify themselves with the actors as they did with their mothers 'molding' their bodies accordingly. The usual method of sending children into a trance is to communicate to them through a string the rhythm of a stick which man pounds up and down against a bowl. This trance, like the erotic sleep of the men in the Witch drama, would be an equivalent of infantile masturbation, and repetitive of the erotic sleep during the primal scene."⁵⁹ I have also suggested that the attack upon the Witch—the women do not participate in these attacks—with the phallic kris is a symbolic coitus. At the end the men turn the daggers against a spot on their own breast which is said to itch unbearably, thus acting out both the mother and the father role in the coitus scene. (Itching spot on breast—maternal vulva).⁶⁰ These men are the followers of the mythical dragon, children playing the father rôle in the primal scene.

The reason for discussing these points in this introduction is that here the whole picture is completely changed by a few strokes of interpretation and the primal scene acquires a central role in the life of the Balinese. How could it be otherwise with such a theatre-loving people?⁶¹

There is also another observation to be made. We have here an excellent correlation; the behavior of the Witch is strikingly like that of the Balinese mother. But witches in European folklore show exactly (or nearly exactly) the same characteristics as Balinese witches and those on Normanby Island are again strikingly similar to both. The child certainly has body destruction fantasies (M. Klein) even when mothers are not Balinese mothers and thus the problem of witches becomes again more complicated.

59. Bertram D. Lewin: Balinese Character in: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*. New York, Int. Univ. Press. 1, 1945, p. 385.

60. Géza Róheim: Review of Bateson and Mead in: *Psa. Quart.*, 13, 1944, p. 252.

61. Cf. for primal scene and ritual drama, Géza Róheim: *The Riddle of the Sphinx*. London, Hogarth Press, 1934. For the final proof of the primal scene basis of the drama cf. my forthcoming book: *The Psychology of Magic*.

But then again all human children have body destruction fantasies and the result may be somewhat different in another culture; not witches (i.e. female sorcerers) in our sense.⁶²

Margaret Mead came from anthropology to psychoanalysis. Abram Kardiner went from psychoanalysis to anthropology. I have criticized his viewpoint before and do not intend to cover the same ground again.⁶³ Kardiner is what is usually called a neo-Freudian. I would not admit that his system is Freudian even in a restricted sense. But, perhaps viewed historically, just what I object to is his great asset. By discarding so much of the original Freudian ideology he has been able to interest many anthropologists in hitherto recondite topics.⁶⁴ The interrelation of parents and children, of society and the individual, sexual life, personality, and many others have become the core of anthropology. So much at a time the anthropologists will take, but while I was trying to offer them Freudian wine undiluted, they would not drink it. Moreover, Kardiner has developed what was little more than a hint in my publications into a systematic theory of *basic personality*. The theory is that each culture produces a personality type of its own; as the parents behave differently toward their children in various areas those children are bound to develop into different types of personalities. Kardiner has also attempted to observe more closely and to check the various stages in the development of individuals in certain areas. Leaving aside the old hen and egg problem (cultural pressure versus infancy situations) we note that the smaller and more primitive a group may be⁶⁵ the greater

62. Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn: Navaho Witchcraft. *Papers of the Peabody Museum of Am. Arch. and Ethn.* Harvard University, 22, No 2, 1944.

63. Géza Róheim: Society and the Individual. *Psy. Quart.*, 9, 1940, pp. 526-545.

64. Abram Kardiner: *The Individual and His Society*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1939.

65. I disagree with Clyde Kluckhohn who thinks we are begging the question when we call the primitives primitive. This is unnecessary over-sophistication. If we dig down into past geological strata we find eoliths, not automobiles. I have not the slightest doubt about the problem whether our anthropoid ancestors had a highly developed literature and then mysteriously lost it or whether it was gradually developed after writing had been invented. Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, *Psychiatry and Anthropology. Op. cit.*, p. 615, footnote 102.

the probability that the basic personality of the group will also be the basic personality of the individual. Conversely, increase in numbers means increase in variability. Kardiner frankly admits that when compared with individual biographies the basic personality construct is not basic.⁶⁶ In his latest careful study—a book worth reading—the author seems to me to oscillate between an economic and a psychological determinism.⁶⁷ I must say, however, that I have the same objections to the system in its present form as I had to the first book. Kardiner is prone to make generalized statements based upon an insufficient knowledge of anthropological data.

"A strong bit of evidence for this is the absence of the almost universal taboo against sexual relations before battle. This merely indicates that the constellation 'sexual pleasure provokes punishment' is absent".⁶⁸ What basis do we have for such a statement? For instance, we have the Central Australians with masturbation or incestuous coitus as a preliminary to the blood feud; and the constellation mentioned above is certainly not absent in Central Australia. Among the Murngin the chapter on "Warfare" in the careful study made by Lloyd Warner does not mention this taboo (chapter VI.). Yet in the initiation ritual we have a dance in which the dancers have bark penises sticking erect from their belts. Some men without these appendages are female opossums. They may or may not simulate copulation.⁶⁹ This coitus scene is explained by the natives:

"Black man cuts down tree and by and by little ones come up. It is all the same. Walk about single, by and by mate and by and by children. It is all the fault of those women (the mythical Wawilak sisters). If they had not done wrong in their own

66. Cora du Bois: *The People of Alor* with analyses by A. Kardiner and E. Oberholzer. Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1944, p. 548.

67. A. Kardiner: *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 415, 418.

68. A. Kardiner, *op. cit.* p. 91, on the Comanche.

69. W. Lloyd Warner: *A Black Civilization*. New York, Harper Brothers, 1937, p. 296.

country this would not have happened. Everyone, all plants and animals, would have stayed single. But after they had done these bad things . . ."⁷⁰

Sex and punishment are linked here as obviously as in the narrative of Genesis. Yet there is no pre-war coitus taboo. Among the famous Marind-anim Wirz describes an extremely severe morality for the uninitiated. A young man is not even supposed to see a girl's apron.⁷¹ No period of pre-war continence is mentioned.⁷²

These data are taken at random from my bookshelves without much research. Finally we might add another society which does not taboo sexual intercourse before war and yet has sex and punishment linked together: our own. Obviously Kardiner's conclusion is too sweeping. Then again we are told that among the Comanche there is no evidence of supposed hostility to children.⁷³ But on the very next page we are told that the children are threatened with the boggy man. Kardiner is compelled to add a new theoretical angle to his hypotheses. We are told that "the menstrual taboos are survivals, which indicate conceptions of danger associated with the female not supported by an experience of the Comanche themselves and couvade, rudimentary though it is, is evidence that the child must be protected from the father. This surely has no relevancy here . . . The persistence of such institutions in Comanche indicates that not all institutions are functionally meaningful and can not therefore be classified as either primary or secondary but remain adventitious."⁷⁴

In other words, institutions that do not fit in with the theory or refute it are "adventitious". However, notwithstanding my

70 *Op. cit.*, p. 297.

71 P. Wirz: *Die Marind-anim von Holländisch Süd-Neu-Guinea*. Hamburgische Universität. *Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der Auslandskunde*. Bd. 10, Hamburg, L. Friedrichsen, 1922, p. 69.

72. *Op. cit.* 3, p. 49.

73. Kardiner, *op. cit.* p. 85. However, in Comanche folklore the evil magician is always an old man. *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

74. Kardiner, *op. cit.* p. 98.

criticism on theoretical grounds, Kardiner's book is stimulating and interesting.

Another achievement to Kardiner's credit is the emphasis on myths as a diagnostic tool indicating not the past but what is actually in the unconscious of the people who now narrate those myths. But myths are used without comparative material or real analysis of their latent meaning. This method avoids the depths of the unconscious; therefore a biography becomes an adequate substitute for a real analysis.⁷⁵ If Kardiner wishes to discuss "Western Man" why go to "Plainville" and use biographies; why not his own analytic data and discuss Manhattan?

I have tried to show and could show again that the exponents of the "culturist" school have an unfortunate propensity to make hasty, unsubstantiated negative statements, that they "scotomize" the oedipus complex, the superego, the castration complex and anal eroticism or anal character formation.⁷⁶ There is also a great confusion in terminology, for instance in the use of the word superego.

So much has changed in the thirty years that I have been writing psychoanalytic anthropology that it seems almost incredible. It is true that anthropologists for the most part still use psychoanalytic terms without understanding their meaning, but there is reason to hope that the future will bring full clarification. Nobody can really understand what it is all about without having been analyzed. Few would go with me so far, yet I will go a step further. If we are really to understand psychoanalytic anthropology in the Freudian sense, it will have to be written by those who have not only been analyzed but actually practiced analysis

75 On biographies in anthropology cf. also Clyde Kluckhohn: *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology. Soc. Sc. Res. Council Bull.*, 53, 1945, chapter 1. Betty I. Meggs: *Recent Trends in American Ethnology. Amer. Anthropol.* 1946, p. 185.

76. Linton, however, recognizes that "family situations operate on a sub-cultural level." R. Linton: *The Cultural Background of Personality*. New York, Appleton Century Co., 1945, p. 150. The significance of this "subcultural level" is underestimated, and the importance of "cultural patterning" (*op. cit.* p. 120) is overestimated.

themselves.⁷⁷ Without this practice nobody can acquire real skill in deep interpretation and without constant contact with the unconscious we are likely to repress the results of our own analysis and resistance will gradually get the upper hand. However, in order to understand the data of folk-lore or the data of anthropology or sociology, we cannot base our theories on dream analysis alone,⁷⁸ but if the results of dream-analysis agree with what we find in folk-lore or anthropology as revealed to the trained eye, the interpretation will be really convincing. As for the kind of material we should have, a complete therapeutic analysis of a primitive is by far the best. Only an analyst who lives in the country can do that and so far we have only W. Sachs of South Africa who is in a position to talk with authority on the subject.⁷⁹ The next best to this is what the field anthropologist can do if psychoanalytically trained, i.e. to collect and analyze a series of dreams.⁸⁰ The study of primitive children with play technique⁸¹ is one of our most promising approaches. In the future, as psychoanalysis and anthropology continue to cooperate, progress as yet unforeseen can be expected.⁸²

77 This has nothing to do with lay analysis. If lay analysts are not going to be trained, psychoanalytic anthropology should be in the hands of M.D.'s who are also anthropologists.

78. Cf. for instance N. Fodor: *Lykanthropy as a Psychic Mechanism. J. Amer. Folklore.* 58, 1945, p. 310.

79. W. Sachs: *Black Hamlet*. London, G. Bles, 1937.

80. Cf. below my paper on Dream Analysis and Field Anthropology, *this volume*, p. 87.

81 Cf. Géza Róheim: *Children of the Desert. Int. J. Psch.* 13, pp. 23-37. Idem, *Play Analysis with Normanby Island Children. Amer. J. Orthopsych.* 11, 1941, pp. 524-529. The most exhaustive treatment of the subject by I. and Z. Henny. *Doll Play of Pylaga Indian Children*. Research Monograph No. 4, American Orthopsychiatric Association, 1944

82 Cf. also the excellent analytic interpretation given by Erik Homburger Erikson, *Observations on the Yurok: Childhood and World Image. University of California Publications in American Archeology and Ethnology.* 25, No. 10, 1943, pp. 257-302. Idem, *Childhood and Tradition in Two American Indian Tribes. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.* I, New York, Int. Univ. Press., 1945, pp. 319-350.

Part One

ANTHROPOLOGY

SOME ASPECTS OF NAVAHO INFANCY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD

By CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, Ph D (Cambridge)

This is the first technical report upon a study of a group of Navaho Indian children that has been going on since 1936. A popular, highly tentative account of Navaho childhood in general has been published.¹ Previously only a programmatic statement² and isolated observations and theoretical interpretations were published.³ The present article will deal only with certain salient features of the first few years of life: the daily routine of the baby in the cradle, nursing, weaning, toilet training. Descriptions of the prenatal period and of parturition are reserved for later publication. Many aspects of infancy cannot be treated here; indeed it is contemplated that a whole book will be required to present a digest of the materials on infancy.

In the absence of previous publication to which reference

1. Leighton, D. C. and Kluckhohn, C.: *Children of the People*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947. Certain paragraphs (rearranged and revised) from one chapter of this book are repeated here. For this and for the benefits of long-sustained collaboration in field work and in discussions of the problems involved in studying Navaho infancy, I must express my deep obligations to Dr. Leighton. Thanks are also due to the Harvard University Press for their permission to utilize the materials mentioned. I am also grateful to Drs. A. and D. Leighton and to Dr. Janine Chappat for a critical reading of the present manuscript. The research basic to this paper has been supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Viking Fund, The Social Science Research Council, and The Peabody Museum and Department of Anthropology in Harvard University.

2. Kluckhohn, C.: Theoretical Bases of an Empirical Method for the Study of the Acquisition of Culture by Individuals. *Man*, 39, 1939.

3. Cf. e. g. Mowrer, O. H. and Kluckhohn, C.: *Dynamic Theory of Personality in Personality and the Behavior Disorders*. New York, Ronald Press, 1944, J. Hunt, editor; Kluckhohn, C. *Navaho Witchcraft Papers of the Peabody Museum of Harvard University*, 22, 1944.

could be made, it is necessary to present briefly certain background information. Almost all of the data utilized in this chapter were obtained among the group of about five hundred Navaho Indians living near Ramah, New Mexico. Although these Indians live in close proximity to ranchers and not far from a Mormon and a Spanish-American village, intimate contacts have been minimal because of the linguistic barrier. The first school for this group opened only in 1943 and until this time they had been almost completely let alone by the Indian Service and by missionaries. Hence acculturation, other than in the realm of material objects, has been relatively slight. A sketch of the physical environment and the culture of the Ramah Navaho has been published.⁴ Perhaps 5 per cent of the materials basic to this paper were secured among the Two Wells Navaho, some twenty-five miles distant from the Ramah group. Their culture is similar except that it has been more modified by white influences.

THE CORE SAMPLE

Although observations and interviews relating to forty-one other children have also been utilized for purposes of control and to increase the size of certain statistics, the core of this study is a selected sample of Ramah children that has been followed consistently through the years. The original sample consisted of twenty-four boys and twenty-four girls, though this has been decreased by deaths and by the removal of some families to such distances that continued intensive study was impractical.⁵ The children were born in the years 1936-38, but some replacements were made with children born in 1939 and 1940. In most cases the mother was observed, together with her family, during pregnancy. In all save four cases, the baby was seen within forty-eight

4. Kluckhohn, C. and Leighton, D. C: *The Navaho*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1946.

5. The war brought other obstacles to the completion of the project as planned, but most of the observation of infancy had been completed before the war began.

hours of birth and usually within twelve hours. In eleven cases an observer was on the spot at the time of the birth.

Selection of children was limited by the fact that in a group of this size only a small number were born each year during the periods that the writer or one of his collaborators could be in the field. So far as choice was possible, the attempt was made to have the children represent a cross-section of the community from the points of view of economic position, degree of white influence impinging upon the family, age of parents, and size of family. Actually, the laws of chance plus some conscious selection provided a very satisfactory sample both in terms of its ranges of variation and of its modalities.

THE OBSERVERS

This has been a collaborative project. The notes of eighteen observers (nine men and nine women) have been pooled to make the inductions reported in this article.⁶ Six were professional anthropologists or graduate students in anthropology; three were psychiatrists; one was a psychologist and one an educational psychologist; two were botanists; the remainder had no higher degrees in any field, but some had undergraduate training in anthropology or psychology. The participation of these observers in the study of children varied widely. Only eight gave their full time for longer or shorter periods to working with the children. The remainder were primarily engaged in other projects (human geography, basketry, recreation, reproductive life, and so forth) but made incidental observations while resident with families to which one or more of the children belonged. In some cases the observers were asked to observe designated children with particular care or to ask certain questions about them. In other instances (as a kind of control) the observers were merely asked to record

6. Especial thanks are due the following for their materials: D. C. Leighton, M.D., A. H. Leighton, M.D., Margaret Fries, M.D., Flora Bailey, Helen Bradley, Janine Chappat, Ph.D., Marian Mueller, and Josephine Murray.

as much as possible about all children with whom they came in contact.

Some observers were in the field for a single field-season or less. Others spent six months or more continuously in the field or returned for two or more different seasons. The writer has been in the field every year except 1945, and in three different years was able to spend not only the summer but also six weeks or more at some other period of the year. The children have been observed at least once during every month of the year by one or more different observers, though this has not occurred during every year of the study.

It is obvious that the quality of field notes varies greatly in accord with the observer's training, amount of experience with the Navaho, as well as interest and native capacity. Nevertheless the stress upon concrete observational detail was great enough so that each set of notes has yielded valuable data. For it takes no special skill but only a due regard for accuracy to record that a given child nursed at the left breast for so many minutes or was seen to take steps alone on such and such a day. However, this is not the whole of the matter. Naïve observers (i.e., persons with no training in psychology or anthropology and with no instruction in the purposes of the project) were deliberately introduced into the study, and—doubtless because they were good natural observers who saw things freshly and without the distortions probably always produced by theoretical preconceptions—supplied some of the most useful observations obtained.

METHOD OF STUDY

The approach has been that of repeated short-sample observation by multiple observers. Only three families included a person who spoke English and only one observer (the writer) spoke enough Navaho to dispense with an interpreter. Hence the greatest reliance was placed on observation. In essence, we studied these children in their families with the same simple natural his-

torical kind of method that one would use in studying a colony of beavers. The verbal record was liberally supplemented with still and moving pictures. Observations were of course oriented toward acts and periods which psychoanalysis and child psychology suggest are of crucial importance, but the goal was to record everything that occurred in the baby's environment during the period the observer was present. As has been remarked, an attempt was made to control unconscious bias due to theoretical conviction by introducing some observers who were completely without theoretical sophistication.

In addition to observation (and simple experiments, projective techniques, collection of drawings, physical examinations, and tests) there were also interviews with the family and eventually with the children. Dreams of the children and of the parents and siblings have been collected assiduously. Some autobiographies of parents and siblings have been obtained.

Entrée to the families was obtained in a variety of ways. In no case was the family told that it was desired to study a child or children, save when the Rorschach, Grace Arthur performance, Murray Thematic Apperception, and other tests were administered. In this instance it was explained (which was true) that the tests were being given in the endeavor to help the Indian Service improve its methods of teaching Navahos. Otherwise the usual pretext was a desire to learn the Navaho language, though a wish for instruction in weaving and in Navaho cooking were also employed. In the case of newcomers to the region an arrangement was made to pay the family a fee for "board and room". The writer and other observers who have spent much time with the Ramah Navaho have worked out a system whereby informal reciprocities are substituted for direct payment. We ordinarily arrive with gifts in the form of food. The families also know that, within limits, they can count on us to provide them with occasional transportation to Gallup or to the hospital at Black-rock, New Mexico. On the other side, there is an unspoken

understanding that we are welcome to come from time to time and enter the family as guests.

Some observers have preferred to spend each night in the Mormon town of Ramah, staying with the Indian families only during the daylight hours. But most of us have camped with the family, sleeping either outside or in a spare hut or in the hut in which the child was sleeping. Ordinarily each visit was for a period of at least a full twenty-four hours, and unbroken stays of four days to a week were made as a minimum yearly visit to each family in the pre-war years. Although the worker among the Navaho labors under many handicaps as compared with the investigator who has a good laboratory, one-way vision screens, and the like, and who speaks the same language as the children he is studying, this opportunity of entering into the intimate daily life of the family is a great compensation. In a one-room hut not much can be concealed, and when the student remains for some days it is difficult to keep up "company manners". The observer sees the ordinary run of behavior between individuals and feels the emotional tone that colors each pair of relationships.

Although our general aim has been to make ourselves as unobtrusive as possible, the simultaneous recording of events was easy in most families because no one could read or write. The note-taking which went on in public was usually explained to them as being the writing-down of words and phrases of Navaho as they were heard. Picture-taking did not of itself present a problem, for the family were eager for the prints themselves. The persistent difficulty was that posed photographs with individuals dressed in their best clothes were strongly preferred, and sometimes there was resentment over candid camera shots.

Except where otherwise indicated, all statements that follow are based upon first-hand observation or upon corroborated testimony of eyewitnesses obtained very shortly after the event. Uncontrolled hearsay and retrospective interviews dealing with events months or years in the past have been utilized only to

arrive at generalizations about traditions or about folklore. This fact is of great importance, for Navahos are notoriously inaccurate not with regard to sequence of events but as to absolute dates. Mothers have been interviewed as to dates of birth, weaning, walking, and the like, where these dates were definitely known by observation. Accuracy within a month in the mother's report was exceptional, and errors of as much as six months were common. In some instances mothers were questioned as to the same events at intervals of several months to a year or more. The same reply was almost never given, and the spread usually encompassed at least three months, although there is absolutely no reason to believe that there was conscious deception in any case. There is, to be sure, some margin of error in our dates also. That is, Kee was walking by at least September 15, 1941 because he was observed in the act. However, in such cases the family would be questioned as to when this had first occurred and, if the date assigned fitted with other known facts, this would be accepted, for experience has shown that Navahos are approximately correct in dating happenings that occurred within a month or so.

THE FIRST MONTH

Abundant corn pollen is sprinkled on the baby's head as soon as delivery is complete (unless this had been done earlier when the head had partially emerged from the birth canal). The midwife then ties the cord with a piece of homespun wool or a string picked up from the floor and cuts it (formerly, and still sometimes, with a flint knife, but more often with a pair of scissors or a kitchen knife). Sometimes the cord is not cut until the placenta has come. Unless the baby is already crying or breathing well, it is shaken, massaged on the chest, or patted on the back or held by the feet with the head downwards. It is then wrapped tightly in a woolen blanket or in cotton cloths and a sheepskin and placed near the fire. The head is propped with blankets so that it will not get out of shape.

Only after the placenta has been expelled does the woman who received the baby at delivery return to it to bathe it. For this bath the woman receives a basket or some other gift. Usually the midwife is a close relative of the mother but she may be just a neighbor who has experience in these matters. She may be anyone except a practitioner of divination—if a diviner she is supposed to give up divination forever after having been a midwife. Sometimes a second woman assists in giving the first bath.

The bath is given with soap and warm water in an old piece of crockery or a dishpan. There is great fear of the blood connected with birth so that in many families the receptacle is afterwards thrown away. In any case the bath water is carefully disposed of in a hole outside the hut which has been prepared for this purpose. When two women give the bath the vessel is often dispensed with. One woman holds the baby over a pile of sand while the other pours on the water and cleans the child with her hand or with a cloth. The sand is then carefully scraped up and deposited some distance from the hut. If one woman gives the bath, she supports the baby's head with the fingers of her left hand under the neck. The bather sits on the floor with her feet turned back under her and alternates the baby's head and buttocks towards her.

The baby is dried with a towel. A cloth band (sometimes with a little cotton directly over the navel) is wrapped tightly around the abdomen. The whole body to the neck is then swathed firmly in cloths (usually old flour or sugar sacks) which are tied both at the shoulder and hip levels. Thus bundled, the baby is wrapped in a sheepskin (fur side toward the body) and laid at the left of the mother, towards the north, with its head pointing to the fire. Usually, but not invariably, a canopy called "face-cover" is placed over it. This consists of three arches of willow withes or bating wire over which is placed a cloth or a skin to protect the child from the sparks of the fire and from the bright rays of the sun.

Sometimes immediately after the bath but always before sundown of the day of birth, the midwife "shapes" the baby. First the head and other body parts are anointed with pollen from white and yellow corn which has been shaken over corn beetles. The "shaping" ordinarily begins with the nose. The woman's thumb is placed within the baby's mouth and pressed back in the direction of the nose. "Then the nose will be straight. Otherwise the child will have a short nose." After the nose the head and limbs are kneaded and molded "The legs are shaped to make them stiff so the child can walk when it wants to." Often the ears are pierced for earrings within the first twenty-four hours. A needle with a piece of string attached is run through the ear, and then the string is drawn back and forth at intervals until a hole is well established.

The exhausted mother is lying down near the fire on the south side of the hut. She is usually given a tea brewed from juniper branches or from plant leaves. Her first food should be cornmeal mush unseasoned, and indeed in strict theory she should eat nothing but this for four days. We observed nineteen cases in which the mush was first food but no cases in which this was the sole diet for more than a day. Nowadays the mother gets a hearty meal as soon as she wants it. In most cases she does not drink anything but coffee or tepid to warm water until her milk has begun to come freely.

For fifteen mothers who were having their first child the average number of days before they were moving around freely and engaging in more or less normal activity was six and a half and the range was five to nine. For twenty mothers who had one to four children the average was five and a quarter and the range three to seven. For twenty-nine mothers who had had more than four children the average was slightly more than four and the range one to seven. (All cases where conditions were clearly pathological have been eliminated from these tabulations; there

were twenty-two such instances out of a total of eighty-six where the facts were well documented.)

Except when the mother is seriously ill, a relationship of almost constant physical proximity between child and mother begins after the child's first bath and is unbroken until the child can walk. Night and day, wherever the mother goes, whatever she is doing, the baby is either being held by her or is within sight of her eye and almost always within reach of her hand. As soon as she is physically able, the mother herself responds to every manifestation of want or discomfort on the part of her child. Her usual first response whenever the child cries is to place it to her breast. If this fails to produce quiet the baby will be cleaned and dried, cuddled, talked to or sung to. The baby is totally helpless; it can only cry. Wriggling is hardly an outlet for the Navaho baby since it is wrapped so tightly.

The baby's routines are simple and infinitely repeated. He is bathed in warm water every day, or sometimes every other day, depending in part on weather conditions. The cloths⁷ that serve as diapers are changed when the baby is bathed and usually one or more other times during the day. Frequency of changing varies greatly depending upon the relative restlessness of the baby and upon family habits. Navaho mothers ordinarily remove only the one cloth that is really soaked and fold the others in such a way that the child's skin comes into contact with dry materials only. In cold weather the diapers are warmed at the fire first. A cloth that has been soiled will merely be scraped free of fecal matter and then replaced in the cradle. Under such conditions it is not surprising that skin irritations are frequent. A reason frequently given for denying the baby freedom of hands and arms is to prevent it from scratching itself. (Another reason given is warmth.) Sometimes mittens are put on the baby's hands to

7. Before cloths were available mothers used cliff-rose bark which was rubbed together to make a kind of straw. This is still used to some extent to line a sheepskin or a cradle. It absorbs liquids well. After drying in the sun it appears to be practically odorless and is used again and again.

control scratching during the periods the baby is unwrapped. The baby's face may also be largely covered to prevent scratching.

The length of daily periods of being unwrapped during the first month average about two hours, but the range of variation is considerable. In no case did the infant have less than an hour (usually before and/or after the bath) to kick and squirm freely, but where members of the family had a good deal of free time or where the baby was ill or uneasy, this figure mounted to four or even five hours a day, usually in stretches of an hour to an hour and a half at a time.

In every case the baby gets a good deal of affectionate attention. He is, of course, fed and held by the mother. He is also held, touched, and talked to by the grandmother, aunts, father, older brothers and sisters, and indeed by all relatives who come and go in the hogan. The relative joggles the infant and smiles down at him or picks him up and sings a little or makes affectionate noises. All Navahos make a great fuss over babies who thus receive from the start a very great amount of attention and a great deal of facial stimulation by touch. Their faces are patted and their ears are plucked. Their limbs are also stroked when they are out of the cradle, but this occurs far less often.

According to the Navaho ideal, a child is nursed immediately it begins to cry. During the first month of life ideal and practice nearly coincide. Only occasionally is there any delay, as when the mother rouses slowly from sleep during the night or is outside the hogan for a few minutes or is busy with some task which cannot be put aside the instant the baby cries. The infant himself determines not merely when he wishes to suck but also when he is finished. The mother will not terminate nursing until he has ceased to show interest in the nipples. The willingness of a mother to feed her infant on his terms is doubtless increased by the fact that she is never more than a few feet from her child in and around her one-room shelter. She sits on the floor (there being no chairs), and the infant is easily pulled near her. Since the

mother wears only a loose blouse and no underwear the derangement of her clothes is negligible.

The old Navaho custom was to purge the baby before its first feeding by giving it a brew of the inner bark of juniper and pinyon which produced vomiting. We observed only three cases where this practice was followed. However, the associated custom of administering pollen suspended in water before allowing the baby to take milk was noted in fifty-six cases out of eighty. Navaho folklore says that pollen and water should be the baby's only nourishment for four days, but we saw no case where this was followed to the letter. In the great majority of instances the mother nursed the child within forty-eight hours. Often heated goat's milk or sheep's milk or canned milk and water were given in a bottle before the child received mother's milk. This was sometimes because the mother's milk was slow in coming freely, sometimes because Navahos generally distrust the colostrum which they pump out by hand.

Disregarding cases where the child was clearly ill or where the mother's milk supply was plainly deficient,⁸ the average number of times babies under one month nursed during the day was eight and a half (range: five to sixteen; mode: ten) and during the night two plus (range: one to six; mode: two). Average duration was seven and three-quarters minutes (range: two minutes to twenty-three). Breasts were regularly alternated either in the same feeding or in successive feedings, but it was customary for the child to suck from both breasts the very first time it nursed.

Until the mother is up and about, she nurses the baby lying down with the child lying beside her and turned toward her. Later the mother sits supporting the infant with one or both arms. The observer gets the impression that both mother and child are comfortable in position and relaxed. During the first

8. Broth or soup is fed in large amounts to mothers who lack sufficient milk. Plants, ground rocks, and other magical remedies are also rubbed on the breasts. Some informants stated that in cases of too much milk the husband would suck some, but we have never verified this by observation or recent eyewitness testimony.

month the baby usually nurses while swaddled tightly but about once out of every six times the clothes are loosened, or partially or wholly removed.

In only one case studied by us was the infant fed entirely by bottle, and this was when the mother died shortly after birth. In four cases there were supplementary feedings by bottle during the first month (and/or later) and in two cases, where the family had no bottle available, warm milk was squeezed into the mouth from a rag. Wide mouth bottles and red rubber nipples seem to be preferred (possibly because of their resemblance to the breast?). Babies fed by bottle are held on the lap with the face turned toward the mother's breast and the bottle held horizontally—probably to imitate the conditions of breast feeding as closely as possible. A little sugar and varying amounts of water are usually mixed with the goat's or sheep's or canned milk. The bottle is heated in a can of hot water kept on the fire. One family gave an infant a little orange juice every day.

The navel region is gently washed each day, and often a little grease is applied. When the cord dries, and the navel is completely healed, the cord is carefully buried in a propitious place. For a girl this may be under a weaving loom, so that she may become a good weaver. For a boy, a horse corral is an appropriate place. There is much other folk belief connected with the navel cord. For example, the Navaho say that, if the cord be kept in a sack in the hogan, the child will grow up to be a thief.

Twelve male babies whom it was possible to weigh within twelve hours of birth averaged a trifle over 7 pounds, and the heaviest weighed only 7 pounds, 5 ounces. Ten female babies averaged 6 pounds, 10 ounces. (There was no evidence that any child was premature.) A few weighings indicate that the familiar pattern of loss of weight after birth and gradual regaining obtains equally for the Navaho under the same nutritional conditions. For twenty-three babies measured within three days of birth the following are the average dimensions: length: 48.4

cm.; sitting height: 30.9 cm.; chest: 31.5 cm.; abdomen: 30.5 cm.; head circumference: 34 cm.

Tests in 1940 on twelve well infants eight and nine days old for the Moro Startle Response showed no Startle Responses lasting more than twenty-one seconds and only three lasting between ten and twenty-one. Tests on removing the nipple and general observation of the intensity and tempo of movement indicated that three or possibly four children belonged in the Moderately Active group and the remainder in the Quiet group, according to the standards developed by Margaret Fries on New York City children.⁹

MONTHS TWO AND THREE

After about four weeks the child is put onto a cradle board. Sometimes this occurs earlier—as soon as the cord has fallen off and the navel completely healed. The permanent cradle represents a considerable expenditure of labor and, since the cradle will be thrown away if the child dies in it, the family does not wish to risk putting the child into the cradle until the chances for its survival are good. Another factor is the mother's desire for movement. So long as the baby is shifted merely from one hut or windbreak to another nearby, the wrappings of cloth and sheepskin serve very well. But if the mother wishes to go to the trading store or to visit relatives she must take the baby with her on horseback or wagon and for this the protection of the permanent cradle is thought necessary. The same cradle may be used for a succession of brothers and sisters if all have lived, but the cradle is painted afresh with red ochre for each new occupant.

The permanent cradle is not made casually, although these days one sees a few for which boxes or store boards are used. The cradle is ordinarily made by the father from a pine tree which has not been struck by lightning nor badly broken by wind nor

9. Cf. Fries, M. E. and Lewi, B: *Interrelated Factors in Development*. *Amer. J. Orthopsych.*, 8, 1938, 727.

rubbed against by a bear. The tree should be tall and straight, likely to live for many years, and located in a secluded spot where the chances of its being cut down are not great. The bottom board or boards should be split off the east side of the pine. Before doing so the father sprinkles the tree with pollen and says a brief prayer.

The board proper contains one or more small holes in the lower part to allow for the drainage of urine. Sometimes this bottom is made of two boards tied together so as to form a trough-like cradle instead of a perfectly flat one. At the top is placed a narrow padded strip as a pillow. Over this is arched a wooden hood one-and-a-half to three inches wide which clears the child's forehead by some inches. To the bottom is lashed a foot-rest. There are varying sets of holes toward the bottom of the board so that the cradle can be lengthened as the baby grows taller.

Tassels of fringed buckskin in the upper corners of the cradle are seen less and less frequently today, but a turquoise setting or bead for a boy and a white shell for a girl are still prevalent forms of decoration. A squirrel tail is often fastened to the cradle because young squirrels fall without injury. Buckskin pouches with amulets and herbal medicines are also attached for magical protection. The pouches contain various plants and pollens, but one of the most common is pollen that has been shaken over the feathers of a nighthawk. This bird sits quietly on its nest all day long and is not easily alarmed by noises or movements. The Navaho feel therefore that pollen that has touched it will cause children to be contented during the daytime and to sleep soundly at night.

Within the cradle the baby is wrapped tightly in a number of cloths as he has been during the pre-cradle period. Sometimes the two legs are separated and each tightly encased. The child is strapped to the cradle by means of a lacing cord which is passed

in zigzag fashion between cloth or buckskin loops attached to the sides of the board and is finally fastened through a loop on the footboard. A cloth is attached to the top and, resting on the hood, can be lowered to cover the whole cradle and keep out light, flies, and cold (and probably oxygen as well). Except in the case (sometimes) of babies under six weeks or two months, the head is not strapped and the baby can freely move this part of its body.

The cradle is a strong focus of Navaho sentiments. A young man or woman will point proudly to one still hanging in their parents' hogan and say "That is the cradle in which I grew up." This pride from individual association is heightened by its mythological background. The first cradles were made for the Hero Twins, the sons of one of the principal Navaho divinities, Changing Woman. The earth gave the bottom boards; the hood was made from a rainbow, the foot-rests of sunbeams, the side loops were of sheet lightning and the lacings of zigzag lightning.

A soft and ample pad of cloths, cliff-rose bark, or folded blanket is placed back of the child's head to prevent undue flattening. This raised pad is in the form of a hollow triangle (open at the top side). It is supposed to keep the baby's neck straight and to make the neck grow long, but the main point is that the hollow within the pad allows the back of the head to get round. A very flat head is not admired, and a grown child will sometimes openly blame his mother for not taking precautions to prevent this. If the mother carries the cradled baby too much on horesback a flattened back of the head is believed to result.

The proportion of each day that the baby spends tightly laced in his cradle varies with his age and with the temperament and situation of the mother. If she has older children to assist her in household tasks, she is likely to keep the child out of the cradle for longer intervals than a mother who must do all the

work of the household as well as care for the baby. However, since healthy babies sleep most of the time in the early months and do not need to be removed from the cradle for nursing, they can be and often are left there most of the time except when they are bathed or when the cloths which serve as diapers are changed. However, if the mother does take the child out of the cradle for nursing, she usually holds it for ten to twenty minutes after it has finished, unless it has gone to sleep. Babies of two to three months average about two and three-quarters hours daily out of the cradle, but some have as much as five hours and others (on some days) as little as one. In addition to these times of full release from the cradle, the child's arms may be unpinioned for free movement two or three times a day for varying intervals—especially when the temperature is warm.

Children of this age nurse a little more frequently during the day than they did during the first month. The average number of times is eleven with a range from seven to twenty-five (in babies of average health). Duration of nursing does not differ significantly from the first month. They cry somewhat more frequently, but are likely to have to wait a little longer for a response. They are rocked more often as they get older and sleep less. A daily bath is not given quite as scrupulously as during the first month. The children are talked to in a somewhat more personal way as they come to recognize individuals and to respond.

All the elders make a great fuss over each succeeding event in motor development. This seems to follow the same general pattern as with white children. At least the ranges are about the same. The averages (especially for certain later developments such as walking) appear to be a bit later. All figures given in this paper on motor development are to be taken as rough approximations. There has not been time for the careful checking which has gone into other statistics, and a separate paper on this topic will be published later.

MONTHS FOUR TO TWELVE

From an objective point of view the features of this period are: more or less the ordinary course of human motor development, a greater proportion of time out of the cradle, gradually increasing ingestion of foods other than milk, accelerating frequency of nursing, and the growth of the symbolic significance of nursing.

Although tied to the cradle during part of their waking hours each day, Navaho children nevertheless get some chance to explore their bodies and other individuals with their hands, to move their limbs, to try out their muscular equipment in a variety of ways. Apparently this limited practice is sufficient because there seems to be comparatively little difference between Navaho and white children in the ages at which motor skills are developed though the relevant figures have not yet been fully analyzed. With both there is, of course, considerable individual variation.

The Navaho say that a child sits up when it has two teeth. The average of fifty-one cases for sitting with slight support is 4.2 months, of forty-eight cases it is 5.3 months for sitting alone. By five months or a little later children will also reach for and grasp things and put their feet in their mouths. As they acquire teeth they have the same need for things to chew on as do our children. Bones, beads, and other hard objects are freely given them. Thumb-sucking is very rare, and we have never observed "obsessive" thumb-sucking or a child asleep with its thumb in its mouth. When excited or disturbed, a child will not infrequently put the index or some other finger in its mouth. Occasionally the mother will put a baby's whole fist in its mouth to quiet it. Sometimes a mother will also pacify a small baby by putting her own finger in its mouth.

Scotting while sitting on the buttocks may start at seven months, but the average date is about seven and three-quarters. Creeping starts as early as eight months, but the average is

nearly ten. At eight to nine months most babies will stand when supported under the arms (two cases were observed at a little less than seven months), and some will raise themselves to a standing position. At about ten to twelve months they will walk when led, and the first independent steps usually come from two to six months later. These signs of development are aided and encouraged, but the child is under much less pressure to hurry up and walk than white children, and the Navaho mother counts it no disgrace that the child takes his time to grow up.

Of one feature of development the Navaho make a little ceremony. The first laugh is eagerly watched for. The person who sees it first must give a present to each other member of the family. When visitors come to the hogan it is polite for them to enquire "Has the baby laughed yet?" The ceremony consists in the mother's holding the baby's hands out straight while some member of the family (usually a brother or sister) puts a pinch of salt and bread and meat on each hand. Today store candy is sometimes used. The food is then immediately taken away—"so that the baby will learn not to be selfish." The father or mother then kills a sheep and distributes this to relatives along with a bit of salt for each piece. The Navaho say:

"If you don't do this to the baby, he won't feel very good, he won't be very healthy. If you do that, he'll be healthy from that day on. He will sit up right away and pretty soon he'll start talking without any trouble."

The hours spent in the cradle steadily diminish as the child grows older. Some families put the baby in the cradle relatively little after he is able to sit up—mainly for traveling and for protection at night. Other families take the onset of crawling or scooting as a signal for freeing the child from the cradle almost all of the day. But conservative Navaho opinion insists that the cradle is the normal place for the infant until he can walk independently. As one old-fashioned mother said:

"Babies are kept that way in the cradle to make them

straight and strong. Some women let their children lie on sheepskins and roll about, but they are always weak, sick children."

Children of six months average 4.2 hours daily out of the cradle, those of nine months 5.8, those of eleven months 9.3 (a good many children of this age are out of the cradle entirely). Younger children out of the cradle are held in the arms or lap of the mother or some other relative or are allowed to lie on a pile of skins or blankets to kick freely. Those who can scoot or crawl are permitted to move about on the floor of the hut for brief periods so long as someone is able to keep an eye on them so that they do not get too near the fire.

Especially from the time a baby is able to sit up, it is offered any and all foods available that can be eaten with its equipment of teeth. Bread dipped in broth or coffee, canned tomatoes, fruit, rice, cooked cereal, soft store cookies, and squash are usually among the first solid foods in a baby's experience. Bones, bits of pork rind, and pieces of meat to suck on are also commonly given the child from the time its teeth begin to appear. Gradually the child is taught to use a cup or bowl instead of a bottle—with weak, heavily sweetened coffee as the inducement. Squash, bits of potato, pieces of softened meat are fed with a spoon, and the child is encouraged to hold the spoon himself.

The Navaho formula continues to be: "Feed a child whenever it cries, day or night. Give it anything that the people it sees are eating if it will eat." Permitting a four-months old child to have as much coffee¹⁰ as it likes shocks most whites. Indeed the practice of letting a child eat whenever it cries seems to most whites bad for the child as well as inconvenient for the mother. But the psychological consequences are probably highly beneficial. Previous to a child's ability to state its wants verbally, others can

10. Since coffee and tea are boiled, they are from at least one point of view the best liquids (except mother's milk) which can be offered the child. It should also be noted that Navaho coffee is almost always very weak.

respond only to its crying or fidgeting. The important thing among the Navaho is that something is always done when the child manifests discomfort or demands attention in this way. It is now generally agreed that among all human beings many of the most deeply rooted aspects of a personality take their form in the first year of life. They are the more tenacious because they are un verbalized. These basic "unvoiced" attitudes grow in large part out of the interaction between the baby's manifestations of his wants and needs and the responses which surrounding individuals (and especially the mother) make to them.

To see what this means in this case, let us contrast certain typical experiences of the white child and of the Navaho child in the pre-verbal period. To the white child, whose feeding and other routines are rigidly scheduled, the mother or nurse or maid (and these are representatives for the entire world of other persons) must appear incalculable. He finds that there are rules of behavior which are above and beyond his needs or wishes. No matter how hard he cries he does not get his bottle until the clock says he should. It seems plausible that many children develop an unconscious conviction that each individual is, after all, alone in life. To the Navaho baby, on the other hand, other persons must appear warmer and more dependable, for every time he cries, something is done for him. If he grabs for a piece of bread he sees his sister eating, it or a similar piece is given him. Each step he takes toward social participation is rewarded. The easier tempo of Navaho life and the fact that the daily tasks of house-keeping are carried on mainly within a single room make it possible for parents and brothers and sisters to give much more constant encouragement to early attempts at creeping, walking, and talking. Few indeed are the moments of its waking hours when the child is alone or isolated from the social scene.

In spite of the gradually greater intake of solid food, there is a marked increase in frequency of nursing during this period. Children of six months average 20.4 contacts with the breast

daily (range: 13 to 42). Children of twelve months average 30.6, and this figure is lowered by the fact that four children out of fifty-six were practically weaned at this period (range: 2 to 87). In part this increase is undoubtedly due to the tendency for the mother's supply of milk to decrease. This is confirmed by the fact that the duration of nursing decreases markedly to an average of 5.2 minutes at ten months. The child approaching a year of age typically sucks only for a short time and presumably does not get much nourishment in any one attempt. Particularly if the mother is undernourished or in indifferent health, the baby will suck fiercely, struggle, and give other evidences of lack of complete satisfaction.

There is, however, considerable evidence that the increased frequency of nursing is also due to the fact that nursing has come to have secondary or symbolic values. The child gets attention, and often obtains freedom from its cradle-prison which gives it a chance to move freely and also possibly greater comfort when the cloth over its head is removed, releasing the child from a too moist air, body odors, and excess carbondioxide. By the time most children are nine months old it is also plain that they find libidinous pleasure in nursing and in handling the mother's breast.

TODDLERS

The child who can walk alone has completely abandoned the cradle, although usually this has been quit (at least for the daytime when not traveling) a little earlier. Certain routines change. The bath, for example, is seldom given more than once a week with a yucca suds shampoo of the hair perhaps once in two weeks. The toddler now runs about exploring his world. He grabs cats and dogs who are so unwary as to permit themselves to be caught. Parents or other elders seldom discourage a child's cruelties to animals. They will often join in the laughter of the other children at a dog's yelp when it is kicked or has its tail

pulled by a baby. Even special tortures such as running a needle and thread through a kitten's ear are tolerated.

The child runs from person to person and is petted by each in turn or consoled if it has met with some small accident. The father will take a toddler who wakes fretful from a nap in the heat and soothe him in his arms. Any older person rushes to the child when he screams after a fall or a slight burn or an ant bite. At the same time the Navaho method is generally to let learning occur through such minor injuries but not to rub the lesson in by further punishment. After the safety of the cradle is gone, the child's principal protection is the presence of elders. But their backs must sometimes be turned, and children learn the realities of fires, knives, and sharp claws through experience. Navahos spend comparatively little time in verbal warnings, in imaginatively enlarging upon such dangers and their consequences and making generalizations. White practice perhaps tends to make some children unduly fearful and dependent. Navaho practice tends to make children better able to look after themselves, as far as the external world is concerned.

Almost all training in the first two or three years of life is delayed, gradual, and gentle. The positive side of child training in this period is mainly a matter of constant encouragement in the acquisition of language and of other skills. Someone is always talking to the baby, giving him words to imitate, telling him especially the proper kinship terms with which to address his various relatives, praising him whenever his random babblings happen to hit a meaningful sound combination or when his imitations are understandable.

Training in the strict Navaho taboo on exposure of the genitals also starts about this time. Relatives are forever snatching down the skirts of little girls and admonishing them not to expose themselves. Older children are held responsible for toddlers in this respect:

"The father spoke sharply to the four-year old when her

baby sister exposed herself to view in 'hitching', and the four year old pulled down her skirt for her. The baby has glorious disregard for such things still."

Less attention is paid to little boys in this respect at present, for until they have fully learned sphincter control they are dressed in pants that are open through the crotch. This slit makes constant exposure of their genitals inevitable (and also makes it possible for the observer to note erections during nursing and at other times).

Except for these restrictions as to modesty, the Navaho take sexuality from the very beginning of life as natural and permitted. They do not interfere with the toddler's exploration of the genital region or with so-called "infantile masturbation". Not only is no attention paid when children manipulate their own genitals, but the mother herself may stroke the naked genitals of a nursing child with her hand. Children not only use their hands freely but also rub themselves against brooms and sticks and indulge in other forms of auto-erotic experiment. This acceptance of erotic pleasure from infancy on may be the central explanation of the fact that impotence in men and frigidity in women appears to be excessively rare among adults.

No fuss is made about food or sleep. The child sleeps when and where he chooses. He eats (of what is available) what he pleases and when. "The baby knows what is best for him", Navahos say. Some of all the dishes prepared for the rest of the family are offered the baby, but none are forced upon him. When the family buy sweets or soda pop at the trading store, the youngest gets as much as he will take—or at least his fair share and usually more.

The youngest child is definitely the kingpin of the household. After he can walk he tends to get progressively less of his mother's undivided attention, it is true. His mother will tell an older child to amuse him, and toddlers are bounced, carried around on the hip, and entertained in every conceivable way by

elder siblings, especially sisters. The following sample observational record suggests the extent to which the baby of the family monopolizes the time and interest of others:

- 2:44 J. (twenty-year old sister) comes from the hut with Johnny (16 months).
- 2:51 J. feeds Johnny some orange juice. She calls L. (sister in her teens) who brings some bread. J. feeds Johnny. L. returns to hut.
- 3:04 J. takes Johnny into hut.
- 3:14 L. comes out the door with Johnny. Starts to help him walk. He cries and she carries him inside. He stops crying.
- 3:34 Johnny cries. L. sits up. Talks to him.
- 3:35 D. (another sister in her teens) walks into hut Johnny cries again. D. comes out of hut. L. talks to him. Carries Johnny into hut.
- 3:40 L. comes out, sits down with Johnny.
- 3:41 J. speaks to her. She takes Johnny in again.
- 4:44 J. comes out with Johnny all washed.
- 4:47 Ki (brother of four) comes out and talks to Johnny. Plays with Johnny.
- 4:49 Johnny stands up, J. holding, and holds on to Ki's hand who is sitting in front.
- 4:50 Johnny and Ki laugh. Johnny plays with Ki's nose. Ki leaves.
- 4:53 Dan (brother of nearly three) comes to Johnny. He is washed too. Plays with Johnny.
- 4:55 Johnny whimpers. Dan into cardboard with knife to amuse him.
- 4:58 Johnny still whimpers. J. takes him into hut.
- 5:04 J., Johnny, and Ki come out. All go around other side.
- 5:05 All come back. J. and Johnny walk into hut.
- 5:06 J. comes out and sits down and calls Ki. Ki goes and plays with Johnny.
- 5:09 Ki comes out. Sits beside J. and Johnny in front of hut.
- 5:10 Ki gives J. cup of water. J. feeds Johnny.

- 5:11 J. speaks to Ki who takes cup in. J. speaks to Dan who brings bottle of soda pop. J. feeds Johnny.
5:12 Ki brings cup.
5:13 J. feeds Johnny and self. Dan drinks last drops of soda.
5:14 J. plays with Johnny. Lets him walk but holds on. Imitates mourning dove (which sings in distance) many times.
5:16 Johnny throws cup on ground.
5:24 Ki goes back in hut. Helps Johnny walk out. Talks to him. Walks to log.
5:26 L. goes behind hut with Johnny.
5:30 L. comes out of hut with Johnny. Sits by hut door.
5:31 J. comes out and sits too. Talks to Johnny.

According to psychoanalytic conceptions, the Navaho infant has exceptionally favorable opportunities for developing a secure and confident adult personality. Apart from sickness (which is of course responded to), there appear to be only two slight liabilities in the pre-weaning period. Teasing of children of nine months or a year and over is not infrequent—even by the mother. Sometimes it takes mildly sadistic forms, as when a child reaches for the cigarette the mother is smoking and she holds the burning end toward him. There are also delays in the response to crying, even of pre-verbal children. A child of seven or eight months may cry fifteen or twenty minutes during the day before a busy mother picks him up. During the night sometimes soundly sleeping parents are very slow to rouse.

But there is no sudden and harsh attempt to compel the child to control his eliminative activities. Older persons are almost always quite tolerant of displays of aggression (even blows with sticks and other objects) and temper tantrums. When a toddler has something taken from him or fails to get what he wants, he will scream, arch his back, brace himself, hold his breath, and be quite inconsolable until his elders give in (which they do more often than not) or somehow distract him. If a child holds his

breath so long that it begins to get stiff, cold water will be thrown in its face.

White observers often comment that Navahos "spoil" their younger children. They do *indulge* them, but they seldom "spoil" them in the original sense of the word, i. e. to deform or ruin the character. The "spoiled" child is the one who is petted one moment and neglected or beaten the next—regardless of his behavior. The Navaho toddler is given self-confidence by being made to feel that he is constantly loved and valued. Navahos sometimes comment that they spoil the last baby in a family, but here again this must be translated to mean "indulge even more than earlier children".

Nor is it true that Navaho children experience no restrictions. Whites who go into a Navaho hut and see a crawler put into its mouth a lump of dirt from the floor or a cup which the dog has just licked, or see a four-year old sticking a nail through a cat's ear, are likely to get the impression that the words "No" and "Don't" are never used to Navaho children. This is far from being the case. *T'adoo* (equivalent to "stop that") is one of the most frequently heard words where small children are present. Probably there are *fewer* "don't's" than among whites. This is partly because there are fewer prohibitions put upon biological impulses, partly because Navaho life is simpler and there are fewer objects that a child can destroy or be harmed by, and partly because there are no taboos on "dirt" or "germs". On the other hand, the number of "superstitious" taboos which are enforced upon the child are much more numerous. In other words, the number of interferences and prohibitions to the child's activity in the form "I don't want you to do that" is relatively small, but the number in the form "Such and such will happen to you if you do that" is fairly high. If parents are not ultimately responsible for denials and restrictions, then it is no use for a child to try to coax or cajole them. One hears many straightforward requests and even

demands from children to their elders but little wheedling; plenty of crying but comparatively little whining.

Let us now turn from a chronological review to a topical treatment which will include data on children of two years and more of age (all unweaned and recently weaned children).

THE BABY AND THE CRADLE

During many hours of the day and all of the night, the cradle baby's bodily movements are sharply restricted by the cradle. Its position is varied from the horizontal to the upright, but the baby cannot move much of its own volition. There is, however, a certain uniformity of environment when the baby is moved from one place to another—regardless of who does the moving. It is also to be noted that the entire body as an extended unit receives the impact when the child is rocked or moved.

The infant's sensory contacts are also limited by the cradle. It can see well—more than most white babies when its cradle is upright—and of course its hearing and sense of smell are not interfered with. Perhaps the greatest limitation is on the sense of touch. During the many times that the child is moved each day, the hands of the mover do not ordinarily come into direct contact with the child's body, for they grasp the cradle instead. The face, lips, and hands of elders often touch the child's face, and the hands and arms receive a fair amount of direct contact, but its legs and torso are handled only during the brief intervals off the cradleboard. In turn the child has limited opportunity to explore its own body for its arms are pinioned or, when free, cannot gain access to the swathed body.

Thus the infant may experience a fairly full range of sensory impressions through sight, taste, smell, and hearing and a very limited range of tactile impressions. But, when it is capable of moving its body in response to the stimulation from its environment, it is more often than not prevented from doing so by the cradle. The cradle also restricts the baby's response to internal

stimuli, such as anger, hunger, or pain. He cannot kick or wriggle about. He can only cry or refuse to suck or swallow or breathe.

Perhaps this frustration of desire for bodily movement may not be so great as might be expected, for the desire may be extinguished after repeated frustrations. Perhaps, too, such frustration is no more detrimental to the baby than that which results from the painful outcome of freer motor activity, such as picking up a hot coal or being stepped on or scolded for getting in the way of others.

Certain aspects of cradling have obvious survival advantages. The cradle board and the thick swaddling provide a measure of protection against harmful insects and snakes. The heavy canopy, which may be raised or lowered slightly, guards the child's eyes against the direct rays of the bright sun out of doors, and if, when the mother is traveling on horseback with her baby, the horse should buck or shy or fall and the baby be dropped, the hood provides excellent insurance against head injury. After the child has begun to creep, it can be put in the cradle to protect it from getting too close to the fire during occasional moments when all other persons may be out of the hut. In a crowded dwelling where toddlers and older children may be scuffling about, the baby is probably safer in his cradle than on a sheepskin on the floor as the other children sleep.

The cradle is often placed in an upright position after the child has been nursed. White pediatricians have suggested that this habit may help the baby in digesting his food much as being held upright helps the white baby to "bubble". Margaret Fries also suggests that the custom of propping the cradled child in an upright position before he can crawl or even sit may facilitate walking. She points out that the apparatus of balance and vision are then on the same plane as when the child is walking. His legs are kept constantly extended with feet flexed against the foot-board in the position for standing.

In addition, there appear to be important psychological ad-

vantages to cradling. Birth must be an unpleasant experience to the child. In addition to the violence of the birth process, the warmth and complete security of the womb are exchanged for the irregularities of food, alterations of temperature, and other unpredictables of the external world. The abruptness of this transition tends to be cushioned by the cradle—even the tight wrappings of the first temporary cradle. The cradle, like the womb, is a place where movement is restricted, where support is always present, and where changes resulting from movement or from temperature fluctuations are minimized in their effect.

Likewise, the cradle permits babies, who could not otherwise sit up unaided, to assume for long periods a position other than that of lying down, out of touch with what is going on around them. When the weather is warm or mild, and the family is lounging or eating under the trees outside, for instance, the cradle is ordinarily propped against a tree. This means that the child's face and eyes are on about the same level as those of the adults who are sitting near him. In this, as in several other ways, the Navaho child from the very beginning is part of the total society rather than being isolated or segregated from it, "just a baby", as in white families.

Furthermore, at no time is the cradled infant able to interfere physically with the mother or with whatever she is doing. Regardless of her moods, she has little excuse to vent them on him, and the infant has little chance to annoy her. This eliminates a countless number of frustrations from the child and reduces his conflict with the arbitrary emotions of his mother.

One judge of the merits of cradling is the baby itself. We have frequently observed babies crying both to be released from the cradle and to be put back into it. The former predominates with children of six months and more. There is evidence that with younger children the protection (or habit?) of the cradle has a strong appeal especially when the child is sleepy. Many children have difficulty in becoming accustomed to sleeping out-

side the cradle. During wakeful hours, however, children of six months and older apparently begin to feel the confinement as frustration and will wail to be released or at being put back into the cradle. The average age at which the cradle is hung up and no longer used *at all* is 11.6 months (range 8 to 15½ months).

These considerations suggest some reflections upon the behavior of certain physicians, missionaries, teachers, nurses, and other well-intentioned whites who, in their zeal to see the Navaho adopt white habits in their entirety and discard their own backward ways, urge Navaho mothers to "give up those savage cradles and use cribs like civilized folks". It must never be forgotten that any people's way of life represents their set of solutions to recurrent problems, solutions that they have slowly worked out because of their own special historic experiences and the peculiar conditions of life which they have had to meet.

A coherent culture represents a very delicate adjustment between people and environment which has been arrived at by countless generations of trial and error. If it be thoughtlessly and indiscriminately interfered with, the disruption and the loss to human happiness and human safety may sometimes be incalculable. The use of the cradle board—*under the circumstances of Navaho life*—is an excellent example of this point.

NURSING

Some details of nursing behavior have already been presented. It remains to note certain variations and to trace the development of secondary functions of the act of nursing.

If the mother is unusually weak or ill after parturition, the baby will be held in place for nursing by some other woman or even by the father. Or the mother, instead of holding the child in her arms, will place it or have it placed by her side and she will turn toward it.

Whether or not the child is taken out of the cradle for nursing depends upon the immediate situation and the mother's

personal preference, but the tendency is for older babies to be removed considerably more frequently than younger ones. If the child is kept in the cradle, a common practice is to lay the board across the lap and let the child turn its head to nurse. When the child is free, it commonly lies on the mother's lap supported by her arm. Older nurslings may suckle standing in front of a kneeling or sitting mother. For young infants the mother will often hold the nipple in position between her fingers. Later she will merely pull up her blouse and put her hand against the child's back. Crawling children will often go up to the mother and mouth the front of her blouse. Walking children frequently raise the mother's blouse themselves.

Babies under six months often urinate or defecate while nursing, and this not infrequently occurs with older children as well. These occurrences are accepted as a matter of course until the child talks or at least responds to words. At most the mother will interrupt the nursing briefly in order to clean her clothes or protect herself with additional dry cloths.

Sometimes the mother sits in apparent passive indifference, but frequently she is active during nursing. She will clean the child's nose or groom its hair or gently tickle its abdomen if the child is out of the cradle. We have observed a good many cases, especially where the children were six months or more of age, where the mother's hand or arm is between the child's legs. Occasional gentle manipulation of the genitals of boys has been observed. Some mothers tickle the buttocks of a nursing child.

Children are very commonly put to sleep by nursing. In this case the mother will often lie on one side facing the child and will gently pat him as he nurses. She remains beside him until he falls asleep. Nursing is also used as a means of distracting a child from some activity regarded as dangerous or improper. If a knife, for example, be taken from a baby who then howls, the mother will present her breast as a means of making him forget the deprivation.

Although in far the greater number of instances, the child takes the initiative in being fed, some mothers fairly frequently put a child to the breast without its crying or fussing or in any way indicating hunger. Sometimes this will be done six or seven times within two or three hours. The only occasions on which we have observed children wakened to nurse were at night just before the family was about to retire, and the Navahos explained this as a precaution against the child's waking up hungry within a short time.

With older children, and particularly with those who walk, nursing is obviously a symbol of right of access to the mother and indeed of possession of her. Often a child will be playing contentedly during a mother's brief absence and will have refused foods eaten with relish when hungry, but will cry and seek the breast briefly immediately on the mother's reappearance. Likewise, a baby who has just been well fed will rush back to the mother's breast if an older child is getting her concentrated attention at the moment. A number of observers have independently commented on the greater tendency of children to cry when their mother was in sight.

The erotic manifestations accompanying nursing are particularly plain with children past a year and a half. There is also no doubt whatsoever that this is seen more often with boys than with girls. The following extracts from field notes of four different observers report nursing behavior (not always demonstrably "erotic") typical of older boys:

"Tony (a boy of twenty-six months) kept fighting for her breast, and half stood up on his feet, bending across her knees to nurse and at the same time manipulating his genitals with one hand and wiggling in a decidedly passionate manner. Presently he fell asleep and she held him on her lap. He woke at intervals and nursed more quietly, lying on her lap while she stroked his hair. Just before we left, he was lying on his back in her lap, when he began wiggling and

fighting for her breast again, and had a prolonged erection. His mother, noticing it, played with him and stroked his penis as he nursed. If she left off, he continued by himself. He seemed very pleased and even left off nursing once to smile at all about him. Finally he relaxed and crawled away, his sister playing with him for a while, and then his brother tussling with him."

"At 9:12 Jake (a boy of two and a half) nursed for four minutes. As he nursed, his mother patted him on the head, fondled his hair, and also patted his lower leg. He nursed greedily and noisily, giving vent to pants of ecstasy. He nursed first on the left breast. While doing this, he fondled the right breast and pulled out the nipple. Then he nursed briefly on the right breast. Now—five minutes later—he is going after the left breast again. His mother at first makes a gesture of protest, then lets him have it. But he sticks at it less than a minute. Two minutes later he is back at it again.

"Having played with each breast again for a few minutes, Jake now dawdles in his mother's lap—is tickled by her and laughs rather hysterically. At 9:45 his mother is lying down. Jake tries to get breast, but she won't have it at first and sits up. He says: 'My mother is stingy.' He cries and whines. After a couple of minutes, she gives him first the left breast. Then he takes the right. She grooms his head briefly as he nurses.

"Between 10:00 and 10:40 Jake was eating constantly: orange, tomato, bread, meat. He sat near his mother and touched her several times. Once she kissed him passionately on the mouth.

"10:40 Jake nurses at both breasts again (three minutes).

"11:00 Jake starts nursing again—left breast for five minutes, right for five. He fondled her breasts as before. Once he appeared to bite a little. When he finished nursing, his mother was asleep. He asked his sister petulantly where his youngest aunt was—shouted the question finally. Then he ran off to find her.

"11:30. Jake returned to nurse the left breast again. At first rather fiercely and greedily with twistings and turnings

of his body. Then more quietly. Meanwhile his hand very gently embraced the right breast—part of the time actively fondling it, part of the time patting it and moving his hand over the top. His mother appears to sleep the while.

"11:42. Now he himself appears to be practically asleep, although occasionally I still hear a rather violent suction. He is lying facing her with his left leg up over her legs. Only at 11:46 did he finally stop occasionally sucking and really go to sleep with his mouth on the breast.

"11:49 one final suck and partial erection—then turns away from his mother and really sleeps.

"12:25 Jake is sucking and playing with the left breast again.

"2:30 Jake again observed after his mother's breasts."

"Willee (a boy of thirty-four months): It wasn't long before he was nursing his mother, and he repeated this rather often—it seemed whenever he couldn't think of anything else to do. When nursing this boy would butt at his mother with his head like a lamb, dig his toes into the ground and push."

"Johnny (a boy of past four) by his mother. After supper cuddles very close to her, sitting on her lap, right hand several times playing with her breast, looks up at her, plays with her necklace then with her breast again. No aggressive behavior. Mother doesn't react to all action, takes for granted with same pleased expression on her face the whole of Johnny's behavior."

The following descriptions of girls of about the same age nursing present, in their quietness, absence of violence or overt eroticism, a contrast which is fairly standard:

"Hanaba (a girl of twenty-nine months) nestled comfortably in her mother's arms and very familiarly lifted up first one side of the blouse and then the other and took a suck or two. Apparently she didn't get much, for she quit promptly—but without whimpering or anything. She did not push her mother's breasts and her whole behavior was very gentle."

"Danazba (a girl of thirty-one months) gained access to her mother's breasts five times in this three hour period. Each time she begged very shyly, pleadingly, sometimes with softly murmured words I could not hear—sometimes just with motions. She nursed quietly and shyly. There was almost no noise. She supported the breast she was taking with one or both hands but did not caress them. Her mother patted her head from time to time during the process. The child sometimes stood or half stood and half kneeled and sometimes half sat, half lay on her mother's lap."

WEANING

Except for ill health, occasional teasing, occasional refusals of the breast to older children, and some delays in response to crying, the Navaho child's troubles may be said to begin only at the weaning period. Weaning, however, is late and it is almost always gradual. Often, and especially in cases where the next baby does not come for several years or not at all, the child may be said to wean itself. As its taste for other types of nourishment increases, as the mother's milk supply decreases, and as greater activity takes it away from the mother more, the child's dependence on nursing gradually diminishes. But so long as there is no rival younger sibling the youngster still has almost free access to its mother's breast. It is very common indeed to see children two years old (and those of three and even four are by no means exceptional) continue to suckle. Apparently they frequently get little or no milk. The Navaho themselves recognize this, saying "he just likes to suck".

Navaho theory and practice on the subject of forced weaning show sharp disagreements. Some informants maintain that it is bad for a child who walks and who has a set of teeth to continue nursing. "It sure makes the mother poor." In some families relatives begin to make fun of children past two if they persist in nursing, and many children will eventually stop under this slight pressure, but sometimes it is unavailing. The following notes on

a child at the ages of one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half are given at some length because of their intrinsic interest on several points beside the failure of family pressure to stop nursing:

(1940) "The father, undressed as the patient in a curing ceremonial, plays with Pressley. Pressley feels him all over, plays with his nipples, and pulls out some hairs on them. Much laughter by onlookers. Then the father leans toward the child and holds one nipple between first and second fingers as a nursing woman would do. Pressley refuses to take the bait and all laugh.

"Pressley nurses from his mother constantly—when he is tired, angry, thirsty, and the like, and it quiets him. He is very coy about it sometimes, playing games with his mother, teasing her by pulling out her breasts and then refusing to nurse—or just playing with them. He sometimes nurses standing while his mother kneels. . . . Pressley is never refused any whim. He cries and fights to get what he wants, but if not crossed is very sweet-tempered and cute."

(1941) "Still nurses whenever the spirit moves him, though attempts to discourage him are made. Mother's sister says "dirty, dirty" to him when he nurses. His father calls him a baby. Pressley looks sheepish but goes right ahead usually. Sometimes his mother refuses him bluntly and goes away out of the house. He soon forgets, after weeping a bit. On one occasion it was announced that the reason the mother was left at home on a trip and Pressley was taken was so he would get over wanting to nurse her. However, as soon as he returned in the evening the first thing he did was to have a drink. He still likes to play games with his mother about the matter." (Observations by Flora Bailey in the Pinedale, New Mexico, area).

Other families say: "A child has a right to nurse as long as it wants to." The average age of weaning (defined as complete cessation of recourse to the mother's breast) for sixty-three children was two years, four months (range: eight months to four years, five months). The average age for thirty-two girls was two years, one month; for thirty-one boys two years, seven months.

Crying is responded to with less and less immediacy and less fully tolerated. A weaned child who gets in the mother's way may be rather roughly jerked aside. Comforting comes more from siblings, the father, and other relatives and less from the mother. Moreover, the mother starts to make demands on the weaned youngster. Performance of simple chores, such as bringing in sticks of wood for the fire or snow to be melted for water, comes to be expected. Neglect of these, or getting into mischief, will bring a harsh scolding or a cuff and, a little later, a mild switching. Performance also brings praise and group acceptance—i.e., the situation is not all pressure but also achievement.

When another baby is born, weaning means really sudden and complete dispossession at the hands of a rival. It means that the weaned child comes into the almost complete charge of an older sibling, grandmother, or some other relative who is likely to impose more restrictions than the mother ever did and who does not offer the compensation of nursing. That Navahos themselves recognize such displacement as a cause of discomfort to the child is shown by a good deal of folklore:

"It's easy to wean babies. The child knows a new baby is coming—he can tell from the taste of the milk, and so he doesn't like it any more . . . A woman who is expecting a new baby mustn't go into a corn field with her youngest child. This is because only happy people with nice thoughts should go there or the corn wouldn't ripen right. A child is always mean and fussy before its younger brother or sister comes."

Children who have recently been weaned seem to find the sight of the new baby at the mother's breast a disturbing experience. They will commonly run over to the mother on every such occasion and try to get her to pet them or show some affection. But she will often cuff them away, and this experience is also new and highly upsetting. The following field note is typical, save for the display of overt aggression toward the baby:

"The two daughters stayed most of the time I watched pretty close to their parents . . . The baby had started to climb up on the crate which had become pretty rickety. First her mother snatched her off, which made her howl then sat her on it at which she looked frightened, and howled again. She played around it quite a while but didn't try to climb on it again. She took great pleasure in banging with a slat that was loose at one end . . . The elder sister pulled loose nails out of the crate . . . The baby played with the nails removed. The four-year old took one from the baby which made the baby cry and was snatched from the four-year old and given to the baby. This made the four-year old bawl and she seemed quite mad at her mother, going over and slapping her. After that I noticed that about every time her mother paid much attention to the baby, nursing it or cuddling it, Nazbali would stop what she was doing and come for a petting too. When the baby nursed she would push her away rather roughly. Generally at such scenes her father would speak to her and she would go over and curl up near him, sometimes in tears."

Perhaps the upset is aggravated by being continually cautioned not to step on the new baby, not to scuff dust in its face, and so forth. The baby is always the king in every family, but each king—except the very last child in the series—must come to know the meaning of dethronement.

It is interesting and significant, however, that display of open hostility toward the dethroning rival is exceedingly rare. On the contrary, the new baby is outwardly accepted and cherished. If it is crying and the mother or an older sibling does not seem to be doing their best to comfort it, the newly weaned child will strike them. If the displaced child is old enough, he or she will apparently make every effort to act as the No. 2 mother for the baby. In other ways weaned children outwardly appear to "grow up" rapidly once the new baby actually arrives. In spite of not infrequent tantrums they appear less "bratty". Aggression is discharged in the form of temper tantrums and in blows and

verbal abuse directed against the mother and, more frequently, the older children. Many children appear to feel particularly aggrieved when a brother or sister who is carrying them puts them down.

Boys find weaning a more upsetting experience than do girls. At least their temper tantrums are more frequent, more sustained, more intense. They bite and slap other people, kick, scream, hold their breath. Boys have, of course, generally been weaned later and they have nursed, on the average, more often each day. Perhaps the best guess as to an explanation is the greater erotic significance of nursing for Navaho boys (or a higher energy level—more active in general? Perhaps both?). As has been pointed out, mothers stroke the genitals of boy nurslings, and the active, passionate manipulation of the mother's breast during the later years of nursing is almost exclusively characteristic of boys.

Children who happen to be the last in the family, or whose following brother or sister dies very soon after birth leaving them the youngest again, undergo life experiences in this period that are different in important respects from those of the average child. Preliminary analyses of materials indicate, in fact, that adult Navahos who were biologically or psychologically "last-born" tend to have a personality structure that differs considerably from that of other Navaho. They tend to be more stable, more secure, less suspicious, generally "happier". It must be realized that the number who are psychologically last-born is considerable, for the infant mortality rate is very high. It is also interesting to note that when a new baby dies the weaned child often reverts to psychological babyhood in various ways: loss of sphincter control that had been achieved, retardation of talking, reversion to nursing.

In general, however, at the weaning period the Navaho child comes to learn effectively that the world around him makes demands, imposes restrictions, and gives punishments, as well as supplying reassurances and rewards. Although the Navaho con-

tinue to allow great latitude with respect to activities that are severely regulated by white parents (such as eating and sleeping), the weaned child must face keenly-felt deprivations. Latterly he has been accustomed to nurse as much for comfort or libidinal pleasure as for nourishment. Now this solace is denied him even when he is tired, cross, or frightened. No longer is everything done for him with hardly any effort on his part; instead he must learn to feed, wash, and dress himself. To be sure, these activities do not have the same significance for Navaho children as for whites. The etiquette of eating is simple, to say the least. Washing is a matter of hands and face and an occasional yucca suds shampoo of the hair. Except for removing and putting on shoes, dressing takes place more nearly weekly than daily. Nevertheless, life must have a very different quality for the nursing than for the weaned child. Upon the nursing child the only restrictions imposed are those which the cradle places upon movement, and even this restriction usually is terminated while the child still nurses. No longer are almost all his responses rewarded, no longer does his mother devote herself mainly to his comfort and pleasure. The mother averages only about an hour a day out of sight of the nine months old child but nearly three away from the eighteen-months old baby. After the child really begins to talk, he finds that all responses and rewards are made much more selectively by his elders—he has to do the right thing for attention and praise. Sometimes crying is responded to only by placing the child on a water barrel or elsewhere in isolation until it stops.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the number of older persons who are available to respond to the child is unusually large. One of the most common sights in an extended Navaho family is that of a toddler (especially one who has been recently weaned and feels himself rejected by his mother) running from one woman in the group to another and receiving some sign of affection from each.

If the initial experiences with the mother have been good

(which is usually the case), it seems to be one or more of the older brothers and sisters who bears the brunt of the hostility generated at the period of weaning. Expression of hostility toward the new baby would be an unforgivable sin in a society where children are so highly valued. Conscious or unconscious rejection of a child by the mother seems very rare; reciprocally, hatred for a mother—even at the unconscious level—is seldom manifested, except in excessively disguised form—at most a certain measure of ambivalence about the maternal image is evidenced in dreams and folklore. But the freshly weaned child and the older sister (or brother) who has the care of him and bears much of the disciplinary responsibility for him take out a good deal on each other. It is interesting to note that the standard chant tale—which is centered on the drama of the unhappy or disobedient child—does not make any provision for vengeance on either parent. Pets also supply an outlet. Certainly the younger child (whose whole expectations have been unhinged by weaning) deflects most of its “meanness” onto one or more older brothers and sisters—especially the one who has him in charge. The older children, in turn, appear sometimes to displace against “run-about” youngsters some of the animosity which they repressed when a baby actually dethroned them.

Little hostility appears to be generated against the father during this early period. He is usually out of the child's sight a great part of the time, and when he is present his role is very positive: he seldom disciplines and he pets and comforts (especially the child recently displaced by weaning). He cannot give the reward of nursing, but he does supply candy and other food tidbits. He also will often hold the baby while the mother is cooking or engaged in some other urgent task, particularly when an older sister of the baby is not available. (There has not been space in this paper to consider the father's part in detail. For the cradled baby this part seems to be relatively small. Even with toddlers the fact that grown men sit on one side of the hut and

women and young children on another diminishes the father's interactions with the younger children.)

TOILET TRAINING

Not until he can talk and understand is pressure put on a child to learn Navaho conventions of excretion. If a child who can walk and talk (or at least respond to speech) starts to urinate inside the hut, he is told to go outside to do this, and an older child will gently lead him out. At first elimination is permitted just outside the door; later the child is expected to go away into the bushes or behind a rock ledge. For a long time he is not punished for lapses or accidents but encouraged to act like his elders. Before going to sleep at night, he is taken out and is also advised not to eat or drink much for some time before going to bed. No special "baby words" are used with children in referring to urine or feces.

In only two families where there had been a relatively large amount of white influence were serious demands for bladder and bowel control made before the child was about two. After this age lapses are frequent, partly because of the prevalence of diarrhea among children. Few children indeed cease to wet or soil themselves a good many times a week before they are five. Indeed when the Day School was established in 1942 the teacher commented insistently that the six and seven year olds "hadn't really passed the baby stage yet".

Navaho clothing for children is such that "accidents" seldom render the garments completely unfit for further wear without washing. Neither sex ordinarily wears underwear. Little girls squat within the hut and by pulling their skirts out a bit may urinate without wetting their clothes. The split trousers of boys have been mentioned. No cases have been observed of a child's playing with its own excreta.

Children of both sexes are often observed watching with apparent interest and perhaps pleasure the stream of urine. Little

girls who urinate outside the hut ordinarily pull up the front part of their dresses, perhaps to protect the garments, possibly so they can see the stream. The stringent restrictions on exposure of the genitals do not begin to be enforced until the child is seven or eight or older.

It is important to realize that bowel control is not expected of the Navaho child until he is old enough to direct his own movements and merely accompany an elder at night and in the morning. The mother or an older sister takes the child out in the morning when she herself goes to defecate and tells the little one to imitate her position and her actions. This experience seems in general to be a pleasant one for the youngster, but there is one feature that may well be of considerable importance in shaping the child's view of the world. Conservative Navahos are careful to cover up their feces and urine so that they cannot be gathered by a witch and used against them.¹¹ The child must notice a certain uneasiness which his elders manifest in their scrupulous concealment of the waste matter. The mother, for example, is now revealed not as omnipotent but as herself anxious or afraid. This experience has another aspect which may be of some importance. In white society children appear to learn bodily cleanliness primarily to please the parents and thus gain approval, affection, and other rewards from them. Perhaps the Navaho child gets a sense that this hygiene is a form of *self-protection*. If so, the consequences for character formation which psychoanalysis has claimed for these disciplines must be quite different among the Navaho.

After a time, the youngster who continues to wet or soil himself is teased or scolded by his relatives. In some families the buttocks of older children are slapped though ordinarily Navaho children are switched on the legs, not on the buttocks. Even babies of under two who urinate or defecate within the hogan will be observed to have a slightly guilty look. Some chil-

11. See Kluckhohn, C. *Navaho Witchcraft*, *op. cit*

dren who are about to perform give an advance signal (such as a hand on the buttocks) which is recognized by the family, and they are hurriedly taken outside.

There is none of the obsessive daily questioning as to whether a bowel movement has occurred which is so marked a feature of recent American life. The Navaho mother pays no attention unless there is evidence of illness. We have never heard a Navaho mother say "Go move your bowels for me"—or anything of remotely this sort. Too frequent movements are noted and interpreted as evidence of diarrhea. In this case fruits may be withheld or folk remedies or white medicine employed. The child's excreta are not systematically examined by an elder.

Little feeling of disgust for urine or feces is inculcated. There is no exaggerated emphasis upon the unpleasantness of odors or consistency of excreta. A little girl of four will scrape out the diapers of her young brother in a perfectly matter of fact manner. Indeed, once a diaper is dry, she may use it for a head covering. Feces within the hogan are usually covered with sand or dirt and carried out in a shovel, but they may also be scraped into the firepit or under a stove. Adults do avoid stepping in urine or excreta, but their behavior conveys the notion that these materials are merely mildly unpleasant—not disgusting and certainly not shameful. When a baby urinates or defecates in someone's lap (which frequently occurs) the event is taken very calmly. Children are not thoroughly washed each time, and a toddler is often allowed to continue to play for a long time with wet pants.

In short, the two evacuation activities of the child are uniquely free from parental interference for a long time. Whatever may be the sensations associated with evacuation or retention of urine and feces, the processes are subject for some time to the impulses of the child, unmixed with parental punishment. The conflict between the child and its parents because of the discipline of cleanliness which is so critical in child development among us

is postponed for at least a year and usually, for all practical purposes, for two years.

This postponement of sphincter discipline also postpones the origin of much of the child's ambivalent emotions to his parents. He does not experience resentment because of their interference, and without resentment basic grounds for anger are eliminated. His anger would inevitably bring upon him further punishment by his all-powerful parents, and this in turn would introduce a behavior pattern of fear. As it is, for a year or more he will not experience the formation of a repetitive pattern wherein these anal and urethral impulses conflict with fear. Since an infant reacts to any frustration of his impulses as if this frustration were punishment, he is likewise free from this tension and its by-products for a period of time when he is least able to withstand tensions. Furthermore, he is not subject to that alternative reaction pattern where the fear of his parents' retaliation to his anger is sufficient to make him direct his anger not at them but at himself and thus lay down the rudiments of self-punishment patterns. Such conditions as prevail in Navaho infancy are most inauspicious for the beginnings of a tyrannical superego. Since the child's contact with the arbitrary emotions of his mother has in the earlier period been reduced by the situations due to the cradle board, he has likewise not been likely to develop the pattern of responding to his mother's emotions by repression, hostility, or resignation. If he has not resorted to these mechanisms, tension and its counterpart, anxiety, should have been but little developed in the first year of life.

It seems likely, however, that under any circumstances of sphincter discipline, the parents and other adults loom large to the infant and under such conditions of helplessness and anger which are accompanied by frustration and punishment, the anger impulses to some extent will be repressed. This very fortunate and involuntary mechanism will vary with each child but what *is*

repressed will become distorted.¹² The degree of this distortion may subsequently be determined by obtaining the individual's fantasies and dreams where the parents, other adults, and siblings are proportionately distorted and appear as the weird or fearsome animals of folktales and as the divinities of myths. This distortion has been canalized and elaborated into the more or less standardized versions of tales and myths, but the amount of distortion from the given individual's repression of aggressive impulses may be judged by that particular individual's reactions to tribal lore.

The mythic figures are of course also symbols of the unknown forces of evil and danger of which the child's parents are also afraid, but the idiosyncratic way in which each individual emphasizes, elaborates, and suppresses in telling tribal stories is symptomatic—as is also his choice of stories and especially those he chooses to repeat again and again.¹³

Inasmuch as the Navaho infant has no sphincter discipline for a year or more and only very gentle discipline thereafter and yet emerges with roughly the distortions and fears common to children in every culture where they have been investigated, it may be surmised that psychoanalysis has placed undue emphasis upon the results of infant disciplining. The mere fact that the infant is helpless and yet dependent in respect to his parents may be sufficient basis for the distortion in the unconscious projections of his parents which seem to form a common substratum in the folklore of all peoples.

DISCUSSION

The most striking theoretical question which emerges from this consideration of some of the main aspects of Navaho infancy

12. It is, of course, at least an open question as to whether there may not be successful repression without distortion

13. On the general questions involved in this paragraph, see also Kluckhohn, C: *Myths and Rituals, a General Theory*, *Harvard Theological Review*, 35, January, 1942, pp. 45-80.

is this: how can this picture be reconciled with the facts on Navaho witchcraft, on the states of morbid melancholia and endemic uneasiness which have been well documented for adult Navaho? How can the anxiety level be so high among a people where infants are nursed whenever they want to be, where childhood disciplines are so permissive, where there is so much genuine affection for children? If the writings of certain psychoanalysts were literally true (and the whole truth), adult Navahos ought to have calm and beautifully adjusted personalities.¹⁴ However, this is most certainly not the case. In spite of the fact that Navaho infants receive a maximum of protection and gratification, they tend to be moody and to worry a great deal when they become adults.

The explanation may rest in part upon the frequent ill health of Navaho children, upon teasing, upon refusals of the breast to toddlers, and upon delays in response to crying or upon other factors (such as genetic ones) that have been overlooked. But the main point is probably not that the theorists are utterly wrong but that they claim too much for the earliest years and do not pay enough attention to later events and to the total situation in which the mature person finds himself. Infantile indulgence very probably does constitute the firmest foundation upon which, if later circumstances are reasonably favorable, a secure and confident adult personality can be developed. But it affords only a possible basis; it does not, in and of itself, promise fulfillment. The high degree of tension observed among adult Navaho may be traced partly to the exceedingly grave pressures to which

14 Here and in certain other interpretative remarks earlier I have been treading on thin theoretical ice in one respect. The children of our study are not yet adults. I have therefore been assuming that present-day adults had about the same up-bringing as the children in the study. I can provide factual evidence that this assumption is probably, in general, well-founded, but it must be freely admitted that it is not certain that unknown small differences may not have been of great significance.

Navaho society is at present subject, and also to the conflicts caused by weaning, other experiences of later childhood, and beliefs about supernatural forces.¹⁵

15. For certain additional generalizations on Navaho infancy and childhood (written after this chapter but published earlier) see. C. Kluckhohn, *Personality Formation among the Navaho Indians*, *Sociometry*, 9, 1946, pp. 128-133. Note also that *Children of the People*, by Leighton and Kluckhohn, though in general less detailed than this chapter, contains certain ethnographic information not repeated here

DREAM ANALYSIS AND FIELD WORK IN ANTHROPOLOGY

By GÉZA RÓHEIM, Ph. D. (New York)

In a recently published book on *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology*, Clyde Kluckhohn, in the section on anthropology, devotes about one page to the problem of dreams.¹ I think this problem is one of the most important issues in anthropological field work. Ever since Tylor based his theory of animism on dream life or primitive man's interpretation of dream life² anthropologists have been interested in what primitive man believes about his dreams. In his now well-nigh forgotten attempt to achieve a synthesis of anthropological data and build a "Völkerpsychologie", Wundt discusses the role of dreams in animistic and demon beliefs from several points of view.³ Anthropologists of the old school have therefore always recorded two things: dreams as evidence of animistic beliefs and the dream interpretation given by the primitives themselves. Howitt, for instance tells us what the Dieri believe about the dead visiting them in their dreams or their own soul leaving their body and going to the other world.⁴ The animistic meaning

1. Louis Gottschalk, Clyde Kluckhohn and Robert Angell: *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology*. Social Science Research Council Bulletin 53, 1945, pp. 105, 106.

2. E. B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*. London, J. Murray, 1903, I. 428.

3. W. Wundt: *Völkerpsychologie*. Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1906, II, p. 98. Wachvision und Traumvision, p. 109, Angsttraum and Krankheitsanfall, p. 114, Der Fratzenraum, p. 118, Der Alptraum, and so forth.

4. A. W. Howitt: *The Native Tribes of Southeast Australia*. London, Macmillan and Co., 1904, pp. 434-435. Cf. R. H. Codrington: *The Melanesians*. Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1891, p. 249

was emphasized by anthropological theory. The dream interpretation was offered by the primitives themselves.⁵

A new chapter in dream research opens with psychoanalysis or rather with anthropology becoming aware of psychoanalysis. The fourteenth volume of the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* contains the Presidential Address by C. G. Seligman, "Anthropology and Psychology". The section on "Type Dreams" discusses the tooth-losing dream, the flying dream and the climbing dream. Seligman comes to the conclusion that "*the essential mechanisms of non-Europeans, including savage and barbaric people, appear to be the same as in ourselves,*" and that "dreams with the same manifest content to which identical (latent) meanings are attached (type dreams) occur, not only in cognatic groups but among people of diverse race and in every stage of culture."⁶ Seligman's papers resulted⁷ in an increased interest in dreams. The data collected confirm our knowledge of dream symbolism⁸ but there are no individual dreams and of course no associations. Seligman also wrote the introduction to Lincoln's book.⁹ This book contains unpublished dream material partly collected by the author (Navaho) partly by Blackwood (Solomon Islands) and also by Radin (Eastern Woodlands). Whenever the author has association material he analyzes the dreams correctly, but in

5. Cf. for instance, Ch Keysser: Aus dem Leben der Kaileute, in R. Neuhauss: *Deutsch Neu Guinea*. Berlin, D. Reimer, 1911, 3, pp. 109-111.

6. C. G. Seligman: Presidential Address *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 14, 1924, p. 46. (my italics)

7. C. G. Seligman in *Man*, 1923, p. 120

8. "To dream of a flood—wife commencing her period" "To dream of an ant heap—wife is pregnant by another man." A. G. O. Hodgson: Dreams of Central Africa, *Man*, 26, 1926, pp. 67-68. In Tikopia "a woman dreams that she goes to the stream, fills her water-bottles and puts them in a kit on her back—she will conceive" Raymond Firth: The Meaning of Dreams in Tikopia. In *Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman*. London, 1934, Kegan Paul, p. 68. To dream that one's hand is smeared with feces means that one will haul up a shark. *Ibid.* p. 70 (the equation is: feces equals plenty as in our culture feces equals money). Among the Dazomba and Moshi, to dream of a snake biting one's wife's right side means that she will soon have a child. A. W. Cardinall: Note on Dreams among the Dazomba and Moshi, *Man*, 1927, 27, p. 88

9. T. Steward Lincoln: *The Dream in Primitive Cultures*. The Cresset Press, London, 1935.

most cases no associations are given. Kluckhohn emphasizes¹⁰ that the anthropologist should be more explicit in stating the working situation. Looking back at what I had to say on this subject after my field work, I find that the "transference" aspect of the situation is adequately discussed¹¹ but a few remarks might be added on external circumstances. Most of the work was done with an interpreter. Both in Central Australia and in Normanby Island, I was very lucky in the choice of my interpreters. They were natives (or half-castes) of exceptional intelligence and a perfect understanding of English. It would probably have been very difficult even when I knew the language to explain to an average native what was meant by "interpretation". This is pretty obvious since the difficulty arises even with the most intelligent representatives of our own culture. What I mean by association was first explained to the interpreter (in one case using his own dreams) and he could then make the informants understand what I was driving at. My first field publication contains also the first series of analyzed dreams from one native informant.¹²

If the anthropologist in the field is also trained as a psychoanalyst, he will find that dreams, *providing he can get some associations*¹³ can be used for three distinct purposes:

1. The associations reveal ethnological data that might otherwise escape notice. Obviously, there are two ways of finding something out about the life of a tribe:

- a. By asking questions; b. by observing events.

The first method has the drawback that if the culture is not already very well known one does not know what questions to ask. The second method is more reliable than any other, and would be perfect if the time spent in the field were not limited. The gathering of free associations to the dreams supplements

10. Cf. Gottschalk, Kluckhohn and Angell, *op. cit.* p. 123.

11. Géza Róheim. Psycho-Analytic Technique and Field Anthropology. *Int. J. Psa.* 13, 1932, pp. 8-15.

12. Géza Róheim. Doketa. *Int. J. Psa.* 13, pp. 150-179.

13. I do not see much use in collecting dreams without associations

both methods because the informants relate life situations and customs which otherwise might have escaped our notice.

2. The second aim was what I had in mind in my field work¹⁴ and that is that the unconscious meaning of an institution, or belief, or the like, can be obtained by analyzing the dream in which it occurs. Instances of this method are my interpretation of the *alknarintja* on basis of the dreams of Yirramba banga¹⁵ or of the latent meaning of the dogma of totemic incarnation on the basis of the dreams of women in Central Australia.¹⁶

Some anthropologists or non-Freudian psychoanalysts may object at this juncture. Dreams have to be analyzed only "in cultural context".¹⁷

The question, of course, is what is meant by this. If it means that in order to analyze a dream it is necessary to know what the dreamer is talking about—then this is quite obvious. On the other hand, anyone who really knows what a dream is will agree that there cannot be several "culturally determined" ways of dreaming just as there are no two ways of sleeping.

It is true, of course, that I am in a better position to understand a dream in which a baseball scene occurs if I know what baseball is. But as long as the dreamer is willing to explain matters this only means a delay or loss of time. Everyday experience shows that if a patient brings a dream for the first hour of analysis and associates, I can understand that dream¹⁸ even before I know anything about the patient. The dream work is the same for everybody although there are differences in the degree and technique of secondary elaboration.

3. A third aim is an approximation to the real psychoanalytic

14. Géza Róheim: Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types. *Int. J. Ps.* 13, 1933, parts 1, 2.

15. Géza Róheim: Sexual Life in Central Australia. *Int. J. Ps.* 13, 1932, pp. 48, 49.

16. Géza Róheim: Women and their Life in Central Australia. *J. R. Anthropol. Inst.* 63, 1933, pp. 241-250.

17. Cf. Kluckhohn, *op. cit.*, p. 106

18. "Understand" here means to be able to formulate the latent dream content.

situation. In the work of Cora Du Bois and Kardiner this has been attempted.¹⁹ The biography is really a substitute for an analysis but the difficulty here, apart from all other obstacles, lies in the duality of workers. If I give an analysis of a patient on the basis of what another observer reports, it would hardly be the same as if the analyst is doing the work himself. Another weakness of the Du Bois-Kardiner work is that few dreams are given with associations. Notwithstanding all this, the book represents a great step forward in the direction of a regular analysis.

There is one record of an analysis of a native medicine man. The trouble is that it is published like a novel without the dreams and interpretation. Incidentally, we have here the proof of my contention that dreams can be interpreted and correctly interpreted without knowing the cultural background or rather without asserting that each culture gives a specific frame of reference in which the dream should be understood.²⁰

When I was working in the field (1929, 1930, 1931) I was only aiming at what I have now called the second possible aim of dream analysis in field work. I did not devote enough time to each informant as an informant *per se* to give them an hour every day as was done by Cora Du Bois. If I had stayed a second year, both in Central Australia and on Normanby Island, I suppose I would have done this. As it is, the dreams obtained do give some data of this type. Following are two such dream series.

1. RAMORAMO

Ramoramo is a man of about thirty-five, an energetic, manly type. His name means *making a new garden*; it is a Missima word, the name of a man there. His parents were

Subukwajega
(father)

Rikeke
(mother)

19. Cora Du Bois: *The People of Alor*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1944.

20. W. Sachs: *Black Hamlet* The Mind of an African Negro Revealed by Psychoanalysis, Geoffrey Bles, London, 1937, p. 11.

of Wejoko of the *gewara* (small parrot) totem. (Subukwaijega=he came down and hid.)

of the *magisub* (eagle) totem, born in a Tube-tube village. (Rikeke=eagle hunting pigs.)

He is therefore a *magisub* (eagle). His wife is Sadaramo of Kebebeku; she is the *toni-kasa* or owner of the village, a woman of the *gewara* totem. Her original village is Nedukarena (plenty of grass), a Sipupu village further inland. Sadaramo is a Dobu word meaning "breadfruit". They have the following children:

1. Sadaramo or Mwanigia, a boy of about sixteen.
2. Dehuroro, a girl of ten. (The name is the name of a canoe in Tubetube.)
3. Kewona (bird song), a boy of about eight.
4. Rabeodani (two stand up together=name of Ramoramo's friend in Tubetube) a girl, age about two.

At present (i.e., 1930) they live in Kebebeku, but they are also making a house in Duruha where a *sagari*¹ will be given next year.

Ramoramo is friendly, outspoken, independent, easy to get on with. He is not such a nuisance as most of them are, not so much a *gewana karena* (trunk of asking); that is, he is not continually pestering you and asking for various things. He has the same tendencies as all the others but keeps up a manly front and does not want to look childish. But he is really an *ose* (stingy) and not the generous *esa-esa* he impersonates. When my boys cut off a few trees from a wood that was supposed to belong to him, he demanded immediate payment although I had been giving him piles of things for months when this happened. He brought me a few turkey eggs as a present, and immediately demanded payment for it. That would be in accordance with their customs, for a gift has to be met by a counter-gift. But he was decidedly going too far when he kept asking for things afterwards with the petulant exclamation, "Well, didn't I bring you

¹ Food distribution ceremony

the eggs?", quite disregarding the fact that he had asked and received payment for the eggs.

Dream 1

"Last night I dreamt they were trying to *barau* (kill by magic) me. I ran, I jumped into a small canoe (*kewou*) and paddled out to a white man's boat. I said to the white man, 'I will sail with you,' and 'I will work for you.' Then I woke."

Associations

The white man was one for whom he had worked before, a friend of his. The man who is trying to kill him by magic is *his son* (really his brother's son) Kuhuwa, who is mourning for *his little son* who was drowned recently. As a young boy Ramoramo mourned for his nibana (cross-cousin) and before that *for his father*. The reason for going to the white man is quite clear in this dream. It is the conscious or unconscious anxiety in the family circle. The father who mourns for his son and who is a son to Ramoramo stands for the dead father he mourned for in the past.

Dream 2

"I dreamt that they buried yams in the ground. I went with Kwadiura and we took some out of the earth oven. Many women were there, carrying yams and a sagari pig. There was a feast (*sagari*); we got presents. A man called Keweso from Lomitawa speared me with a spear in the breast. I took an axe and cut his nose. He died."

Associations

Kwadiura had his yams in an earth oven like this when he was getting ready for a sagari. Kwadiura married Ramoramo's sister. He used to have his ground here and Ramoramo now gets the money for it from the Mission (*Bwaruada*).

He made a sagari for Kwadiura's uncle (that is, he went to the sagari as *muri*, married relation). They give each other presents and they are *kune* (trade) partners. He, Ramoramo, got his first kune from his uncle.

The sagari scene is like a sagari at Kasakoja, a Widiwidi hill village (kasakoja means "village hill"). He was there with his classificatory brother To Diweta. To Diweta beat his wife Mwedidi because she had flirted with his nephew. This was also Ramoramo's nephew and he is just now getting ready to help the nephew who is a good boy for his sagari. When his uncle died, he told Ramoramo to take care of all the women in the family; Kwadiura's wife (Ramoramo's sister), his niece Matanogi, his mother, Taniore's² wife, his own wife—all these he has to take care of.

Keweso is his hereditary enemy, a Lomitawa man. Keweso was put into jail recently by the government for killing a man. His mother used to tell him about fights with Lomitawa. Her uncle, Moketa, killed a Lomitawa man called Tarabunama like he kills the man in his dream, by hitting him on the nose. One of his opponents he killed by a hit on the nose, another by spearing him through the breast.

Ramoramo had been feeling sick before this dream. He thought he might die before he could make the big sagari for his "old people".

Moketa was an angry man, a great war leader, and he killed many of the Lomitawa. That was because his aunt was crying after his father's death. Moketa's father committed the suicide that is typical of Normanby Island. He quarrelled with his wife, he was jealous. Then he went to a Lomitawa village and said, "Come and kill me!" They speared him through the breast and ate him.

His son "paid back by killing" two men; he hit one of them on the nose, the other he speared through the breast. He brought them to his father's clansfolk to be eaten.

Interpretation

Ramoramo is thinking of making a sagari in honor of his dead

2 His clan "son," same totem

"uncles", the old men of his clan. He is now the old man of his clan who has to take care of all the women of the clan. In the list of women he includes his wife. Legally this is, of course, wrong; she is not a member of his totem group. But whether a society be matrilineal or patrilineal or in any form of social organization, it is obvious that his own wife is one of the women he is taking care of and it is also obvious that she is one of the "mothers",³ that emotions are displaced from the mother to the wife. The sagari with its presents and counterpresents expresses and cements the psychological unity of the clan, the identification with its male members and the sublimated ownership of the women of the clan. Through the women these bonds of identification go beyond the frontiers of the clan. Ramoramo's sister is Kwadiura's wife; he has a "share" in her and in her lands.

In the fight he represents his clan against the arch-enemy; Moketa, his ideal, killed one man by hitting him on the nose, one by spearing him through the breast. Ramoramo acts like Moketa but is also wounded like Moketa's opponent. Every ideal formation is ambivalent; he is both Moketa and Moketa's enemy.

Who is this Moketa? The avenger of his father. It is therefore quite possible that the ambivalency was first connected with the father image and hence displaced to the uncle or mother's uncle.

Dream 3

"A pig chased me and I climbed up a tree."

Associations

The place was his own garden. The pig was like his own pig which he is growing now for the sagari in honor of his mother and mother's brother. But it was also like a bush pig; it had tusks. His mother was very good to him. She always told him and his brother not to leave her because the barau would get

3. The women of the clan are called mothers.

them. He dreams this very often; once it is a black pig, then a red pig that chases him.

Before telling me his dream, he was telling me about the *baawe garegara*, a mythical pig who is or which is sent by the *barau* (sorcerer) to carry the man away whom they want to kill. After what are ostensibly the associations to the dream, he talks about *people who married their own relations* and tells the story of the Tauhau who married his sisters. In the love magic derived from this story, *Tauhau's pig* is his sister. Then he talks about his love life as a young man, how he slept with every woman he wanted and how he fought for his present wife with a rival.

Interpretation

It is evident that the pig with tusks (male) represents his guilt feelings. He has disobeyed mother and he has desired his own relations, the women of his own maternal clan.

Dream 4

"I dreamt that I saw a big bird. I ran, I went to the village; it came after me to kill me. I shouted to the people. The bird ran away and the people held me."

Associations

The bird is like his totem bird, the *magisub* (eagle), and to see the *magisub* in the dream means the *rara*. The *rara* is a disease people get by eating food in a village that was hostile to their father's clan. It amounts symbolically to eating their fathers and the blood kills them. Taisanina died recently of *rara* in Kebebeku; or rather, he was buried alive as is the custom in these cases. If such people are not disposed of, they run to the members of their own clan, catch them, and then they can die because they pass over their disease and their life to the other clan member.

The night before he had this dream they were talking about old times and other cases of *rara*. In his life, one was especially significant, his mother's real brother, the uncle who taught him everything. Everybody ran away, but he stayed with his uncle.

This time he is certain that the dead man has been coming out of the grave and throwing stones at him. "By chance" he sings a song after this in which a man wants to have intercourse with his sister, but she refuses. A day before he told the origin myth of his totem. The interesting thing in this myth is that, in contrast to the other totem myths of this area, the symbol is derived not from the ancestress but from the man who marries her, i.e., not from the mother but from the father.

Interpretation

This dream conforms completely to the pattern described by Malinowski; the ambivalent conflict is with the uncle who wields the authority in the clan, the incestuous desire is for the sister. However, the totem bird is the mother's (or sister's) *husband*, not her brother.

Dream 5

On the 21st day of May the event with the rara reappears in another dream. The dead man, i.e., "blood" (he uses the word for the disease instead of the name), they went to his grave, they buried him, saying, 'You stay here, we go away.' But the dead man said, 'You go away, I stay in my house (grave).' Later he came out and the people ran away from him. He said, 'You have bewitched me.' Then he went to another village and became an owl.

Associations

This time he goes back to an earlier case of rara in his life. It was his *tubuna* (matrilineal grandfather) who died of the rara. When that happened he dreamt of a red man who looked like a red flower with red eyebrows and eyelids, who threw stones at him. Then he talks about a *sasara*, that is, a fight that breaks out at a *sagari* (food distribution). The *sasara* in question happened at Nuadubu; a Donakija (name of village) man was attacked by the Lomitawa. This man was the husband of his cross-cousin. He looked after him and Ramoramo as a young boy lived in his house. First he lived with father, and mother,

then he went to his uncle; then when his uncle died he went back to his mother and then this cousin's husband took him because he liked him. It was there that he grew up to a man's estate. Boys do not always grow up at their uncle's house; some stay with father or go to other relations of the mother. Sometimes the parents are dead and there are members of their clan who will then function after the marriage in the role of the uncle—that is, they will get the presents. An old woman happens to pass; he says this is his cross-cousin, the one he was just talking about. She was really his mother's cross-cousin and is about his mother's age. Therefore she calls him "natugu" (my son). The event at Nuadubu was the continuation of an old feud which is commemorated in the following song.

Dajaru	kana	mudu	taga
Dajaru	her	pudenda	drip
Mwanena	kainega		inao
His wife	over the legs		goes
Tamana	quajaquaja		ina
Father	dead		his (his penis)
Kaheguja	jaragunaja		
In my mouth	I put it		

Dajaru's husband was a man from Lomitawa. The people from Donakija had tied him up and laid him on a mat in order to roast him. They did not wish to lose a single drop of blood for it was *mebu* (blood revenge). Therefore they had put him on the mat. His wife was from Boasitoroba and Boasitoroba sided with them, so they did not hurt her. She had to go to urinate and in doing so she stepped over her husband's legs as he was stretched out ready for roasting. In the second part of the song Dajaru identifies herself with her father's people—they are going to eat her husband. ("In my mouth I place.") Moreover the husband's body is identified with the father's penis.

Interpretation

The cross-cousin's husband represents the father. The song as association shows the desire to castrate his father.

Dream 6

"Nekelesi, a woman from Bunama came and she stayed in Donakija. My cousin Nasimua went up to her and said, 'What about it?' 'You show me,' he said to me, 'how to have intercourse with her.' So I showed him how to make a cigarette. He gave it to her and they had intercourse."

Associations

He explains how this magic is made. Before they had tobacco, they would do the same with the betel-nut. "We make a spell, we light the cigarette, we stop the fire, we light it again and then we go to sleep with it. Then we tell our own shadow: 'You go and wake the woman and give her the cigarette.' Next day she comes and says, 'I dreamt of you last night. You came and gave me a cigarette.' Then they have intercourse and their body gets soft."

Interpretation

He gave no more associations that day. Before telling the dream, he said: "I remember the dream and when I see your face I forget everything," which shows that repression is at work and that it is somewhat of an analytic situation. The cousin in the dream corresponds to the shadow in the magic.

After awhile however he observes, "My father had very long hair. I lost him when I was quite young. My mother wanted to make my hair grow with oil and a root (bwayawe, i.e. magic) but I said: 'No, if you oil it, it will get white quickly and they will say he is an old man.'"

As the cross-cousin is often called "father" in their terminology, I conjecture that the dream in which he sees his cross-cousin having intercourse with Nekelesi, the sine-bwaina of Bunama, is really a *primal scene dream*. The latent anxiety is

shown by his rejection of the father rôle⁴ while the manifest anxiety is economized by putting him in the position of the experienced man who *teaches* the other elements of love magic.

When Ramoramo talks about his wandering from one relative to the other after his father's early death, he left out an event which must be significant in his life. Next day he told the story of his conflict with Dujero, his brother. When his uncle died, Ramoramo made a clearing and Dujero came behind him. Ramoramo put his sticks into the ground to mark the territory he claimed. Then Dujero came and threw them out. Dujero said: "Who picked that ground out for a sagari garden?" Ramoramo said, "I did." Dujero said, "It is my garden." So Ramoramo challenged him to meet there next day and fight. Dujero did not accept this challenge so Ramoramo kept his share. As Dujero had not wanted to give him anything, so, when Dujero died, Ramoramo kept it all for himself and nobody got anything. If he had killed his brother he would have had to make a new village on another ground because of the "rara" or "blood," for then he would have been forbidden to take fruit, food or fire from his old village.

The rara spirit who wants to kill him represents his elder brother or uncle, originally his father, and he will be killed because it was he who wanted to kill.

Dream 7

"I was carrying my daughter. My wife's first husband (he is dead now) came and threw the child away. I was crying."

Associations

This man had first married Ramoramo's wife's sister. Then when she died he married Ramoramo's present wife. The dead man was his (classificatory) *tubuna*; that is, he had the same totem as Ramoramo's paternal grandfather. But they belonged to the same group; they used to talk about their lovers and to go

4. In the associations

to girls together. In the dream the spirit appears as he used to be in real life when he was getting ready for a sagari with a club and sweet-smelling flowers. Everybody is getting ready now for Sawaitoja's sagari at Boasitoroba and Sipupu. When he has got as far as this with the associations he seems to have finished the topic and says, "Now what shall I tell you? The story of Tokedukeketai? But, of course, you know that."

At the sagari in question, there was a fight between a Sipupu man (Ramoramo's *wahana* i.e., uncle or nephew) and the Boasitoroba people. His *wahana* and the people of Sipupu were justified in their resentment; a pig was due to them and they did not get it. So he attacked his own people. This is a recognized form of showing the Boasitoroba people that they are wrong.⁵

The uncle for whom the feast was held was a great singer. One of his songs was about a widow. Her relations could not pay a pig to her deceased husband's relations, so the new suitor had to send the widow back. The second is about a deserted wife whose former husband says he cannot give her anything more because he has a new wife.

Interpretation

Ramoramo and the other husband, his friend, both stand for the dreamer himself. One of them kills the child; the other cries for it. In the scene of the sagari at Boasitoroba we see the same ambivalence; he attacks his own side to show that they are in the right.

The songs show something else—a love object is relinquished, a desire is unfulfilled. The ambivalence of a father and a love object lost—when we add to this the chance associations of the myth of the cannibal ogre, the whole spells oedipus complex. For in this myth the Duau Oedipus Matakapotaitaia⁶ kills the

5. Cf. Géza Róheim. *War, Crime and the Covenant*, J. Clin. Psychopath. Monograph Series, No. 1, p. 75 (also on the *rara*)

6. Cf. on this myth Geza Róheim: *The Riddle of the Sphinx*. Hogarth Press, London, 1934

cannibal ogre and in another version the cannibal eats his own sons. The feast is in honor of a deceased uncle and here we have the ambivalent fight—the conflict is displaced from father to uncle.

Dream 8

"I went up a big hill. I went, I stayed. It kept turning around quicker and quicker. From the moving hill I jumped across to a house. This house was on the top of a cocoanut tree. A white man came and I asked, 'Where did I come from?' He raised his hand: 'You came from my hand,' and I came down to the earth."

Associations

The white man looked like Usubeni, a missionary, who lived at Giligili. He was a very good man; Booki used to look after his pigs. He used to ask Booki: "*Did the boar fuck the sow?*" If Booki said no, Usubeni would threaten to shoot him.

The place where the dream occurred looked like the whole earth.

The hill was like a hill at Bwebweso called Sabedi. This is a witch's hill. Kaiaraj of Murua told him that the werabana's hill always turns around. This was a strong man, a young man, his friend. The werabana told him: "Inside the earth there is a trunk that makes the whole world turn around." The werabana went down to the land of the *numu*⁷ to see this *arena* (trunk) *gidarina* (small) *gidemusa* (like) *sijaru* (needle).

From the hill he saw the house on the tree. They build houses like that on the mainland to protect them from enemies, for instance, from the white police.

People came from Bunama yesterday. They were going on an *une*.⁸ They told Bebe: "Why do you tell the white man everything? The government will make our tax big! Then all the white

7. Spirits of the underworld and of fertility.

8. Trade-exchange expedition. Cf. R. F. Fortune: *Sorcerers of Dobu*. E. P. Dutton, New York, 1931, p. 200. Géza Róheim: *The Origin and Function of Culture*. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, 1943, p. 31.

people will come. They will take our ground and wives!" But he replied: "For ourselves we tell the story because the white think we are only kangaroo." Then without any apparent reason he remarks: "If women ask me to have intercourse, my eyes get red like blood from desire." Then he says: "Everybody is afraid of a storm because famine is the consequence of a storm." In such a situation he would exchange his children with other parents and each would eat the other's child.

His maternal grandmother told him all about this. A fire may come from Kelologea and it will burn everything from Kelologea to Duau. If a famine comes again she would say: "Your mother will give you away in exchange for another child and you will be eaten."

But since the white people are here, the storm is afraid of the gun and it is finished.

Interpretation

What is the role of the white man in this dream? He is a sort of intermediary between the white man's god and the dreamer. "Where did I come from?" is the question asked by children of all races. "From my hand," the missionary replies—that is, he represents the father in the dream. And he came from the sky where the Creator God of the white man lives. The day stimulus of the dream was the talk with the people of Bunama; the white men will come into the country and take their land and wives. The white man's government is also a powerful protector. The storm does not dare to put in an appearance since the white man has been here. A storm means for the child that their parents are going to eat them or let them be eaten. The association before this theme was his sexual desire and before that we have again the "white man" anxiety of the natives. The white man will come and take their women.

The whole dream is about the theme "Where did I come from?" i.e., about parental coitus. If this is the case we have the

explanation in the association as to how the missionary Usubeni enters the dream as a father symbol. He used to ask: "Has the boar fucked the sow?" Anxiety in connection with the primal scene comes into the picture; he threatens to shoot Booki if he does not help to bring about the "primal scene" which is the very thing the child does not want to do. On the other hand, the representative of the benevolent Christian Creator God as a father-image allays anxiety in connection with the primal scene.

The piece of Woodlark (Murua) mythology fits well into this setting. The trunk or needle that makes the world turn round is the father's penis in the mother. The witches see this in the netherworld where all mysterious things take place. The child saw the father's penis (raised hand) the movement that followed ("hill turning round" i.e., primal scene) and jumps into the protecting house (fantasy of uterine regression). The "raised hand" (erect penis), originally the source of anxiety, is transformed by the dream work into reassurance and protection.

Dream 9

"I dreamt that I caught a fish with a round net. I called my uncle; he came, he ran to me and he took the fish. We went ashore to divide it. Qualeilej (his sister, wife of Tubujaj) was there, Matanogi (daughter of Qualeilej), Booki, Maibogi, Bakira, Dokija. I divided to them. I got angry. I threw the fish down and when I looked, the fish was chasing them. I shouted: 'You catch my fish!' Then I jumped up and I was awake."

Associations

The man in the dream is Mwarahusa, Gabebe's father. This was the uncle with whom he stayed and who taught him everything. His sons are now preparing to make a *bwabware* (mortuary ceremony) for him. When this uncle grew old Ramoramo had to help him in the garden. The uncle used to go away and climb a breadfruit tree and Ramoramo used to tell him: "I have a share in the *une* now, so it throws a bad light on me if you have to climb

for fruit. I will give you food if you ask for it!" And then he would send his wife to the garden to fetch food for him. Qualeilej is his sister, Tubujaj's wife. There is great *oboboma* (love) between them. They are always giving things to each other. She "pets" his pigs (i.e. strokes them or feeds them) and always keeps some yams for him for the hunger month if she has many. He fishes for her and her husband fishes for him. If nobody has any tobacco and she has just one stick⁹ or one betel-nut, he gets it. Matanogi, her daughter, is just like her mother. She obeys only her father and she will only give people things if her father tells her to do it. With regard to Maibogi, he remarks that if one gives him hard words he won't eat. After the death of the man who died recently (the *rara* case) Bakira scolded the others: "Why don't you get ready for the *basa*?¹⁰ If Tubujaj dies, you will be like that too." "If a stranger marries into our village, we have to take good care of him because he loses his life in our village." Dokija is a man who came back recently from the white people. He is a good worker but he gets angry very easily and goes away.

Then he related episodes in his life in which he behaves the way he behaved in the dream. "Once when I was young at Donakija I smashed the yam pots. This was because my wife reproached me that I don't work enough, so I smashed the fish, yam, and everything. Some days ago I was waiting for the food in the garden. They were rather slow in bringing it and I wanted to chew, (i.e., betel nuts) but I could not because I had not eaten. So when Deororo brought it I threw all the yams into the bush. Deororo cried". Then they picked the yams up, washed them and he ate it. Now he is preparing for a sagari for Tahabo, his madiana ("son", step son). He appears at that sagari as muri (follower, i.e., in-law relation).

9. Tobacco comes in sticks.

10. Mortuary ceremony: farewell to the dead

Interpretation

In this dream we see that he is thoroughly fed up with gifts, uncles, and other social obligations. The uncle deprives him, he does not give it voluntarily. The day-stimulus is the mortuary ceremony they are preparing for this uncle. Although according to the social fiction he is the one to receive gifts, the day-stimulus revives the whole ambivalent "gift complex" (the fish attacks those who receive). Ultimately it does not make much difference whether he is to give gifts or receive them, because he must reciprocate them. The remark about his uncle climbing a tree is significant. A barau (sorcerer) makes people climb trees to kill them, people would therefore suspect that he wants to kill his uncle. And they would be right. Now he talks about gifts, counter-gifts and love in relationship to his sister. The ambivalent nature of this relationship is perfectly evident. Then comes the theme "superego" i.e. reproaches and reactions to reproaches either depressive or aggressive. Finally we have the reproach and reaction theme in the husband-wife situation and the oral sources of his aggression (slow in bringing him his food, chewing). I suspect that the fish which the uncle wants to take and which attacks those who are to receive the gift (sister, wife) is a phallic symbol.

Dream 10

"My brother came, he embraced me and said, 'You come and we go! I have built a house for you. I am feeding a pig and a hog for you. My body is tired.' He said it and I cried. 'I came to fetch you, we go', he said. 'You go and I stay,' I said. 'I am going to make a sagari.' 'I, too', he said. 'I am sounding the drums for you and later I will make the sagari'. 'No, you are dead and I make the sagari,' I replied."

Associations

His younger brother was a good man. He could kill his pig in his absence and if Ramoramo made a feast he would catch a bush pig for him. They helped each other.

His brother ate of the fish called *mweura* which is *borausa* (poison) and died.

The dream is like an event that took place before. His people (*igu susu*) came from Soburasi to fetch him. But he said: "No, I wait for a *sagari*." They said, "Come with us. You will come in a *madawa*¹¹ canoe with your seeds" (the garden does not count). He replied to his uncle Ta Besa: "If you had taken me as a child, yes! but now, no!" He could take all his things, they said. But he was afraid that one of them might send him up a tree and he might fall.

Then he describes the preparation for the *sagari* which will be next year. This younger brother of his always used to spear the boys, him too, in play. But he would obey him in everything.

Then he goes back to the people of Soburasi. The way his younger brother speaks in the dream is like the people of Soburasi when they came to fetch him. "Come with your mother," they said.

Then he thinks, what stories would he tell me? The first that comes to his mind he has told already. It is about a man who runs away from a woman because he thinks that her pubic hair is her belly hanging out. The next story is about a man who comes out of a stone and has intercourse with two sisters every night till finally the mother-in-law catches him and he marries the two sisters. The third story is about To Kedu Keketaj, the Man Eater who marries a woman and whenever a child is born he eats it, until she hides the children and they grow up in hiding and go to a human village.

Interpretation

The first thing that we see from the dream and the association is that making a *sagari* is connected with guilt. The ghost has come to fetch him and the consolation in the dream is: "No, you are dead and I am alive." Although he gives the conventional

11. Madawa is a big Tube tube canoe.

praise to his younger brother, the relation of the two was not without an underlying current of hostility for he mentions that the boy would throw spears at everybody, including him. To go to Soburasi would have been a kind of death; the anxiety is quite manifest when he says that he might have been told to go up a tree and then he would fall, which means that he would have been killed by barau. The key to the whole anxiety and guilt is contained in the stories. In one story a hidden man has intercourse at night; in the other the father eats all his children except those who have been hidden by the mother.

At the bottom of guilt and anxiety we find the oedipus complex; the boy who is afraid that the father will kill him for his hidden desires.

Dream 11

"I was gathering yam, there were many women. I dug the yam out of the ground and many women carried it. We filled up a house with the yam. Matanogi was there and my wife and Deuroro and Majowa."

Associations

He remarks that he has three houses, one in his wife's village, one in his own village and one in the gardens. The house that is being "filled up" is in his wife's village; he is in the role of an "in-law relation".

The scene reminds him of his mother's sagari when he was a child. Father and mother sung the "baita" (incantations). "My mother and my uncles were proud; then we paid them back." The point in this is (a) that his wife's sagari is a repetition of his mother's sagari, (b) that he, quite against custom, identifies himself with his father's clan, "later we paid them back."

Then he gives the following songs:

Their leaves get crumpled
Young girls of Rabiaj
Cousin, talk to me first!
The story gets home first.

A young man went to a girl at Rabiaj, a village in Bijawa. "Talk to me first," she said, "then you will get what you want!" i.e., intercourse. The mat they were lying on got crumpled i.e., they had intercourse, and the news of what happened traveled faster than the young man; by the time he got home to his village they knew all about it.

The next song is about the people of Lomitawa; whatever they do they do it wrong.

Then he gives a dirge about the death of a chief at Soburata and then an incantation which derives the origin of yam from a woman's blood which poured forth when she was cut by her jealous husband.

Interpretation

A sagari is for fame; the song about the boy and his mistress emphasizes how fast fame travels. There is a genital element in the sagari; filling up the house is filling up a woman. We know that the sagari in the dream is a repetition of the one given by his father for his mother. Now he is giving it for his wife and he is taking his father's place. The death of the great chief and the motive of jealousy follow naturally since the latent content is evidently the oedipus complex.

Dream 12

"I climbed a big hill on a ladder. I went to a sagari wanting to get a present. I found a woman; she gave me ripe bananas and said: 'Come and sleep with me.' 'I did not come to make love; I came for the sagari,' I replied. Then we went and we had intercourse. My wife was jealous and I beat her. Then we went to court. The Government said I had to pay one pound of paper money. I paid."

Associations

The woman was like Nivano, a very old woman near Panajati. This is an island near Samarai. He chewed betel-nuts with this old woman and she gave the policemen betel-nuts. She was their friend. The sagari was like the one for his first wife at

Kebebeku. The *toni-kasa* (owners of village) people, Inois and Tanusiani said: "Tomorrow we pay back." But Booki and Tubujaj replied: "Oh, no, you can't pay back."

The woman in the dream is also like Naomi. She was his rawerawe (mistress). He had To Poru (the round or nice one¹²) and passed it to Tubudau at Dobu. The woman in the dream was really like Naomi; she roasted some pork for him before they slept. She gave him a bunch of bananas; that is the general custom before sleeping together. Once a woman sent a big bunch of bananas to him through her nephew. The bananas were wanted by her husband who was sick. He wanted to send them to his in-laws. The house where he has intercourse with the woman is a house in Tubetube. Tabesa, a young woman, sent by Tabesa's mother (whom he also calls mother in the narrative), came and took him by the hand. She took him away from some young girls who wanted to have intercourse with him, but would have killed him by their witchcraft (werabana).

The scene before the court: Tau Didimajero, his wahana (nephew) went to court like that. He wanted to have intercourse with a woman, this was Mwagarea's wife. She made a fuss about it and they put him in prison for three months. He dreamt this the night after he wanted to "make court" for his ground. This refers to the ground we had built our house on. He says that some of the men who were clearing the jungle for us cut down some trees on his land; it should be taken out of their pay.

He tells some more amorous adventures, how he fought for his girl with her lover, and says: "I would have fought for my ground with those men today if there had been no government." Then he sings a song about a young woman who walked on the shore with her little son. She saw a young man and said to her mother: "You carry your grandson. I go for shells, i.e., for coitus."

12. Name of a *mwari* (white armshell of the *une* exchange.)

Interpretation

Climbing the ladder is a symbolic coitus. The interpretation of the sagari's genital significance is confirmed here. The woman in the dream reminds him of several of his lovers, of an old woman and of the dreaded werabana, the witches who are always called "our mothers". The day-stimulus is the conflict about the ground inherited in the maternal clan, Mother Earth.

Ramorammo is the son in the song, whom his mother leaves to go to her lover. He has always fought for his women and his land (oedipus situation).

Dream 13

"I cut a man with a club and he got angry and he cut me. I caught his club and we pulled it one way and the other. Then he said: 'Stop! you pay me a *bagi*.'¹³ I stopped and I gave him a *bagi*."

Associations

He had a fight like this with Diaiki. Diaiki is his *manu-tasina* i.e., totem brother. They fought because of the girls. Diaiki also had an affair with Ramorammo's wife. Ramorammo cut him and then made peace by giving him *mwari* and a pig. The way the fight is stopped in the dream corresponds to custom in general, if somebody says this fight cannot go on.

The man with whom he fights in the dream, however, does not look like Diaiki. He looks like Suaratega, Ramorammo's uncle, who was the leading personage of Kebelogwari. Suaratega told him how he handled the problem of courtship when he was a young man.

This is how the gwari took place: "We went together to every village and one went up to the girl. I always let the others go first and I went last. This is the way of a good man. He will say, 'No, don't take me; take my friend'."

The point in this narrative is what the speaker does not say.

13. Shell string in the *une*.

reef. They put handcuffs on me and they said: "You kill a pig; then we shall let you go."

Associations

The boat was like a big steamer with many white people. The place where it goes on the reef is like Bwaruada. They handcuffed Notura like that because of Bebe's wife. Mr. Rich *lokapu* Lemwasaj like that because of his affair with a married woman.

Then he relates a story in which he worked on a white man's boat and was beaten by a white man.

Interpretation

The associations do not give us very deep insight. Bwaruada is the place where I lived and I am the only white man with whom he is in contact at the time of the dream, so one would suspect his aggressions are now directed against me and that he is being "locked up" or "lokapu" in its Duau form in the dream for these aggressions.

The first dream reveals the oedipus complex. His classificatory son who is mourning for his real son is trying to kill him.¹⁴ Mourner and sorcerer are closely related, guilt is the connecting link. In the second dream we discover that although sociologically making a sagari can only mean succeeding to his mother's brother's dignity (since the organization is matrilineal) psychologically it means replacing his father. The third dream spells incest and guilt with the mother's brother as avenger and the next dream is on the same lines. In the fifth dream the father is again revealed as the real enemy of the son. The sixth dream is clearly a primal scene dream in which the dreamer makes the transition from the passive (voyeur) to the active (exhibitionist) role. The seventh is an anxiety dream, the father figure threatens to deprive him of his daughter (girl). The eighth is a primal scene dream and throws some light on witch beliefs. The ninth

14. I.e., the Kuhua whom Ramoramo calls "son" is in mourning. The dead person is a child, Kuhua's son.

dream throws some light on the ambivalence underlying all relationships. The next dreams (10, 11, 12), give the key to the understanding of the *sagari*: filling up a house is making mother pregnant. The thirteenth and fourteenth dream reveal his ambivalent attitude both to his uncle and to the white man who wants his dreams.

2. KAUANAMO

Kauanamo is certainly a typical representative of his culture. If there is one thing that characterizes this old man it is his incessant greed or demanding things. Doketa characterizes him as *taubada gejojejoj*, an ugly or mean old man. If he sees a single betel-nut in the basket of a young girl or boy, he will ask for it although he has many betel-nuts and nobody dares to refuse because they are so afraid of his powers as a *barau*. Doketa also told us that the old man was not giving us the real incantations for the *barau* art. "Why not?" I asked. "What is missing?" "The text is all right," he said "but he does not spit when he says it." 'Spitting' is not an exact translation; he really means emitting the saliva through his teeth, sort of withholding it and emitting it at the same time. "If Kauanamo did this a cloud would arise from his mouth and we who listen to him and all the people in the neighborhood would all be killed." I had to accept this as a valid reason for ethnographical inaccuracy and take the words without the saliva.

Whatever gifts he received he accepted with utmost stoicism—or asked for more. In contrast to others like Bebe or Seguragura or Jarekeni he could never say that he was pleased or smile when he got a gift. Once when we had to go to Samarai, we decided that we would bring a really magnificent gift from the white man's stores to see whether we could break through his wall of indifference. We got him whatever we could think of; that is all the white man's goods a native coveted. There was an undershirt, a bush-knife, tobacco, calico, a pipe, sugar, and I don't know what

else. He accepted the gift, and took it home to his house without a word or gesture of "thank you".

Next day, however, when he came to see me, he made the terse comment: "Be *sopi nigeia*,"—"But there was no soap." It took him a whole day to think of something that was not included in his bundle. Perhaps the old saying *nomen est omen* is valid here for his name Kauanamo means, "mouth-only".

These are his *ipsissima verba* about his childhood and life: "I was a young boy when the people of Panamosi¹ took me. I left my mother and father behind and while I was at Panamosi my father died. We went to Murua (Woodlark) and came back again and then I went again.

"When I grew up a little I heard a talk (i.e., I understood what was said to me). My mother said to me: 'You look on how your father does! How he gets his *bagi* from Tubetube, his *mwari* from Dobu. Don't be *uwauwa* (mad, or doing things the wrong way), and don't steal from the gardens and don't make love to married women.' I grew somewhat² and I made a little *sagari* with yams which I got from my own little garden. My play fellows are all dead now. *Some boys were of the aggressive type—these we chased back to their mothers.* These were the boys when we made a play *sagari* always wanted to be the *toni-but* (master of fame, giver of the ceremony). *If prevented he would get a stick and smash all the yams* (he is talking about a certain boy now). This boy was *wahagu* (i.e., my uncle—classificatory) a little older than I was. He died very soon; the barau killed him because he was too wild.

"They take a *sumwana* (particle of garment, saliva, blood, nail, hair, or the like) and they fry it with pepper and they make magic and call his name and then that man will die. Our body becomes soft. If a barau eats something (like sugar-cane,

1. An island not far from Duau. The people belonged to his mother's clan.

2. The word used is *esa-esa sara*; *esa-esa* means chief or rich man. *Esa-esa sara* also means to play.

they take his saliva and also put it into the bundle. Some barau will do this against a bad barau.³

"People learn barau from their father or uncle. When I came back there was nobody to teach me since my father was dead."⁴

The following statements are comments on what ought to be and have nothing to do with reality.

"Our old people told us not to go near the girls because if we did we would later have intercourse with them. Our ancestors did that and so they made their sisters pregnant. Therefore they stopped it.

"If we live with father and mother, the first thing they tell us is not to go to the grave and not to eat fruit from father's village; it would give us *togutogura* (coughing sickness). Don't walk alone but with friends! If you go alone the barau or the werabana will kill you!"

Dream 1

"I dreamt this before I came to you (middle of April, 1930).

I heard the voice of a witch calling, 'Kauanamo, don't walk about. The sorcerers or the witches will kill you.' I woke up frightened."

Associations

Once I went for a *bagi*⁵ and the people offered me food, too, and said, "You cook your food." But I was afraid to eat and I went home to my wife although I was very hungry. My wife cooked food for me and I ate that.

I heard only a voice, but that was exactly what my mother used to tell me when I was a little child.

"I saw a gully in the dream, a hole. The witch in the dream wanted to put me in the hole. The gully was like the gully of Majawa where *Matakapotaiataia* was born."

3 The latter remark is a colossal piece of *hypocrisy* for the benefit of the white man. There is no such thing as a good barau.

4. Another outstanding lie. He is well known as a great barau.

5 String of shells. Obtained in the kune (trade expedition).

He does not know that he is still "free-associating" to the dream,⁶ but he now chooses to relate a myth.

"A woman was pregnant and she was delivered of a pig. The pig mated with a bush pig and was delivered of twins, a boy and a girl. The sow went into the garden and people speared and ate the animal. *The children cried for their dead mother and got the belly.* They took the belly to the water to clean it and they opened it. They found *bagi* and *mwari* and a *dona* and a *somwakupwas* and a *mwau*⁷ and earrings and a stone axe in the belly. So they took all this out, cleaned it in the water and then they cleaned themselves and made themselves flash and they went to their father. Their father said, "Who is this?" They replied, "You killed our mother and ate her⁸ and these things we have got out of her belly." He got all the people to come to see all the things the children had got out. Then the children had a talk with their father and they gave names to the *bagis*, calling them Pretty Snake, Fine Weather Bird, Red Tongue. The *mwari*s they called Ginger-Man, We-go-to-bathe-at-Quaraiuwa, Dirty Skin, and so forth. They decided that the *mwari* should go round to the east and the *bagi* to the west and this is how the *kune* was started. The children wanted to wash the excrements out of the belly but instead of excrement they found these things."

Interpretation

The identity of witch and mother is perfectly clear. The wish in the dream is to go into the mother's hole, i.e., the hole where the mythical hero was born. This uterine regression is transformed into anxiety by the superego (voice). Matakapo-

6. That is, I have stopped asking him about the dream and he thinks that theme is finished. It is left to him to choose a theme.

7. *Bagi* and *mwari* are the red shell strings and the white arm-shells respectively. They circulate in opposite directions. The *somwakupwa* is an inferior kind of *bagi*. The *dona* is a string-shell with a disc. The *mwau* is a white shell nose pin. All these including the earrings and the stone axes are *kune* objects.

8. Here the myth explains that the father was the owner of the spear that killed the pig.

taiatara is the oedipus hero. The uterine regression is the regressive equivalent of this oedipus wish.

One of the associations to the dream was about bagis and food anxiety. The myth told as an association relates the origin of the kune—in terms of a body destruction fantasy of the orphaned children. (cf. M. Klein). The father appears in the role of the cannibal-ogre who eats the mother (sow).

Dream 2

"I dreamt of a person with a big belly. It was a witch who had died of the rara (blood). They said: Stay at home, or we will kill you. Your brother has been sick for a long time and you go to Bwaruada. If he has eaten his yams and his time is finished then you can leave him."

Associations

His wife had said the night before: "Don't stay at Bwaruada, tell the doctor I am sick." The witch was the spirit of his dead tubuna (grandmother). Rara is a disease that afflicts those who have eaten food in an enemy village. He adds a detail to the dream. The witch in the dream cut him and made his navel bleed.

Interpretation

The witch is his wife. The facts that she has a big belly (pregnancy) and cuts his navel make it very likely that she is also his mother. He is really afraid to leave home because of his wife (mother). That is what every child is told: don't go far, the sorcerers or witches might catch you. The detail about the bleeding indicates castration anxiety. The other dream factor is his guilt feeling about his brother who was actually sick and died while we were living there.

Dream 3

"I dreamt that a child had died and there were many mourners. There were two *tokwatokway*, Sine Mweire (Woman Round) and Sine Gaurejana (Woman from

Cave). The second was the older one. They cried and danced and said: 'Kauanamo! you are asleep and we came to see you. Rise and give us a present (of the *iwara* type), yams and cocoanuts. Many a time we have come to wail for you and you have not given us our pig or our yams. We look after your village and if the *barau* makes incantations against you we stop it; if the witches do the same, we stop it. You are Kauanamo, our child and if we left you the witches would kill you'."

Associations

There is very little in the way of day-stimulus except his eternal complaints about being here (in Sipupu) and about wanting to go back to his village. The spirits who appear in the dream as mourners came to the burial of Monadijero, his sister's daughter.

He enumerates the mourners and then talks about the spirits:

"These tokwatokway near the village are like our people. If we cry they come and cry and if we go for an une they go with us. My mother used to say Sine Mweire and Sine Gaureja are your mothers. They will always protect you against witches and sorcerers."

The associations are too meagre for an interpretation.

Dream 4

"We went for a sagari to Mwaruquasia. They were beating a man called Rugujamwej. He asked for our help and we came to the rescue. His enemy again ran at him and told us to desist from helping the man; then he can kill him: 'Why do you want to kill him?' I asked. 'For a pig!' he said. 'Why do you help my enemies, the people of Quanaura?' he said. He threw a spear at us and the missionary of Soburata said: 'Don't do that. This is the time of Christianity. Stop it.' We refused the food they gave us."

Associations

The man in the dream is called Rugujamwej (went in wait-

ing). He is a good man but weak, *taj nadigega waine* (a man like a woman).

To the *sagari* at *Mwaruquasia* he remarks: *Kedarakija* had a *sagari* there once (relation of his father). At the dance they sang this song.

Virgins their dirt
In the district of *Joho*, I bathe naked
Cloud of *Jaibweuri* (plain at *Kelologeia*)
Standing it covers me.

A *Kelologeia* man went to a girl to make love. He bathed at *Joho*. But he was homesick for *Kelologeia*.

A man called *Wijawija* attacked another one called *Laseni* at a *Soburata sagari*, saying that he had not been repaid for his pig. He cut the other man's neck with a knife. The result was that *Laseni*, the injured party, received a whole pig to "make peace". One of the men who helped him was his cousin *Waramaija*. He has just sent his wife to ask *Waramaija* for food. His other helper was a man called *Nupa-ura*, his "*wari-esa*" (a man who has the same name that he has). He is an *esa-esa*; another word for *esa-esa* is *masura kadi kasau* = where food accumulates. By the way, he says to me, "give me my rice!".

The missionary's words were actually spoken at a *sagari* at *Soburata* by the missionary *Wasselo*, his cross-cousin.

Interpretation

We cannot get very far on the basis of these associations. One thing we can see, *Kauanamo* is aiding a "woman" (man like a woman) against an "angry man". Also, that the "dispenser of food", the chief, is essentially a female ideal and that they go to the *sagari* oscillating between aggression (male) and the desire to be an *esa-esa* (female). Moreover, that going to a *sagari* in a foreign village is an ambivalent matter, they want to go yet they are homesick to return as soon as possible. But all this does not disclose the latent dream content.

Dream 5

"We sailed and we caught a fish near an island called Sarupaj (means island-vegetable; good water there) and then we sailed to another island called Bunora (sea shell; no water to drink there) and a ghost said: 'Kauanamo, you bring our net.' The name of that net was *Pasikeda* and we fished and we caught a man. He said: 'I am not a fish but a man. My name is Utau (*You man*). Take me to my sister Kedebwejara (Road ripe).' Kedebwejara said, 'You caught my brother. If you give me a basket full of mwari and bagi, you can kill him and eat him.'

She then made a *mona* (pudding; taro and cocoanut oil). This brother and sister are from the same grandmother."

Associations

The Ghost. The voice was the voice of a man called Qualieli, his *ejena* (in-law relation). This was a man from Panamosi. The fishermen of Panamosi used to come to sell fish at Duau. This Qualieli was an important man in the une. His *gumagi* (i.e., une partner), a man called Tapa Ruruana stole his wife. (The wife was Kauanamo's nuhuna, class sister.) They had a quarrel. Qualieli said: "Why do you take my wife?" The other man said, "What are you going to do to me?"

The Net. The net *Pasikeda* was owned by Bisari. Bisari was his kana gwara's⁹ son, his *tasina*.¹⁰ This is the man who took him to Panamosi because Nisari's mother wanted him. During his stay in Panamosi his father died. (He has told me this several times). "Bisari would say to me, 'Take whatever you like from my basket. Then you will go to the women, offer it to them and you will have intercourse.'" Bisari reminds him of his own father. He was a great giver. He used to say: "There is my wife, there are my children. They will all gather around me and cover me (i.e., love me)."

The name of the net is *Pasikeda* = Grown on Road. If you

9. Mother's sister.

10. Ortho-cousin.

ay that to a man that is equivalent to calling him a son of a bitch. Somebody said this to Bisari and therefore he called the next net that he made Pasikeda.¹¹ About the man called Utau (You Man) whom they catch in the net, he has the following observations, "I got five *bagis* from Utau Didijara mwedujena, Gomakara-redakeda, Siboigaj, Mwaraurau, Senubeta." The names mean "Thorn of the Grass Didijara", "Lizard on the Road", "Their own thing", "Walker", "Cough". From the two islands mentioned in the dream he used to bring many fish as *pokara*, i.e., presents to elicit *bagis*.

The man whom they catch is therefore his *une partner*. Now, *une partner* means *gu magi*—my betel nut, i.e., something to *hew*. The idea of catching a man takes him back to the pre-white days with cannibal raids.

A man called Enoeno (Sleeping) was caught by his sister's husband. This was in revenge for a brother of Kauanamo who had been caught and eaten by the enemy. A woman called Bukau said, like in the dream: "Pass it on for *bagi*." He was bought and eaten by the people of Wewekona, a village in Majawa.

Interpretation

The voices in the dream represent the superego. In Dream 1 the superego is the mother, here it is the father. But beside the father two other images are superimposed—a) that of a man whose wife was stolen, b) of his adoptive father at Panamosi.

The overtly all too giving behavior of his father and his adoptive father increases his guilt feelings, for there can be scarcely any doubt about it, the name of Utau (You Man) is not chosen by accident but represents Kauanamo himself. This great eater (Mouth only) whom everybody characterizes as a greedy child was a spoilt child, a fact which increased his greediness and also his guilt feelings. The great eater is going to be eaten. The

11. This is according to custom. They are always consoling themselves for what they have suffered.

associations lead to a man who was caught and eaten on a revenge expedition for Kauanamo's brother. Therefore sibling rivalry has evidently something to do with the guilt feelings. Then there is the man whose wife was stolen and whom he identifies with his father and the adoptive father who urged him to take his things and use them in winning women—clearly showing the oedipus sources of his guilt feeling.

And he finishes the session by a gau (hiding incantation) against the witches, i.e., the mother who has been transformed into an object of dread, both on account of oral (pre-oedipal) and of oedipal guilt feelings. This is the incantation:

Sine	Kuku	Marjero
Woman	Sound	Come to us
Kaua	bwaga	jagauli
Her	ocean	I hide (i.e., cover with fog)
Igu	kasa	jagauli
My	village	I hide
Igu	waga	jagauli
My	boat	I hide
Jagau	jagau	kausi
I hide	I hide	cover
Jarujaruagu		makamakajangu
My soul,		my shadow
Jagau,	jagau	kausi
I hide,	I hide,	I shut
Jagau,	jagau	bodej
I hide,	I hide	close

While saying this incantation they hit a tree with a ceremonial axe. He shows how they do it with his hand, representing the axe and my hand as the tree.

The witch who is a sound is a witch at Dutuna Point. There used to be an echo there. The choice of this incantation is not accidental; the voice is the superego. He hides (i.e., regresses into the womb), because he chops the tree (mother) with his axe (tooth, penis).

Dream 6

"A person from Bwebweso called Dibwajaore (their magic, meaning magic leaves, bwajawe) came and said: 'You get up and we go! Bwebweso dance we dance.' My soul got up and said: 'Dibwajaore! Where are we to go to dance?' He said: 'We go to Bwebweso and on their dancing place we dance.' We were there and he started the dance with the following song:

Bwebweso	goma	kesaba
Bwebweso	young	girls
Tau	wae	lemaej
Man	you take from each other	

They danced and then they sang the second half of the song:

Jaita	kami	sibonu
Who is	your	young boy
Nuana	wagenonaya	
His mind you turn around		
Nekite		idoudou
(name of his daughter)		cries
Jaira	be	jagebej
I go back and I see her		
Tau	wae	lemaej
Men	you go on taking from each other."	

Associations

When he dreamt this dream he was sick. They came for his soul to fetch him to a dance at Bwebweso.

Once before, his friends woke him for a dance and then they made this song at Quauaura:

Wainari	iwari	
Wainari	sings	
Weyagana		bwebwejana
W. (name of a flower)		pretty
Gwama	kutuna	wejej
child	push	back
To	kawe	radiradina

What tree its color
Tabadi gejojowej
We stick in hanging from the side.

The song is based on the following event: A man came to make love to a woman but she had her child with her. He said: "Push the child away. I have brought a pretty flower (ane). It may stick out and hurt the child." She replies: "It won't hurt the child."

The women of Bwebweso wanted to have intercourse with Negita's father (i.e., Kauanamo), but he says: "No, I am going back to my daughter."

This Dibwajaore was a man he never knew, but when he was a little boy his ancestors used to talk about him as a great dancer.

Interpretation

A sick man is afraid of death. The spirit comes to fetch him, but it is for a dance and for love-making with the young girls of Bwebweso. For him these mythical beings mean his own daughter towards whom the old man's libido is directed. The song reflects the oedipus situation. The child is pushed aside when the adults are having intercourse. The flower that sticks out symbolizes the penis.

Dream 7

"I walked about in the bush and the people of Guj chased me. 'Why did you come?' they asked me. 'I came for betel nuts,' I replied. A man called Napijeni led them. They chased me and I ran. I jumped into a gully. They wanted to kill me. I said: 'Now you beat me for nothing. I came for betel nuts.' They said, 'We planted our betel nuts. They are ours. You can take what is in the bush.' We went to a house. They cooked food and put it down beside me, saying: 'You eat.' I refused, saying: 'I came for betel nuts and you hit me. Now it is up to you. If you want to, you can kill me.' I came away with betel nuts and food. 'You go,' they said, 'and never come back.' "

Associations

Napijeni is his rabaraba, his brother's son. Napijeni calls him "my father". He looks ugly. He has a lot of fun. If he sees a woman he will say: "My wife, I had intercourse with her before." He comes from the inland village with yams for which he gets cocoanuts. He is Kauanamo's son. The place is a village called Sumarawe. He goes there quite often to Napijeni for his betelnuts. He would call and Napijeni would come down from the garden on the hill to bring him this betelnut. Napijeni is just like his son. The gully into which he jumps is Kekura gully, the place of Matakapotaiataia. Matakapotaiataia's footstep is visible there. It is his place of gagasa (pride). Matakapotaiataia is *tau tokumalina* (a bad man) *Gamwasoara arena* (the root of anger). He was really chased like that once. This was at Kebelugua (his uncle's bush village). He was on a perfectly innocent visit to his uncle. They thought he came to get *sumwana* (left overs of food, spittle, blood, clothing, and the like) to barau them. They chased him and he ran away. This uncle's name was Selilo (he was not a real uncle, only an older member of the same totem-clan).

This uncle was held by the young people the way he is held in the dream. The words: "You beat me for nothing" were said by this uncle. "I came for the single girls." He was in the village and asleep when the shouts woke him. The men shouted: "We caught Selilo. We thought he came for married women or barau." They will all rally against any stranger; he is supposed to *come for barau or to steal their wives*. But a light is enough to drive them away. Then they will all run away for "omaiamaia" (shame).

The words: "We planted our betel nuts; they are ours. You can take what is in the bush," are what old men always say to the young men who walk about at night. He often says it himself to the young men in his village (Kebelugua). "What I planted is mine! Let me chew it and when I die it will be yours!"

The young men want the betel nuts so that they can give them as presents to the girls to whom they go for *gwari*.

When he was young, Mwajtagili said the same thing to him. Mwajtagili was his sister's husband. He protested and said: "I did not come to steal betel nuts, I came for the girls." They thought he came for barau or stealing.

The words in which he refuses to take the food were said by some people of Quanaura who were chased by the Guj people. "Next time they come with their yams for cocoanuts, we shall refuse the exchange and beat them." Taweroga said this, his "tasina" (brother) of Quanaura. This is a quiet man, a good gardener and a great singer.

Interpretation

Another dream that is dominated by his guilt feelings. His main opponent or persecutor is a man whom he calls "son" and who calls him "father". We often find in analyzing our patients that the son plays the role of the reincarnated father, in the sense of the Uranos-Kronos-Zeus myth; the deed demands retribution to fit the crime.

Actually we find the younger man in the role that is typical of old men, while he, Kauanamo, is a young Kauanamo, once more out to kill the old men and to steal their wives. The intimate link in the associations between girls, stealing, sorcery and betelnuts makes this quite clear. Of course Kauanamo protests his innocence. He uses the words of the "quiet man", his brother, yet these very words were spoken in a mood of fighting.

But more important than all this is the gully into which he jumps. It looks like Kekura gully, the place in which the mother of Matakopotaiataia hides when she is afraid of the man-eating giant Tokedukeketai and is pregnant with Matakopotaiataia, the Papuan oedipus¹² (cf. Dream 1). Kauanamo jumps into his

12. Cf. Geza Róheim: *The Riddle of the Sphinx*, London, Hogarth Press, 1934, p. 182.

mother's vulva, the gully, *for like every barau he is Matakapotaia-taia*. This is the latent wish fulfillment in the dream; the gwar and the betelnuts are symbolic representatives of the same. For the old man, the young men represent the father image and the rest of the dream is dictated by the superego.

In the first dream the witch is revealed as the mother and the trading expedition as the move "away from the mother". Father murders mother (primal scene), the sons take the "good body content" out of mother and make peace with father on basis of the kune. The second dream reveals his anxiety about not being at home; the voice of the superego in the dream is again the mother's voice. In the fifth dream we again have the voice of conscience; this time it is the father's voice. The father is identified with a man whose wife he has stolen. The associations point to the oedipus complex. They show us the effect the "good father" of a matrilineal society has on the formation of a personality. The goodness of the father increases the guilt feelings. Moreover we can also see how the fact that they are "spoiling" the child most of the time,¹³ while at the same time traumatizing it orally creates the "oral aggressive" character type described by Bergler. Siblings are not wanted; guilt for these death wishes is dealt with in the cannibal raid. The spirits are coming to fetch him in the sixth dream but Eros transforms death into coitus with his own daughter. The last dream is again an anxiety dream. Kau anamo, the great barau, is guilty and his guilt is based on the oedipus complex. His "son" who now has the women appears in the role of a father. We can definitely see from all this that the great sorcerer is no less afraid of people than they are of him.

What follows from these two cases?

A. From the point of view of institutions and beliefs:

The dreams of Kauanamo give us a hypothetical clue to the

13. It is true that they beat the child sometimes and therefore, compared to Australia, they are severe. But on the whole the children are spoilt little tyrants whose gewana (demanding) they often indulge.

meaning of the great ceremonial trade and barter institution or kune. It is really the body destruction fantasy of a thwarted child projected beyond the boundaries and represented as a restitution instead of a destruction. If this hypothesis helps us to understand the details of ritual myth and magic we shall assume it is a valid one.

Surely the analysis of a barau (evil sorcerer) must have some bearing on the psychology of black magic. We see from these dreams that Kauanamo has strong guilt feelings (the voice = superego) and anxiety (his narrative practically starts with how the barau got people). Nor can there be any doubt about the oral sources of Kauanamo's ever-demanding character, which is just what the people themselves regard as typical of their own "ethos". If somebody would, however, deduce the conclusion from these facts that in this matrilineal society personality is based on the pre-oedipal situation, we would be justified in calling attention to the dreams in which the voice (superego) is paternal and to the references to the oedipus myth of Matakapotaiataia.

Then we have Ramoramo, a less typical and more virile personality. We know that he is this way through personal contact. In a difficulty, he is more likely to use his spear than his knowledge of sorcery. The dreams confirm this, as oedipus and genital motives dominate the scene. In Dreams 1 and 2 we have guilt connected with the father-son situation. The cannibal ogre (Tokedukeketai) is a projection of the father image. Then, again we find Ramoramo chased by his totem-bird or in an open fight with his elder brother. Even the sagari (food distribution ceremony) with its obvious oral symbolism becomes genital and oedipal.

B. From the point of view of the personalities:

I said that Ramoramo was less typical than Kauanamo. By that I mean less like the projected type, less like they appear to be. But whether he is also less like the way they are—that is quite

different a question. It should also be noted that Ramoramo is about thirty-five; Kauanamo about sixty-five; and that Kauanamo is a *barau*; Ramoramo is just a layman. The question remains whether the analytic understanding of the institutions will yield the same latent meanings as the interpretations of the dreams, in which they occur. If there is a difference, a hypothesis is needed to explain that difference.

The society in which Ramoramo and Kauanamo live is matrilineal and matrilocal. Any anthropologist of the "cultural" school would come to the conclusion that they have no oedipus complex. The point is however that you cannot arrive at reliable conclusions regarding personality and the unconscious without analyzing dreams.

PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACHES TO THE JAPANESE CHARACTER

By HERMANN M. SPITZER, B.A., J.U.D. (Washington, D.C.)

I.

The Japanese were the most enigmatic of our enemies. We may dislike and condemn the Germans of today, but if we go far enough back in their history and in our own we find ideals which our ancestors have shared, and looking backwards we can almost point to the day on which the Germans began to forsake the common road.

It is different with the Japanese. What we seem to have in common is what they have copied from us. Their own reactions seem the opposite to ours. If we enter a room we take off our hat while they take off their shoes. When we stand a wet umbrella on its head they stand it on its handle, when we strike a match toward us, they pull it away from the body.¹ When we fence we pull the blade of the sword toward us at the moment of striking while the Japanese swordsman pushes it away from him. We put the thread through the eye of the needle while the Japanese girl slips the needle's eye over the point of the thread.²

It may be argued that these are the externals and superficialities of life. But it is the same with the essentials, with life itself. We love life. We are willing to sacrifice it for some higher ideal,

1 Percival Lowell, *The Soul of the Far East*, New York, Macmillan & Co., 1911, p. 3.

2 Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan, an Attempt at Interpretation*, New York, Macmillan & Co., 1904, p. 11/2.

for the safety of our country or in the pursuit of knowledge, but we condemn suicide as we condemn any needless sacrifice. The soldier who surrenders in the face of overwhelming odds especially after he has completed his task has our approval. If he decides to stay on and sell his life dearly he wins our admiration. But if instead he prefers to commit suicide, which after all makes things easier for the enemy, we think that the strain of battle has deranged his mind. Such, however, seems still the prevailing Japanese practice.

Lest we assume that the Japanese soldier's suicide is due to the fear of ill-treatment in captivity, or even of the loss of honor on return to his own country let us consider the history of Major Kuga who happened to fall into Chinese captivity. This was due to no fault of his own. He was found on the battlefield, wounded and unconscious, by a former Chinese college-mate. The Chinese saved his life and after a time the Japanese officer was returned home. He had to face a court martial and was absolved from any blame. But his conscience gave him no rest. He travelled back to the spot where he so nearly lost his life and ended it there by suicide.³

We should need more than ordinary imagination to regard this as a meritorious act. If we are Christians we must disapprove of suicide; if we are not, we must still condemn a deed which has deprived the country of the services of a courageous man. But the Japanese see it differently. Tsunetomo Yamamoto, a retainer of the lords of Nabeshima, preached the ideals of the warrior around 1700 in these words: "I have seen it eye to eye: Bushidô, the way of the warrior, means death. Where there are two ways to choose, let thy choice be the one that leadeth to death. Reason not; set thy mind on the way thou chooseth—and push on. . . . Every morning make up thy mind how to die. Every evening freshen thy mind in the thought of death. And let this be

3. Hillis Lory, *Japan's Military Masters*, New York, Viking, 1943, p. 82.

done without end.”⁴ And indeed death in battle is the prevailing theme of his book.

Tsunetomo began to dictate his *Hagakure Rongo* ten years after he had retired from worldly life. The knight who leaves the world and becomes a monk or hermit was no unknown figure in medieval Europe. But in Europe he turned his mind away from worldly things while in Japan he seems to strengthen his grip on the world by his nominal retirement.

There are other aspects of the Japanese character beside the preference for death that puzzle the observer and that find expression in the contradictory assertions of people who have had much contact with the Japanese. Some will speak to us of the amazing politeness to be met with everywhere in the country while others will regale us with stories of Japanese rudeness or brutality. Still others will quote amazing instances of Japanese honesty and reliability while we ourselves regard the behavior of the Japanese negotiators at the time of Pearl Harbor as a case of unparalleled duplicity.

How is it possible to make reason out of these contradictions? Neither common experience nor common sense provide a clue. But that need not deter us. The last fifty years have witnessed the development of a technique for understanding hitherto inexplicable human behavior. It is psychoanalysis. I am proposing to use it for the interpretation of certain peculiarities of Japanese behavior. Before doing so I wish to state some of the reasons that make psychoanalysis particularly apt for an attempt of this kind.

There is, first of all, the psychoanalytic concept of the human personality. Psychoanalysis studies human personality as a result of a never-ending series of conflicts. The fundamental conflict springs from the physiological and psychological needs of the human organism—which psychoanalysis calls the id—and the frustrating factors of the environment. The original claims

4. Z. T. Iwado, *Hagakure Bushido*, *Cultural Nippon*, Tokyo, vol. 7, no. 3/4, p. 38.

are simple, food and warmth, and they are certain to be satisfied—for if they are not satisfied the organism dies. But they are not always satisfied at the time when the need arises nor to its full extent. There are disappointments, and in coping with these disappointments the human personality develops certain devices which appear at successive stages in a person's life without ever superseding one another completely. The first is hallucination: the satisfaction which does not take place in reality takes place in the imagination. It is a device which is never completely abandoned, even the most mature will indulge in daydreams or supplement their everyday life by vicarious life drawn from the reading of fiction.

The second device is a way of avoiding conflicts with reality by anticipating them in imagination. After the model of the authorities which inflict punishment for the child's transgressions the child creates in himself an authority which intervenes before the punishable action is committed and often inhibits it even before the wish becomes conscious. We can watch part of this activity in ourselves and call it conscience, but a much larger part of it never becomes conscious in the healthy adult. Psychoanalysis considers the two together and calls them the superego. The form which the superego activity takes depends on the way in which the environment treats the demands of the child, and it must not be forgotten that the child is an animist who will not only regard men and beasts as equals but invent other friendly or evil beings and hold them responsible for what we call the inanimate world.

With increasing maturity man develops a third device, the conscious regulation of his behavior in order to adapt either the environment to his needs or his needs to the environment. This regulation is the work of the ego, the third part of the human personality, the part that develops latest and never obtains complete control. The dreams even of the sanest people are a battlefield between the superego and id, and even in our considered

actions they battle with the ego for the control and, as our slips of the tongue and other mistakes show, often obtain it.

In addition to the concept of the human personality as being made up of the three instances, id, superego and ego, and as being understandable as the result of a continuous strife among the three, psychoanalysis furnishes a second key to the understanding of human nature in the concept of ambivalence. Since the same persons in the child's environment are the source of both the child's satisfactions and his disappointments, they are both loved and hated at the same time or in such rapid alternation as to make the two sentiments practically contemporaneous.

This seems contrary to all logic and much human ingenuity has been spent in efforts to cope with this dilemma. We find it in Christian theology as the problem of theodicy, the difficulty of reconciling divine providence and benevolence with the existence of evil. The solution which the child adopts is not unlike that of the theologian: he divides people in two and supplies the good mother with an imaginary double in the shape of a wicked step-mother or a witch and repeats the process for all the other important and ambiguous figures of his early environment. Thus he arrives at a view of the world which is esthetically and ethically most gratifying, all made up of contrasts of white and black, of good and evil.

The third discovery of psychoanalysis which is important in our efforts to understand unexpected behavior is the heuristic principle that people do what they really want, that not only their total personality but also their isolated actions can be understood when they are viewed as compromises between the desires of the three instances that make up human personality. The rational meaning of an act is usually accompanied by an unconscious, irrational, symbolic meaning. To give a harmless instance: How few of us ever stop to think it curious that man alone of all living beings should make a point of having his food cooked and of eating it warm? We are unconsciously repeating our first

experience: the food we tasted first, our mother's milk, was warm.

There is neither time nor space to enter upon the various ways in which symbolization takes place. Many of them were known long before psychoanalysis was developed and can be found in the most old-fashioned books on rhetoric. What psychoanalysis has discovered and what makes them pregnant with meaning is that, in the realm of the unconscious, thought and action are identical. Our unconscious harbors the belief that thought is omnipotent and this belief in connection with the techniques of symbolization is the source of both the magical practices of the primitives and the superstitions of the civilized.

I am proposing to apply psychoanalytic thinking to three Japanese traits that are among the most puzzling ones, and that had a particular bearing in the last war. They are, firstly, the Japanese readiness to die and their preference for suicide over surrender, secondly, the nature of Japanese cruelty and the occasions at which it manifests itself, and thirdly, the peculiar Japanese concept of sincerity.

The first and the second trait are closely connected and the two can be treated together. They result from the fact that aggression which, according to psychoanalytic theory, is one of the two basic human drives, is much less securely controlled in the Japanese than in other civilizations. Under favorable conditions aggression is fused with the other basic drive, libido, as the individual matures. Aggression is thus rendered harmless and social life upon informal and friendly terms becomes possible. In Japan, however, conditions do not favor this fusion.

This becomes apparent from the way in which Japanese children are reared⁵ and the way in which Japanese adults are ex-

5. On the rearing of children see especially John F. Embree, *Suye Mura*, Chicago Univ. Press, 1939, pp. 183/4, and Y. Inouye, *Home Life in Tokyo*, Tokyo 1911, pp. 149, 161, 219, 223-252. The description given there is confirmed by many published Japanese autobiographies, e.g. Sumie Mishima's *My Narrow Isle*, New York, John Day, 1941.

pected to behave. The Japanese child is extremely well treated, as long as he is the youngest. His needs for food are amply gratified. Mother or wet nurse will suckle him whenever he desires it, and he will have abundant warmth as he is well clothed and shares his bed with mother or nurse. In fact, he is living in an infant's paradise. But from this paradise he is expelled almost overnight when a sibling is born. We know how serious a shock the birth of a younger rival is to Western children, and yet Western children are as a rule weaned long before a second birth takes place. There is not the double shock of weaning and loss of care; the frustration which they suffer is gradual and hence much less intense than that experienced by the Japanese child.

Unhappily, whenever frustration occurs it sets free aggression; the process of fusing aggression and libido is reversed. Libido that ordinarily is directed toward some object in the outside world is withdrawn and turned toward the self which needs consolation. Aggression is ordinarily directed against the obstacle, but it may happen that the obstacle is too frightening. In such a case aggression is turned against the self. Almost anyone who has occasion to observe people during a protracted physical illness can check the truth of this statement, for he will see the patient lose interest in the outside world—i.e., withdraw his libido from it—and will see him become irritable against the people who tend him, much more irritable against those who treat him kindly than those who use him harshly.

That the shock of weaning is very severe in Japan seems to be borne out by Japanese eating habits. Both Japanese and foreign observers agree that the Japanese eat very hastily. Food as a rule is monotonous to the palate, however attractive it may be to the eye, and more food seems to be eaten cold than with us.⁶ In other words, the Japanese have trained themselves to forego permanently a pleasure of which they were so brusquely deprived in their infancy.

6. Hillis Lory, *l.c.*, pp. 60/2 and Y. Inouye, *l.c.*, pp. 63, 71/5.

It is unfortunate that the weaning occurs most frequently between the ages of two and three years, for this is the period during which the aggressive drives develop most rapidly in a person's life. And it is doubly unfortunate that at least the urban civilization of Japan fails to provide either sufficient repression or possibilities of sublimation for children at that age. This appears for instance from an article in the *Tokyo Asahi* of August 15, 1940, in which German and Japanese children were compared by an author who complained that Germans were refusing to rent apartments to Japanese families with children, since Japanese parents did not curb their children but let them damage and destroy the furniture. The Japanese child is allowed a few years of unchecked aggression until he enters school. Then aggression is checked and again the checking comes as a sudden psychological shock.

The checking of aggression begins as the child enters school, and it lasts until the man retires after the age of sixty.⁷ While Western civilization assigns much importance to restraints, to things that are not done, but leaves to the individual relative freedom in his choice of behavior outside the forbidden field, Japanese civilization withholds such freedom. There, the main insistence is positive and on the right way of behavior. Too much zeal is as bad as too little. "As the child goes under the influence of his father and teacher," observed two psychologists who visited Japan not long ago, "there is a tendency to limit his freedom of thought and individuality more and more. One requires from the child a maximum of obedience. Every manifestation of initiative is suppressed."⁸ A corollary to this suppression of initiative is the smothering of competition. "At school athletic games," says Embree, "all entrants, not only first, second, and third, receive prizes. By giving prizes thus generously, no one feels unduly

7. John F. Embree, *L.c.*, chap. 6. The Life Story of the Individual.

8. J. Wielawski and W. Winiarz, Some Observations from Three Years of Study of Psychopathology and Genetic Psychology in Asia, *Psy Rev.* 23, 1936, p. 177.

slighted.”⁹ This is not as much of a psychological advantage as it may appear, for it also means that the children never learn to bear slights, even in moderate doses. That is to say, they do not learn to bear slights from equals, for Japanese life is not lacking in slights from superiors which must be borne. Yet, this does not mean that the inferior will submit to every kind of slight from the superior. In the well ordered Japanese society even the permissible types of slight are standardized and deviation from the standard may result in revolt.

Moreover, the superior must justify to the inferiors that he is really superior; mere appointment by a higher authority is not enough. The new teacher will be tested by the students before he is accepted.¹⁰ The consequence of such tests is that all authority is really strong and the pressure of authority the greater.

Growing up under such pressure and with so little outlet may be expected to yield one of two results. It may produce either rebels or compulsive neurotics. As a rule, it breeds the second, and indeed the whole Japanese civilization presents the pattern of a compulsion neurosis. The importance of ceremonial and the detailed regulation of all the activities of life are as characteristic of this pattern as is the fear of dirt and the equation of sin with pollution. We know that compulsive traits are a reaction-formation, a way of permanently checking aggressive drives that are dangerously strong. The stronger the aggressive impulse, the closer the sufferer clings to his ritual. If for some reason he is compelled to abandon the ritual he will either become a prey to anxiety or protect himself by substituting a new ritual for the old one.

The way in which the compulsive mechanism works in Japan is shown by the following incident. The First Higher School in Tokyo has for over sixty years adhered to the “Main Gate Principle”. One of the school regulations reads: “Students shall enter

9. John F. Embree, *l.c.*, p. 188.

10. Based on unpublished observations of Western residents in Japan

or leave the school grounds with uprightness and dignity." When the school was moved to another district the principle was maintained and the new rear gate that had been added was kept closed. Then a new headmaster was appointed and he decided that the rear gate too should be opened and used. A few days before the opening he received a visit from some students and was thus addressed by their spokesman: "Sir, we have heard that you are going to open the rear gate. We question whether it is proper to carry out such an action for the sake of convenience or with an excuse of utilitarianism. The Main Gate Principle is not a mere tradition. It is an ethical principle firmly established in our school. Therefore, we students are abiding by it with faith and devoutness. . . ."11

The very triviality of this example shows the strength of the compulsions. Here is something that would make life easier. Can the students accept it? No, they are afraid of it, they feel compelled to reject it. They have become reconciled to the fact that life is unpleasant and they revel in it. They have turned masochists. Not only do they find it easier to bear the ills they have than fly to others that they know not of, they have reached a state in which they manage to extract satisfaction from the accustomed ills.

And here we have the reason which makes so many Japanese soldiers prefer suicide to captivity. They feel secure in the world in which they live, however harshly and unkindly that world may treat them. Captivity, the cessation of fighting, may mean an easier life but that is just what they are afraid of. We pray "and do not lead us into temptation". That should help us to understand the Japanese soldier whose unconscious is no less afraid of temptation than any Christian. We have no reason to believe that the medieval heretic was less moral than the orthodox Catholic of those times, in fact some of them seem to have shown more kindness than their opponents. That only made the fury

11. *Tokyo Zisshu*. f. *Psa.*, 9, 1941, no. 3/4.

of the persecution worse, for it was necessary to combat the temptation that might spring from their example.

It has been argued that Japanese soldiers have been led to commit suicide by the fear of being ill-treated or of not being allowed to return home. It seems very doubtful that the first motive can often be effective. People who feel so strongly about life as to fear ill-treatment are likely to take a chance on it, as our soldiers do. Fear of not being able to return is another matter. If surrender means cutting oneself off from the established Japanese society it must be frightening, not only consciously because it means the loss of emotional security, but also unconsciously because it means the denial of the Japanese system of society, because it is an act of revolt, the denial of the "Main Gate Principle".

There have been times during the Russo-Japanese war as well as during the last one when surrenders multiplied, namely when morale fell low under the prospect of inevitable defeat. Then many soldiers sought the easy way out by giving themselves up. They abandoned Japanese ideals. That is one possible psychological reaction to such a situation, but there is another one of which I shall speak later.

Fear of the loss of the certainties of Japanese life is not the only psychological reason that may make dying easier for the Japanese. There is another one which springs from the nature of the human unconscious which is incapable of conceiving of its own death. Recognition of the possibility of one's own personal death is an accomplishment of maturity. Children, on the whole, cannot conceive of anybody's death. Even adults find the idea of their own death unpalatable and cling to the compromise formula of an immortal soul. The official doctrine of Christianity even today is the resurrection of the flesh, although many Christians may no longer hold it. But even where the Westerner believes in the resurrection of the flesh he has drawn a sharp line between this world and the next. This the Japanese has never done; his

gods can die, and his men are immortal. The borderline between gods and men is as fluid as is the line between life and death. Life and death are two different forms of existence.¹² It seems easy and natural to pass from one into the other and death does not imply the transformation of the personality which it means to us.

A civilization that represses aggression as strongly as the Japanese imposes an almost impossible task upon human nature. People may be able to avoid aggressive acts against their oppressors and even their aggressive feelings may become unconscious, but the feelings will still be there and find expression in institutions although in disguised form. The institution that allows us to diagnose aggression most clearly is ancestor worship. The worshipper atones for the destructive wishes which he has harbored against the oppressing ancestor, the wishes which have brought about the ancestor's death, for in the worshipper's unconscious the wish and the deed are identical. Ancestor worship is not only a Japanese characteristic, but neither are ambivalent feelings of children against parents. However, other civilizations have managed to cope with the mechanism of ambivalence by different institutions. Japan has not only preserved ancestor worship, it has intensified the system by superimposing the loyalty-relation toward the feudal lord and finally toward the emperor. Feudal loyalty in medieval Europe was a reciprocal institution, the vassal had rights upon as well as duties toward the lord. The Japanese vassal had, if not only duties toward his lord, certainly no admitted right of enforcing the lord's duties toward him. Naturally the system intensified the ambivalent character of the relationship and with it the unconscious feeling of guilt on the part of the inferior. This would tend to reach a peak at the time when the lord died, and the vassal would cope with it either by

12. The quotations from Hirata (1776-1843) given by Sir E. Satow in *The Revival of Pure Shinto*, Yokohama, 1875. (Supplement to the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.)

committing suicide—as General Nogi did at the time of the Emperor's death in September 1912—or by withdrawing from the world and going into retirement.¹³

Retirement at an early age—the forties—and passing on the office or the estate to the son was a feature of Tokugawa Japan. It may explain why the Tokugawa experiment of stabilizing society succeeded as well as it did. The domination of the head of the family might be oppressive, but it was transitory. Yet even so, the Tokugawa system bred enough rebels to supersede the Tokugawas.

They did not, however, supersede the system. True, there were bold and perspicacious spirits like Fukugawa Yukichi who recognized its dangers and wanted to do away with it, but their success was only temporary. What Japan got in the end was a combination of both the Western and the Japanese systems, with Western institutions stopping not a few of the outlets that the Japanese system had left open. The custom of early retirement disappeared and with it one of the main safeguards of the old order. In addition the government tried to force Western ideas of sexual morality upon the people. Phallic worship was the first to go, homosexuality which had been tolerated up till then became a criminal offence, and a new standard of chastity was set which reached even the most primitive rural districts. As one of the village people remarked to Embree, "even a servant girl now has enough education to know that she must keep her virginity."¹⁴ All these measures had to have one effect: to increase the aggressive tension in the body politic. Assassination supplemented the methods of constitutional government. But the domestic openings were not enough, a large surplus of aggression remained available for warfare abroad.

13. For a psychologically interesting Japanese evaluation of Nogi's suicide see Shuroku Kuroiwa, *On Hearing of the Devotional Self-immolation of General Nogi*, published in Y. Hibino, *Nippon Shindo Ron*, Cambridge Univ Press, 1928, pp. 23-30.

14. John F. Embree, *l.c.*, p. 194.

That the Japanese embarked upon foreign warfare would not be surprising; most nations have done so at one time or another. What is surprising is the cruelty that they brought to it and particularly the fact that this cruelty is relatively recent. At the time of the Boxer rebellion, for instance, Japanese troops were much better behaved than many of the Western ones, while the present generation is acting like fiends. Similarly, if we go back in Japanese history and compare Japan under feudalism with Europe under feudalism and even some time after, we do not get the impression that the Japanese were more cruel, and in the course of time their cruelty seems even to have declined. The Tokugawa criminal code foresaw a particularly unpleasant form of execution: the condemned man was put into a box with only his head sticking out. On the box was laid a saw and passers-by were supposed to help saw the head off by each taking a pull at the saw. However, in later Tokugawa times no passers-by could be found willing to pull the saw and the condemned had to be put to death by the public executioner.¹⁵

I think we are right in attributing the recrudescence of cruelty to the increase of repressions and the stopping up of old outlets after the opening of Japan under Meiji. This would also explain the relative late appearance of cruel behavior. The people brought up before the Meiji restoration of 1868 and those formed in the first two or three decades after its inception would not yet have felt the full strain of the reforms.

While this would account for the general increase of cruelty, it would not account for the occasions at which cruelty is manifested. We should expect cruelty when restraints are normally loosened, in the heat of battle or immediately afterwards. We should not expect it seemingly in cold blood against the prisoner of war long after his surrender. Nor should we expect it to be directed against women or children, especially not against chil-

15. J. C. Hall, *The Tokugawa Legislation IV, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 41, 1913, p. 791 and note on "nokogiri-biki" on plate.

dren, since by all accounts the Japanese are extremely fond of children.

The clue to this riddle lies in the mechanism of identification. Identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object. The infant starts by identifying himself with his parents. In the unconscious where wish and reality are identical, that means that he is like them, that he and they are one or that they are part of him. Such identification need not be complete, the child picks out certain aspects in a parents' character and neglects others, he copies certain mannerisms which acquire symbolical significance and leaves aside others. Identification is the basis of all character-formation, it is also the basis of most social relations.

One of these relations is pity. The basis of pity is identification with the weaker one who suffers, and for this reason pity is not a sentiment in which people with a weak ego can safely indulge. Pity is an adult trait, often conspicuously lacking in children and adolescents. The growing child strives after identification with the stronger, with the victor, not with the victim. So does the adult who has been unable to develop a strong ego. He identifies himself with a powerful leader, and one way of establishing such identification is the abuse of power toward the weaker. In fact, the very existence of weak people constitutes a psychological danger to people whose ego-development has been hampered. Their unconscious fear is that they may be among the weak ones—which is precisely what they are—and to counteract this sentiment they try to prove by their actions that they are really strong. We were able to watch this process at work in Germany where allied prisoners of war began to be treated badly as misgivings spread that Germany might have lost the war. The Japanese were in a similar position. They had to convince themselves that they were really strong, and the need of such conviction was greatest when they were about to be beaten. Hence the pointless cruelties immediately before withdrawals. They were frantic efforts to deny the reality of defeat.

This conclusion may sound fantastic. But the denial of an unpleasant reality is not a specifically Japanese trait. Anyone who likes to make a collection of the sayings of prominent European statesmen on Hitler and the Nazis about 1937 and 1938 will see that the technique is not unfamiliar in the West. But while the West in principle disapproves of it, Japan thinks it a highly proper procedure. "Another mode of avoiding an embarrassing situation," writes Embree, "is not to see it if it occurs," and he proceeds to give a series of examples. For instance, a young man may decide to pay a nocturnal visit to a girl. He wraps a towel round his face, which means that he intends not to be recognized. The girl may recognize him well enough, but she will pretend not to do so. Thus she may rebuff his advances without embarrassment to either when they meet again in the daylight. Or: "When a caller comes to a house, the host, if not properly dressed, will not speak to his guest but will leave the room as if he had not seen him. After dressing, he reappears and bows a formal welcome to the guest, and the conversation begins."¹⁶ We see, the denial of physical reality in favor of psychological reality is an established principle in Japanese social relations. Confirmation of this principle can also be found in the political sphere where so much importance has been placed on the control of dangerous thoughts.

This leads us to the third feature which psychoanalysis might help to elucidate, namely the Japanese concept of sincerity. Sincere, to the Japanese, means from the heart. It is not really remote from our concept for when we say we are sincere we mean that we are speaking in accordance with our beliefs, acting in accordance with our convictions, carrying out our pledged word. This the Japanese sometimes fail to do in the most striking manner. "People in Suze," Embree relates, "will go a long way to avoid open face-to-face trouble. Thus, when in a group of people any-

16. John F. Embree, *loc. cit.*, p. 173.

one says anything, the others will all nod and say 'yes, yes'. What the next person says may be quite different, but again the chorus answers, 'aye'."¹⁷ This cannot appear insincere to the Japanese, since sincerity and honesty rank high on their scale of values. In fact, it is they who often charge us with insincerity.

The importance of face-saving has been put forward as an explanation. But face-saving would not be so important were it not that the Japanese ego were so weak. This, it has been argued, is due to the sudden shocks and the heavy pressure under which the individual grows up and which disable him from bearing slights, from standing up to scolding or from enduring ridicule. That he can employ this particular method is due to his willingness to deny physical reality where strong psychological drives are involved.

If we wish to test our sincerity we appeal to our conscience. Translated into psychoanalytic terms this would mean that we are sincere when our ego and our superego are in agreement. Now, the superego begins to develop early in life and by the time the individual has passed puberty it seems fixed in unalterable shape. As a rule it stays fixed. There are, however, conditions under which changes take place; in fact, psychoanalysis serves as a therapeutic method because such change is possible.

Human behavior is largely under the influence of what has been termed the repetition compulsion. This means that present situations, perhaps consciously, but certainly unconsciously are apprehended as repetitions of childhood situations and as far as the unconscious is capable of influencing the individual's behavior are dealt with in the way the childhood situations were managed. The less strongly developed the ego is, the stronger will be the influence of unconscious factors. The individual transfers to the elements in the present constellation the attitudes which he has taken up toward their counterparts in the past. Notably, he will

17. John F. Embree, *loc. cit.*, p. 173

transfer to some present authority the attitudes which he had adopted toward the childhood authorities after whose image the superego has been shaped. Thanks to this transference the behavior of the present authority may help to remould the character of the superego.

Transference situations are not confined to psychoanalytic treatment. I believe they are not infrequent in the relation between father-confessor and penitent among Catholics. And I suspect that the relation of the average Japanese to his Emperor is of this kind.

If this hypothesis is true, sincerity to the Japanese would mean action in accordance with the will of the Emperor. On that assumption all their actions leading up to Pearl Harbor were sincere while our resistance to Japanese plans must be rated as expression of our insincerity.

I have to admit that this theory concerning the psychological character of the relation between the average Japanese and his Emperor is largely conjectural. However, there is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence to support it.

It is first of all the fact of the relative weakness of the Japanese ego which has already been discussed.

It is secondly the conception of the Japanese state. Japan is neither a liberal state, argues Chikao Fujisawa, nor a class state in which one class dominates the others, nor has Japan anything in common with the Western monarchies. Japan is a family state of a peculiar type, of which no counterpart exists anywhere in the world. The Emperor is the head of the Japanese family state, he is the educator of the nation who points the way, *Kodô*, the imperial way; he is also the father of the nation and his subjects are his children; and he is finally their ruler.¹⁸ A conception of this kind easily increases the difficulty of the present day Japanese to reach emotional maturity and to develop adult initiative.

18. Chikao Fujisawa, *Die geistige Grundlage Japans, Cultural Nippon*, Tokyo, 4, 1936, pp. 7-12.

Even under favorable conditions emotional maturity, the ability to deal with the fact of ambivalence in reality instead of by flight into fantasy, and the satisfactory fusion of libido and aggression are not easy to achieve. Not a few people in our midst fail to do so. But our civilization at least presents us with an adult ideal. The Japanese civilization has no such ideal and thus it is not surprising that the individual Japanese more often than not fails to develop any wide range of personal initiative. What is characteristic of the Japanese is their preference for group action to personal action. They do not like to act alone. It is possible that one factor in their upbringing and their habits may have something to do with this attitude, namely their practice of frequent and communal hot bathing. The habit starts early in life—the mother takes the infant with her into the tub—and it continues until death. We know that the skin is a potential libidinal zone and the current stimulation of any libidinal zone may be expected to have some influence on character formation, but we know hardly anything of its potential effects since in our civilization skin stimulation plays a relatively insignificant part. In fact, the Japanese civilization is the only major civilization where it is important, and for this reason it is not unlikely that some of the Japanese characteristics may be ultimately traceable to it. There exists at any rate a comment by a Japanese teacher of philosophy that suggests that the habit may militate against individual independence: "When you take a bath with others you materially realize the unity of your self and other selves, for in the warmth of the bath, which is about the temperature of the human body, you feel your body warmth melt into the hot water and blend with that of other people. Spiritually, too, this can be realized."¹⁹

In conclusion we may ask whether the psychoanalytic considerations put forward in this paper point the way to any practical

19. Sumie S. Mishima, *My Narrow Isle, the Story of a Modern Woman in Japan*, New York, John Day, 1941, p. 69.

The postulate that aggression is "a probably learned drive" made it clear that, whatever the terminology used might seem to imply, strict psychoanalytic thinking could not have influenced the study very deeply and suggested that there would be room for an investigation of the available material on strictly psychoanalytic lines.

Such an investigation seemed also indicated because some of Gorer's conclusions appeared to be contrary to what psychoanalytic experience would lead one to expect. Thus from the fact of a long suckling period he inferred that weaning "superficially . . . would seem to be very slightly traumatic"²², and went on to speak of "the emotional unimportance of food".²³ But according to Embree's first-hand observations in Japan the weaning shock is as traumatic as one would expect and death is more likely to occur at that stage of childhood than at any other;²⁴ moreover the multitude of names for rice in its different stages and forms²⁵ and the limiting of women and younger sons to cold or burnt rice²⁶ seem at variance with this conclusion. And some of Gorer's own assertions, such as that until very recently (and still today in all but the most modern families) "milk is considered disgusting"²⁷ or that "among Japanese past childhood, eating acquires a certain aura of shame"²⁸ would seem to disprove his contention concerning the emotional unimportance of food. Gorer's own explanation is that a displacement of the affect from defecation to the eating of solid foods has taken place; but such an explanation, although ingenious, seems unnecessary, in view of the indications suggesting a strong weaning trauma due to the channeling of the libido toward oral gratification by the inhibition of other forms of gratification, such as free muscular movement, followed by belated

22. Gorer, *l.c.*, p. 6.

23. Gorer, *l.c.*, p. 6.

24. Embree, *l.c.*, pp. 183-4

25. Mishima, *l.c.*, p. 45.

26. Embree, *l.c.*, pp. 37-8.

27. Gorer, *l.c.*, p. 6.

28. Gorer, *l.c.*, p. 6.

deprivation of oral gratification; and the explanation also seems unwarranted in view of the absence of any indication showing the road of such displacement.

Gorer's chief point is that Japanese character is determined by the effects of early and severe cleanliness training which fosters the development of what in our civilization would be considered as compulsive neurotics—a conclusion which one can only endorse—but he fails to apply psychoanalytic experience or psychoanalytic method to other phenomena which could be easily explained with their aid and which he mentions, such as the need for approval, or the effectiveness of ridicule, or the mechanisms of child-parent relationships.

The psychoanalytic study in the first section of the present paper rests in part on the same material as Gorer's. It uses most of the written sources quoted by him and adds others which seemed promising when discovered in the course of research for a bibliography on Japanese psychology.^{28a} It does not, however, use the unpublished material collected by Gorer with the aid of his detailed questionnaire on childhood training. The material which I have been able to collect from Kibei (foreign-born but Japan-educated Japanese) and from native Japanese seemed in conflict with some of Gorer's statements based on replies to the questionnaire. I have tried to fill the gap by utilizing the published findings of Japanese psychoanalysts, whenever they were available; unfortunately they were not too numerous. Consequently the range of the character traits discussed had to be narrower than that covered by Gorer.

After the first section of the paper had been completed two other psychoanalytic studies of the Japanese appeared in print.

The first, "Psychoanalytical Aspects of Current Japanese

28a. *Bibliography of Articles and Books Relating to Japanese Psychology*, compiled by Dr. Hermann M. Spitzer in consultation with Dr. Ruth Fulton Benedict, Washington, Office of War Information, 1945.

and German Paradoxa" by Judith Silberpfennig,²⁹ describes analogies between current Japanese behavior and the behavior of some children in the phallic phase of development. She draws parallels not only between the behavior of the individual Japanese and the child but also between the behavior of the child and the conduct of policy by the Japanese government. This is the weakness of an otherwise provocative paper. Her characterization of the Japanese individual which she bases on Gorer's paper is sound enough: "One is tempted to assume that the four-year-old Japanese boy who is taught to overvalue masculinity as such will have a prolonged phallic phase in which the usual phallic aggression must be strongly influenced by anal-sadistic forms of aggression against the mother. His early resentment of motility and anal prohibitions is now permitted to express itself under the guise of manliness. On the other hand, aggression against an older male is a major offence which must unduly re-enforce the fears around his masculinity. The final solution seems to be a state in which the boy strongly identifies with the powerful male, but constantly needs him for protection. He is safe only if he obeys him. He is permitted to divert his aggression against the threatening strong male to the weaker male or the female."³⁰ And her discussion of the mechanisms of projection in virtue of which the weak and the women are regarded as particularly dangerous and as threatening aggressors is of the greatest value for the understanding of individual Japanese behavior and a very likely clue to Japanese policy.

But Silberpfennig stops half-way, saying that these analogies might suggest a hypothesis, but not offering any method by which such a hypothesis might be tested. Moreover, she skirts the danger of falling into the anthropomorphic trap—if she does not actually fall into it—when she plays with the idea "that we may

²⁹ Psychological Aspects of Current Japanese and German Paradoxa, by Judith Silberpfennig, *Psy. Rev.*, 1945

³⁰ Silberpfennig, *l.c.*, p. 80

ask ourselves whether this nation is now in a stage analogous to a certain individual stage of development, or whether a particular type of national behavior does not rather represent a regression to an earlier, more primitive phase of the nation's development."³¹

The other paper, written by La Barre, is more ambitious than that of Silberpfennig, having been planned as part of a study of Oriental character structure which is to include the Chinese and the Indians in addition to the Japanese.³²

He assumes that "there is such a thing as psychological nationality"³³ and that the "character" of a person and the temperament or "ethos" of a group are of the same order: "Whatever 'character' a person develops and whatever 'temperament' or 'ethos' the members of a group may hold in common appears to be based on the unique life history of the individual person or the unique collective history of the group concerned."³⁴ Individuals "share a group ethos only insofar as their individual experiences have been characteristic" and they are socially normal if their characteristics are adjusted to the group pattern.³⁵ In another group the very same character types might be maladjusted and constitute clinical cases. Whether they would appear thus depends on the type of civilization. Generally speaking, the more developed a civilization is, the greater is the range of variation permitted to the individual within it.³⁶ Psychological nationality develops because "the culturally-dictated management of these basically identical bodies and appetites (of individuals) differs, and thus gives different colors to the ethos of various groups."³⁷

La Barre proceeds to give a very interesting sketch of the historical experiences that have shaped the American character

31. Silberpfennig, *l.c.*, p. 74.

32. Oriental Character Structure, by Weston La Barre, *Psychiatry*, 1945

33. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 321.

34. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 321.

35. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 321.

36. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 322.

37. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 320.

and describes the "typical American character-structure" as follows: "A character on the whole somewhat compulsive in its Protestant-ethic discipline of appetites, but not at all inhibited in the social expression of many emotions and impulses, with a very high Anspruchs-niveau in material culture, aggressive, individualistic, emotionally rather simple and underived, and with a strong tendency to the sort of rationalism that is taught by the machine."³⁸ He undertakes this analysis so that the reader may be warned against his own personal bias.

He goes on to say that the Japanese are of all peoples the most compulsive, exhibiting the following traits characteristic of the compulsive type: "Secretiveness, hiding of emotions and attitudes; perseveration and persistency; conscientiousness; self-righteousness; a tendency to project attitudes; fanaticism; arrogance; touchiness; precision and perfectionism; neatness and ritualistic cleanliness; ceremoniousness; conformity to rule; sado-masochistic behavior; hypochondriasis; suspiciousness; jealousy and enviousness; pedantry; sentimentality; love of scatological obscenity and anal sexuality."³⁹

These traits he discusses one by one, quoting corroborating examples of Japanese behavior. But he does not delve very deeply into the structure of the underlying psychological mechanisms and sketches them only for a few of the traits, such as secretiveness which he regards as a "reaction-formation against repressed hostile aggressiveness",⁴⁰ or sado-masochistic behavior, the discussion of which constitutes perhaps the most interesting part of the paper.

He comments upon the Japanese ambivalence shown toward the mother which he ascribes to her role in the weaning and cleanliness training, and suggests in passing that the Japanese oedipus complex may perhaps be partly reversed,⁴¹ but he fails to follow

38. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 326

39. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 326.

40. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 327.

41. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 329.

up this hypothesis. This is regrettable; a special and fuller treatment of the Japanese oedipus situation would have been desirable in view of the author's advice on a future policy toward Japan which should destroy "the myth of the emperor and the feudal economic and military system which sustains it" and "see that freedom prevails among the erstwhile enemies."⁴²

Unfortunately, he refrains from giving suggestions on how these objectives are to be achieved and leaves the reader only with the negative but highly important caution that additional repressions imposed under Western influence would be highly injurious: "The Japanese already show evidence of genital insecurity in the great frequency of their advertisements of aphrodisiacs and of 'lost virility'. It is hard to see how this tense and explosive character structure can take on any further inhibitions with impunity."⁴³

42. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 342.

43. La Barre, *l.c.*, p. 341.

Part Two

MYTHOLOGY

NARCISSUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC NOTE

By HENRY ALDEN BUNKER, M.D. (New York)

Freud has said that, "it seems that an accumulation of narcissistic libido over and above a certain level becomes intolerable. We might well imagine that it was this that first led to the cathexis of objects—that the ego was obliged to send forth its libido in order not to fall ill of an excessive accumulation of it".¹

It is perhaps of some interest that the Greeks, who knew so much, knew this also. At least so it would seem from their story of Narcissus, the youth who fell ill and died of an excessive accumulation of narcissistic libido.

The tale of Narcissus is as simple as it is well known. It is no more than that a certain youth, the loveliest of young men, became enamored of his reflection in a pool, beside which he remained, unable to tear himself away, until he died of starvation, and was then changed into the flower that bears his name. This was the fate meted out by Nemesis for his repulse of the nymph Echo—whom, by the way, Hera had deprived of the power of speech except for repeating the last words of whoever spoke to her.² Narcissus repulsed her advances, or else he flouted the command of Aphrodite that he should marry her; it was following upon this, or in punishment for it, that he fell victim to the fate

1. Freud: *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1929, p. 351.

2. So that Narcissus was not capable of even a narcissistic type of object-choice—if we think of the name of the nymph, Echo, as *per se* representing a mere replica of its original.

already referred to. Thus, obviously, an object-cathexis was rejected by him in favor of a narcissistic one, ego-libido taking the place of object-libido.

A somewhat similar idea is present in the version of the story which Pausanias tells.³ Here Narcissus had a twin sister whom he loved; when she died, it became his habit to console himself by looking at his own reflection in the spring, as a sort of picture of her. Here we have what appears to be, not an avoidance of an object-cathexis in favor of a narcissistic one, but a direct transformation of an object-cathexis into an ego-cathexis—the withdrawal of object-libido into the ego; while here again the original object-choice is—and even more clearly—a narcissistic one: the twin who is, so to speak, his mirror image.

In any event Narcissus not only fell ill of an excessive accumulation of narcissistic libido but actually died of it; for, as already said, his inability to tear himself away from gazing upon the image of himself with which he had fallen so utterly in love compelled him to remain by the pool until, as we are told, he died of starvation and unsatisfied longing.

It could hardly be more clearly stated than it is in the story of Narcissus that some connection exists between "an excessive accumulation of libido within the ego" and death. But another example occurs to me of what equally seems to be an equating of narcissism with stupor or death. I refer to *The Delectable Tale of Cupid and Psyche*, and specifically to the episode therein in which Psyche, searching for the vanished Cupid, was forced by Venus to carry out the most difficult tasks (as so many male heroes have been compelled by a tyrannous father-figure to do), of which the most dangerous was to fetch from the underground kingdom of Pluto the box containing the ointment of beauty—a substance clearly enough serving a narcissistic purpose. On her way back she had a curiosity to examine the supposed casket

3. Pausanias: *Descriptio Graecae*, IX, 31, 7-8.

of beauty which she carried. She found it to contain, however, not beauty but a deathly sleep; she was overcome by the vapor which the ointment of beauty gave forth, and fell into a stupor. • Significantly enough, she was only restored to her senses by contact with the arrow of Cupid, whereby she was revived and ultimately united to him. Here if ever we have a story of which two interpretations are possible and both of them correct. On the one hand, we have the familiar fantasy of the return to the womb (the underground kingdom of Pluto) in order to obtain *that adornment* (the ointment of beauty), together with the idea that penetration by the arrow of Cupid cures one of this "senselessness"; on the other hand, we have with equal certainty the fact that the cathexis of objects—as Freud has said—is that which protects the ego from (or, as here, cures it of) falling ill of an excessive accumulation of its libido.

If the stupefying vapor given forth from the ointment of beauty is, therefore, expressive of an equating of narcissism with death or stupor or a deathly sleep, so is even more directly the name Narcissus itself. For this name is formed on the word *νάρκη* meaning numbness, stupor (whence for example our words *narcotic*, *narcolepsy*, and so forth). Perhaps it should be added, if parenthetically, that Artemidorus, our oldest writer on the interpretation of dreams, held it to be an omen of death if a man dreamed of seeing his reflection—which is in turn reminiscent of the very widespread folk belief that it is unlucky to see one's own reflection.⁴

A final detail: Narcissus, upon his death, was changed into the flower which bears his name—a flower that does, in fact, grow around pools. And indeed, the Greeks—referring undoubtedly to the type of narcissus which we know as *narcissus poeticus*—thought that the name of this flower derived from its overpowering or stupefying scent. This would imply that "the loveliest of

4. Frazer, Sir James G: *The Golden Bough*, New York, Macmillan, 1935; 3, p. 94.

young men" was named after the flower instead of the other way about, as the myth of Narcissus avers. Was the hyacinth named after Hyacinthus, or Hyacinthus *ex post facto* named after the flower which sprang from the drops of his spilled blood? This we can perhaps never know; but on other grounds it would seem in the present instance that it was not nearly so much the scent of the flower that was stupefying as it was the self-infatuation, the narcissism, of its namesake that eventuated in stupefaction (νάρκη) —and death. Resuming the botanical theme, let me note in conclusion that another of the several types of narcissus is the daffodil. But daffodil is merely the English (from the Dutch *De affodil*) for the Greek asphodel, which has only connotations of death: it was the Plain of Asphodel that was, in Greek eschatology, the dwelling-place of the departed.

Part Three

RELIGION

THE BOUPHONIA, OR OX-MURDER: A FOOTNOTE TO *TOTEM AND TABOO*

By HENRY ALDEN BUNKER, M.D (New York)

Anthropologists have long rejected Freud's conceptions of the meaning, and indeed of the very existence, of the so called totem feast—that celebration at which the otherwise revered totem animal was once a year killed in the presence of all the members of the clan, devoured, and then mourned over. More recently, however, it has been conceded that these conceptions of Freud's—first set forth thirty years ago in *Totem and Taboo*, and restated in unmodified form twenty-five years later in *Moses and Monotheism*—may be useful and even true, in spite of their basis in discredited documentation.¹ As those acquainted with one of Freud's greater works are aware, this basis consists largely in the report of one St. Nilus upon the sacrificial custom observed by the Bedouins of the desert of Mt. Sinai toward the end of the fourth century A.D.; for it was upon this that Robertson Smith (in: *The Religion of the Semites*) based, in part, his theory of totem religion, an important element in which was the periodic killing and eating of the totem.

It is the very modest purpose of this essay to suggest that a documentation of much less dubiety lies ready to hand in the form of a rite carried out annually at Athens as late as the fifth cen-

1. See for example Clyde Kluckhohn: The Influences of Psychiatry on Anthropology in America during the Past One Hundred Years, in *One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1944; pp. 589 ff.

This chapter, by the way, is a superlative account of the recent growing *rapprochement* between anthropology and the tenets of psychoanalysis.

tury B.C.—a rite which, apparently of Cretan origin, dates back to perhaps 1500-2000 B.C.² I refer to the Bouphonia, or Ox-Murder, which was annually enacted on the Acropolis on the day of the full moon of the last month of the Athenian year (June-July), when the threshing was ended and the new corn gathered in.³

The rite of the Bouphonia was carried out as follows.⁴ Oxen were driven round the altar of Zeus Polieus, on which were laid cakes of barley mixed with honey; and the ox which went up to the altar and ate of the cakes was by that token chosen as victim for the sacrifice. This sacrifice was thereupon performed by two men: one, the Boutypos, felled the ox with an axe; the other, the Bouphonos, cut its throat with a knife—a division of guilt, a sharing of guilt with the "companion in guilt", which will be obvious.⁵ After one celebrant had struck the ox and another slain him, of those who afterwards flayed the ox all tasted his flesh. In the meantime both the murderers threw down their weapons and fled. The weapons were subsequently brought to trial, adjudged guilty of the crime of ox-murder, and cast into the sea.

2. A. B. Cook: *Hellenic Studies*, 1914 (cited by Harrison).

3. It would of course be easy to remark, with that touch of aspersio inseparabile from the *odium theologicum* (in whatever guise), that anthropologists cannot be expected to be archaeologists or classical scholars. What is much more to the point, however, is that Robertson Smith was fully acquainted with the Bouphonia. Indeed, he was the first to draw attention to the significance of this Athenian rite, as he was also the first to perceive the import of the word Bouphonia. (See Jane Ellen Harrison: *Themis*, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927, p. 142, footnote 1; J. G. Frazer: *The Golden Bough*, Macmillan, New York, 1935, vol. 8, p. 5 footnote 2; Jane Ellen Harrison: *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 1922, p. 111, footnote 1; *idem*: *Themis*, pp. 145-6.)

4. The fullest account of the Bouphonia is given by Porphyry (*De Abstinentia*, ii, 28 ff.), who borrowed it from Theophrastus. See in particular Jane Ellen Harrison: *Prolegomena*, pp. 111-114 *idem*: *Themis*, pp. 141-150.)

5. Theophrastus mentions, in this connection, families of Ox-smiters (Βουρύνται) and Goaders (Κέντροιῶται)—as though, one might imagine, these each represented a brother horde to which these respective names were given. However this may be, the latter name brings to mind the Κέντρον (Centaur)—a name which possibly means Ox-goaders or Ox-prickers. The Centaurs were the progeny of the (incestuous) union of Ixion (who had tried to seduce Hera, wife of Zeus) and a mother-image Nephele, whom Zeus created out of a cloud (as the name imports) as a double of Hera; it was this union which gave origin to the first Centaur or to the race of Centaurs.

When the ox had been flayed and all the flayers had tasted his flesh, "they sewed up the hide and stuffed it out with hay and set it up just as it was when it was alive", Porphyry tells us,⁶ "and they yoked a plough to it as though it were ploughing."

The ox deserved its fate; it had eaten of a cake sacred to Zeus Polieus. Nevertheless its slaying was a criminal act, as shown by the guilt to which it gave rise—a guilt so great, indeed, that four different measures were resorted to (in addition to that already mentioned: "it deserved to die"), to deal with it. The responsibility for the act had to be shared with a "companion in guilt" (the ox-feller and the ox-slayer), and, similarly, the devouring of the slain ox was participated in by all as a communal feast. In addition to this, there was the flight of the actual murderers, the projection of the responsibility upon the axe and the knife, and the "undoing" of the murder through stuffing the hide of the murdered ox with hay and setting it up "just as it was when it was alive".

Thus the Bouphonia has every appearance of being not only a "mimetic representation" (as the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Peace* called it⁷), but a repetition (and commemoration) of that act in which the expelled sons joined forces, returned, slew and ate the father—and suffered remorse for their deed. The "mimetic representation" of which the Bouphonia appears to be so clear an example has of course its counterpart in narrative form in the universal Myth of the Birth of the Hero—in the numberless tales in which the hero returns (from exile) and overcomes the father.

Some additional light is perhaps thrown on the Bouphonia by the aetiological myth in regard to it. According to this myth, the ox was first smitten by a stranger, either Sopatros or Dromos, a Cretan who happened to be present at the ceremonial in question and who was outraged at the sacrilege committed by the ox in

6. *op. cit.*, ii, 30 (quoted in *Themis*, p. 143).

7. *ad v.* 50 (quoted in *Themis*, p. 143, footnote 5).

eating the cake dedicated to Zeus Polieus (itself a crime against the father). After his murder of the ox, Sopatros fled to Crete—in the manner of the flight of the ox-smiths in the ritual of the Bouphonia. But he was discovered, and it then became his opinion that he could escape the pollution he had incurred, be absolved of the guilt of his act, "if they would all do the deed in common". And in order to bring this about, the Athenians were to make Sopatros a citizen, and thus make themselves sharers in the murder.⁸ We have here the statement, as explicit as possible, that the action in question, forbidden to the individual, can only be justified—i.e., robbed of guilt—through the participation of all.⁹

The very name of Sopatros—and in being a stranger from abroad he is like Hamlet and Orestes and Oedipus and many another hero who returned from abroad and subsequently overcame the father—would seem to be significant. For, just as the name Soti-polis obviously means the Savior of the State, so the name Sopatros may mean (as Miss Harrison plausibly suggests) the Savior of the *πάτρα*. The word *πάτρα* has as one of its meanings fatherhood, descent from a common father; and thus it comes to be the equivalent of *πατρία*, a body of persons claiming descent from a common ancestor, thus a house or clan (Latin *gens*). Hence it is this "brother-horde" (*πάτρα*) of which Sopatros, as his name seems to tell us, was the savior. He took upon himself the guilt of the ox-murder, that symbolic parricide—just as a much later Savior redeemed mankind by taking upon Himself the guilt of a sin which in His case demanded the sacrifice of His own life, and which therefore could only have been murder.¹⁰ This "redeemer" could be no one else but he who was most guilty, the leader of the brother-horde which had overpowered the Father—wherein, as Freud has said, we have the origin of the conception of the hero: he who rebels against the father and kills him in some

8. *Themis*, p. 143.

9. Freud: *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 232-3.

10 *Totem and Taboo*, pp 255-6.

guise or other.¹¹ Thus Sopatros was such a hero, such a savior (of the *πάτρα*); and this he was, moreover, in direct connection with a totem-feast and its annually re-enacted mimetic representation, the Bouphonia at Athens.

11. Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*, New York, 1939; pp. 137-8

If we can hardly doubt, as Freud goes on to say, that in Greek tragedy the hero and the chorus represent this same rebel hero and the brother horde, it becomes of interest to note the large number of brother-hordes (with their leaders) which inhabit Greek mythology: the Titans, the Centaurs, the Satyrs, the Kouretes, the Bacchantes, the Korybantes, and others.

NOTES ON THE "PRIMAL HORDE"

By SANDOR S. FELDMAN, M.D. (Rochester, N. Y.)

It is the aim of the present paper to contribute to the understanding of Freud's conception of the "primal horde" through psychoanalytic interpretation of two rituals and one game prevalent among male children in conservative Jewry. In his book *Totem and Taboo*, and later in his *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud expounded the theory that the idea of one great God as well as some religious rites can be derived from the primeval situation in the primal horde.¹ Making use of some theoretical conjectures of Charles Darwin, J. J. Atkinson and Robertson Smith, Freud built up a hypothesis according to which men originally lived in hordes in a patriarchal system, the strong father being the master and the dictator of the group. The emotional relation of his children toward him was an ambivalent one, but the positive affection receded into the background because the father appropriated all the goods necessary to life, all the females, and he ruled by brute force, killing even his own sons if they did not obey him. Eventually the youngsters got tired of his rule, plotted against him, rebelled against him, seized and killed him, and consumed his body. Following this "stupendous and monstrous deed" the sons and the other youngsters lived in a "brother horde" in which the mortal fight continued between the strongest male and the other males until they realized that in order not to destroy each other they had to observe certain rules which would put an end to the fight and prevent its recrudescence. After

1. *Totem and Taboo* In: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, trans. by Dr. A. A. Brill. The Modern Library, New York, 1938.

the killing of the primal father, the hatred was more or less repressed and the love for him came to the fore. The father was replaced by the totem animal which was feared and revered. He was the protecting spirit of the group and must not be killed or hurt. Once a year, however, perhaps because of the need to give expression to this ambivalence, the original murder of the primal father was symbolically repeated in a feast in which the totem animal was killed and eaten, and in which everybody without exception had to participate.

This, according to Freud, was the beginning of religion, social order and moral law, and today everybody deep in his unconscious vaguely suspects that "once upon a time" he had a primeval father and killed him. This is accomplished, Freud suggests, by archaic inheritance, and if this idea can be accepted, then "we have bridged the gap between individual and mass psychology and can treat peoples as we do individual neurotics". Outstanding authorities in biology, anthropology, psychology, and so forth, have bitterly contested the last part of the Freudian hypothesis, and the possibility of such an archaic inheritance is questioned vehemently. Róheim tries to mollify some of these critics when he suggests instead of the phylogenetic an ontogenetic theory of culture. But Róheim himself does not reject the possibility of an archaic inheritance.² In a paper on an ancient religious ritual, the unconscious background of which is interpreted, the present writer accepted the possibility that certain important events in the history of the human species—like a traumatic experience—appear as memory traces in the succeeding generations, and that the ritual serves the purpose of gratifying the instinctual drive while trying to repress it. As in many neurotic symptoms a compromise takes place in which both the id-desire and the self-preservative ego-desire equally assert them-

2. Róheim, Géza: The Primal Horde and Incest in Central Australia. *J. Crim. Psychopath.*, 3, No. 3, Jan. 1942, pp. 454-460. Idem: The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Culture. *Int. J. Psa.*, 1941, 22, part 2.

selves.³ In this same paper, however, the writer already made a timid suggestion that although many phenomena support the maintenance of the phylogenetic theory, (dream symbolism, the history of speech, archaism in the psychoses, and so forth), it is not necessary to refer to former or different cultures of mankind in order to understand the rituals practiced at the present time and in our present culture *because as far as instinctual needs are concerned there is no difference between the human being in primeval and in present times; and furthermore there is no difference in the tools the ego uses when dealing with instinctual drives.* Certainly we cannot know whether a human group in the present would invent the same ritual as did primeval man. It might be the same and it might not. But if the same ritual is not invented, another one is devised for the same reason and for the same purpose. Our everyday clinical practice shows how inventive man is in this respect. Why should mankind refuse a ready-to-wear ritual offered it? Why invent a new "modern" settlement when the old one is so comfortable, unless the intellectual development creates a need for a new technique? Modern man lives in the family and in groups just as did primeval man, the outer reality is just the same as before, and the instinctual drives certainly have not changed at all. In the following the writer wishes further to emphasize his suggestion that *the rituals of mankind at the present time have the same psychogenesis as the rituals following the traumatic events to which primeval man was subjected.* The writer believes that even in the traumas there is no difference. Though they are no longer as spectacular, nevertheless they are of exactly the same nature. The writer's late brother, A. A. Feldman, came to the same conclusion when analyzing a series of rituals.⁴

Two rituals and one game will be subjected to analytic investi-

3. Feldman, S S · The Blessings of the Kohanites. *Amer. Imago*, 2, No 4.

4. Feldman, Arthur A.: Freud's Moses and Monotheism and the Three Stages of Israelitish Religion *Psy. Rev.*, 31, No. 4, October 1944

gation. The writer himself participated in the game with great interest and joy for many years in his boyhood; he observed the two rituals also in his early childhood, and until puberty perceived them with his whole being, in deep devotion and awe. Furthermore he lived for long years in close emotional, spiritual and intellectual bond with the people and in the group observing the rituals. The writer knew their inner life, understood them, though he came to full understanding only by his passive and active analytic experiences. These particular rituals may be observed all over the world among millions of pious Jews; and to my knowledge the game which will be presented was played by all the boys in central Europe and in other places as it is today.

I

B'CHOR

The "Firstborn" Game

"It is reasonable to surmise that after the killing of the father a time followed when the brothers quarrelled among themselves for the succession, which each of them wanted to obtain for himself alone."

"An echo of the expulsion of the eldest son, as well as of the favored position of the youngest, seems to linger in many myths and fairy tales."

"In order to be able to live in peace with one another the victorious brothers renounced the women for whose sake they had killed the father . . ."

Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*.

The game is played exclusively in the eight days of a certain holiday (Tabernacles). It is a *harvest festival*. The boys gather in the afternoons, usually about five in one team. Their pockets bulge with nuts. If girls are present, they are permitted to look on but they *never* participate in the game. As in all games of boys in the presence of girls, the boys—though they do not want to admit this, and conceal it—show off to impress the girls with their skill. These boys are all under the age of thirteen. This is the age when the boy is considered as mature, belonging to the

grownups, and under all the obligations of the religious laws. It implies that he is no longer a child, i.e., he is supposed to be through all the struggles around the oedipus complex. In a few years he becomes a full-fledged member of the group of the grownups, and in some communities he marries between the ages of eighteen and twenty.

The game starts with each boy agreeing to stake (say) five nuts, which are placed in a straight line on the ground. The biggest nut is chosen and placed on the end at the left. It is called "the firstborn", and this gives the name to the whole game. The boys agree in the turns, or by some kind of lot decide who shall start. Each boy when his turn comes, stands about five or six yards away, and throws a nut at the line of nuts. He wins all the nuts to the right of the one he knocks out of line. Therefore he who is cautious and modest is almost sure to win some nuts, and he who dares to aim at the "firstborn" and hits it, wins the whole line at one blow. In the latter event each player has to put nuts in the line again, and the game continues with the boy next in turn. Usually one boy at least gets very heated and aims all the time at the "firstborn" no matter how often he loses. Certainly he is the "big shot" and the hero for his winning and for his daring. As in all play the root of which goes deep and is fed by a highly charged complex, the boys are indefatigable in the "firstborn" play. They play until darkness supervenes.

From observation of the boys in their family and general environment one can plainly see the underlying forces which are discharged in the play. Jewish families generally consist of many boys and girls. The father is absolute master of the house, and in this he is supported by a host of different laws, orders of the Bible, customs, and so forth. The firstborn son has a prominent position in the family circle, gives the youngsters orders, metes out corporal punishment for disobedience, and often uses derisive means to make the younger ones feel that he, after the father, is the most

privileged person in the family. The mother and the other female members of the family accept the prerogatives of the firstborn. Even the father—despite ambivalence toward his firstborn son—supports his rule as long as the son is devoted to him. There are often heated arguments, bitter fights, between him and the other boys, nor is it unusual that they gang up against him, annoy him, and try to make his position ridiculous. If there is a considerable age difference between the firstborn and the other boys, the eldest boy refuses to participate in the “firstborn” game. It is beneath his dignity. If the age difference is not great, the enmity between him and the other boys is replaced by the enmity between the father and all the boys, and the father is represented in the game by the “firstborn” nut.

From the clinical point of view there is no need to assume that the boys carry with them memory traces of the ancient struggles of their ancestors—memory traces of the primal brother-horde. Everything is there in *statu nascendi*—the family, the father, the females, the firstborn, the other sons. The conflicts are the same as in the hypothetical brother-horde, the instinctual sexual and aggressive forces are the same, but the scenery is more civilized and part of it represented by and in a game. Róheim interpreted as “abreaction of the object loss by dramatization” a game of children in Normanby Island. In the play, children were represented by pretty stones. In another play described by Róheim the same motif was dramatized in a play called *turtle's eggs* in which the turtle symbolizes the mother and the eggs represent the children.⁵ As we can see in the plays described, nuts, stones, eggs, represent children. In the writer's opinion the same instinctual forces are behind a game popular all over the world, namely bowling. G. G. Menke quotes W. Pehle to the effect that the game of bowls is very old, having originated in Europe as early as the third or fourth century A.D. According to Menke, bowling

5. Róheim, Géza: Children's Games and Rhymes in Duau (Normanby Island) *Amer. Anthropol.*, 45, No. 1, Jan-March, 1943.

has a religious origin.⁶ At first the pin represented a heathen, and he who displayed great skill in hitting it with a ball was considered pure and free of sin. Later, instead of one pin three or more were used. According to Pehle, Luther was an enthusiastic bowler. (In the writer's opinion this might shed some light on Luther's reformatory tendencies.) Women have become interested in bowling only in the last two decades. (It is another sign of woman's striving for equality with man.)

Numerous other games, the various sports of different countries, reveal that all over the world children, youngsters and grownups have a keen need to invent culturalized forms to abreact the instinctual urges that actually govern their life. Whether this is enforced by phylogenetic memory traces is another question. As the writer mentioned above, there are strong indications that this is possible and even probable. Schilder's investigations in brain histology and their psychoanalytic evaluations give strong support to the phylogenetic theory.⁷ Supporting Ferenczi's latest contributions, Schilder believes that "in the final analysis everything physical-organic must be definable as the result of psychic constellations (attitudes), and every organ must be looked upon as a structuralization of something instinctual that has gone before, and every organ, insofar as it is vital and alive, still possesses something of this instinctive character."

II

HALLAH

The Cake or Dough Ritual

On the day before the Holy Sabbath and other holy days, thousands of pious Jewish women all over the world detach a small piece of dough from the Sabbath cake, and according to the

⁶ Menke, George G: *Encyclopedia of Sports*. George G Renneker Co., Chicago, Ill. He quotes Wilhelm Pehle: *Bowling* (Out of print).

⁷ Schilder, Paul *Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 50 New York and Washington, 1928, p 69.

ancient laws, customs and tradition, cast it into the fire, at the same time uttering a prayer praising the Lord for ordering them to take the Hallah (a piece) from the dough. The *Sulchan Aruch* emphasizes that the Hallah is the duty of the wife.⁸ Until the destruction of the Holy Temple the piece of dough used in baking the holiday cake was dedicated to God. Later on it was dedicated to the representative of God, to the priest, and thrown into the fire.⁹ The ritual is based on the Law: "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 'Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, When you come into the land whither I bring you, Then it shall be, that when ye eat of the bread of the land, ye shall offer up an heave offering unto the Lord. Ye shall offer up a cake of the first of your dough for an heave offering: as ye do the heave offering of the threshing floor, so shall ye heave it. Of the first of your dough, ye shall give unto the Lord an heave offering in your generations' ".¹⁰

Sacrifice has been a universal religious custom from time immemorial. Sacrifice by fire of the "first", whether animate or inanimate, is an outstanding ancient ritual. There can be little doubt that the original sacrifice was that of a human being. Culturalization of human instinctual drives—as innumerable clinical examples of compulsive neurotics prove—changed it into the sacrifice of animals or even of plants, as may be seen in the Hallah ritual. The angel of the Lord replaced Isaac with a lamb after his father Abraham was willing to obey the Lord's order to sacrifice his son in proof of his obedience to Him. There is much evidence that it was only after a great length of time and after many inner struggles that the prophets succeeded at last in forcing the Jewish people to abandon human sacrifice and replace it with the sacrifice of animals, plants, fruits, and the like, and with certain rituals, which proves in the writer's opinion

8. *Sulchan Aruch*, chapter XXXV.

9. *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York, 1939-43, 5, p. 183.

10. *Num.* 15: 17-21. The same law is repeated in *Lev.* 7: 1-13.

that the original instinctual need was for the sacrifice of the firstborn son. Here it may be pointed out as was done in the previous section, that clinical observation is impressive on this point, even if the phylogenetic hypothesis must be abandoned—which in the writer's opinion is not necessary. The present-day state of affairs contains all the elements necessary to explain the ritual, in our case the Hallah ritual. The life of a pious Jewish family shows explicit traces of the life assumed to have been led by the primal horde. The father is by law and by tradition the master and ruler of the home. The wife is devoted to him with all her body and soul. The daughters implicitly follow his wishes and obey his orders. They marry the man whom the father has chosen. Many women do not even speak to their husbands until after the wedding ceremony. To touch a prospective wife is something unheard of, or at least held in detestation. The same applies to the sons, though in this case signs of strong ambivalence are detectable. The situation of the firstborn son is especially precarious. Fighting between him and the father is very common. He is the favorite of the mother who seldom dares to take his part or to protect him when the father disciplines him. This latter often takes the form of severe physical punishment. The most common controversy—on the surface—is a religious one. The son does not follow the father in strict ritualism and is reprimanded for this. The mother stands by in despair, she has to side with the father although her heart bleeds for the son. It often happens that the son runs away from home. He might not write the parents for years, and they might not even know where he is. After many years, he returns, usually a repentant boy, and is reconciled with his father. Many Central European men came to this country in this way. On the other hand, he is respected by his parents. The father loves him because he is his successor, it is he who is accepted first in the community as socially mature, bound to keep the religious laws, and obey the ordinances. He has a special rank in the line of the sons. He gives them orders, makes

them do errands, supports them, and deals with them harshly when disobedient. One can often observe the ganging up of the youngsters against him; they try to annoy and hurt him, and to undermine his reputation and power. In almost every family the primal horde situation exists in miniature, in the conflict between father and firstborn, between father and sons, between the first-born son and the other sons, between the men themselves. It is a thrilling experience to see how the numerous rituals fit into the whole picture. They serve two purposes: that of the gratification of an instinctual drive, and the defence against it by sublimation and reaction formation; while the condensation of both of these are observed in different rituals.

The end piece or the first piece of the dough thrown into the fire as a sacrifice to God is a culturalized form of the sacrifices of the firstborn son. This interpretation is supported by another ritual called *Ransom of the Firstborn* (Pydjon). The Biblical law declares in *Num. 18* that the firstborn of everything belongs to God: "All the best of the oil, and all the best of the wine, and of the wheat, the first fruits of them which they shall offer unto the Lord, shall be thine . . .!" (i.e., the Cohen, a descendant of the Aaronitic priesthood). "Everything that openeth the womb in all flesh (peter rechem), which they bring unto the Lord, whether it be of men or beasts, shall be thine, nevertheless the firstborn of man shall thou redeem. . . ." One can clearly see the transition of human sacrifice into the sacrifice of animals and inanimate objects. We shall see in the following data how strongly the custom of the sacrifice of the firstborn was enrooted even in Jewry, and as mentioned above, the Prophets fought tooth and nail against it.

At the present time among ritualistic Jewry, the ritual of the ransom of the firstborn is widely practiced. The father takes his firstborn son and presents him to the Cohen, announcing that this is his firstborn son and he wants to redeem him. He offers the Cohen about two and a half dollars in lieu of the son. The Cohen

according to his duty asks the father whether he wants to give the money or the child, and naturally the father's answer is that he prefers to keep the child and give the money. Accepting the money for the child, the priest declares that the child is redeemed, gives his blessing and says a benediction over him.¹¹

It is the sin of the firstborn son that he passed at birth the genitals of his mother, that he "opened the womb of the mother", that he committed, in one word, incest. The fact that he was the first male, who after the father—though in a reversed way and without conscious intention—passed the mother's genitals, makes him a sinner. It is a precedent which might make him feel that he has prerogatives and he thus endangers the sexual and social rights of the father. He is therefore dangerous, and he has to be eliminated, killed. The writer once asked a Jewish woman what she thought of her practicing the Hallah ritual. At first she said that she did not know, but after further inquiry she said, somewhat embarrassed: "I am just a poor woman, what else could I give? If Abraham was willing to sacrifice his son, why shouldn't I give a piece of the dough?" The mother who loves her firstborn not despite but *because* he emerged from her genitals first (from the point of view of the unconscious, the "coming out" is equated with the "going in"), solves her conflict whom to prefer, the husband or the firstborn son, through a symbolic sacrifice. It is her intention to gain everything: to have peace between herself and her husband, peace between firstborn son and father, and last but not least, to save the life of her son. The psychological solution is achieved by throwing a piece of dough into the fire. One can see clearly that rituals are of great help to conflict-stricken man. That is why he clings to them so tenaciously. Reformers should bear this in mind and realize that only when—as in the psychoanalytic treatment of the ritual of a compulsive

11 *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, 9, pp 98-99. Also *Sulchan Aruch*, Chapters 164, 67, and 158. The two latter chapters deal with the redemption of the firstborn animals, specifically with the redemption of the firstborn ass.

neurotic—the solution can be achieved on a higher level, can the individual give up the ritual. In giving up the defense which the ritual supplies the individual has to have another one in its place, otherwise anxiety will immediately appear. But it is a long and difficult process to achieve this re-orientation. Individuals claiming to have no need for rituals often practice in a mild form one ritual or another, thus betraying that fundamentally nothing has changed. Rituals create a balance between the manifold forces in the human being. They reveal the primal drives and the original struggles which mankind has had to go through since the beginning of culture. It makes little difference whether or not there really was a primal horde; but obviously there was. If we can find traces of it so clearly in contemporary life there can be little doubt that under primitive conditions the same struggles presented themselves in some form of primal horde.

The rivalry between father and firstborn reveals itself in the Bible. It is evident that the Jews practiced the sacrifice of the son to Moloch, i.e., fire. For example, the king "then took his eldest son, that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall",¹² and the King Ahaz "walked in the way of the kings of Israel, yea, and made his son to pass through the fire, according to the abominations of the heathen. . . ."¹³ Furthermore the King Ahaz "burnt incense . . ., and burnt his children in the fire, after the abominations of the heathen."¹⁴ The prophet Ezekiel laments bitterly the Moloch sacrifice: "For when ye offer your gifts, when ye make your sons to pass through the fire, ye pollute yourselves. . . ."¹⁵ The sacrifice of the firstborn was offered even to YHWH (Jahveh, the Jewish God), though his prophets fought against it.¹⁶ Certainly the sacrifice of sons and human sacrifice in general was

12. 2. *Kings* 3: 27.

13. 2. *Kings* 16: 3.

14. 2. *Chron.* 28: 3.

15. *Ezek.* 20: 31.

16. *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, 10, p. 622.

practiced not only in the Orient. Frazer mentions that On, the King of Sweden, sacrificed one of his sons every nine years to the god Odin.¹⁷ The Athenians sacrificed seven boys and seven girls to Minos every eight years. They were, according to Frazer, "roasted alive in a bronze image of a bull, or of a bull-headed man . . . they were shut up in the labyrinth, there to be devoured by the Minotaur. . . ."¹⁸ In the writer's opinion the gassing of victims in special concentration camps, the burying alive of human beings, even children, the cremation en masse, is an archaic feature characteristic of the German collective unconscious (Jung). It rests in the phylogenesis of the great German masses which in history have often exploded in mass torture and other bloody features. It is the sacrifice of the Germanic group to their mythological god, in the present time that of blood or race, in order to save the people who would rebel against him.¹⁹ The sacrifice of a human being of another ethnical group instead of one's own is a common psychological and self-preservative step.²⁰ The same device is used in the sacrifice of girls together with boys. "In order to renew the solar fires, human victims may have been sacrificed to the idol by being roasted in its hollow body (the bull's image) or placed on its sloping hands and allowed to roll into a pit of fire. It was in the latter fashion that the Carthaginians sacrificed their offspring to Moloch. The children were laid on the hands of a calf-headed image of bronze, from which they slid into a fiery oven, while the people danced (the Nazis had music played, or made the victims themselves or their kin sing or play music) to the music of flutes and timbrels to drown the shrieks of the burning victims. The resemblance which the Cretan traditions bear to the Carthaginian practice

17. Frazer, James G.: *The Golden Bough*, London. Macmillan, 1911, The Dying God, p 160.

18. *loc. cit.* 280.

19. Due to the ambivalence

20 But, in the writer's opinion, the possibility of such a regression to an archaic level may turn up in any ethnic or other group. Perhaps not particularly, but psychologically we all are alike in this respect.

suggests that the worship associated with the names of Minos and the Minotaur may have been powerfully influenced by that of Semitic Baal."²¹ Frazer verifies Biblical statements when he writes that according to Philo of Byblus it was a custom among the Jews that "in time of national danger the king or the ruler of a city sacrificed his son to pacify the demons. . . . So Cronus, whom the Phoenicians called Israel, being king of the land and having an only begotten son called Jeoud, dressed him in royal robes and sacrificed him upon an altar in a time of war, when the country was in great danger from the enemy."²²

The killing of the firstborn son, later replaced by circumcision as a symbolic castration, and as a further step, the sacrifice of an animal, or—as in our case—the dough ritual, might shed some light on the sacrifice of girls instead of or together with the sons. It is an expression of castration. As one can often see in psychoanalytic practice, castration is presented in many ways; among others in a negative way, so that not the genitals are removed, but the object of love, the woman, is taken away. Virgins were sacrificed, girls who were not yet touched by a man. The sacrifice of a virgin is basically identical with the sacrifice of a man to God. Thus the piece of dough the mother throws into the fire expresses in symbolic form through the well-known mechanism of *condensation* (Freud) on the one hand the enormous need for the maintenance of the social order by sacrificing the most loved ones, the firstborn son or the virgin daughter, and on the other, the mother's tendency to save their lives by offering to God instead the first of the inanimate food. But that also the father's heart sorrowed deeply for the life of the daughter is reflected in the beautiful story of the daughter of King Jephtha: he made a vow that if the Lord permitted him to win an important battle on his return home "whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me . . . will offer (it) up for a

21. Frazer, James G.: *loc. cit.* pp 74, 75.

22. *loc. cit.*, p. 166.

burnt offering". And after the Lord made him the victor and he came home "his daughter came out to meet him with timbrels and with dances; and she was his only child; beside her he had neither son nor daughter". The father was cast down but he had to keep his vow. He told the story to his daughter, and she agreed that nothing else could be done and that she had to be sacrificed. The only thing she asked her father was "let me alone two months, that I may go up and down upon the mountains, and bewail my virginity". The king consented and "she went with her companions, and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains". At the end of two months "she returned unto her father, who did with her according to his vow which he had vowed; and she knew no man". From that time on "it was a custom in Israel that the daughters of Israel went yearly to lament the daughter of Jephtha . . . four days in a year".²³

III

HAMOUCH

The Rite of the Slicing of the Bread

"Thus more than one author was struck by the close resemblance between the rite of Christian Communion—where the believer symbolically incorporates the blood and flesh of his God—and the totem feast."

Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*

All over the world in all the homes where pious Jews observe the laws and the commandments of the Lord and live through every day from opening their eyes in the morning to closing them to sleep, according to the ordinances of their venerated teachers, the rite of the slicing of the bread is practiced. The solemnity of the ritual is more marked on Sabbath and other holy days than on weekdays. On the Sabbath and on holy days a whole cake (Sabbath-cake, *barcheth*) is put on a plate in front of the

23. *Judg.* 11: 30-31, 34-40.

father's place. On weekdays slices of bread are placed on a plate in the middle of the table so that the members of the family may take their piece from it and say the prescribed prayer. On Sabbath and on holy days the members of the family have to wait until the bread is sliced by the father, or in his absence by his representative, the eldest son or at least the oldest son present. Freud pointed out the striking resemblance between the rites of compulsive neurotics and religious rituals. In both cases, the act *must be done*. In the case of a religious ritual it must be done lest one violate the law with all the consequences: pangs of conscience, fear of punishment, loss of love, and, in the last analysis, death. In the case of a neurotic ritual the act must be performed otherwise anxiety will arise. In the latter case there is a feeling that in omitting the performance of the ritual one is guilty. In most cases the violator is guilty of the death of a loved one. This phenomenon was called by Stekel the *death clause*: "If I do not perform the (compulsive) action somebody will die and I am responsible for his death." One male patient, each time he needed to pull the shades, had to repeat the action three times, otherwise he would feel guilty in case his father should die. If he did perform the action he would not feel guilty in the event of his father's death. In both religious and neurotic rituals one of the most outstanding characteristics, besides the compulsiveness, is that no part of the ritual may be changed. If the ritual is not performed one is guilty; the slightest omission of one part or the slightest change in any part of the ritual also engenders feelings of guilt. Analyses reveal that two inexorable forces are here opposed: an aggressive or sexual drive versus a social one through which the person wants to prove his innocence of the drive. It is as if he said: "The drive is in me, I cannot deny it, but in order to prove that I am against the drive I will perform an action; if I forget it, if I change it, if I permit the slightest fault in its performance, then I am guilty." The difference between religious and neurotic rituals is that in the religious ritual

it is claimed that it is performed under the orders of a high outside authority; in the case of neurotic ritual the authority is *unknown* to the individual, but in analyses one can easily see that this authority is the conscience, i.e., it is identical with religious authority. During the course of time the intellectual demands of believers attached rationalizations to the religious rituals. The neurotic, however, does not give any explanation or rationalization; he simply has to do it. Ordinances governing rituals are often complemented by rationalizations which offer a more or less acceptable "meaning" for the ritual, but they of course fail to explain why the failure to express distinctly even one letter of a prayer, nullifies the ritual and makes the person guilty.

Unless the defiance of the children spoils its solemnity, the ritual of the slicing of the bread makes a profound impression on all who participate in it. The table is set, the candles are burning, kindled by mother who lifts her two arms over them and says her prayer. On the Sabbath and on holy days two cakes are placed on a plate covered by an embroidered spread made for this purpose, in front of the father's place. The family gathers around the table. The father signals to the boys (*only to the boys*) to follow him to the bathroom or kitchen sink in order to perform a preliminary ritual: the *ritualistic* washing of the hands. "Ritualistic" means that it is not done for the purpose of removing dirt from the hands. To be clean is taken for granted. What matters is to *perform the ritual*, i.e., just to run water on the hands and wipe it off while saying a prayer. The washing ritual is done according to age: first the father, then the eldest son, and so on. From the moment one has said the prayer of the washing of the hands, *he must not speak, but must remain silent*. The distance between the place of washing and the table must not be long. (This apparently signifies that one must not forget, must not move far away from the *motif* which is in the washing ritual.) The males, one after another, return to the table. No one has spoken. The father uncovers the cakes, takes both in his hands,

ness of Jones' interpretation.²⁴ Everything indicates that the *ritual of the slicing of the bread is identical with the totem-feast*.²⁵ Nor must one lose sight of another fundamental feature of the ritual, namely that it is not an individual ritual, but one in common with the others. The bread is eaten in public, it is a public sacrificial feast in which all men participate. The women members of the circle are offered the bread but they do not have to perform the hand-washing ritual; they may talk, and if they do not it is because of reverence for the ritual of the males, and no one cares anyway what they are doing.

According to Freud, in the primal horde the tyrannical father was overcome and slain by the sons who combined against him. They hated him for his rough treatment; they hated him because they were dependent on him for food and women. The gratification of the instinct of self-preservation and that of the sexual need depended upon the father, who through his strength, power, voice, looks (fiery eyes), ruled over all food and all the women, and even the life of the son was at stake if he disobeyed. After the killing of the father, the sons lived together, but since the strongest son replaced the father, the situation remained the same because he was no different from the powerful father. The fight therefore went on until it dawned upon them that in order to maintain themselves, some kind of order and social organization had to be created. The sons had also a positive affectionate feeling toward their father, and the need for order and self-maintenance plus the love-part of the ambivalence toward the father, created the first social order. The whole monstrous deed was not settled in their mind. It left its traces behind. Like a self-inflicted traumatic event it forced upon humanity the need to repeat it, though in a culturalized form. Furthermore *from an instinctual point of view the situation did not change because—*

²⁴ Jones, Ernest: *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*, The Symbolic Significance of Salt Chapter 4, p. 134 London, Int. Psal. Press, 1923

²⁵ Freud, Sigmund Totem and Taboo I c (1), pp 909 916, and 918

though in a more subtile way—the relation of the father to the sons and vice versa remained the same, and is the same now. The father was eventually replaced by the totem animal which on special occasions was publicly killed, though otherwise it was sacred and must not be touched or harmed. On one special day, in the presence of all the members of the community, it was killed and everybody had to eat of its body. Eating in public of the body of the totem animal which was killed in public, was an admission by all that once upon a time all members, all males, wanted to (and did) kill the primeval father, eat of his flesh and drink his blood.

But, as the writer has already pointed out, the ritual cannot be considered merely as a repetition of something old, a compulsive re-living of an old and impressive trauma. All the instinctual forces which once exploded in the primal horde are just as strong now as they were then. The development of social and psychic organization demanded their transformation into a culturalized form. In the ritual of the slicing of the bread, the father is replaced not by an animal but by an inanimate substance, bread. However, the features of the ritual reveal that the bread is a symbolic representation of the father. In the family the father who himself was once a son feels the same need for the performance of the original deed as do his sons. In many compulsive neurotic rituals the end is placed at the beginning. In the present ritual the hand-washing would have its proper place at the end and not at the beginning, but again repression must veil the whole issue, and displaces the hand-washing. They wash their hands in order to express their regret for the killing of the father. This explains why the hands are not washed in order to remove dirt but to express repentance for the misdeed. The idea is to remove the guilt feeling for the killing and to strive for forgiveness. The washing must therefore be a ritualistic one and not be carried out for hygienic or aesthetic reasons. One must not have to go too far to wash the

hands. Again this expresses in a poetic and symbolic way that one should not forget, in going from the washing place to the table, the reason for the hand-washing. One would be inclined to forget the misdeed but this must be prevented. Therefore, the distance has to be short.

If we look upon this ritual in a narrative form, the hand-washing may be in the right place, and the wording would be as follows: "We all wash our hands (in repentance) because we have killed our father . . .", and the *killing is expressed by the prescribed silence. Through the silence all the members dramatize and admit the killing.* In the last analysis silence means death. The dead are silent. Murder is represented by one feature, by the silence of the slain person. In our social life it is a very common practice to honor by silence the memory of a deceased person. The chairman of a convention or meeting calls upon all members to honor the memory of the dead by one minute of silence. In German, "totschweigen" means to treat someone as if he were dead, i.e., by not talking about him. Reik, in a brilliant paper dealing with this subject, was the first to prove that silence under certain circumstances—as in our case—means an identification with the dead person, an expression of being dead and of being guilty in the death of another.²⁶ Freud has given the same interpretation to silence in his "The Theme of the Three Caskets in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*."²⁷

The narrative proceeds: "We have killed our father as shown by us through the ritual, namely, we gathered as we do now around the table, all of us, none of the sons is missing. We attacked him while he was asleep with his wife, our mother (indicated by removing the cover from the bread; there are two loaves, a larger one which is the father, and a smaller one which is the mother), we killed him, cut off his head, and we all ate

26. Reik, Theodor: *Die Bedeutung des Schweigens* (The Meaning of Being Silent). *Imago*, 5, 1917-1919, pp. 354-363.

27. Freud, Sigmund: *Collected Papers*, London, Hogarth Press, 1924, 4

of his body in order that through this incorporation we should share his qualities, abilities, and power. No one can claim that he is not guilty in this crime, no one can escape by assuming that he did not participate in the murder. We all did it, we all repent our misdeed, our crime, and we have to remember it to our benefit, to show our regret, each time we assemble to eat."

The salt is the essence of life, like the semen in which the life of man originates. It is the semen, the body of the father. By eating it the father's sexual strength is incorporated, and his sexual power acquired after his destruction. In order to make the dramatic performance perfect, the piece of bread used in the ritual must be dipped in salt.

That the ritual is not merely a repetition of a traumatic event from the phylogeny of the life of humanity, as Freud and, in a measure Róheim, and the present writer assume, but is a living and effective phenomenon, is proved by the analyses of the infantile part of the neuroses and by the neuroses of children. The most striking and convincing example is presented to us in a thrilling analysis by Zulliger of a five-and-a-half year old boy.²⁸ The boy Alfred who, because of his deed, gained the name of "rooster-killer", enjoyed a great reputation among his siblings and friends. They loved him even though he was capricious, hot-tempered, rude, and violent. Alfred witnessed a physical argument between his parents. After the argument the parents left the house, whereupon the boy in his anger and despair, ran into the yard and cried bitterly. It happened that just at this time he saw a rooster jumping on the back of a hen. This so enraged him that he seized the rooster, took him into the barn, and decapitated him. He threw the head away, plucked the feathers, cut off the legs, and removed the inner parts. He covered the blood-stains with sawdust, went into the kitchen, took a frying-pan, put fat and the rooster in it and cooked it. He forced

28. Zulliger, Hans: "Totemmahl" eines fünfteinhalbjährigen Knaben. ("Totem-feast" of a five-and-a-half year old boy.) *Imago*, 13, 1927, Part 2, 3, 4, pp. 538-540.

his siblings to participate in the meal. The bones were disposed of. In the course of the afternoon the parents came home, "scented" what had happened, and spanked Alfred and the others also. Despite the punishment, Alfred was in a gay mood, and boasted all over the village of his great deed. All the other children sided with him, celebrated him, and called him the "rooster-killer". The analysis of the event took place when the boy was thirteen years old, and his story was verified by others. At Zulliger's question as to why he forced his siblings to eat of the rooster, he said it was not in order to consume the whole rooster and eliminate the traces, but so that they also should become guilty. Furthermore, it is evident that Alfred did something that all the others bore in their minds, otherwise he would not have become the hero of his siblings and schoolmates. This happened about twenty years ago. It was not only the revival of a phylogenetically existing psychic memory—trace of the murder of the primal father in the primal horde—which is probable—but it was the murder of the father for maltreating the mother observed in *statu nascendi* as an ontogenetic phenomenon.²⁹ It indicates that tremendous underground forces are operating in mankind: these same forces have undoubtedly been operating from the advent of human culture in the dim and distant past right down to our own time. Probe a human being in the twentieth century with the device of Freudian analysis and you will learn what was going on in the "primal horde"; you will see that basically we still live in such a primitive group atmosphere.

29 A child's sadistic interpretation of sexual intercourse

NEW VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

FROM WILLIAM JAMES TO SIGMUND FREUD

By EDWARD HITSCHMANN, M.D (Cambridge, Mass)

Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est. sed recipit infusionem
e voluntate et affectibus: id quod generat ad quod vult scientias: quod
enim mavult homo, id potius credit. Innumeris modis, iisque interdum
imperceptibilibus, affectus intellectum imbuunt et inficit.

Baron

If we were to draw a map of the world, in which the area
ed by religious people would be white, and that of the un-
ers, sceptics and atheists black, we should get a white map
the continents and only in some capitals should we find some
black spots. Even Russia, in the last war, returned to the
color of innocence, as Russian patriotism and Russian
ous sentiment have again become united.

About a hundred years ago in the United States of America,
's own country", a man was born who was deeply interested
e different forms religion assumes in human beings: the
the atheist, the converted and the counter-converted. In
andard-work on the psychology of religion, *The Varieties of*
ous Experience, he had the courage to say that religion
not come from God, but is caused by personality and is
'ore different in different individuals. He rejected "dogmatic
ogy" and proposed "a science of religions" James acknowl-
the fact that religious feelings are caused or influenced by
conscious and admits that "the religious are often neurotic".
We shall show in this paper how James' own religious destiny

proves his teachings. James mentions Breuer's and Freud's work and writes on the influence of the unconscious:

"We cannot avoid the conclusion that in religion we have a department of human nature with unusually close relations to the transmarginal or subliminal region. If the word 'subliminal' is offensive to any of you, as smelling too much of psychical research or other aberrations, call it by any other name you please, to distinguish it from the level of full sunlit consciousness. Call this latter the A region of personality, if you care to, and call the other the B region. The B region is then obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir that passes unrecorded or unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions and in general all our non-rational operations, come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and 'hypnoid' conditions, if we are subject to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supranormal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the fountainhead of much that feeds our religion. In persons deep in the religious life, we have now abundantly seen—and this is my conclusion—the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history."

William James' father was a very religious man, a sectarian, who not only went through a "salvation from his Calvinism", but was so influenced by the mystic Swedenborg and by Fourier that we may call him twice converted. William refers to his father's conversion at Windsor (1844) as an instance of "panic fear".

Henry James was a very kind father who did not influence the choice of profession of his sons. He once told Emerson he wished at times that lightning would strike his "wife and children out of existence and he should suffer no more from loving them". He was enthusiastic and eccentric, a good writer, but paradoxical and obscure in his lectures and books. His relation to morals was not always clear. Swedenborg's toleration of concubines and Fourier's interest in free love, this "little fat, rosy Swedenborg amateur" he may not have really approved.

William James' father was one of those enthusiastic, idealistic, but somewhat obscure sages whom early America produced; "mystics of independent mind, hermits in the desert of business, and heretics in the churches" (George Santayana). The mystic Swedenborg had a potent influence upon these people and especially on James' father. Swedenborgians still exist as a sect, in spite of the fact that Swedenborg, in his later years, represented an obvious case of religious paranoia. His religious crisis at the age of forty-six is a typical conversion by regression to his childhood; but Swedenborg is not listed among the cases of conversion William James quotes in his book. His name appears only in a footnote. In 1912 I published in the *Zentralblatt fuer Psychoanalyse* a study about "Swedenborg's Paranoia" and showed how his psychosis resembled the case of Schreber, published by Freud in "Psychoanalytic Remarks about an Autobiographically Described Case of Paranoia" (1911). Since then, the following books and papers have been written on the subject: Martin Lamm's book, *Swedenborg, A Study About His Development into a Mystic and Visionary* (1922); a paper by the psychiatrist W. Gruhle, "Swedenborg's Dreams, a Contribution to the Phenomenology of his Mysticism" (1924); and an article by A. von Winterstein, a pupil of mine, entitled "Swedenborg's Religious Crisis and His Dream Diary" (*Imago*, 1936).

Swedenborg, the son of a parson (and later bishop), was extremely religious in childhood, but later became a great student

of the exact sciences and a positivist. When he was about fifty, he had hallucinations and delusional ideas of a mystical and religious nature; God and the Devil appeared to him; ascetic and voluptuous fantasies overwhelmed his mind. Swedenborg returned by regression to his early religious attitude and became a writer of pathological productivity on theological problems. He represents a classic case of change of personality, i.e., of paranoia, including the change of his libidinal position to homosexuality in dreams and hallucinations. However, his psychosis did not destroy his whole personality and he did not show dementia as other cases of paranoia do.

William James had an idealizing love for his father. He found his place in the world and his career only after a long period of vacillations and doubts, aggravated by neurotic states and ill-health. His work on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is believed to be an act of filial piety. In spite of the sceptical attitude of his thinking, William James was religious¹ and declared: "I, myself, believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences." "It seems correct to say," is the opinion of a friendly biographer, "that he did in fact have experiences of the type called mystical." William James named his constitutional disease "Zerrissenheit" (being torn to pieces). "An inventory of James' pathological traits would embrace," according to R. B. Perry, "tendencies to hypochondria and hallucinatory experiences, abnormally frequent and intense oscillations of mood, and an almost morbid alogism, or antipathy to the mode of thinking which employs definitions, symbols and trains of inference." James was periodically depressed, had insomnia and hypochondria, not without suicidal preoccupations. He also showed "a pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought". Santayana calls James an agnostic; James himself never would

1. Also Janet believed that his own interest in psychology and philosophy was the result of a conflict between two tendencies, the one religious, and quasi-mystical, the other scientific.

have admitted this. But Allport's lecture on "The Productive Paradoxes of William James" (1942) seems almost to prove it.

However we interpret and classify "mystical experiences" or "ecstatic states", James wrestled repeatedly in his life with melancholia and a sense of frustration. In his twenties he wrote: "I have always thought that this experience of melancholia of mine had a religious bearing . . . I mean that the fear was so invasive and powerful, that, if I had not clung to Scripture texts like 'The eternal God is my refuge', etc., 'Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy-laden', etc., I should have grown really insane." In a letter written at the age of twenty-six James wrote: "The fact is that I am . . . little fitted by nature to be a worker in science, and yet . . . my only ideal is a scientific life."

James was able to find a compromise between faith and the science of religion. "If philosophy will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction," he says, "she can make herself enormously useful, frankly transforming herself from theology into a science of religions. Why should a critical science of religions not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science! Even the personally non-religious might accept its conclusions on trust." He emphasized the prevalence of the psychopathic temperament in religious biography, without being versed in the terms of psychiatry. We find in his book on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* also the following passage: "Does God really exist? How does He exist? What is He? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion." In another place he says: "The warring gods and formulae of the various religions do indeed cancel each other, but there is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet. It consists of two parts: An uneasiness; and its solution. The solution is a sense that we are saved from the wrongness, from the sense that there is something wrong about us."

James describes those who are predisposed for conversion as "subjects who are in possession of a large region in which mental work can go on subliminally and from which invasive experiences may come". A divine miracle is not necessary for conversion. "But if there be higher spiritual agencies, that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them." The direct presence of the Deity, however, is not excluded. In his *Will to Believe* James complains of the paralysis in the academic public of the inborn ability to believe, but he defends the right of the individual to devote himself to his personal faith at his personal risk.

He, the son of "the best and most theological" father had to be deeply religious; but for the people he recommends religion, because it is "pragmatic" to be religious, and he claims that one has "to will" to be religious. The individual should have the right to an individual personal faith.

We do not assume that the conflict between science and faith, between the son's scepticism and the father's profound religiousness alone caused James' neurotic states. But deep differences in their attitudes existed and an anxious letter of William to his wife after his father's death is characteristic: "You must not leave me till I understand a little more of the value and meaning of religion in father's sense, in the mental life and destiny of man . . . I must learn to interpret it alright."

It is not widely known that James met the representative of this new world of the unconscious, Freud, face to face. James really welcomed psychoanalysis, personally coming to Worcester for one day, where Freud, at Clark University, gave the well-known five lectures in 1909. James applauded the aims of psychoanalysis—it was a year before his death—even when he distrusted its individual exponents. We find in a letter to Theodore Flournoy the following report: "'Speaking of 'functional' psychology, Clark University . . . had a little international congress the other day

in honor of the twentieth year of its existence. I went there for one day in order to see what Freud was like. I hope that Freud and his pupils will push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are. They can't fail to throw light on human nature; but I confess that he made on me personally the impression of a man obsessed with fixed ideas. I can make nothing in my own case with his dream-theories, and obviously 'symbolism' is a most dangerous method. A newspaper report of the congress said that Freud has condemned the American religious therapy (which has such extensive results) as very 'dangerous' because so 'unscientific'. Bah!"

In another letter he wrote: "I strongly suspect Freud, with his dream-theory, of being a regular halluciné . . . Undoubtedly it covers some facts, and will add to our understanding of functional psychology, which is the real psychology." Freud—"obsessed with fixed ideas"—"a regular halluciné". James was not exactly a good psychiatric diagnostician!

But James' first reaction was indeed a relatively mild one and hopeful for the future of psychoanalysis. "Freud and his pupils should push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are"—this really ensued after James' death.

We have seen how enthusiastically William James, with his interest in novelties, welcomed the great progress in psychology, brought about by the insight into the unconscious psychical processes. But it was reserved for Freud to specify the unconscious material that determines the religious "Weltanschauung". What is rising through the open door, is "determined by the situation that subsisted in our childhood . . . A thesis unshakable by any questions of detail", Freud adds.

God-Creator is openly called father. Psychoanalysis concludes that he really is the father, clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child. The religious man's image of the creation of the universe is the same as his image of his own creation. The same individual, to whom the child owes his

existence, the father (or, more correctly, the mother also) has protected and watched over the weak and helpless child, exposed as he is to all the dangers which threaten him in the external world; in his father's care he has felt safe. Even the grown man cannot give up the protection that he enjoyed as a child. But he has long since realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute. He therefore looks back to the memory-image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a deity and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory-image and the lasting nature of his need for protection are the two supports of his belief in God. The same father (the parental function²) who gave the child his life and preserved him from the dangers which that life involves, also taught him what he might or might not do, made him accept certain limitations of his instinctual wishes, and told him what consideration he would be expected to show towards his parents, and brothers and sisters, if he wanted to be tolerated and liked as a member of the family circle, and later on of more extensive groups. This whole state of affairs is carried over by the grown-up man into his religion. The prohibitions and commands of his parents live on in his breast as his moral conscience; God rules the world of men with the help of the same system of rewards and punishments. The feeling of security, with which every individual fortifies himself against the dangers both of the external world and of his human environment, is founded on his love of God and the consciousness of God's love for him. Finally, he exercises a direct influence on the divine will in prayer, and in that way obtains a share in the divine omnipotence.

2. It is true that Freud has limited his investigations to the peculiarities of one type of religion; therefore the father-motive got a decisive place. But he mentions the mother or speaks about her parental function. Other psychoanalysts acknowledge the importance of the mother-motive and of the narcissistic self-motive, so especially H. and K. Schelderup in their book, *On the Three Main Types of Religious Experiences and Their Psychological Basis* Berlin and Leipzig, de Gruyter, 1932.

We know, too, from the inner life of individuals as disclosed in analysis that the relation to the real father was in all probability ambivalent from the outset, or at any rate it soon became so; that is to say, it comprised two sets of emotional impulses, quite opposite in nature, not merely one of fondness and submission but also one of hostility and defiance. We hold—continues Freud, whom we quote here—that this ambivalence governs the relation of mankind to its deities. This unresolved conflict, the longing for the father, and dread and defiance, explains the fantasy of the Evil Spirit, regarded as the antithesis of God, namely *the Devil*. Not all religions have adopted this enemy of God, but it requires no great psychoanalytic insight to guess that God and the Devil were originally one and the same, a single figure which was later split into two, bearing opposite characteristics.

I refer here to Freud's works *Totem and Tabu* and *The Future of an Illusion*, the chapter "On a Weltanschauung" in the sequence of *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, further the case histories of "Schreber's Paranoia" and of the "Devil-neurosis of the Seventeenth Century," finally to the paper on "Compulsive Acts and Religious Rituals".

We are very fortunate in being able to refer also to the work of a professor of Biblical Literature and History of Religions, at Brown University in Providence, R. P. Casey. In his paper, "Oedipus Motivation in Religious Thought and Fantasy",³ Casey states in detail his opinion on the influence of the oedipus complex. This scholar writes: "There is a statement of Freud not sufficiently utilized for the understanding of religion, namely, that the oedipus complex is unique in being normally and regularly suppressed rather than resolved. It is for this reason that it serves as a foundation for character development and leaves its marks on the adult personality in sickness and in health. The

3. *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1942

resolution of a complex involves the dissipation of its influence on consciousness, but the oedipus complex is habitually not resolved and its influence persists and forms a problem not only in the economy of personal life but in social exchange as well. It is the common possession of this nucleus of conflict that has driven men to find for it a socialized expression and the result has been the emergence of religious institutions and organizations in the history of all cultures."

The most characteristic symptom of oedipus residua is underlying anxiety which betrays itself in two ways: the fear or suspicion of punishment however undeserved and the attempt to avert such punishment by appeasing and ingratiating the source of the supposed threat. The former impresses itself in imperfectly rationalized guilt, in religious terms in an inadequately explained sense of sin; the latter is attempted by admitting the overwhelming superiority and excellence of the disciplinary figure or by a surface assumption that his dispositions are the reverse of those suggested by the fear.

Alexander's principle of "the bribability of the superego" is confirmed by the history of religions. Its underlying motivation is anxiety based on feelings of guilt toward the father; its emotional impression one of masochistic submissiveness, often covered by unconscious religious attitudes of high and noble character. Beneath the historical sequences of religious ideas and attitudes, the activity of the oedipus complex is clearly present, having persistently the same unconscious problems for sublimation in religious patterns of thought, feeling and behavior.

Casey declared in his summary of "The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion,"⁴ that "there is a great need for new material of a kind more susceptible to experimental observation and control . . . the psychological evaluation of religion in terms of evidence rather than of hypothesis would represent a substantial gain."

⁴ *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 33, pp. 437-452.

"The structure of most religious beliefs and practices is the oedipus complex." This sentence by Casey I put as motto at the head of *my personal contributions to this matter*. We are not going to discuss the average person, as we are convinced that their religious destiny is essentially shaped in a general development by public institutions, tradition and education. We are interested here in the conscious and unconscious development of peculiar religious destinies, peculiar individuals, peculiar religious experiences. We do not exclude psychotic cases such as religious paranoia cases. But my new varieties of religious experience have to show that the religious attitude of many normal or seemingly normal people is transparent in its development if we take into consideration their personal oedipus complex. My examples will mostly be writers, people who confess voluntarily or involuntarily, by writing about themselves, but also some simple individuals: An American M.D., an anonymous old maid described in the *Reader's Digest*, a psychoanalyst, and others. Writers, poets and artists are the best objects for our investigation because, as Rank emphasized in his book *The Incest Motif in Myth and Poetry*: "The artist, compelled to an intensive repression of the oedipus complex, sublimates his powerful impulses and indulges in fantasies. The same process takes place in primitive mankind and results in myths and religions."

FRANZ WERFEL

Franz Werfel, the novelist, represented a very interesting type. He was a Jew, but believed he had found the way to genuine Christianity. He did not state exactly when he had had "the religious experience", the revelation, or when his conversion had taken place; but he referred to feelings of his early youth. Orthodox Catholicism rightly claimed the poet as a Catholic. At the age of forty-two Werfel once lectured to a large audience. "Are We Able to Live without Belief in God?" was the title of his

lecture and in it he clearly made propaganda for his own faith. His aim was to convert the audience to divine unity: "The goal of this way is the goal of the world: Joy!" His arguments were partly personal ones. Man will remember death and destruction, especially the death of his mother, particularly the day of her death. More often he may suffer from the fear of annihilation. Werfel adds that the idea of God is incomparably older than the patriarchate; but both, male and female deities, are only interpretations of the divine principle in conformity with the age. The "ecstatic state" is the deepest human experience. "The revolt against metaphysics is the cause of all our misery." Werfel's last two novels, *The Embezzled Heaven* and *The Song of Bernadette*, deal with religious problems and reveal the dilemma of the writer. The deeply religious persons whom he depicts are described with cool aloofness, even with irony. The little girl, who, for some weeks, suffers from visions, becomes reluctantly the origin of the fame of Lourdes and is finally canonized after her death, which was caused by tuberculosis of the bones. Werfel deals with her only as a sober historian would do. His description of the inevitable development is masterly, even down to his exposing superstition and egotism. Where does he, in this novel, give proof of the existence of God or the value of belief? Only toward the end Lafite, the unbelieving man of letters, admits that he is converted. Lafite probably represents the author. His admission is due to the influence of a malign disease. He says: "I know well that all gods are reflected images of our own body-structures and that, if the pelicans believed in a god, he would have to be a pelican. But that is not a proof against the existence of a deity; it is only a proof for the narrowness of the earthly spirit, which cannot exist outside of images and words. I could never have endured the thought of being eternally excluded from the knowledge of God, to whom I feel, for all that, allied. There are no conversions to belief, there is only a return to it.

Then God is not a function of the soul, but this soul itself in its last nakedness."

Thus Lafite, he who had been the arch-sceptic and the Virgin's proudest foe, was converted when he became gravely ill and then sank upon his knees before the famous grotto of Lourdes. Here Werfel unconsciously betrayed his own fear of illness and death.

The original and exceptional religious destiny of Werfel is easily interpreted by psychoanalytic insight. Feelings of guilt and anxiety,⁵ resulting from unusually great hostility against his father and the influence of a Catholic servant in his youth are sufficient causes. The conflict between father and son was exceedingly acute in Werfel's life. In his poem, *Father and Son*, in the novel, *Not the Murderer, the Murdered is Guilty*, and in the play *Mirrorman*—to quote his biographer Richard Specht—Werfel has "dramatized the very subtle, horrible and criminal situation that psychoanalysis has formulated as the oedipus complex". After the publication of this biography by Specht, Werfel wrote the novel *Family Pascarella*, which again describes in detail the damage a vain and aggressive father is able to inflict upon his six children.

Verses, such as, "Before our time begins, we become guilty that we are", or "My father, I look now for you!" may have a special meaning. The murder-novel reveals inhibitions similar to those of Hamlet; here the son, who hates his father, does not kill him though he threatens him brutally. The figure of a Catholic servant appears prominently in two of Werfel's novels, in *Barbara* and in *The Embezzled Heaven*; in the latter as a bigoted cook who steals from her mistress. The religious persons in Werfel's writings are often very simple. The Catholic servant may have secured her great influence on the boy because the mother had to be supplanted; her picture may have been merged

5. The connection of the fear of death with religion Werfel betrays in his book *The Embezzled Heaven*, as follows: There is an uncanny evening. A mother who fears the death of her children says: "It is really difficult to believe in God." The writer answers: "God is exactly the space in us which death does not occupy."

into fantasies about prostitutes, well-known derivatives of the oedipus complex.

Werfel may not have known anything about these interpretations of his strange religiosity. The very paradox of it and the over-emphasis that made him a preacher and a propagandist betray its origin in inner conflicts. The storm and stress of Werfel's years of development were violent. He revolted also against traditional artistic expression; he choose new forms for his verses and therefore not all of his poems are intelligible. There does not exist a better proof for Freud's principle that the religious "Weltanschauung" is determined by our childhood.

Certainly Werfel's strange religious attitude was determined "by the situation that subsisted in his childhood". In his works he discloses fantasies of bad and hard fathers who invariably die or are murdered. It was an archaic overwhelming hatred against his father that produced these strange reactions. Anxiety to be punished by God-Father resulted in his fear of dying. Werfel was mistaken in assuming that everybody suffers from such fear of death and in regarding this as a basic motive in religious conversion. Unconscious processes—guilt feelings, anxiety, fear of death—produced in him personally a paradoxical conversion: here was a modern well-educated man and a Jew, who became a devout Catholic and a propagandist eager to make proselytes.

FREUD'S CASE

In 1928, Freud published a case of conversion, "a religious experience" of an American student of medicine who had reported this experience years later as follows: "One afternoon while I was passing through the dissecting-room, my attention was attracted to a sweet-faced dear old woman who was being carried to a dissecting table. This sweet-faced woman made such an impression on me that a thought flashed up in my mind: 'There is no God; if there were a God, he would not have allowed this dear old woman to be brought to the dissecting-room.'

When I got home that afternoon, the feeling I had had at the sight in the dissecting-room had determined me to discontinue to go to church. The doctrines of Christianity had before this been the subject of doubts in my mind.

While I was meditating on this matter a voice spoke to my soul that I should consider the step I was about to take. My spirit replied to this inner voice by saying: 'If I knew of a certainty that Christianity was truth and the Bible was the Word of God, then I would accept it.'

In the course of the next few days, God made it clear to my soul, that the Bible was His Word, that the teachings about Jesus Christ were true and that Jesus was our only hope. After such a clear revelation, I accepted the Bible as God's Word and Jesus Christ as my personal savior. Since then God has revealed himself to me by many infallible proofs."

Freud suggests the following hypothetical explanation: The aspect of the naked body of a woman or of one destined to be exposed, reminded the young man of his mother and awakened in him a longing for his mother, which originated from the oedipus complex. This longing included rebellion against the father. The desire to kill the father can become conscious as a doubt in the existence of God, and it can be accepted by reason as indignation about the mistreated mother-object. The child sometimes regards what father does to mother as an assault. The new emotion displaced to the religious realm is only a repetition of the oedipus situation and therefore has the same destiny. It succumbs to a mighty counter-wave. The conflict seems to have assumed the form of a hallucinatory psychosis, inner voices resounded in order to dissuade the student from resistance. The end of the conflict appeared again in the religious realm; it is the complete subjection to the will of the Father-God, as predestined by the oedipus complex; the young man now believed and accepted everything he had been taught since childhood about God and Jesus Christ. He had had a religious experience, had been con-

verted and then tried to convert friends. Theodor Reik in "A Note to Freud's Paper: A Religious Experience", remarks: "The most important precondition for a conversion is the unconscious emergence of hostile and aggressive impulses against the father, which appear as doubts, respectively as unbelief in God. The conversion follows upon a break-through of an impulse, which actualized the hate tendencies against the father; it represents a reaction caused by unconscious anxiety and tenderness."

A CASE OF COUNTER-CONVERSION

The following case of counter-conversion is reported in James' book: The impression of a violent assault of a husband against his wife produced in a girl of nineteen the idea: "I have no use for God who permits such things." Since this painful experience she never again had any personal relation to God. From early youth, she had always been more or less sceptical about "God", had felt shame and remorse for a long time when, at sixteen, she joined the church and was not sincere about it. Her actual story reads as follows: "At nineteen, I had an attack of tonsillitis. Before I had quite recovered, I heard a story of a brute who had kicked his wife downstairs and then continued kicking her until she passed out. I felt the horror of the thing keenly. Instantly the blasphemous thought flashed through my mind."

No further recollections are told, nothing about her father and his relation to her mother. But in all probability our assumption is justified that an originally loved father had disappointed his daughter by violence and had become the origin of her negation of God the Father. Generally, religious persons do not make God responsible for violent actions of brutal people.

THE MAGAZINE CASE

I think I should discuss a case of a rather fulminant conversion of a young woman, although we do not know anything

about her childhood. A religious writer, who has published a book *Have You a Religion?* commented on her way of conversion, in an article in the *Reader's Digest*. The woman, who was neither pretty nor gifted, became a happy and religious person, when she happened to read the brief magazine suggestion: "Try religion for a day—a single day!"

We are told that the girl praised this change by which she lost her fears of life, of death, of old age, of sickness, of losing her job, of the future. She gave up anger, hatred, greed, lust, cruelty and pride, as well as suspicion and intolerance against people around her. She tried the suggestion for a day and then for another day; success came to her increasingly; tolerance, kindness and love won the upper hand; she seemed to have become positive instead of negative and felt she was at last a genuine human being.

No doubt this girl was in a chronic state of anxiety, isolated and disappointed. A scene in her office in which she had been made the scapegoat, had occurred just before she read the notice. She was not especially attractive. Thus we have to assume a certain readiness for an escape from herself and the suggestion of the magazine came just in time. The flight into faith may have rescued her from suicide; a new life began instead. But how many readers of that magazine were in such readiness? Fear, isolation, despair and frustration provide the most fertile ground for a conversion, if childhood has prepared the way.

Santa de Sanctis writes in his book on *Religious Conversion*: "Suffering in advance is to be found in every case of adult conversion. Liberation and the sensation of victory, feeling the nearness of God and finally tranquillity are experienced afterwards."

THE SWISS PSYCHOANALYST

A scientific opinion can be changed by a kind of conversion. A Swiss psychoanalyst reported in his paper, "Healing and De-

velopment of the Soul" (1918), that a word of Christ, which he had as a child learned by heart, but had never comprehended, "I am the way, the truth and the life", all of a sudden became meaningful. A feeling of new power and of new trust in his human nature and destination was caused by his discovery of the "teleological function of dreams", of this entirely unconscious and incontrovertible phenomenon. This made an overwhelming impression on him; for the first time his positivism and his mechanical conception of life were shaken.

From the general circumstances we described, we must suppose that Dr. X was in inner readiness for his conversion, and that his alleged discovery—incidentally, not accepted by Freud—was conditioned by his entirely unconscious readiness.⁶ It is really a return from science to faith, to the emotional religious impressions of his youth. We quote here a passage from the paper: "Sensual enjoyment and greediness for money took possession of the hearts and enslaved the world. The word of Christ claims that every really born or newborn living personality looks for its own path."

C. G. Jung, once an enthusiastic follower of Freud, wrote: "Every one of my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—fell ill, because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given their followers; and none of them has really been healed, who did not regain his religious outlook." If you read that, you may well remember that Jung is the son of a minister, and may have gone the way of regression too, like his colleague. He even once wrote a paper about "The Importance of the Father for the Destiny of the Individual". It is very instructive to read what Professor Casey wrote about Jung's method, which erroneously still goes under the name of psychoanalysis: "Freudian analysis is

6. Even a conversion which is reported as sudden has been prepared unconsciously, Starbuck speaks of "subconscious incubation", James of a state of being "tuned aright".

different from other analytic procedures which rely on suggestion and instructions, as, for example, Jung's analyses, which end in conversion to Jung's ideas and, ideally at least, in a graduate course in his philosophy of life."

ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Even if a man is already religious, a conversion is still possible, which is then a conversion to a higher ethic, to a perfection near to that of a saint. Such was the conversion of Albert Schweitzer, a man of varied talents: theologian, preacher, student of Jesus and of Bach, expert in organ music and virtuoso, philosopher and finally missionary and doctor in Africa.

Schweitzer describes his conversion at the age of twenty-one as follows: "One brilliant summer morning at Guensbach, during the Whitsuntide holidays, there came to me, as I awoke, the thought that I must not accept this happiness as a matter of course, but must give something in return for it. Proceeding to think the matter out with calm deliberation, while the birds were singing outside, I settled with myself, before I got up, that I would consider myself justified in living for science and art till I was thirty, in order to devote myself from that time forward to the direct service of humanity. Many a time already had I tried to settle what meaning lay hidden for me in the saying of Jesus, 'Whosoever would save his life, shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospels', shall save it.' Now the answer was found. In addition to the outward, I now had inward happiness."

Schweitzer, too, was the son of a minister. He describes his childhood and youth as a very happy one, "unclouded but for the frequent illnesses of his father". In the Gymnasium (High School) he was "slack and dreamy", yet mastered what did not come easily to him and learned strict discipline and fulfillment of duty.

"It struck me," he says later, "as incomprehensible that I should be allowed to live such a happy life, while I saw so many people around me wrestling with care and suffering." What rare feelings of compassion and guilt!

Schweitzer then wanted to work with abandoned or neglected children, with tramps or discharged prisoners; but he did not like to work with an organization. What he wanted was an absolutely personal and independent activity, free from interference. By chance, "one day in 1904", he read that there was the "need of the Mission of the Congo", to find some of those "on whom the Master's eyes already rested" and who had only to answer the Master's call: "Lord, I am coming." Schweitzer decided to begin his medical studies and in spite of the fact that his friends and family warned him and said that he was "not quite in his right mind", he accomplished "the most irrational thing". In 1913, he left with his wife for "the direct human service (as a doctor) in Equatorial Africa".

It is disappointing not to find more details about his youth in his all too short autobiography *My Life and Thoughts*. We have here the typical formula for conversion "Once on a sunny day . . ." We see a moral conversion to a more highly appreciated occupation than could be offered by the work of a writer, theologian, musician, scientist or artist. The God of Schweitzer prefers "direct service for humanity", and only thereby does Schweitzer achieve security and inner happiness. External happiness in which not all people participate in equal degree, he experiences as sin. Since this feeling is not a general one, we assume the existence of an unconscious guilt feeling which originated in early years and was revived by regression.

SCHOPENHAUER

Since the conception of God and religious belief and practice are so essentially dependent on the child-parent relation in their

structure, I would like to add at least one more proof that "the need of conceiving an universe and the character ascribed to any universe", the philosophy of life or "Weltanschauung" depend on the same unconscious development. In Schopenhauer's main work, *The World as Will and Idea*, his pessimism and misogyny are striking features in this brilliant and highly educated man.

My psychoanalysis of his character and work (*Imago* 1913) shows the pessimism derived from his peculiar childhood between a father of a hard and violent nature and a mother who was tender in the beginning and then rejecting. There are no reports with full details, but many characteristic memories. Approximately at the age of eighteen, Schopenhauer said: "Could God have created this world? No. Rather a devil. I suffered much in growing up, through the callousness of my father."

Behind this conscious remark of the young man, we have to assume an unhappy childhood; the boy really considered the two happiest years of his youth those he spent with another family, where the foster-father was "a dear, kind, pleasant man". Schopenhauer showed anxiety, feelings of guilt and hypochondriacal symptoms and suffered from strong, mostly suppressed sexual desires. A second root of his pessimism may be seen in the deep disappointment in the changing behavior of his mother who rejected her son, preferring her lovers who lived with her. Schopenhauer became, of course, irreligious in early life, but as an ideal he described the saint, who has overcome will, hostility and sexuality. "Schopenhauer idealized pity and chastity, because he suffered most of all from the contrary" (Nietzsche).

Schopenhauer's philosophy is an unconscious confession and projection. The power of his father, which he felt in childhood so superior to himself, he projected as a symbol into the universe: as will.

He was not in sympathy with the supernatural element, but valued the moral doctrines of Christianity and Buddhism. In his dialogue on *Religion* he admits the practical value of religion,

which is metaphysics of the masses, on the intellectual level. But the other partner in this dialogue predicts euthanasia of religion in the future; religion will take its leave from European humanity, like a nurse whom the child has outgrown. Philosophy and science will then be instructors and tutors. Many of Schopenhauer's argumentations we find in Freud's *Future of an Illusion*.

It is again Professor Casey, who formulated clearly: "The assumption of a good universe depends on a disposition to affirm the successful survival of positive elements in the oedipus complex, that of a hostile or indifferent universe represents their extinction or defeat by negative elements, reflecting experiences of hostility or indifference in the parents or parent-substitutes in the formative years."

GOTTFRIED KELLER

The father-relation of the well-known Swiss poet Gottfried Keller was complicated. At the age of five he lost his beloved and esteemed father. At the age of seven he hated his stepfather, but this marriage of his mother lasted only a few years. She often spoke about his father, and the son was full of longing and nostalgia for him. The father had been an enthusiastic and learned man, interested in arts and literature and in a moral and religious education.

Subsequently, idealistic father-images appear in Keller's autobiographical novel, *Der Gruene Heinrich*, and the writer and passive hero is continuously struggling with the problem of the divinity. God is for him a kind of father, the supporter, who takes care of him. The father's noble image is growing also to "a part of the great Infinite". He has to sanction his son's work as a painter; the son "had won a mighty and grand patron, who invisibly stalked over the dusky world". The son inherited from his father the delight in festivals and in the ringing of bells in church, and also the sense of freedom from encroachments of

ultramontanism and from the intolerance of orthodox and hypocritical priests. The penitential sermon at his confirmation drove the son from the church for many years, but he kept an unsophisticated belief in God. He wrote to his mother: "I always need to remain in an easily trusting relation with God." When studying with Feuerbach, he became a denier of God and immortality, but later he changed again and returned to God the Father.

He imagined the dead father as an intellectual mentor. Great men of genius are his father-substitutes: Jean Paul, an older poet, influenced him, and was venerated and loved. It is said in the novel: "At that time I entered into a new alliance with God and Jean Paul, who took the place of a father for me . . . I will never disown him as long as my heart does not dry up. With other spiritual heroes one is only a guest, with him one is united forever." Keller was indebted to his father for his liberal faith in God.

As a little boy—was it at the time of his stepfather?—Keller committed compulsive blasphemies, succumbing to the temptation, especially before falling asleep, of calling God nicknames, even invectives. The hero of the autobiographical novel calls it "an unconscious experiment with the omnipresence of God". It is interesting that the boy imagined God as a weather-cock or picture-book tiger.

AUGUSTE COMTE

Auguste Comte demonstrates the legitimacy of such developments of character, where scientific interests are in contrast to early religious trends. His work reminds one of Swedenborg, inasmuch as during twelve years of his life he examined "the total state of the wisdom of his time for its concrete and positive contents, removing its theological and metaphysical ingredients". Originally the *Positive Philosophy* was intended as an "harmonic and systematic whole of all science". But Comte experienced

in later years a change in personality and converted from science to faith. By regression to deep religious impressions of his youth he changed even his work to a religious one.

Auguste Comte was a descendant of an exceedingly pious family and his mother especially went to extremes in order to validate her principles even at the risk of his life. This explains why, in the last period of his life, he returned by regression to the religious state, though in entire opposition to his previous axioms.

Comte was psychotic for a certain period at the age of twenty-eight, was divorced at forty-four, and in his forty-seventh year again went through a "nervous crisis". His new sweetheart, Clotilde de Vaux, was the origin of his conversion to a renewed religion; however, she died after a year they spent together. Here a regression to childhood, to the mother and the early influence of her bigotry brought the conversion to Catholicism. It was Wilhelm Ostwald, who, in his biography of Comte, pointed out this mechanism of regression. As a result we have "Comte's conviction of the inevitability of religious institutions and sentiments in a world enlightened by science": a compromise.

SELMA LAGERLÖF

If we wish to collect more "religious experiences", I may use at random the psychoanalytic supplements to biographies I have published. The famous Swedish authoress Selma Lagerlöf, for instance, was a very pious lady; she was charitable, full of mercy and pity, and showed traits of saintliness. Her novels deal all too often with the themes of guilt and punishment, atonement and redemption. As a child she was full of feelings of guilt and anxiety; in her writings she preferred to deal with hard and unjust stepmothers, or mothers-in-law, or with witches. Even in later years she was frightened by the hallucination of a gruesome old female beggar.

Here we see that the feeling of guilt arising from the oedipus complex, by the roundabout way of anxiety, produced the over-religious character. A very kind father was the prototype of God, who, represented by Christ or by a priest, acts in this world as a kind, forgiving, understanding authority. Some of the memories of her childhood, particularly the mention of some little acts of sacrilege, verify Selma Lagerlöf's development. At the age of fourteen, Selma listened with curiosity to a conversation her uncle had with a lady who was interested in positivism and seemed not to believe in God. Selma felt obliged to assert that she herself believed in God; but she was too shy to profess it in the way the old Christian martyrs did. She doubted whether God could ever forgive her for this omission, and feared she would be punished by him with many severe disasters. She developed into a very religious personality, and her character, in reaction against her early stubbornness, avarice and irascibility, displayed compassion, charity and kindness. In her childhood she suffered from a phobia of birds which might pick her eyes out and this phobia also appears in her works. Such a phobia is a symptom of feelings of guilt due to hating her mother in connection with the oedipus complex.

KNUT HAMSDUN

How will the religious reaction to the oedipus complex develop in an individual who as a boy had had a phobia of an uncanny, threatening, devilish man, towards whom the boy felt guilty? The Norwegian novelist, Knut Hamsun, in his work manifests his hatred of his father, in addition to the recurrent problem of the fear of "castration". Incidentally, he lets all father-images, the mighty, impulsive and sensual types, lose their fortune and potency in later age. The motive of jealousy and of "the damaged third" demonstrates the fixation to the mother. In the entire work of this ingenious writer we do not find the description

of any noble woman, but psychoanalysis teaches us, that the exalted image of the mother may be symbolized by Mother Earth or by Nature. Actually Hamsun and his heroes flee from the struggles and worries of life to the outdoors, the forest, the beach, to Nature. They enjoy living in a warm, lonely cavern. Hamsun's description of Nature shows its maternal origin and its symbolic character. For instance, he describes a locality: "It is not really a slope of a hill; it is a breast, a lap, so smooth . . . a big slope, so full of tenderness and helplessness, like a mother it allows itself to be fondled in every way."

Nature appears as a place where one has already been; as a *déjà vu*, combined with feelings of reincarnation. He said once: "Many years have passed, since I felt such peace around me, maybe twenty or thirty years, maybe it was in an earlier life. I must have once felt this peace though, as I now walked around here . . . and cared about every stone and every blade, and these, in turn, seemed to care for me. We knew each other . . . I walked through the wood, I was moved to tears, I was enchanted, and I said constantly: God in heaven, that again I should come here! As if I had been here before."

Hamsun's much praised sentimental descriptions of Nature result from his longing for the innocent time of paradise with mother. We know of his fixation to his homeland; *Mother Earth* is the title of one of his novels; he liked country life, and ran a farm. Is it too dogmatic to assume that he built up a kind of natural religion, that he found security only at the breast of the mother, symbolized by Nature, finding the fulfillment of an unconscious longing only in a pantheistic union with her? He worshipped Nature. The "oceanic feeling", the feeling of an indissoluble connection with Nature, the "Naturgefühl"—they all may substitute a religious feeling for a God, substituting the beloved Mother for the father and Nature for the mother. It is not only tenderness, warmth and beauty that mother represents; she is the nourishing principle too. Hamsun obstinately

refused to give biographical data about himself; but in a hidden place in his writings he mentions his childhood: "We had an unusual mother who often turned back and pretended to have forgotten something, when she caught us in the store-room." Although Hamsun had this tendency to hide all details about his development, one description by the Norwegian Trygve Braatoy, of a striking character trait of the main persons in some of his books may be quoted: "Love and hatred, contempt and veneration in turn, are felt toward the same object—toward God and existence."

MAX DAUTHENDEY

I discussed one of the most striking examples of our problem in my paper on the German poet Max Dauthendey. In his autobiography his ambivalent relation to his domineering father is described very lucidly: "My father's spirit rules all I do. He comes and goes (a long time after his death) as if alive. For me his spirit still rises daily with the sun and stays with the stars in the nocturnal sky."

Too hard and too strong to be loved unambiguously, these super-fathers are so attractive and imposing, so efficient in everything and represent such perfect models for ambition, that the children are not able to reject them with indifference. The sons remain in feminine dependency, in fetters for a long time, or for ever, or they break loose fighting in heroic love for their mothers or her representatives and thereby fighting the omnipotent fathers.

Max Dauthendey demonstrates clearly the psychoanalytic concepts of conversion and counter-conversion of apostasy. For three months he had hardly spoken a word to his father, finally he left the house thoroughly fed up with the tyrant. A single remark of a friend made him a pantheist, who could imagine the heavens empty and could dethrone the old God. The apostasy from the father made the son able to sustain the apostasy from

God. "A human being is not the slave of a master; he is a master himself; the master of his life and of all future lives," he said. His words: "The feeling of love will also then be richer. You will not value God any higher than the heart of the woman whom you will choose,"—seem to illustrate the libido-change as the basis of the conversion by regression to the mother's image.

Dauthendey's conversion from Father-God to Mother-Nature, from a homosexual attitude to a heterosexual one, is a regression to his earliest love, that to his mother. Her early death furthered the later substitution by his father's personality. In his works the poet characteristically indulges in his great enjoyment of Nature, which he intimately describes.

I have interpreted some telepathic phenomena Dauthendey experienced and had in this context to point out his ambivalence, his hostility to his father, his death-wishes and repentance. When his father died, and he received the message abroad, he felt relief. Later he found it vicious and low, "that the death of the beloved old father made him feel relief in his distress". But the son was relieved from veritable hunger and was enabled to live on the inheritance. He says: "In the wild disdain I felt in this tragic situation, I said: to inherit is cannibalism."

His flight from his homeland may here be characteristic of his escape from his father, who seemed to be the cause of the suicides of his first wife and of a second son, who suffered from persecution delusion; perhaps this psychosis was caused by a parallelism of the same forces of different intensity—fixation in love and hatred. A dream of Max Dauthendey in his forty-seventh year may here be reported as proof of an intensive father-fixation: "I stood beside my father and embraced him and pointed to a little child, who wore a little cap on his head and was held on somebody's arm. 'Ah!' said I, 'Papa, let all of us wear such a little nightcap, you and me too, and let us then sit under the plum-trees, you and me, and let us speak about Mama!' My father smiled and I felt in the dream that what I had said was childish

and tired. Then I threw my arms around him, drew him to me and said: 'Ah, Father, let me at least imagine this, also if it is not at all possible, but I like to imagine it, that is already enough and it does me good, to imagine it.' I awoke and felt my heart sweetly beating, my chest sobbing and my eyes wet by tears, which I had shed in the dream on my father's shoulder, half in delight, half in great suffering and inexpressible grief."

GOETHE

In my psychoanalytic supplements to biographies I have often dealt with the problem of how the special religious positions of famous men were influenced by their personal relation to their fathers and mothers.

Goethe, in his universality, greatness and comprehension of all human affairs, is not easy to understand. His faith was influenced by a strong father whom he experienced as overwhelming, often manifesting intense rivalry with and resistance against him. The victorious overcoming of this father was revealed in poetry. The verses:

O that I could be once filled up
By you, the Eternal—
Alas, this deep pain,
How it endureth on this earth!

reveal feminine-passive emotions and a humble longing; the poem "Ganymed" shows a glorification of being merged with the universe; the poem "Prometheus" discloses open rebellion, the defiance of the Titans. In the son, the father's Protestantism became a more comprehensive, impersonal, pantheistic religion, a kind of overcoming of the paternal principle. Yet, all through his life Goethe remained religious in a wider sense. The father had been relatively tolerant toward his son; "in spite of a more old-fashioned opinion with regard to religion, he did not take offense at my speculations and opinions," says the son. One may

remember the peculiar altar that the son once built, in a rather heathenish manner, from products of Nature, and dedicated to the God of Nature, as a burnt-offering. "The God, who was closely connected with Nature, seemed to him the real God . . . The boy could not represent this being in definite shape . . ."

Perhaps we may ascribe the uncertainty, the doubt about God, and the denial of a personal God, to this ambiguous relation to the father, and to a kind of longing for the mother, interwoven with a specific "feeling of Nature". The circumstances in this case are complicated, because Nature represented for Goethe something divine; his religious feeling merged with the "feeling of Nature". It is for him a "pure, deeply inborn and familiar perception, to see God in Nature and Nature in God". Faust's creed also is that of a pantheist. "Neither the philosopher nor the theologian is able to achieve a satisfying idea about Goethe's God and Goethe's Nature" (Chamberlain).

Goethe wrote in a letter to his friend Jakobi: "As a poet and an artist I am a polytheist; but as a natural scientist, a pantheist; and the one I am as decisively as the other. When I need a God for myself personally, as an ethical being, this, too, is taken care of. The celestial and terrestrial matters are so wide a realm, that only the organs of all beings together are able to comprehend it."

The rebellion against the father is known from Goethe's autobiographical novel; the kind mother, to whom the son was always very much attached, often had to intervene. In his book on the incest-complex, Rank points out the unconscious continuation of this rebellion against the father.

SAMUEL JOHNSON

One of the most instructive cases of "religious experience" is that of the famous English writer and moralist, Samuel Johnson (1709-1784). He was a model of morality and religiousness; a volume of his prayers and meditations was pub-

lished after his death. His charity was well known; he used only one third of his royal pension for himself, and the rest he spent for indigent persons. We may be justified in calling him an abortive saint; it would, at least, have been his ideal to represent one, as he described the wise man Imlac in his novel *Rasselas*.

Religion was, as a biographer rightly found out, "the nightmare of his life". His parents were very religious and his mother had told him about heaven and hell at an early age. But he denied any lasting impression from this information. The real cause of his anxiety, which increased enormously toward the end of his life, was a deep feeling of guilt about his aggressive behavior against and early hatred of his father, about his later offenses against decency and moral and religious commands, but especially about an irreligious period in his boyhood. Such a period is a frequent occurrence as a result of hatred against the father, originating from the oedipus complex. Samuel Johnson's exceptional fate was that he had been infected by his tuberculous wet nurse, which made him half-blind and hard of hearing. That the father was a miser and guilty of hiring such a nurse was the son's everlasting reproach.

Thus, it was small wonder that the boy was very aggressive and had to repress this aggression, and this was what caused his severe neurosis. He was also very voracious and dirty. But he developed by reaction a kind of "abortive" saintliness as mentioned above; he was kind, generous and compassionate, charitable and to some degree ascetic. His mind did not overcome his feelings of repentance from partly unconscious guilt-feelings. Originally envious of his friends and of his brother, he had to turn to generosity. His case is transparent as hardly any other; after fifty years he returned in contrition to a place where he had once offended his father by obstinacy and arrogance.

Johnson's was indeed, a severe neurosis: He suffered from depressions, and from a tic in addition to his "compulsion neurosis", all three disturbances originating from an exceptionally high

fight against the English government is of a rare tenacity; he is the admired leader of the Indians, he, who fought for them as a martyr.

He proves once again that a very aggressive boy may, by repression and reaction, develop into the most altruistic, ascetic, and pious man; but the repressed aggression of the "original sin" will return, accompanied by feelings of guilt, manifesting itself by submission to God and reactive masochistic traits, such as the preference of a simple life, asceticism, periods of silence or fasting. He did not mind being imprisoned many times. Thus he represents "the fighting soul of India", and has aroused in the Indians a sense of nationhood and courage; he has stressed the importance of religion and fought for the "Untouchables"; they call him: "India's Noblest Son". Some obstinacy against natural cultural progress, such as railways, or his fight for the "spinning wheel" and for "India-made cloth", reveal that he is sometimes "absolutely irreconcilable", like compulsive neurotics or psychopaths.

His religion shows a development similar to conversion. Originally "entirely Hindu", he has been influenced by the Christian father-son religion; he admits that he owes to his Christian friends in South Africa the awakening of his religious quest. To him "all religions are like different roads leading to the same goal"

Gandhi's saintliness is characterized by fanaticism, purity, charity and asceticism, all furthered by unconscious masochism. This masochism is based on repressed aggression, which breaks through as his tenacity, irreconcilability and consistent fight against the "stepfather" England. Non-cooperation and civil disobedience are the substitutes for "violence". There seems to be some hypocrisy in the principle of "non-violence". All these paradoxes and the over-emphasis betray the repressed aggression, which here leads to slow conversion, by way of unconscious guilt feeling, anxiety and ingratiation with God. All the prayers, the fasting

and the self-ordained silence are compulsive means to expiate his sins. Let us call Gandhi a borderline case, an abortive saint with peculiar character traits.

SOEREN KIERKEGARD

The series of "religious experiences" I report here may be tiring, but only "the regularity of occurrences" proves a law and "the technique of proving a particular law is the demonstration of the frequency of similar events, disregarding individual differences" (Aristotle).

Freud's view, that the religious *Weltanschauung* is determined by the situation that subsisted in our childhood, is a thesis that Freud calls "unshakeable by any question of detail".

I think I should close my demonstration with one significant passage, quoted from the posthumously published papers of the famous, though neurotic theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard:

"I never knew the mirth to be a child because of the dreadful tortures I suffered . . . But often it seems to me, as if all would come back again. Then, how unhappy *my father* has made me, it seems as if I would live to see it *now in relation to God*: to be a child; and all my earliest life may have been so awfully lost and wasted in order to undergo it a second time, more true in relation to God."

SUMMARY

Here I end my presentation of a new group of varieties of religious experience. I have to expect the criticism that I have dealt with the problem of religious feelings only from a psychoanalytic point of view and have not shown insight in the broader aspects of religion as a sociological, historical, cultural problem. But my intention was merely to reaffirm the importance of the oedipus complex, which is ubiquitous, yet through different intensity and character creates varieties of character-types, neuro-

ses and, incidentally, different religious types. To understand these types will also further our practical work with patients.

The reproach may be more justified, that I did not bring more extensive psychoanalytic material. If I had dealt with patients, discretion would explain the restriction. My biographical studies of earlier years contain further data and in this paper on personality I intended to summarize the results. One type, represented by Swedenborg, shows, after a life dedicated, mainly in opposition to the religious father, to science and positivism, a later regression to the father, i.e., to God. It is a real change of personality, and simultaneously a libidinal change to homosexual dreams and hallucinations. In the same way, Auguste Comte, after several psychotic attacks, shows the regression from positivism to early religious impressions.

Franz Werfel, after a very stormy oedipal period, became a very gifted writer. In his works, he deals with parricide and religious problems. He undergoes a conversion to the Catholic faith, mentioning his own ecstatic experiences, but also anxiety and fear of death as motives of conversion to religious faith. He is even a propagandist, who likes to make proselytes. His guilt feelings about father-hatred remain unconscious, only anxiety is obvious.

Samuel Johnson, after an irreligious period in childhood, caused by father-hatred due to the oedipus complex, develops into an abortive saint, famous by charity and religiousness; his religion is essentially fear of hell, "the nightmare of his life".

The psychoanalyst X and Albert Schweitzer experienced a conversion, through remembering especially impressive words of Christ, heard but not sufficiently valued in childhood. X, as a result, assumed an ascetic attitude and Schweitzer renounced a leisurely life, devoted to artistic and scientific endeavors, for a very "ethical" life, devoted to poor negroes in Africa.

Two of my cases of famous writers suffered as children from a phobia; the woman, Selma Lagerlöf, from a phobia of birds, which turns up often in her widely read books; Knut Ham-

sun, from a phobia of a devilish man, symbolically castrated by a missing tooth. This missing tooth and other symbolic representations of castration appear very often in his works. Selma Lagerlöf developed into a very religious woman of highly refined character, but was never free from anxieties.

Hamsun humiliates and degrades his father figures, he is indifferent toward religion, but worships Nature representing the mother. Dauthendey changes to a pantheist at the moment when he breaks with his beloved but disappointingly severe father; longing for his mother whom he lost at an early age appears in his worship of Nature.

Goethe and Gottfried Keller had to go through similar inner struggles.

Schopenhauer, himself an aggressive person, revolted against the hard father, lost the love of his mother, and became an atheist, pessimist, misogyn, but clung to the saint as his ideal.

All these unconscious developments caused by the oedipus complex or its consequences, are now easy to understand. James felt that there was an open door to the Unconscious; but not till Freud did we learn what comes up through this door. James knew where, but Freud found what comes up. James described the varieties of religious experience, Freud taught us to understand them. James knew what they are like, Freud why they are so. We do not yet know where the psychotic process begins and what the mystic and ecstatic states represent. As paranoia or fixed idea a conversion does not change the whole personality, especially not the intelligence or ability to work. Even the religious paranoia of Swedenborg with all its psychotic symptoms did not prevent him from being regarded as a great man by his followers. It is the over-emphasis on the phenomena that is so convincing. Saints are rare, but ascetic, over-charitable types with self sacrificing tendencies exist also without having a particular religious belief.

We have seen that the idea of a saint became the egoideal of

Schopenhauer, Johnson and Gandhi. A high degree of aggression is reported as the original character-trait of these men; it had to be repressed and was changed to the opposite by reaction-formation.

About Gandhi we are told, that his father was ill for many years; is it too bold to suppose that death wishes had developed in the unconscious and had aroused guilt feelings?

The egoideal of a perfect moralist, as created by the formative years in accordance with parental or later models, we find also in cases that do not show religious tendencies after puberty. Starbuck found such moral conversion as a normal adolescent phenomenon, at least in evangelical circles. A. D. Nock of Harvard, dealing with antiquity only confirms it.

We have seen how effective is the oedipus complex, the "original sin", in forming the varieties of our experience, and have only to add an explanation of how the multitude of normal, average people solve it without doubts and difficulties. Most of the members of the many hundred creeds in the melting pot America develop, after successful repression of a moderate oedipus complex, an independent, strong and reliable ego and superego. They do not suffer from guilt and anxiety, but are influenced by tradition, models and the atmosphere of the formative years.

Incidentally, the problem of the followers of the founder of a new sect, is one of mass psychology and sociology.

I do not pretend to have revealed something basically new and should be satisfied if I have offered stimulation and suggestions regarding the problem of personality. The insight that religious attitudes have unconscious personal roots will create an atmosphere of tolerance.

What we have pointed out as the norm in special religious attitudes is also valid for the two great minds and contrasting personalities of James and Freud.

James' eminent achievements in other realms of science I am not able to evaluate; he represents "the great philosopher of

America" and was the most beloved philosopher of his time. He did not found any school, left practically no disciples in the strict sense of the word. His was a neurotic belief, developed after inner struggles and mystic experiences. He gave a description of religion, as Santayana points out, "that showed religion to be madness"; characterizing James' uncertainty, he says that James did not really believe, he merely believed in the right of believing, that you might be right if you believed. The focus of James' outlook was moral heroism. He adopted the belief in the freedom of will, and has frequently been blamed for systematic lack of system.

Freud's psychology is based on rigorous determinism, he is rational and believes only in logos. He was the most hated psychologist of his time, but he found enthusiastic followers and founded a school that spread all over the world. He himself must have gone through a very intensive oedipus complex,⁷ which prompted him to write, at the age of seventy-two, *The Future of an Illusion*, his polemic treatise against religion. It presented a personal point of view, he himself said that his pupils may think differently about the problem. But let us stress the main thesis "unshakable by any questions of detail": The religious *Weltanschauung* is determined by the situation that subsisted in our childhood.

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7. Hanns Sachs: *Freud, Master and Friend*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1944.

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THE ANATHEMA OF THE DEAD MOTHER

By SANDOR LORAND, M.D., (New York)

In 1924, I heard about a strange religious rite that had recently been carried out in the Jewish community of the Czech town in which I was practising. A woman member of the orthodox group had died during the last few weeks of her pregnancy and the leaders of the community conducted a ceremony designed to compel the dead woman to deliver her child before she was buried. The form of the ritual, which was identical with that used for excommunication (Cherem), I shall examine in the light of psychoanalytic concepts. The excommunication ritual has been used since Biblical times against impious sinners, enemies of the community or of God. Through it the person against whom it is directed is condemned to utter destruction. But it is rarely directed against dead persons. This religious ceremony is particularly awe-inspiring when used against a corpse, when it is, in effect, directed at spirits. Thus it is closely related to the rites and taboos of the primitives.

The ritual is conducted in the following manner: two women place the body in an upright position and three men, who are the leaders of the community and who constitute a jury, approach the corpse, blowing a ram's horn (the same type is used on the Day of Atonement). One member of the jury addresses the corpse: "By the power of the ban and the voice of the horn we ask you to give forth your child. You have not yet done it. If you are afraid that your child will not have a name, we promise you that if it is a boy, he will be circumcised according to the law

and he will be given a name. If it is a girl, she will also be given a name. Only bring your child into the world so that you and your child may achieve immortality." The ban and the formula having no effect on the woman, after a short time the sexton approaches her and bending towards her ear, speaks as follows: "If you will not give forth your child, you will be taken to the cemetery, dragged by your hair. You will not be buried. The bulls will trample your body and you will not reach your grave." This also having no effect on the corpse, the jury then asks her for forgiveness in the name of the whole community and they carry her to her grave.

Robertson Smith quotes examples from the Old Testament of the ban being used against certain enemies of the Jews, against animals and cattle, or against cities.¹ In the Talmudic period it was often used in controversies between the different schools, the leader of one school putting under ban the followers of another. In the Middle Ages it was used in the same way. Such a ceremony took place when Spinoza was excommunicated. But in Talmudic literature one never finds excommunication used against the dead. The literature in which the ritual is mentioned and the formula of the ceremony given, is contained in a Cabbalistic book, *Sadei Chemed*, in which diverse opinions are cited.

The common belief that the dead are likely to return to earth and disturb the peace of the living, led to the use of many protective measures, which to this day are carried out in religious Jewish families after a death. There have also been cases in which it was thought necessary to exact an oath from some wandering spirit that it would not return. One formula for such an oath, the efficacy of which has been proven, according to its originator, Rabbi Shalom of Neustadt,² runs as follows: "By the power of the courts of heaven and earth, I exact an oath from you, in the name

1. W. Robertson Smith: *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*. London, A and Ch. Black, 1907, pp. 150, 371, 453.

2. Cited by Dr. M. Grunwald, in the Review, *Mitteilungen zur Juedischen Volkskunde*, 15, No. 1

of the God of Heaven and Earth and in the name of our fathers, that you will not take any man, woman, or child after you, whether relative or stranger, that you will not do harm either with your body or with your spirit, but that your body will lie in its grave until the Day of Judgment and that your soul will rest in its proper place. And that pledge I put on you by oath and by imprecation forever and ever."

The problem of the death of women during pregnancy, the fate of the mother and her unborn child, has preoccupied different peoples and races throughout the world and is still a source of concern to some groups today. The belief that a woman who dies in childbirth becomes a ghost is almost universal. The same holds true for her unborn child. In *Malay Magic*,³ W. W. Skeat describes the superstition about Langsuyar. Women who die in childbirth, either before or after delivery, become Langsuyar, whose embodiment is something resembling a night owl. Doughty⁴ relates that in Arabia a woman who dies in childbirth is believed to become a forlorn bird who screeches like an owl in the night, seeking her lost child. The Langsuyar is equivalent to the Lilith of the Rabbinic tradition and is related to the Arabian ghost referred to by Doughty.

The belief that unbaptized children become vampires is still common in the present day, especially among the Slav people in Russia and Ruthenia. In Transylvania the belief is that the unbaptized child, in the form of a vampire, will pursue its parents.⁵ The Jewish belief, as indicated in medieval writings (especially of the Gaonic times), that an uncircumcized male has "no share in the world to come" led to the custom of circumcizing at the grave infants who died before their eighth day, and of giving them a name. The belief that the dead enters the world of spirits and that the soul hovers over its vacated shell,

3. W. W. Skeat: *Malay Magic*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1900, p. 325.

4. R. C. Thompson: *Semitic Magic*, London, Lusac & Co., 1908.

5. H. Ploss and B. Renz: *Das Kind in Sitte und Brauch der Völker*, Leipzig, Griebens Verlag, 1911, 1, pp. 360-371.

potentially capable of harming those who come near it, is still part of Jewish belief. For this reason orthodox Jews feel that contact with the dead is to be avoided and the sooner the body is put away the better for the living and the dead.⁶

The Hebrew ban or the Greek anathema is the Polynesian "taboo". As explained in Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, it corresponds to the ancient Roman expression, *sacer* and to the Hebrew, *kadosh*. The meaning of the word is twofold: on the one hand it means holy, consecrated, and on the other it means dangerous, forbidden. Freud's term "holy dread" best expresses the meaning of "taboo". W. Robertson Smith is also of the opinion that although the ban means anathema, it is a form of devotion to the Deity and so the verb "to ban" is sometimes rendered "to consecrate".⁷ In the oldest Hebrew use of the word it meant the utter destruction, not only of the persons involved but of their property as well.

Among the various classes of taboo which Freud mentions in his study, there is one which is imposed by the priest or tribal chief and its purpose is the protection and safeguarding of human beings from the power and influence of ghosts and spirits. Freud pointed out that demons are our ejected evil wishes and the derivatives of rejected and repressed impulses which originated in our unconscious and have been projected into the external world.

In connection with the ritual to compel a dead woman to deliver her child, three problems are of major importance: why a dead person is summoned by an earthly court, why it is of such importance to receive a dead child, and why the attitude of the whole community changes after the ban has been unsuccessful, and the woman is asked for forgiveness. No less interesting from a psychoanalytic viewpoint is the formula of the anathema, especially the use of the shofar (ram's horn).

6. J. Trachtenberg *Jewish Magic and Superstition*. New York, Berman's Jewish Book House, 1939, pp. 61-68

7. *Mich.*: IV: 13.

To understand the use of anathema against the dead mother, the psychoanalytic explanation of the fear of death must be taken into consideration. In *Totem and Taboo* Freud said that the taboo of the primitives has grown out of their "ambivalent emotional attitude".⁸ Just as the neurotic fear of death originates in repressed death wishes against beloved persons, similarly the root of the primitive's fear of evil spirits lies in repressed hostile thoughts about members of his community. In the application of anathema against the dead mother to make her deliver her child, the same components are at work. It is not only the father who takes part in the ceremony; the whole community tries, with the aid of the terrible threat, to influence the woman to give forth her child. The entire community has taken upon itself the responsibility for obtaining the child. This attitude closely resembles that of the Dieris⁹ who beat themselves on the head when a child has met with an accident, as if the community were responsible for the mishap.

Primitive man considers the deceased person as someone outside of his society; by projecting his own hostile feelings into him after death, he makes an enemy of him. Then the deceased relative or member of the community has reason to resent his surviving tribesmen, and so the primitive man has a well-founded reason to be afraid of disturbance by the spirit of the deceased person.¹⁰

The attitude of the Jews toward the deceased is that he is someone with whom they have severed friendship, thereby automatically arousing resentment in the renounced person. Other customs of dealing with the deceased and with the rites of burial are equally influenced by ambivalence of emotions. For instance, the Talmud forbids autopsies, considering them a disgrace to the human body which is resented by the dead person.¹¹

8. S. Freud: *Totem and Taboo*. London, George Routledge, 1919, chap. 2.

9. G. Róheim. *Australian Totemism*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1925.

10. Freud, *loc. cit.*, p. 91.

11. *Cholin*: XI. 2.

In the rite under discussion the objects of fear are both the mother and child. The mother is brought to trial to make her give forth her child which the community wants at all costs, in order to circumcise it if a boy, and if a girl to give it a name, and finally in order to bury it. Results of investigations by Frazer, Freud, Reik and Róheim emphasize that the fear of demons is really the fear of the return of the deceased ancestor. Freud showed that the fear is rooted in the ambivalent attitude of primitive man and this ambivalence of emotions is present more or less in every one of us.

The object of fear in the present case is really the child, of whose death the father, and in a broader sense, the community is guilty. To understand the repressed emotions present in the father concerning his children one must refer to the oedipus conflict and its role in creating anxiety.

From his investigation of unconscious sources of anxiety, Freud concluded that object loss is the conditioning feature of anxiety. It is not difficult to understand how he arrived at that conclusion if one observes the anxiety aroused in an infant by the mother's absence. As the child matures the separation anxiety is modified into castration fear, which in turn has an important influence upon introjection and identification with the parental images forming the superego.

When the problem of pregnancy and childbirth is brought to their attention, anxiety is aroused in the members of the community because the subject reactivates deeply repressed fears from earlier years when beliefs in the power of thoughts centered around their own fantasies about pregnancy and childbirth in connection with their own oedipus complex, with its attendant guilt and castration fears.

The guilt and fear related to the oedipus period concern the superego (the father), against whom the young boy rebels and whom he wishes to replace. This ritual indicates a revival in the male members of the community of their own infantile

situation and identification with the unborn infant. The birth of a child is a threat for many reasons. First, the child is a rival of his father for the mother's love, which brings to the fore the father's repressed guilt feelings which have been carried over from his own oedipus period. The male members of the community thus re-experience their own castration fears which include early separation anxiety. Considering the unborn child a rival carries hostile wishes *per se* and consequent feelings of guilt which cause the father to feel responsible if the child is not born. On the other hand, identification with the child reactivates the separation anxiety.

Frazer has explained in a superficial way the reason for the father's attitude in regard to the death of a child. He came to the conclusion that the sacrifice of the child means prolongation of the life of the father. In Peru, for instance, it is believed that the son's death assures a longer life for the father.¹² In accordance with Frazer's conclusion, the son always means danger to the father, and that idea is connected with the belief that in the newly born the deceased ancestor comes to life again. The prohibition against mentioning the names of the deceased or of naming newborn children after the deceased until a certain period has elapsed, also bears some relationship to belief in reappearance of the ancestor in the child. Among the Bakairi the father and his newborn son are called "Big Father and Little Father".¹³ In *Australian Totemism* Róheim states that the feeling experienced by the father toward his own father is revived in the relationship with his son, a fact that leads to the idea that the children are the reincarnation of the dead.¹⁴

If the father fears that his own deceased father will come to life again in the baby, he will have death wishes against the child.

12 J. G. Frazer *The Golden Bough* part 3, chap. 6, The Dying God New York, Macmillan Co., 1911.

13 Karl von den Steinen *Unter den Naturvoelkern Zentral Brasiliens*. Berlin, 1897, p. 292 Th. Reik *Probleme der Religionspsychologie* chap. 2, Die Couvade Leipzig & Wien, 1919

14 G. Róheim *loc. cit.* pp. 150, 157.

The members of the community must be afraid of the spirit of a child that has been thus destroyed, because by identification with the father, the entire community shares the guilt. And if the child has no name it will certainly turn into an evil spirit (according to Jewish belief) and will wander about without rest. In the last analysis, the father is responsible for all this.

The Jews name a child after the dead, never after a living relative. This custom also shows an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, it expresses the longing for the deceased relative, and on the other, the tendency to expiate because of fear of revenge on the part of the deceased. The Jewish custom of changing the name of a very sick person must also have its root in the fear of demons. The change in name is intended to deceive the evil spirits and thus prevent their further harming the invalid.

The object of the rite, namely, the separation of the unborn child from the mother, is based on the identification of the father with the child. The Aranda custom shows the identification with the child in the womb. When an Aranda woman has difficulties in childbirth, the father walks up and down in front of the mother to induce the unborn child to follow him.¹⁵ The Jewish father's eagerness, then, to get the child, circumcize it, give it a name and bury it is due to the Jewish belief that otherwise "it (and by identification the father himself) has no share in the world to come". The other important aspect is to get the dead mother out of the way as soon as possible without the husband's being attached to her in any way (again, through identification with the child). As long as the child is attached to the mother, the community is attached to the dead. Similarly, by separating the child from the dead mother, the complete separation of the community from the child is accomplished and the mother can then be safely buried.

As to the meaning of bringing the deceased mother before

15. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen: *The Arunta*. London, Macmillan Co., 1927, 2, p. 487.

a living court of law: firstly, the responsibility for the impending danger is thus placed upon her. Then there is a clue leading to the conclusion that according to Jewish belief the mother can be made responsible for her own death. It is stated in the Talmud (Sabbath) that there are three sins which may cause death during the period of gestation or delivery: carelessness in regard to the restrictions concerning menstrual periods; failure to fulfill the law which requires women to drop a piece of dough from every baking into the fire (a reminder of the law commanding a sacrifice of a part of all food); failure to fulfill the law in regard to lighting candles on Sabbath Eve, a ritual connected with the commemoration of the dead. (Usually the mistress of the house lights a candle for every deceased member of the family.) These three rites are of importance only because they indicate the belief that the pregnant woman herself may be responsible for her death and consequently for the death of her child as well. This maternal responsibility is clearly expressed in the text of the above-mentioned Cabbalistic work (Eben Segillah), in which the author quotes the Talionic Law of the Old Testament: "Shofeich dom hodom beodom domo ishofeich," the literal translation of which is: "He who kills a human being in a human being, his blood shall be poured out." That law may refer to the mother because the child had died within her.

In *Australian Totemism*, Róheim mentions that among their mourning rites, the lower Murray tribes abuse the deceased for having died. When a friend of the deceased or a member of his tribe sees the corpse set up for the first time, he approaches it and rains abuse upon it. The dead person is told that there was plenty of food and that he should therefore have been content to remain among the living. After looking at the body for some time, the observer throws his spear and wirri at it, exclaiming: "Why did you die? Take this for dying." At the Herbert River, the father or brother of the deceased, if the latter was a man, or the husband if it was a woman, beats the body with a club, often

so violently that the bones are broken. The legs are generally broken to prevent the ghost from wandering at night, and the beating is given in order to frighten the spirit so that it will refrain from haunting the camp. Stones are placed on the body to prevent the spirit from travelling far.¹⁶

As has been pointed out, by making the mother responsible for her own death, she is thereby also made responsible for taking her child with her; therefore she is put on trial. The fact that her forgiveness is asked after the trial has proved unsuccessful certainly indicates fear of her return. The fear can be due to the guilt feeling of the husband who believes that his hostile feelings have caused her death.

Reik has shown conclusively that the ram's horn is the symbol of the father's (God's) penis.¹⁷ The ceremony, then, leads back to the fear of castration, a fear determined by the incestuous fixation of the son to the mother. Therefore the horn, which retains its phallic significance and at the same time imitates the father's voice in the excommunication ceremony, represents God (father) at the trial. The person under ban, whether alive or dead, must obey and must fear God (Father). The formula used in the excommunication ceremony supports Reik's view that the voice of the ram's horn actually replaces the sound of the *bull* which represents the voice of God; for, the formula emphasizes that if the woman does not emit her child, she will not be buried and bulls will trample her body.

From a psychological point of view the rite serves as a defense against the breaking through of various anti-social tendencies. The mechanisms are similar to those found in compulsion neurosis, where the object of the obsessive, magical thinking and compulsive action is the controlling of anti-social tendencies. The instincts and unconscious drives are transformed into a religious ceremony and are kept under control by religion itself.

¹⁶ G. Róheim *loc. cit* pp 353ff

¹⁷ Th. Reik *loc. cit* Regarding the horn, cf. M. Bonaparte *Die Symbolik der Kopftrophäen*. Int. Psa. Verlag, Vienna, 1928.

Part Four

LITERATURE

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF WRITERS AND OF LITERARY PRODUCTIVITY

By EDMUND BERGLER, M.D., (New York)

1. *REVIEW OF THEORIES ON DYNAMICS OF ARTISTIC CREATION*

From the beginning, Freudian psychoanalysis has been interested in writers and their work for two reasons, one of which was a personal predilection of its founder. Freud personally was greatly interested in literature, especially in view of the light which his new science could shed on the subject. In many passages of the six thousand printed pages of his collected papers we find references to and explanations of creative writing; works of Shakespeare, Ibsen, Goethe, Dostoevski, Schnitzler, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Jensen, and others are looked at through the analytic microscope. Many of his disciples shared this interest with Freud, with the result that analytic literature contains hundreds of papers on that subject.

The second reason was of a practical nature. Attacked again and again by "practical" people as nonsensical and fantastic, psychoanalytic science has defended itself by various means, for example, by pointing out that great writers have known intuitively everything that psychoanalysis has discovered and proved clinically. Therefore, the writer's intuitive knowledge has been adduced as an argument pro analysis in many psychoanalytic papers.

Every educated person has, occasionally, and especially during the period of puberty, had the inner impulse to create artistically in the form of a poem, a drama, a novel. Later in life, some people laugh about their adolescent follies, or are even ashamed of them. Others, however (and there are many of them), will cling stubbornly to their principle; in spite of repeated obvious failures they keep trying to write and thus become "habitual criminals of art". Oscar Wilde sarcastically says in *The Critic as Artist*: "Anybody can write a three-volumed novel. It merely requires a complete ignorance of both life and literature. The difficulty that I should fancy the reviewer feels is the difficulty of sustaining any standard. . . . The poor reviewers are apparently reduced to be the reporters of the police-court of literature, the chroniclers of the doings of the habitual criminals of art."

This impulse to write is especially common in countries where the number of illiterates is small and, therefore, the number of people reading newspapers, books, weekly and monthly magazines, enormous. The allure of "easy money" in writing for these publications added to natural inclination results in millions of potential writers.

Why do people want to write? First of all, we will eliminate all conscious motives, such as the desire for financial success and for fame and recognition; they are banal and self-evident and need no explanation. We are interested in the unconscious motives.

The creation of the artist is a product not of his conscious but of his unconscious. In other words, the writer's pen is guided by subterranean forces. The more understanding writers have often given expression to this fact, and have described the creative act as being composed of two phases: the first, in which "something" within them causes the ideas to appear and, the second, the working out of these ideas. The former, whatever it be called—inspiration, intuition, the gift of God—"moves" the artist and appears independent of any voluntary act. The second phase is

work, often hard work, in forming and developing the material received from unconscious sources; experience, tact, and great technical skill are required in this phase. Since the artist has no control over the primary creative act, he is unable himself to explain this initial stage. He may attempt a description of the conditions in which he was surprised by his inspiration, or he may describe the second phase, the process of working out the material. In short, the artist can offer us a great deal, masterpieces included, but he cannot offer us an explanation of his own creative processes.

First of all, let us produce some evidence that every artistic creation is unconsciously conditioned:

Goethe says to Eckermann (March 11, 1828):

"No productivity of the highest kind, no remarkable conception, no discovery, no great thought that bears fruit and has results, is in the power of anyone; such things are above earthly control. Man must consider them as an unexpected gift from above, as pure children of God which he must receive and venerate with joyful thanks. They are akin to the dæmon, which does with him what it pleases, and to which he unconsciously resigns himself whilst he believes he is acting from his own impulse. In such cases, man may often be considered an instrument in a higher government of the world—a vessel worthy to contain a divine influence. . . . Thus, Shakespeare was inspired with the first thought of his Hamlet when the spirit of the whole presented itself to his mind as an unexpected impression; and when he surveyed the several situations, characters, and conclusion, in an elevated mood, as a pure gift from above on which he had no immediate influence—although the possibility of such a conception certainly presupposed a mind like his. But the development of the individual scenes, and the dialogue of the characters, he had completely in his power, so that he might produce them daily and hourly and work at them for weeks if he liked. . . ."¹

¹ *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann*, translated by J. Oxenford, edited by J. K. Moorhead, 1935

Nietzsche describes the act of artistic creation similarly in *Ecce Homo*,² as the following excerpt shows:

"... Has any one at the end of the nineteenth century any distinct notion of what poets of a stronger age understood by the word inspiration? If not, I will describe it. If one had the smallest vestige of superstition left in one, it would hardly be possible completely to set aside the idea that one is the mere incarnation, mouthpiece, or medium of an almighty power. The idea of revelation, in the sense that something which profoundly convulses and upsets one becomes suddenly visible and audible with indescribable certainty and accuracy—describes the simple fact. One hears—one does not seek; one takes—one does not ask who gives. A thought suddenly flashes up like lightning; it comes with necessity, without faltering. I have never had any choice in the matter. There is an ecstasy so great that the immense strain of it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears, during which one's steps now involuntarily rush and anon involuntarily lag. There is the feeling that one is utterly out of hand, with the very distinct consciousness of an endless number of fine thrills and titillations descending to one's very toes. There is a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy parts do not act as antitheses to the rest, but are produced and required as necessary shades of color in such an overflow of light. There is an instinct for rhythmic relations which embraces a whole world of forms (length, the need of a wide-embracing rhythm, is almost the measure of the force of an inspiration, a sort of counterpart to its pressure and tension). Everything happens quite involuntarily, as if in a tempestuous outburst of freedom, of absoluteness, of power and divinity. The involuntary nature of figures and similes is the most remarkable thing; one loses all perception of what is imagery and metaphor; everything seems to present itself as the readiest, the truest, and simplest

2. Ernest Jones says in his book on Hamlet: "Nowhere is the irresistible impetuosity of the artistic creation more perfectly portrayed than in the memorable passage in *Ecce Homo* where Nietzsche describes the birth of *Also sprach Zarathustra*, and its involuntary character has been plainly indicated by most great writers, from Socrates to Goethe."

means of expression. It actually seems, to use one of Zarathustra's own phrases, as if all things came to one, and offered themselves as similes. .

Stendhal defines the act of artistic creation with the words: "I write blindly, hastily." And further: "As these images come into my mind, my pen writes them down." In the scenario of *Lamiel* he says: "I have the capacity to improvise, if any. I forget everything I write down. I could compose four variations on the same motive of a novel and remember not one of them."

Josef Conrad starts his *Personal Record* by saying:

"Books may be written in all sorts of places. Verbal inspiration may enter the berth of a mariner on board of a ship frozen fast in a river in the middle of a town; and since saints are supposed to look benignantly on humble believers, I indulge in the pleasant fancy that the shade of old Flaubert . . . might have hovered with amused interest over the docks of a two-thousand-ton steamer . . ., on board of which, gripped by the inclement winter alongside a quay in Rouen, the tenth chapter of *Almayer's Folly* was begun . . ."⁴

Analytic discoveries on the subject of writers and their products reflect the development of analytic science. Knowledge of the workings of the different parts of the unconscious personality did not spring like Pallas Athene from Zeus' head—at once beautiful and complete. This is the difference between mythology and science. Every step had to be discovered, tested, and modified over and over again. Consequently, papers applying analytic discoveries to writers and their artistic products are timebound: they reflect the specific period in which they were written.

The whole analytic approach to the problem of writers started with a passage in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* published in 1899. Therein Freud explained Hamlet's indecision so accurately that it deserves quoting in the original:

3. Translated by Anthony M. Ludovici; New York Macmillan, 1911.

4. *A Personal Record*. New York, Harper Bros., 1912.

"Another of the great poetic tragedies, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, is rooted in the same soil as *Oedipus Rex*. But the whole difference in the psychic life of the two widely separated periods of civilization, and the progress, during the course of time, of repression in the emotional life of humanity, is manifested in the differing treatment of the same material. In *Oedipus Rex* the basic wish-fantasy of the child is brought to light and realized as it is in dreams; in *Hamlet* it remains repressed, and we learn of its existence—as we discover the relevant facts in a neurosis—only through the inhibitory effects which proceed from it. In the more modern drama, the curious fact that it is possible to remain in complete uncertainty as to the character of the hero has proved to be quite consistent with the over-powering effect of the tragedy. The play is based upon Hamlet's hesitation in accomplishing the task of revenge assigned to him; the text does not give the cause or the motive of this hesitation, nor have the manifold attempts at interpretation succeeded in doing so. According to the still prevailing conception, a conception for which Goethe was first responsible, Hamlet represents the type of man whose active energy is paralyzed by excessive intellectual activity: '*Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.*' According to another conception, the poet has endeavored to portray a morbid, irresolute character, on the verge of neurasthenia. The plot of the drama, however, shows us that Hamlet is by no means intended to appear as a character wholly incapable of action. On two separate occasions we see him assert himself: once in a sudden outburst of rage, when he stabs the eavesdropper behind the arras, and on the other occasion when he deliberately, and even craftily, with the complete unscrupulousness of a prince of the Renaissance, sends the two courtiers to the death which was intended for himself. What is it, then, that inhibits him in accomplishing the task which his father's ghost has laid upon him? Here the explanation offers itself that it is the peculiar nature of this task. Hamlet is able to do anything but take vengeance upon the man who did away with his father and has taken his father's place with his mother—the man who realizes the repressed desires of his own child-

nood. The loathing which should have driven him to revenge is thus replaced by self-reproach, by conscientious scruples, which tell him that he himself is no better than the murderer he is required to punish. I have here translated into consciousness what had to remain unconscious in the mind of the hero; if anyone wishes to call Hamlet an hysterical subject I cannot but admit that this is the deduction to be drawn from my interpretation. The sexual aversion which Hamlet expresses in conversation with Ophelia is perfectly consistent with this deduction—the same sexual aversion which during the next few years was increasingly to take possession of the poet's soul, until it found its supreme utterance in *Timon of Athens*. It can, of course, be only the poet's own psychology with which we are confronted in *Hamlet*; and in a work on Shakespeare by Georg Brandes (1896) I find the statement that the drama was composed immediately after the death of Shakespeare's father (1601)—that is to say, when he was still mourning his loss, and during a revival, as we may fairly assume, of his own childish feelings in respect to his father. It is known, too, that Shakespeare's son, who died in childhood, bore the name of Hamnet (identical with Hamlet). Just as *Hamlet* treats of the relation of the son to his parents, so *Macbeth* which was written about the same period, is based upon the theme of childlessness. Just as all neurotic symptoms, like dreams themselves, are capable of hyper-interpretation, and even require such hyper-interpretation before they become perfectly intelligible, so every genuine poetical creation must have proceeded from more than one motive, more than one impulse in the mind of the poet, and must admit of more than one interpretation. I have here attempted to interpret only the deepest stratum of impulses in the mind of the creative poet." (These indications in the direction of an analytical understanding of *Hamlet* were subsequently developed by Dr. Ernest Jones, who defended that above conception against others which have been put forward in literature on the subject. *The Problem of Hamlet and the Oedipus Complex*, 1911.)⁵

5 The Interpretation of Dreams, in: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, Transl. by A. A. Brill, M.D. New York, Modern Library, 1938, pp. 309-11. The passage in brackets is a footnote in Freud, *loc. cit.*, p. 311.

The concept of the unconscious had long been familiar to philosophers, but we know that Freud added new content to it and, out of a nebulous and mystical "something", he made a clinically provable, dynamically effective, and therapeutically available fact. His specific contribution to an understanding of the creative artist can be formulated as follows: The artist expresses in his work his *unconscious* fantasies and his day dreams. In his paper, "The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming" (1908), Freud goes on to say:

"The writer does the same as the child at play; he creates a world of fantasy which he takes very seriously, that is, he invests it with a great deal of affect. . . . Day-dreaming is a continuation of play. . . . Unsatisfied wishes are the driving power behind fantasies; every separate fantasy contains the fulfillment of a wish and improves on unsatisfactory reality. . . . The impelling wishes of the day-dream either are . . . ambitious or erotic."

Naturally the day-dream appears considerably modified in the creative product. On a deeper level, however, "His Majesty, the Ego" can be recognized despite its disguise. It is of course the infantile self, in adult clothing. Freud's original formula ran as follows:

"Some actual experience which made a strong impression on the writer had stirred up a memory of an earlier experience, generally belonging to childhood, which then arouses a wish that finds fulfillment in the work in question, and in which elements of the recent event and the old memory should be discernible."

Freud, in speaking of the specific mechanism utilized by the writer, says:

"The day-dreamer hides his fantasies from other people, because he had reason to be ashamed of them. . . . If he were to communicate them to us, he would give us no pleasure by his disclosures. When we hear such fantasies, they

repel us, or at least leave us cold. But when a man of literary talent presents his plays, or relates what we take to be his personal day-dreams, we experience great pleasure arising probably from many sources. How the writer accomplishes this, is his innermost secret; the essential *ars poetica* lies in the technique by which our feeling of repulsion is overcome and this has certainly to do with those barriers erected between every individual being and all others. We can guess at two methods used in this technique. The writer softens the egotistical character of the day-dream by changes and disguises, and bribes us by the offer of a purely formal, that is, aesthetic pleasure in the presentation of his fantasies. The increment of pleasure which is offered us in order to release yet greater pleasure arising from deeper sources in the mind is called 'incitement premium' ('Verlockungsprämie') or technically 'fore pleasure' ('Vorlust'). . . . All the aesthetic pleasure we gain from the works of imaginative writers is of the same type as this 'fore-pleasure', and . . . the true enjoyment of literature proceeds from the release of tension in our minds. Perhaps much that brings about this result consists in the writer's putting us into a position in which we can enjoy our own day-dreams without reproach or shame."⁶

These, then, were Freud's views in 1908.

In an early book, *Der Künstler* (1908), Otto Rank discusses the problem of artistic productivity. He arrives at the conclusion that with respect to their relation to the outer world, which is determined by the degree of mental health, the artist may be placed between the dreamer and the neurotic. Their psychological processes are alike; there are only gradations between them. Contrary to the other two, however, the artist displays a certain degree of activity which exempts him from the stigma of illness. Instead of the anti-social neurotic symptom, which strives to remove the individual from a reality unendurable to him, the artist turns to the world with the intention of winning its acclaim. His regres-

6. Sigmund Freud, *The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming*, *Coll. Papers*, London, Hogarth Press, 1922, 4, pp. 173-183.

sion, from an unsatisfactory reality to the world of fantasy, makes him comparable to the neurotic, but by means of his own peculiar productive ability, he finds his way back to reality. Despite feverish attempts the neurotic is no longer able to do this. However, through excessive passivity—a basic characteristic of every artist—all productivity is coupled with the symptom of suffering. Artistic creation, in its deepest roots, originates in suffering;⁷ it is conditioned by conflicts from within, which the artist cannot gain control of by “normal” means. He differs both from the neurotic and the healthy person by his ability to express his personal conflicts in a form that makes them enjoyable to others, without its becoming too noticeable that they originate from repressed wishes. Hence he creates by giving artistic form to his unconscious fantasies, which, through the process of repression, have become unpleasurable but in art find and retain a sublime method of gratification and pleasure. The discharge of affect in this form, and the scrupulous attention given both to the arrangement of the whole and to some apparently unimportant details, are displacements of psychical intensity which the fore-pleasure mechanism utilized. The repressed impulses, however,

7. Many years after Rank's book had been published, in 1923, I. Hermann tried to establish a connection between higher mental productive capacities and masochistic suffering, consisting of a sublimated technique of avoiding pain. (*I.Z. f. Psychoan* 9: 309, 1923.) Previously Hermann had published a paper on the psychogenesis of the talent for drawing (*Imago* 8: 54-66, 1922) in which he surmised that in a person thus gifted the hand has a libidinous hypercathexis, an increased “libido-tonus” (Tausk). He generalized this assumption for other creative artists as well. In writers, e.g., he suspected a strong “libido-tonus” of the mouth-zone, a narcissistic “prophetic complex”, and a “death-complex”. Testing the contradictions of his own assumptions, he asks in another paper why Freud's study on Leonardo (1910) uncovered oral-libidinous material, whereas he himself would have expected in a painter and sculptor material pertaining to the libidinization of the hand. He comes to the conclusion that feelings of guilt must be connected with erotization of a specific zone (*Imago* 10: 430, 1923). Some of Hermann's findings seem like precursors of later analytic discoveries in that particular field e.g., the erotization of the mouth-zone. He has, however, in mind a *hysteriform* erotization and not oral regression. Some ideas are repetitions of previous findings; guilt pertaining to erotization of specific libidinous zones in painters was stressed by E. Hirschmann in 1915. Some formulations are rather naive. the “prophetic-complex” means—if anything—voyeurism. What his “death-complex” in writers denotes, I do not understand. In general I have the impression that Hermann intuitively sensed something while he was unable at that time, to formulate what he dimly suspected.

will break through, even though indirectly, yet in their greatest intensity.

In addition, Rank says, rather paradoxically, that the neurotic is an artist who has become effeminate, and the artist a neurotic who has become more manly, and who has unconsciously effected his own cure. The artists' over-evaluation of his work is rooted in narcissism which has been displaced secondarily upon his creations. His narcissistic constitution excludes the possibility of any true object love. And finally, Rank points to the artist's "shameless" tendency to relate, and reveal himself. This is the *revelation impulse*, i.e., his narcissistic exhibitionism.

In his book, *Gemeinsame Tagträume*,⁸ written in 1920, Hanns Sachs clarified one of the important problems related to the understanding of the artist. Essentially, he deals with the role played by the artist's unconscious guilt feelings. In 1908, Rank still thought that the artist sought for recognition because by these means he obtained confirmation of his private "beliefs", and consequently cured himself of his "delusion". Sachs, however, called our attention to a much more significant motivation. He said that the artist was in need of recognition in order to be able to discharge his own guilt feelings. He coerces his audience into agreement with him. It is as if they were saying: "Yes, your inhibited desires, your forbidden impulses are the same as ours, we are united by the same guilt." Through winning the recognition and approval of others, the artist relieves his own conscience.

The next great contribution to our problem came from this country. I refer to A. A. Brill's paper "Poetry as an Oral Outlet".⁹ Brill's contribution to an understanding of the artist is far more significant than the previous ones of either Rank or Sachs, and can be classed with the basic writings of Freud on this subject, of 1908. In other words, he does not attempt to explain details, but deals with the more fundamental questions related to the

8. *The Creative Unconscious*, Boston, Sci-Art, 1942

9. *Psy. Rev.*, 18, No 4, Oct., 1931.

problem. He points out that, peculiarly enough, no one has made any deep study of the oral stage in the poet.

The material that came to his attention convinced Brill that the poet remains on a *pregenital* level.

"Some poets do not advance much beyond the earlier and later oral phases while others, even if they progress to the genital stage of development, nevertheless show the result of fixation in the oral, urethral, and anal-sadistic stages of libido development. . . ." Furthermore, Brill states: "All persons analyzed by me, who showed poetic talent, who took pleasure in rhyming, and who were recognized as poets by the world—all of them showed definite oral-erotic fixations and their neuroses represented oral regressions, or failures in oral sublimation." He concludes: "Poetry is nothing but an oral outlet, an outlet through words and phrases to express a genuine emotion. Poetry is a sensuous or mystic outlet through words, or, as it were, through a chewing and sucking of nice words and phrases. . . . The poet invariably subordinates the thought to the feeling, the affect always comes first, the words and thoughts later. Like a bird suddenly trapped, the poet, when under stress of an emotion, finds himself compelled to abandon thought in favor of sound, logic in favor of rhythm, rhetorical law in favor of poetic license. The omnipotence of thought which originally received its first rude shock when the infant had to cry for the mother's breast, but which was finally gratified through breast sucking, still dominates the poet. He compulsively repeats this whole process and like the infant his affective state can only be pacified through a rhythmical expression of pleasurable sounds."

Let us summarize the conclusions arrived at by these authorities. By using specific props against unconscious guilt feelings, and through aesthetic-formal disguises, the artist gives expression to his unconscious fantasies. According to Freud, Rank, and Sachs, the basis of these wishes invariably is the oedipal phase. Brill, however, believes that for the artist the pre-oedipal phase has been

the one most significant for his development. They concur in their opinion that the artist's creations originate from his unconscious fantasies.

My own investigations on the psychology of the writer were begun in connection with some of my own clinical work. I was repeatedly attracted by the idea of seeking in literary or historic figures those problems that clinical experience had called to my attention. Accordingly, in continuation of my study of the oral phase, I wrote my essay on Grabbe, in connection with my attempts to understand narcissistic phenomena, my study of Stendhal, and as an addition to my study of cynicism, I wrote about Talleyrand's relationship to Napoleon; incidentally, that the latter had also been a writer in his youth, is a fact only few people are aware of.

As a result of my investigations,¹⁰ I arrived at five conclusions, which I wish to present first, and then to illustrate on the basis of clinical material.

1. I came to the conclusion that the writer does *not*, in his work, *express his unconscious wishes and fantasies*, as had been assumed previously; but rather that, under pressure of his unconscious guilt feelings, he gives expression to his unconscious *defense against these wishes and fantasies*.

2. My clinical experience taught me that the writer does *not* suffer from a "shameless urge to reveal himself", that is, from the exhibitory impulse which, since Rank, has been asserted by every psychoanalytic biographer. On the contrary, I could prove that every writer, on the deepest level of his being, is a *voyeur* who utilizes his exhibitionistic tendencies as a defense against these scopophilic impulses.

3. I became familiar with Brill's paper which was orig-

10. These investigations are collected in my book *Talleyrand—Napoleon—Stendhal—Grabbe*, Vienna, Int. Psa. Verlag, 1935, and in the following papers: A Clinical Approach to Psychoanalysis of Writers, *Psa. Rev.*, 31: 1, 1944. The Danger Neurotics Dread Most the Loss of the Basic Fallacy. *Ibid.* 33. 2, 1946. Psychopathology of Pseudobluffers and Pseudohumbugs. *Psychiat. Quart.* (Suppl.) 1, 1946.

inally published in English only when it appeared in German (*Imago*, 1933). My own investigations had begun before this publication. Independent of Brill, I had arrived at the conclusion that, in writers, the most decisive role is played by their *orality*. I was very much encouraged when I discovered later than an authority such as Brill had taken an approach similar to mine. However, according to my conception, the writer's type of neurotic orality is not greediness or a wish "to receive" in repetition of the child-mother situation, but rather a spiteful desire for *oral* independence. By this, the artist *identifies* himself with the "giving" mother out of *aggression* toward her, and thus eliminates her. He achieves oral pleasures for himself through "beautiful" words and ideas. In its deepest sense, it is a desire to refute the "bad" pre-oedipal mother and the disappointments experienced through her, by establishing an "autarchy".¹¹

4. I found myself forced to conclude that many psychoanalytic biographies were constructed on a fallacy, namely, on analogy. Very few writers were actually analyzed, but a great amount of analytic experience was gathered from analyses of neurotics. Because in these *clinical* cases the oedipus complex was found to be the basis of hysteric and compulsive neuroses, and because in *writings* of unanalyzed writers the oedipus complex also could be discovered, the analogy was obvious: In both—in neurotics and writers—the oedipus complex seemed to be decisive. That was fallacy by analogy. Clinical analysis shows that, in writers, orality is the basic element. The analysts of the first decades were struggling for a recognition, as it were, of the oedipus complex; hence they were delighted to find evidence of it in the writings of famous men. What they erroneously concluded was that these writings revealed the unconscious wishes of the writer. They overlooked the possibility that the oedipus

11. The "autarchic fantasy", a concept introduced by L. Jekels and myself, is one of high significance for our whole life Cf. *Transference and Love*, *Imago*, 1934.

complex could be used as a defense against more deeply imbedded oral material.

5. In contrast to the "approach by analogy", I found that the *clinical approach*, that is, a psychoanalytically unprejudiced attitude in a clinical analysis of writers, led to therapeutic results. This statement is based on clinical analysis of twenty-six writers.

2. SOME MECHANISMS USED UNCONSCIOUSLY BY WRITERS TO EXPIATE FEELINGS OF GUILT

Enlisting of the reader as accomplice

Every work of art implicitly contains an invitation to the reader or spectator to partake of the writer's inner guilt. The writer unconsciously reasons: "If people approve of my work, they accept its unconscious content, too; my guilt is therefore shared by them and lessened." That this method of expiation succeeds only temporarily is proven by the continuation of the writer's productivity. As has been mentioned before Sachs, under the influence of Freud's formulations, first stressed this mechanism. Even today it remains one of the bases of analytic understanding of creative activity.

Expression of unconscious defense against the repressed wish as manifested in creative writing

Up to the present time, it has been assumed analytically that the artist expresses his unconscious wishes and fantasies in his work. I believe this assumption to be erroneous (or, more precisely, incomplete), because I have found his creations to be unconscious defense mechanisms against those unconscious wishes. It is true that the audience or readers are invited to exculpate the writer through their approbation, as Sachs has shown. The question is only: "What are they asked to approve or sanc-

tion?" I am of the opinion that it is not the artist's dynamically significant unconscious wishes but the defense against these.

I should like to present this in another way. If we find the unconscious wish B expressed in a piece of writing, what is actually meant on a deeper level is the repressed wish A. We do not find a repressed wish presented more or less directly, though in disguised form. The act of concealment and distortion goes a step further in the direction of the defense reaction. Of course, the substitute-wish B expressed in the creative effort is not chosen arbitrarily. It often corresponds to a wish, also repressed, but dynamically less important at the specific period referred to. Naturally both, the wish and the two-fold defense, remained unconscious.

As evidence for the above assertions, I wish first to present an incident from Stendhal's autobiography.

Stendhal (Henri Beyle) wrote *The Life of Henry Brulard*, his autobiography, in Rome and Civita Vecchia, in 1835, when he was fifty-two years old. In the following passage he describes the relationship of the boy to his mother:

"My mother, Henriette Gagnon, was a charming woman, and I was in love with her. I hasten to add that I lost her when I was seven years old. When I loved her, around perhaps 1789, I had the same character as in 1828, at the time I was madly in love with Alberte de Rubempré (a sweetheart of Stendhal's). The manner in which I went on the hunt for happiness had scarcely altered except for one thing. In respect to the physical part of love, I was in the same situation as Caesar would have been, had he returned to earth, with regard to the use of cannon and smaller missiles of warfare. I could have learned it very easily and it would not have changed my technique. I wanted to cover my mother with kisses, and there shouldn't be any dresses there. She loved me passionately, and kissed me often. I returned her caresses with such fire, that she often found it necessary to leave me. I despised my father when his arrival interrupted our kisses. I always wanted to kiss her on her breast. . . .

For my part, I was as criminal as I possibly could be, I was madly in love with her charms".

It is understandable that this self-confessed intentional incest of the six-year-old caused some controversy among the Stendhal biographers. Most of them extricated themselves from the problem by declaring that it was a product of the author's imagination. They minimized it as cynicism which was not meant to be taken seriously; they even asserted that Stendhal was a joker, given to mystification who wished to make fools of the world. Other biographers, such as Weigand, Zweig, von Oppeln-Bronikowski, believed Stendhal. Weigand, for instance, remarks: "This confession can be recommended to the adherents of Freudian theory as a perfect example." And Zweig summarizes: "In hardly any other place than in the first pages of Stendhal's autobiography, in *Henry Brulaid*, will psychoanalysis find a better oedipus complex presented in literary form." Stendhal always spoke of his father in a disparaging way; "bastard" was a mild epithet. He admitted that he was in favor of the French Revolution because his father preferred the aristocrats and the followers of the Bourbons, and that during the reign of terror he desired his father's arrest, all sorts of suffering, and even his death. When his father passed away, he merely said: "I have been informed of a change of circumstances." In fact, his dislike of his father was so intense that in his testament he left instructions to be buried as "Arrigo Beyle, Milanese" although actually he had been a native of Grenoble. If we take all this into consideration, the intensity of his positive oedipus complex can certainly not be questioned.

Hence the "adherents of Freudian theory"—apostrophized by Weigand—may note the existence of the oedipus complex in Stendhal. But they may refuse to discuss it further by pointing to Stendhal's own confession, they may cut short the dispute of the biographers as to whether the incest was experienced or merely

short time and impressions obtained of other persons are utilized against the self as a form of punishment.

We have no way of measuring genius except on the basis of rather intuitive judgment. To explain away Stendhal's psyche by saying that he was a psychological genius means to abandon any attempt to unravel his personality, since we are ignorant of the intrapsychological approach of the genius. The small number of psychological geniuses of the last hundred-and-fifty years have not devoted their time to a study of this problem. The three other types listed can also be excluded as far as Stendhal is concerned. He was neither schizophrenic, nor a schizoid personality, nor did he originally observe the oedipus complex in someone else.

This leaves us where we started; at best we might suspect that masochistic motives played a part in this introspection. However, this does not bring us any nearer to understanding the genesis of Stendhal's discovery of the oedipus complex.

Evidently, there must exist still another constellation to account for a person's discovery of his own oedipus complex, namely, particular intensity of the negative oedipal conflict, of the unconscious feminine identification. In this dangerous situation the unconscious ego might attempt to effect a compromise by releasing the less unpleasant memory in order to retain the more unpleasant one. The latter, if it became conscious, would prove unacceptable. Hence, the unconscious feminine tendency in Stendhal must have been one of his strongest drives, if his ego exerted every effort to keep it unconscious, even at the price of permitting awareness of other repressed material. This was actually the case, as I succeeded in proving in my book on Stendhal.¹²

Another example of this type—this time a clinical one—is taken from the analysis of a writer who suffered from a work inhibition.

12 For further details, cf. the author's *Talleyrand-Napoleon-Stendhal-Grabbe*.

In one of his unpublished novels he described in masterly way a man who, after breaking off relations with a woman, suddenly realizes that it is he who is to blame and that he is incapable of genuine love and a real, tender relationship. Right away, however, he represses this flash of insight and begins pursuing another woman. The reader is left with the impression that this neurotic individual will endlessly repeat the same pattern of falling in love, being disappointed, and exculpating himself. How the author was able to recognize this aspect of his own neurosis is the question that interests us.

During the preparation of this novel my patient found himself faced with the following conflict: His wife, the victim of a chronic illness, had just suffered a new relapse. Although he desired to leave her, he found this though unacceptable under the circumstances. The marital conflict, however, was in no way connected with his wife's relapses. He had known of their existence before their marriage, and yet had decided to "gamble with destiny" (*ipsissima verba*). This wish to out-trump destiny had the unconsciously foreseen result that, with every new attack, which completely incapacitated her for months, he complained of his misfortune (which had unconsciously been self-imposed) and gratified himself masochistically through self-pity. In addition, his unconscious tendency toward justification was renewed; since his wife caused him repeated disappointments his aggressive attitude toward her was "justified". Yet despite or more precisely, because of this situation, he continued to live with her, although other seemingly irreconcilable conflicts separated them, because she gratified his unconscious masochistic wishes to such a great extent.

The new attack of illness had re-awakened the conflict, and the man found himself torn between the desire to leave his wife and the restraining influence of conscience, which forbade him to carry out this aggression. In this condition of despair he wrote the novel to appease his conscience. What he was trying to say unconsciously was: "If there are some men who leave their wives

without adequate reason, I certainly can do it, for I have every justification."

The neurotic hero of the story played the part of appeaser of my patient's conscience. This explains why a less important part of his neurosis—his inability to love—was permitted to become conscious, although normally it was repressed. Actually, the patient's main conflict was induced by the opposite wish, namely to remain with his wife because she gratified his neurotic-masochistic tendencies. But he was rather permitted to become aware of a dynamically less important wish, the neurotic desire to be unfaithful as a form of aggression against her. The flash of insight that he was ill, hence not punishable, since "one cannot be held responsible for one's neurosis", is still another subterfuge to be noted in this example.

I found further evidence of this mechanism in the analysis of a dramatist who was inhibited in his productivity and was a severe hypochondriac. His ambition was to write satiric comedies, with which, however, he had very little success. Characteristically, he had an entirely incorrect conception of the purpose of a comedy. For instance, he denied that it made use of aggression in the form of ridicule directed against some authoritative personality, or widely accepted beliefs (Jekels). In all his comedies he put the question to himself: "Who will suffer?" He could not understand the fact that, in comedies, no one suffers but that the author's aggression is handled in such a way as to cause the audience always to identify with the aggressor and not with the butt of the joke. However, his peculiar question gave us the key to his problem.

His conflict was as follows: His superego always reminded him that his hypochondriacal symptoms indicated, among other things, an unconscious pleasure in being overpowered by his father. His unconscious ego fought against these reproaches of his conscience and declared: "I am not experiencing pleasure, I am suffering." This attitude explains, first, his inability to com-

prehend the aggressive content of comedy. His attempt at comedy was an unsuccessful attempt at aggression as a defense mechanism, since he actually desired to be passive. Secondly, since his desire for passivity caused him to be unsuccessful, it explains the chronic question: "Who will suffer?" By fantasizing that he was a writer of comedies, he was relieved once more of a feeling of guilt. "I have no pleasure, I am suffering." His creative effort served as an appeaser of his conscience, which in itself corresponded to a defense mechanism, namely, the denial of the wish for castration. Naturally, the wish against which this writer defended himself had to be introduced in a round-about fashion, most clearly revealed in the question: "Who shall suffer?" By seeking sympathy for his heroes, he denied his own passive desires, but at the same time these very tendencies prevented his achieving dramatic success (by means of aggression). In this circuitous way, he again enjoyed passivity through failure.

Another patient, a man with unconscious passive feminine tendencies, entered analysis because of a potency disturbance. In relating his life history, he spoke of having previously written poems, with which he had had some success. In recent years he had lost interest in this activity, and now wrote a poem only once or twice a year, which usually was accepted by the newspapers. I asked to see some of the poems, whereupon he brought two thick volumes, including very favorable reviews, and the like. The poems showed, indeed, great talent. In the course of twelve years' work, several phases in his literary development could be discerned. In his early poems he would reproach women in general for their cruelty and meanness. An ironic and bitter note distinguished the second phase, an attitude of pessimism regarding the value of life. It took the form of rather tame satire, but was never aggressive. In the third phase he caricatured with some success the style of well-known male writers, but the ridicule continued to be rather tame. This period was also one of retreat, since he wrote rarely, rather

unwillingly, and was inhibited in his production. What was the explanation of his productivity and of its inhibition?

Again we find a negative oedipus conflict in this patient. The repressed wish to be attacked sadistically by the father (feminine identification) was first displaced onto a woman. He fell in love with a very manly, aggressive hysteric, who nagged him continually; this led to a potency disturbance in the years preceding the analysis. The development in his poetry paralleled that in his life. First, he complained about the aggressive female. This was a defense against the reproaches of his own conscience, which said: "You are enjoying her cruelty." His next step was to strengthen his alibi. Instead of masochistic complaints, he wrote satires, which were meant to be aggressive but fell short of the mark. Since this attempt at defense also failed, and the superego reproaches increased, poetry no longer helped, and he became creatively and genitally impotent. It was significant that the work inhibition set in at the point where the conscience refused to accept the alibi presented in the form of the satiric verses: "My relation to other men is not passive, it is aggressive." Moreover, it became evident that in the course of years this man turned more and more to the source of his defensive conflict—the male.

A fourth clinical example is that of a woman patient, who some years previously had published a biting satire about the neurotic behavior of a man temporarily jobless because of the stock-market crash. This satire, consciously patterned on her own husband, met with success, and she was encouraged to further production in this field by foremost reviewers. However, it remained her first and last satire in the course of many years. Instead she attempted to write idyllic short stories and failed completely.

The patient always contrived to find a situation in which she could say: "I have been wronged." This unconscious wish had originated in the pre-oedipal conflict situation with her mother. Her husband's unemployment made her consciously very unhappy;

unconsciously, however, she enjoyed it, because once again, she was being denied gratification by the mother-image. The superego reproached her for her masochistic pleasure. She defended herself by proving that she was furious, and made fun of the nasty and incapable husband. Since this aggression served as a defense against the more deeply rooted masochistic wishes, she was able to write successful satire. Naturally, she reacted to her own courage with anxiety, pertaining to her aggression, which again necessitated a defense; this time she chose the form of idyllic writings, in which she failed. Thereupon she gave up writing altogether and was mad if her endeavors in this direction were mentioned.

Exhibitionism versus voyeurism

It is indisputable that exhibitionism is one of the unconscious motives in artistic creation. The artist displaces part of his own exhibitionistic tendencies onto his work, in a manner similar to that used in regard to his narcissism, as pointed out by Rank and Sachs. Yet there are numerous anecdotes current about every artist, that are evidence for his naive narcissism and exhibitionism. We frequently hear stories that make fun of his vain and exaggerated attempts to place himself in the limelight in a combination of narcissism and exhibitionistic tendencies; other stories rather stress the defense against exhibitionism, namely, shyness and timidity.

The observation is correct, but the interpretation is incorrect. Every artist unconsciously is a voyeur ("Peeping Tom"), who defends himself against this tendency by means of exhibition. "To perceive images", that means, to think up fantasies, is one of the most essential unconscious wishes of the creative artist. Since these desires are forbidden, because they are too immediately tied up with the infantile voyeuristic tendencies, he constructs an inner alibi in the form of a defense reaction which says:

"I am not looking at something forbidden; on the contrary, I am permitting myself to be looked at."

What do we know of the relationship between exhibition and voyeurism? Like all other great discoveries in psychoanalysis, the basic facts have been discovered by Freud. In his *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* he points out that they are partial impulses (Partialtriebe) of infantile origin, which later become subordinated to the primate of genital sexuality. Several years later, in *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, he stated that every voyeur identified himself with the exhibitionist, and vice versa. There is a double pleasure in the exhibitionistic impulse; the exhibitionist not only enjoys exhibiting himself, but by means of identification with the voyeur experiences this added narcissistic pleasure. The same is true—mutatis mutandis—in the case of the voyeur.

With few exceptions, strangely little attention has been given in our literature to the active and passive contents of these scopophilic tendencies. The fact, for instance, that exhibitionism can be used as a defense against the voyeuristic tendencies, and vice-versa, was completely overlooked. Eidelberg and I were the first to point out this mechanism in regard to a specific illness, depersonalization.¹³ The striking element of this neurosis is the patient's tendency to change into a "psychical observatory" (Reik). These patients describe, in the most detailed fashion, to what extent their feelings and perceptions differ from those of the pre-morbid period. We concluded that the "mechanism of depersonalization" was the defense against a repressed (anal) exhibitionistic wish by means of the opposite voyeuristic tendency, the introspection (self-observation). Hence in his minute observation of himself, the patient enjoys a satisfaction of his voyeuristic impulses. Naturally, this is also warded off, because he is not aware of this pleasure.

13. The Mechanism of Depersonalization, *Int. Ztschr. Psa*, 1935, pp. 258-285.

Some years later I was able to show, in a paper read at the fifteenth International Psychoanalytic Convention in Paris (1938), that another type of illness, erythrophobia (blushing), makes use of the opposite defense mechanism.¹⁴ Exhibition is substituted only secondarily for voyeurism and is then also warded off.

To summarize my present opinions concerning the genesis and clinical picture of this scopophilic impulse, I would question the existence of a primary exhibitionistic tendency. I believe that voyeurism appears first, and is a variation of orality (Simmel). Many expressions of everyday language furnish us with evidence for this assumption, for instance, to "eat up someone with one's eyes", "to devour a book", and the like. In each case a relationship between voyeurism and food-intake is established, and rightly so, since to perceive something implies the act of intake, of "devouring". This originally narcissistic act must undergo modification under the pressure of guilt feelings as soon as it includes sexual objects (breast and genitals of parents). It then expresses the attitude: "I am not interested in peeping at others; on the contrary, I wish to exhibit myself."

Of course, this latter tendency is also very strictly forbidden to the child. The resulting conflict not only induces a damming up and a subsequent repression of the exhibitionistic tendencies, but it also blocks the attempt to deny the voyeuristic tendencies by means of exhibition. This can best be observed in the little girl, since her more intense exhibitionistic tendencies indicate, on a deeper level: "Look at my body, not at my mutilated genitals" (castration complex). In the male, the development is too complicated to be discussed here.¹⁵

This scopophilic impulse is combined with other impulses in an even more complicated manner. Most significant is its con-

14. A New Approach to the Therapy of Erythrophobia, *Psy. Quart.*, 13, 1944.

15. Cf. E. Bergler and L. Eidelberg. The Breast Complex of the Male. *Int. Ztschr. Psy.*, 1933.

nection with aggression. It originates in the severe reprimands the child is given if he makes an attempt to gratify these impulses. Eo ipso, any activity in this direction represents the violation of an educational rule; thus gratification is possible only by means of aggression and spite, and the child is allowed only to sublimate this wish through curiosity and by acquiring knowledge.

In the following, I shall illustrate by examples the use of exhibitionism as a defense against voyeurism:

A woman patient attended a circus performance with other people, and looked on as two women acrobats performed on the trapeze. She grew dizzy, covered her face, and exclaimed: "I cannot stand it. Please tell me when it is over!" Voyeurism was warded off by means of exhibitionism. By making a spectacle of herself, she exhibited. She could also have avoided looking without making a spectacle. Secondly that defense also was warded off: the patient was ashamed and blushed.

Another example: A patient remembered that as a boy of three-and-a-half he was very much ashamed of sleeping in the same room with his mother. To avoid witnessing her undressing, he would cover the side of the crib with his sheet. That was his inner alibi as it were, of not looking at his mother. But once more voyeurism was warded off by exhibition since his mother used to find him in the morning half-naked, with no sheet over him. Later, this defense, too, was warded off, since every time his mother covered him he was ashamed.

Another patient who was also a writer stated that it was extremely difficult for him to visualize the plot of his dramas. It was only when he began to write that any ideas came into his mind. Even then he was greatly inhibited in developing the plot. Transcribed into analytic language, it means: Voyeurism, the visualizing, is forbidden; exhibition, i.e., writing with the idea that a public would read it, is permitted as a defense.

All of these examples show that voyeurism is unconsciously warded off by substituting exhibitionism. It is difficult to under-

stand why it is a greater crime, in the moral code of the infantile conscience, to look than to display oneself. Perhaps we can find the answer in the fact that voyeurism belongs to the oral phase, and exhibitionism to the later anal and phallic phase of development.

Whatever the explanation may be, clinical experience with writers who show work inhibitions indicates very clearly that they do not succeed or succeed only partially in the utilization of scopophilic defense mechanisms.

A disturbance in the sphere of scopophilia manifests itself in writers in various ways. It may prevent the writer from thinking of a plot, or cause him to have undue difficulties in working it out, or make him "stick" to details. "I am capable of thinking up a plot, but once seated before a typewriter, I am horrified at writing even a line," stated one of my patients. Another patient complained that she spent eight hours in writing ten lines. "I am lost in finding the right expression. I want every expression to be perfect," she said. This shifting of emphasis from the main point to the smallest and least important details of expression is but a camouflage for the real difficulty—transformation of voyeurism into exhibitionism.

A dramatist complained that his wife had no understanding of his work. "Every time I think (about my 'plots'), she believes I am suffering. For her, thinking and suffering are synonymous. Obviously, she thinks only when she worries, thinking seems such a strange occupation to her." Behind this irony the patient concealed a voyeuristic difficulty. He stated that he could think only when he was not conscious that he was thinking. "If my wife catches me in such a situation, I become conscious of my thinking and observe myself—a slightly ridiculous situation."

The true situation was that he could allow himself voyeuristic pleasure only if he outwitted his superego; the moment he became conscious that he was indulging in this pleasure, he had to

turn his attention to unproductive and rather painful self-observation. He could not explain why the "pose of thinking" seemed ridiculous to him, nor why he reacted to it as if it were something forbidden. On the surface level he was behaving in such situations like a child caught in sexual play; on the deeper level, he identified his "thinking" with sexual peeping, hence his writing inhibition.

Another patient presented the following list of difficulties which confronted her when she attempted to write: "Blurred eyes, painful jaw muscles, sore gums, sore crown of head, constriction in breathing, stupor, deep fatigue, burning lips, desire to masturbate (when reading, as well), mental imbecility and mutism, wild restlessness with the feeling of being at an impasse."

Analysis proved that her difficulties had two causes: forbidden voyeurism ("blurred eyes") and refusal to give, a defense against the wish to be refused. Hysterically, she dramatized her refusal ("painful jaw muscles", "sore gums", "constriction of breathing", "mutism", "pseudo debility"). Her desire to masturbate while trying to write was interesting. It represented an attempt to be autarchic ("I can give myself pleasure without outside help"), and at the same time an effort to take refuge from oral danger in genital sexuality.

Another depository of voyeuristic difficulties is observable in writers who directly copy reality. "Lack of imagination" means voyeuristic inhibition; the fact that reality is copied in these cases has the meaning of an unconscious justification: "Reality is responsible, I am not."

With slight modifications the same mechanism applies to "ghostwriters". Hidden behind anonymity—inwardly making fun of the incapable and inarticulate "big-shot"—these writers can produce, while without these precautions they are unable to do so.

3. THE "ORALITY" AND "AUTARCHIC FICTION" OF WRITERS

During the first months of his extrauterine existence, the child is completely dependent on the loving care of his environment. In our society, this environment is represented by the mother or nurse. Whichever it is, a woman is the first human being with whom the biologically parasitic baby is intimately associated. Since the infant does not see reality as it is, he does not even perceive this woman as a human being; he recognizes only the breast or the bottle. And he even misconceives these; he considers them to be a part of his own body (Freud). This misunderstanding of reality can be expressed in one sentence: The infant believes that it is his own magic omnipotence which makes people act (Ferenczi). Delays in providing for his comfort, such as occur even in the best-organized family, arouse the child's anger and fury and are manifested in his crying. Very likely, the first and greatest disappointment in every individual's life consists in the gradual comprehension of the fact that he is not magically omnipotent but dependent on his mother and her successive representatives.

In psychoanalysis, we call the first stage of the libidinous-aggressive development the oral phase (Freud). We use this term because the mouth is the main organ with which reality is contacted; it tests and accepts food, not only as nourishment but for pleasure as well. We may call the child's illusion that he is magically and megalomaniacally self-sufficient the *autarchic fiction* (Jekels and Bergler).

Our assumptions about infants are based on reconstructions derived from actions peculiar to some neurotic people. We call those neurotics who have regressed to this early stage of development *oral neurotics*.¹⁶

16. For instance, sufferers from specific forms of potency disturbances, such as *ejaculatio praecox*, *aspermia*, *frigidity* (oral type), *perversions* (f.i., *homosexuality*), *addictions* (f.i., *alcoholism*), and so forth.

Oral neurotics have been the subject of a great deal of controversy in analytic literature. The majority of analysts still believe that the fundamental desire of orally regressed people is that of "getting". A small minority—and this writer is responsible for the formulations of this very minority—believe the opposite, namely, that these people fundamentally want to be refused. I maintain that oral neurotics in later life unconsciously repeat, not directly the baby's parasitic wish to "get", but its masochistic reversal, the wish to be disappointed. Without being aware of it, they construct in later life the following triad, which I have called the *mechanism of orality*:

1. Through their behavior they provoke unconsciously a disappointment.
2. Not realizing that they have unconsciously brought about this disappointment, they become aggressive, seemingly in self-defense.
3. Then they indulge in self-pity, enjoying unconsciously psychic masochism.

Consciously they realize only their "righteous indignation" and self-pity. The initial provocation, as well as the masochistic enjoyment of self-pity are repressed.

One may object by asking just what sort of people these are. If a child is refused candy, for instance, he will, when he grows up, eat as much candy as possible to make up for his early disappointment. True, he will if he is normal. If, however, he develops an oral neurosis he will repeat the situation of being refused. Obviously, for these neurotics the wish to show up the mother as a disappointing, bad monster is more important than their original desire to receive.

Another difficulty in comprehending mechanisms involved in oral *regression* is the constant confusion between the *original* contents of the child's wishes at the oral stage and the *later* neurotic elaboration of these wishes. Nobody denies that people who later in life display the triad of the mechanism of orality, as

sketched above, once upon a time were babies wanting *to get* milk and milk-equivalents. The imaginary refusal, or the fantasy of getting too little, in other words, oral greed, produced the typical result: anger and fury. The mechanism of orality stresses the clinically observable fact of the later *masochistic elaboration*—"I want to be refused"—of this fury, nothing else. Thus the objection that in my opinion oral neurotics "start their life with suffering", confuses the "historic" sequence with the later neurotic unconscious elaboration of these facts.

Here are a few clinical examples:

A writer who had been recommended to me by another writer-patient of mine, came to see me and told me that he was the author of a book that had achieved great success in years gone by. Since then, however, he had been unable to write. He lived in the country, was extremely poor, and, in addition, was in conflict with his wife. He despaired of his future and wanted to commit suicide, but considered it his duty to follow the advice of his friend and first to try analysis. From his description of his circumstances an analysis seemed almost impossible, since he lived at several hours' distance from any analyst, lacked funds completely, and hence could not think of changing his place of residence. This was further complicated by his unemployment and inability to work. In order not to make him more despondent, I suggested that if he got a job in the city he could come to me for analysis. Upon his insistence, I mentioned a ridiculously low fee, merely as a means of reassuring him. Upon inquiring about him of the man who had recommended him to me, the latter laughed and said that his friend had told me the truth, but not the whole truth. He had failed to mention that his dilapidated hut had been changed into a comfortable country house by his wealthy wife, and that they lived luxuriously. Later, when I asked the patient about this, he rationalized his behavior by saying that he had spoken about himself only, since he was ashamed that his wife supported him.

This demonstrates how the patient used me for the purposes of his oral pseudo-aggression. He wanted to force me into the position of being in the wrong. If, after the information I had received, I had demanded a higher fee, he would have become furious about this "imposition", would have pitied himself masochistically, and would have concluded that my behavior had made analysis impossible. That he himself had provoked the situation would have remained unconscious.

Another example:

A patient was continually complaining about his wife. Above all, he reproached her with "malicious refusal in sexuality". When I asked him what this malicious refusal consisted of, he said that his wife "was completely passive" as to sex. The patient had married a virgin with a repugnance to everything sexual, who theoretically assented to coitus only because, as she said, one had to be "normal". Besides, she wanted to play the woman's part, to be passive and to be "forced" by the man. The patient, on the other hand, expected his wife to take the initiative, to "seduce" him. When I tried to explain to him that the wish to be forced was typical in virgins, I met with complete lack of understanding. "What do you mean? I am to take the initiative? Ridiculous!" was his reply over and over again. When I protested that if he wanted to be seduced he should have chosen an older and more experienced woman for his partner, he replied in an offended tone: "Oh, if the woman enjoyed it, the whole affair would give me no pleasure."

Analysis showed that the patient did not really want intercourse. He only wanted to bring the woman, the giver, into an absurd situation. In this he succeeded by means of a simple unconscious trick. Since both partners wanted to be seduced, a complete inactivity lasting for years resulted. The patient's wife was still practically untouched when he came to me after seven years of marriage. Unconsciously the patient identified the sexually inexperienced woman with the "maliciously refusing mother" who

denied him pleasure, toward whom, therefore, he could behave aggressively without feelings of guilt. For years he refused to have intercourse, did not even talk to his wife about sexual matters, and pitied himself masochistically because of the "bad luck" which he had unconsciously brought upon himself.

Another patient, coming for treatment because of *ejaculatio praecox*, told me the story of his life. He was obviously filled with rage and hatred, and he emphasized that he had continually met with bad luck in all his plans for marriage. The last attempt had failed because of the "malice" of his presumptive father- and mother-in-law, and a "lack of love" on the part of the girl. At the age of thirty-two, he had fallen in love with a girl of eighteen. When the girl's parents made inquiries concerning his financial status, he represented his income as 80 per cent lower than it really was. Alarmed at the prospect of such a "misalliance", the parents, who were shrewd business people, rich, and rather money-conscious, and who wanted their daughter to marry wealth only, opposed the engagement and influenced their daughter accordingly. When the patient's relatives heard about his "awkward behavior" in reference to his income, they were horrified. They had impressed upon him that in such a case "it is better to say too much than too little". When I asked the patient why he had not simply told the truth about his circumstances, he answered that he had wanted to "test" his parents-in-law. Unconsciously he had wanted to disprove the girl and her parents in their roles of "giving" persons, as if to say: "Nobody loves me, therefore I may be aggressive and enjoy my unhappiness." I was able to show him that the failure of previous marriage plans had been brought about in a similar manner.

As a literary example of this attitude of oral neurotics I shall cite an episode from the life of the poet Grabbe. Grabbe who had been a military judge, had neglected his duty in a most provocative manner, had then allowed himself to be dismissed from his job without a pension and thereupon he expected his wealthy wife to support him. Though the poet was aware of the pathological miserliness of his wife, he yet

juggled himself into this state of dependence. His wife refused him all support; this caused Grabbe to flee from their home; only later, after he had been taken seriously ill, the police compelled her to take him into her house. The unconscious meaning of this action was: to force the woman into the role of the denying mother, so that he might be aggressive without feeling of guilt and enjoy self-pity (masochistic pleasure).

These examples show that oral neurotics misconceive reality. For them it represents the draining, refusing, bad mother of their early infancy. A naive objection may be raised here: mothers are not at all denying! They are loving and sacrificing! That is correct; but the child sees reality through the spectacles of his misconceptions. Fairy tales, such as Hänsel and Gretel, offer excellent illustrations of this fantasy. In Grimm's story, which has its equivalents in the fairy tales of most societies, the old witch tries to devour the children. This fear of being eaten up corresponds to the child's projection upon the mother of his own aggressive tendencies against the nipple (M. Klein).

The psychoanalytic *orality* denotes the deepest level of regression. As mentioned above¹⁷, for the infant the fact emerges only gradually that the breast or breast substitutes and its bearer or giver, respectively, are separate entities. The result is that the person on whom the baby is dependent becomes invested with great quantities of libidinous¹⁸ and aggressive¹⁹ derivatives of drives. Since the child's dependence continues, the mother of the pre-oedipal period is loved and hated. As time goes on, this ambivalence becomes unbearable and after complicated transitions the one-and-a-half or two-years old child solves these difficulties by splitting the two contradictory tendencies. In the oedipal period the hatred is shifted to the parent of the same sex; the libidinous

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18. Sucking, and later, eating, are not only a caloric necessity, they are a pleasure as well.

19. Examples: furious crying, spitting, vomiting

tendencies remain with the parent of the opposite sex. To take the example of the boy: in the pre-oedipal period, both libidinal and aggressive tendencies, were directed toward the mother. In the oedipal period (age: one-and-a-half to four) the hatred is directed against the father; the mother, however, is the center of libidinal fantasies. The reasons for the "splitting" of the ambivalence are twofold: first, the conflict inherent in ambivalent feelings; second, the fact that the father is a competitor for the mother's interest and can obviously not be eliminated.

It is of importance to note that the "pre-oedipal" and "oedipal" mother are psychologically different persons though in reality the same. The child develops a misconception of the mother's intentions in the pre-oedipal period of orality. He does not consider her only as loving and giving, as she really is, but in the highlight of the conflict of ambivalence, also as the opposite, as bad and refusing. The child even projects his own fury and anger upon her and thus fantasies of the danger of being devoured originate, since the child wants to bite the breast that disappointed him by being withdrawn. During the oedipal period the mother is invested with great libidinal quantities, but simultaneously she is considered weak, passive, submissive, "castrated".

The contents of the libidinal fantasies dealing with the pre-oedipal and oedipal mother represent the child's misconceptions of sex. Of course they have nothing at all to do with intercourse. The horror, anger and irony heaped upon Freudian psychoanalysis because of the discovery of the pre-stages of the oedipus complex are based on a misunderstanding of that concept.

For the normal child the oral phase is a transitory period. For a specific group of neurotics it is the point to which they regress after a few unsuccessful attempts to reach the higher developmental levels (urethral, anal, phallic).

The disappointment in the phallic mother, which causes this type of neurotics to be disappointed in life and to have guilt feelings because of their own aggressions, also leads to the

strengthening of the "autarchic fantasy" (Jekels and Bergler). Its content for the child, as Freud assumes, is the identity of the outer world and himself: hence he is omnipotent and dependent on no one. When, through many painful disappointments, the child learns that this is not true, he makes complicated efforts to maintain the fantasy of omnipotence. Accordingly, the individual who has regressed to the oral phase vacillates between the desire for alimentary (and other) independence and a continuous wish to obtain or be given something. From this frame of reference, then, the apparent contradiction in the lives of so many artists becomes explicable: they constantly crave independence as defense against masochistic attachment, but still they continue as parasites, living off their friends or relatives. The "oral" writers (in my opinion there are no others) unconsciously alternate between complaining about the "cold, cruel world" (in its deepest sense, the mother), and inducing situations in which they will be disappointed. Seen from the outside, they appear constantly to be pursued by bad luck. *Specifically characteristic for writers is a peculiar mechanism of substitution*, apparently arising from the autarchic fiction. They seem to say: "*I need no one, I am self-sufficient, and I can do everything alone.*" In creating beautiful words, they are, however, only apparently identifying with the "giving" mother. Since the writer, as an autarchist, is, so to speak, self-sufficient, he is, in an *aggressive* way, making the mother unnecessary. Thus, in the deepest sense, writing is an attempt to eliminate the bad and frustrating mother. "I have overcome my disappointment," is the unconscious formula of the successful writer.

This identification of milk and words appears grotesque; examples from clinical material, however, serve as evidence that work inhibitions of writers can be resolved, if their hatred tied up with the "refusal of words" can be changed into a "giving of words". Of course this is impossible without an analytic resolution of the pre-oedipal mother-fixation.

The constant denial of that masochistic attachment is the specific solution that the writer unconsciously finds. It is an attempt at "self cure". These people deny inwardly the wish to be refused by identifying themselves with the "giving" mother, at the same time eliminating the mother because of inner aggression. The reasoning runs something like this: "It is not true that I want to be disappointed and refused by mother; mother doesn't even exist. *I*, autarchically, give myself everything." "Beautiful" ideas and words (substituting for milk) "flow" from the writer's pen. Thus the writer becomes the giving person acting the role of giving mother and receiving child at the same time. When this mechanism of denial works, the writer is productive. When the pseudo-aggressive denial is not strong enough to counteract the masochistic attachment, which it tries to cover up as a defense mechanism, the writer is sterile.

To give a precise formulation of the difference between the productive and the sterile writer: the *unproductive*, neurotically inhibited writer exhausts his psychic energy in the creation of his unconscious alibi of the pseudo-aggressive defense mechanism ("I refuse"). At the same time, he still retains the unconscious masochistic wish *to be refused*. The *productive* writer, experiencing the same conflict, solves it by eliminating, intrapsychically, the mother: *I myself*, autarchically, *give* ideas and words (milk). The successful writer sets a "magic gesture" into motion: he dramatizes unconsciously how he allegedly wants to be treated—kindly and as recipient.²⁰

Since my earlier examples dealt with writers apparently displaying positive or negative oedipus fixation, I seem to be contradicting myself. The contradiction resolves itself if we consider the following: Every writer struggles with the "autarchic fiction". This is an orally determined mechanism, as proved by the fact that throughout his life he continues his fanatic and stub-

20. The complicated substructure of "magic gestures" is discussed in my paper, "The Problem of Magic Gestures", *Psychiat. Quart.*, 1945.

born demand for independence: "I give words." Of course, as a form of defense, he also attempts the resolution of conflicts on higher developmental levels. However, the oedipal conflict of the writer never attains real intensity, as in cases of hysterical or compulsive neuroses. This holds true, even though phenomenologically it appears to be otherwise. We are dealing here with an exaggerated attempt to escape from orality. "Without sublimated orality, no desire to write", seems to be the most precise way of characterizing this type of creative artist.

One of my patients, a well known novelist, dedicated one of his unpublished novels to his mother only to start, on the next page, the first chapter with the description of the main character in a situation in which he was "unjustly" punished by a female teacher. In other words: The conscious feeling of love and admiration for his mother was the defense against his inner masochistic attachment. (Interestingly enough, this writer had remarkable insight, as far as that is possible without psychoanalysis.)

In an unpublished analytic biography of Heinrich Heine,²¹ I have brought evidence of this mechanism in a great deal of material.

The question as to whether the orally regressed neurotic wants to "get" or to be refused, is of prime importance.²² Not only are we taken in by the patient's unconscious if we interpret to him

21. *Heinrich Heine, a Misunderstood Poet* Part of it appeared in *Imago*, 1937, under the title, *Jemanden ablehnen, jemanden bejahen*.

22. I pointed out the clinical importance of that fact in a series of papers: The Problem of the Oral Pessimist, *Imago*, 1934. *Talleyrand, Napoleon, Stendhal, Grabbe*, *Int. Psa.*, Verlag, Vienna, 1935. Some Special Forms of Ejaculatory Disturbance not Hitherto Described, *Int. Ztschr. Psa.*, 1934, and *Int. J. Psa.*, 1935. Obscene Words, *Psa. Quart.*, 5, 1936. *Ejaculatio Praecox*, *Psychiatrische en neurologische Bladen*, Amsterdam, 1937. Further Observations on the Clinical Picture of 'Psychogenic Oral Aspermia', *Int. J. Psa.*, 1937. *Psychic Impotence in Men*, Monograph, Medical Edition, Huber, Berne, 1937. Preliminary Phases of the Masculine Beating Fantasy, *Psa. Quart.*, 1938. On the Psychoanalysis of the Ability to Wait and of Impatience, *Psa. Rev.*, 1939. Four Types of Neurotic Undecisiveness, *Psa. Quart.*, 1940. The 'Leading' and 'Misleading' Basic Identifications, *Psa. Quart.*, 1945.

his alleged wish to get, we are in addition bolstering his neurosis and shall never be able to cure him that way.²³

4. *PLAGIARISM AND WRITING*

Plagiarism is as old as literary production. There are different types of plagiarism: conscious and unconscious. As far as unconscious plagiarism is concerned, there are as many forms as there are different types of identifications. In a paper published in 1932 I enumerated twenty-two types of literary plagiarism.²⁴ The mechanism is always connected with unconscious identification plus projection of the superego into the outside. This projected superego is for the literary man his circle of literati and critics. Therefore, unconsciously, being found out is a prerequisite. That is why plagiarists plagiarize so "stupidly"; it is just one of the techniques of unconsciously inviting punishment. Most grotesque is the helplessness of people whose plagiarism is based on purely unconscious motives, since nobody believes them.

The important fact is that every writer is a plagiarist par excellence, as far as his unconscious tendencies are concerned. This may seem strange in the face of the relative infrequency of actually published plagiarisms. To "get something" represents for the writer one of his defense mechanisms; especially so because the aggressive tendency expressed in taking away (or stealing) ideas works for him as a pseudo-aggressive appeaser of his dynamically-decisive inner reproach that he wants masochistically to be refused. Consequently, to ward off this basic difficulty, the writer, more or less unscrupulously, will appropriate even an-

23. There are two facts in the psychologic make-up of many writers, that are often observed, yet have seldom been officially recorded: his alcoholism and his homosexuality. Of course, the psychologic approach does not spell moral condemnation. For us, alcoholism and homosexuality are symptoms of neurotic disease and nothing else. Both, homosexuality and alcoholism, have a complicated oral substructure which cannot be discussed here. For details see the writer's *Contributions to the Psychogenesis of Alcohol Addiction, Quart. J. Stud. Alc.*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1944, and *Eight Prerequisites for Psa. Treatment of Homosexuality, Psa. Review*, 31, 1944.

24. *Plagiarism Psa. Bewegung*, 1932.

other's mental property. This tendency to unconscious plagiarism as "moral alibi" is counteracted by the writer's megalomania, which leads in the opposite direction—toward autarchy, and the desire to be independent, even of the ideas of others. The resultant of these two forces—the wish to get, as a defense, and the wish to be autarchic (also a defense, though on a different level), determines the amount of actual plagiarism of a specific writer.

Interestingly enough, the typical compromise consists in "modifying" other people's ideas. With surprising monotony I have been told by different writers that there are no new ideas under the sun, and that the greatest writers have, without scruples, been using the ideas of others. In short, writers believe that "modifications" of other people's ideas are exactly the stuff "originality" is made of. Making all necessary allowances for the restrictions governing every original idea, one must say that the means by which some writers arrive at their "new angles" and "different twists" are suspicious. True, even an original writer can have an idea which seems new to him, only to find out later, to his dismay, that it had been used before. But under normal conditions, the peculiar "pleasure of creation" is achieved. However, one tends to get a little impatient with people who try to figure out a literary "solution" exclusively or too exclusively by conscious means.

"Ideas are like air—they are nobody's property", claimed an indignant patient when caught plagiarizing. Another patient, a woman writer, asked me to lend her a paper of mine on a subject which she had seen mentioned somewhere. Since she was writing on the same topic, she was, of course, interested in my "approach". Returning the paper, she said rather indignantly that she could use only one formulation. "I did not know that you had engaged me as a collaborator, and I don't see any reason for you to be indignant that you can use or steal only one idea", was my answer. "Well, in our

business we don't call it stealing—just modifying", she said, unperturbed.

Other experiences have led me to believe that analyzing writers actually means collaborating with them. The more intelligent among them do not directly ask the analyst for ideas; they just present a "psychological" problem which confronts them in their work and ask for an interpretation of their specific difficulty. In this circuitous way they extract ideas. "I understand now," said such a writer, "that I was blocked at that point in my novel. Let's assume that I were not; what idea would have occurred to me? Please give me an example."

This typical intellectual parasitism has the purpose, not so much of extracting ideas, but basically of repeating the old game of pushing the mother into the situation of refusal. If the analyst replies that it is not his business to collaborate on the patient's play or novel, and tries to analyze the patient's request, the patient feels treated unjustly. If, however, the analyst "volunteers" an idea, the patient tries to prove that the idea is worthless, "modifies" it, and unscrupulously presents it as his own at the next occasion.

5. *THE WRITER'S OBJECTIVITY IS BUT A FANTASY*

The writer is a neurotic with a self-devised cure, which works as long as his writing ability which corresponds to a successful sublimation is not inhibited. In writing he gets temporary release from his inner conflict; he expresses in writing his pet defense mechanisms and thus expiates temporarily his feeling of guilt. But he must constantly repeat this defense mechanism; hence the typical writer is a chronic consumer of paper and ink.

In fact, as far as his productivity is concerned, the writer is a self-cured neurotic who convinces even the sceptical critic that he says something, not because he must say it, but because he has something important to convey and wants to say it. In other words, the writer's own rationalization, namely, that he is the

exponent of his time, and even the judge of it, is sometimes naively accepted. The average reader reads for one reason mainly: He wants to be entertained. This means either that his own life is so monotonous or empty of emotions and "interesting" problems that he needs diversion from another source or that he needs relief from his own worries. Via identification, he enjoys other people's troubles and can thus often achieve the satisfaction that he is better off than others. This average reader does not care whether the writer is queer, or healthy, or psychotic. He wants to import emotions which correspond to a defense mechanism in himself (though of course without realizing his unconscious aim), and achieves it. The type of relief needed determines the brand of literature preferred. Where there is a need there is a production. Romance, adventure, pessimism à la carte, satire, social outlook—for \$3 you can buy the book you want and the emotion you need.

We call the suppliers of this very serious emotional need: writers. The writer sells disguised defense mechanisms, mitigated through beauty or at least style. The real writer produces not because there is a demand for his product, but because he solves a conflict within himself. If he does not do it for this reason, he is just a writer-racketeer. Ironically enough the real writer thus gets paid for his cure, while other neurotics have to pay the physician for theirs. This is one of the peculiarities of the business of writing.

All of this does not explain sufficiently how, in certain circles, the writer has achieved immunity against ridicule in his claim of being a sort of a cultural leader or at least a representative of national culture. I believe that critics are chiefly responsible for this misconception. Specialization in modern life has resulted in specialized knowledge, and the "practical man" is outwitted by the comparisons of one writer with others, mainly dead or foreign ones, and by the use of quotations the practical man has never heard of. This is particularly true if the comparison or

quotation appears in a newspaper or in a magazine. Critics have command of technical words, they read a good deal, and they take full advantage of both assets. If you add to this the reader's traditional respect for print, you have an authority established. The critic, usually himself an inhibited writer but with very high literary standards for more successful and less inhibited confrères in the writing profession, must somewhat exaggerate the importance of the work he is praising, or criticizing; if for no other reason than to incite the practical man's interest in "goods" of which the latter erroneously assumes that they are none of his business. Despite the constant conflict between writers and critics, both have to sell the same article, they have a community of interests.

Concerning the writer's claim that he represents the quintessence of culture and is the true representative of his time, a French anecdote best expresses my opinion: "Here go my constituents," exclaimed a politician. "Being their leader, I must follow them." The reasoning in this anecdote is the unconscious reasoning of the writer. In other words, a person writes because he must, in some way or other, rid himself of an inner conflict. By chance his inner indignation stemming from other sources can attach itself to something which the people in the specific period also like or dislike; that is, he chooses for his defense something acceptable to the people of his time. Thus, on the basis of misunderstanding or co-incidence, the writer is the representative of his time for a period of a few weeks. In this sense, the writer is not the objective observer of his time. He actually is a neurotic, unconsciously operating his defense mechanism, without knowing it. Sometimes the defense mechanism will coincide with the general trend, then he will be successful.

From an historical point of view, it is interesting to note that even the most complete of psychological doctrines, psychoanalysis, has, to a certain extent, been taken in by the artist. The original

analytic formulation on this subject ran as follows: The artist expresses in his work his unconscious fantasies. This was a great improvement upon the one previously accepted by the world in general, which assumed that his work represented his conscious wishes and experiences in modified form. Despite this, our increased understanding of the artist's personality was only relative. We still failed to distinguish between the unconscious wish and the unconscious defense mechanism against the wish. This can be explained by the fact that very few artists were analyzed, and consequently early analytic assumptions were based upon the interpretations of the work of artists no longer living. Analysis, in the first three decades of its existence, was struggling for a recognition of the oedipus complex. It was indeed gratifying then to be able to point to the work and statements of great artists, which seemed to corroborate our findings.

To approach this in another way, let us consider Freud's well-known remarks about Hamlet, in regard to this character's indecision (quoted above). "He cannot wreak vengeance upon the man who removed his father and married his mother, because this man's actions are the realization of his own suppressed infantile wishes. The loathing which ought to drive him to revenge is replaced by self-reproach and by conscientious scruples, which remind him that he is literally no better than the sinner whom he is supposed to punish." It is truly an astounding and impressive explanation of Hamlet's character, but not a proof that Shakespeare was suffering from an unresolved oedipus conflict at the time the tragedy was written. It could just as well have been, as has been evidenced in clinical material, that this problem originated as a means of defense against a more deeply imbedded conflict. The erroneous assumption, however, is the foundation for many analytic biographies.

My objections pertain of course not to the fine psychoanalytic papers explaining the psychologic motives for specific works of art. I would like to mention particularly the long series of papers

by Edward Hitschmann, whose work on the artist—especially that on Gottfried Keller (1915)—ranks with Freud's own contributions to the subject.

Freud's statements on the psychology of the writer were formulated in 1908. In our everyday work, we apply the more recent Freudian concept of the defense mechanism.

It may be rightly objected that in the above exposition a decisive factor has been completely overlooked: congenital talent. Freud has never failed to stress that, psychologically, we can understand only the superstructure of the artist. Without allowing for talent, i.e., the constitutional factor, an explanation of the artist's personality is, according to Freud, incomplete.

I personally believe that the biological part of the mysterious ingredient "talent" can be defined in writers more precisely today. It consists of a quantitative increase of oral tendencies and their derivative: voyeurism. Both are biologically conditioned. In other words, I do not believe that a writer can be a writer without this specific, biologically-conditioned admixture. The psychic superstructure of writing can be more easily described, as has been tried in this paper. Still, the results are "strange":

" 'Tis strange—but true; for truth is always strange,
Stranger than fiction." Byron, *Don Juan*.

Quantitative increase of orality and its derivative, voyeurism, do not constitute per se the phenomenon, a writer. Obviously, something else is necessary: oral regression and a specific technique of coping with this regression. The writer has not passed through the danger zone of orality unhurt; on the contrary, he fights desperately to master his childhood situation. He uses a specific technique—specific for him only—to overcome the deep disappointment experienced through his mother. Intrapsychically, he denies her existence and thus the possibility of being disappointed by her. He makes her superfluous by acting unconsciously her part as well as his own in the autarchic giving of words and the

autarchic receiving of words as accepted substitutes for earlier "gifts" (milk, love, attention). Obviously, strong narcissism is a prerequisite of his technique, as is the queer ability to transform voyeurism into exhibitionism, which depends somewhat on narcissism. The psychological part of "talent" is related to these peculiar mechanisms of reparation of traumatic fantasies or experiences. The latter half of the formulation: "The literary safe can be opened analytically; what will be found there, is another story", refers to the fact that the mechanism described as peculiar to writers may or may not be the leading mechanism; if it is not, the "writer" is not a real writer. Generally, it is, if a genuine sublimation can be developed.

Slogans are always dangerous and misleading. The slogan that the writer is objective and one of the highest representatives of his time or of the culture in which he lives is erroneous. Of course, writers often proclaim that slogan as a rationalization. But it is not even true that writers really believe their own claims to cultural prerogatives. On the contrary, they admit that something over which they have no conscious control compels them to write.

The writer is not objective, since he sees only through the spectacles of his neurosis—he is the infantile person having unconsciously only one aim in mind: to furnish his inner alibi. In his constant fight against his inner reproach of, for instance, psychic masochism, he produces pseudo-aggression as one of his alibis. Of course, if one does not share this point of view, one comes to the conclusion, often advanced, that the more aggressive the writer the better his work. In reality, the writer is not concerned with attacking for the sake of justice; he is concerned with attacking for the unconscious sake of attack. Imagine, for instance, a retreating military unit giving to a boy of three the task of destroying vital military installations. No reasonable person would expect that boy to select, very sensibly, the objects

to be destroyed. He would probably first dynamite the Kindergarten he hated. This is how the writer functions.

There is an indictment of writers that applies to writers of all countries and nearly all centuries and that, strangely enough, has never been voiced scientifically. Writers and poets have consistently, through the centuries, misrepresented the problem of love. Being incapable themselves of love because of their neurosis they have created an exaggerated image of romantic love, out of reach in real life but nevertheless the model for naive readers to measure reality. Oscar Wilde was right though in a sense different from that intended when he said: "Literature seldom imitates life with serious profit, but life imitates literature." Writers have produced their exaggerated picture of love, resulting in countless disappointments to those accepting it, simply to cover up their own inability to love. All that writers can achieve in love is unconsciously to have themselves masochistically ill-treated. Of course, they are unaware of this technique. But the standard of love they have created, idealizing their own fantasy as an unconscious alibi ("It is not true that I am incapable of love; real love is too small for me!") has had tragic consequences; not for the writers themselves, since they mistake their masochistic suffering about romantic love for real love, but for the millions of girls and boys everywhere who look for an authoritatively attested mirage. The reading public is very naive indeed, people relate with glee that a great writer is a drunkard and a homosexual, and yet regard as authentic his description of love. Unaware of the contradiction, they will firmly believe that a writer's picture of love is realistic, and at the same time enjoy gossip about the fact that this same writer had just been divorced for the fifth time.

Misrepresentation of *romantic* love is not the only "crime" of writers. They are guilty of misrepresenting love in exactly the opposite way as well. Many authors regard love as sexual promiscuity only. The cynical and sometimes brutal descriptions

of long series of nymphomaniac women and promiscuous men are as representative of reality as the choice of a color-blind person would be in a poster contest.

Love is neither intercourse performed without joy nor the incarnation of romantic fantasies. Every human being harbors the wish for "real" love, but many cannot achieve it because their specific neurosis interferes. The typical writer, being himself a neurotic and therefore incapable of love, is no more competent to describe love than a blind man is to describe colors. The argument often adduced that writers are specialists in the psychology of love because they themselves so often have a "hopeless, true love" for an unattainable woman is once more a misconception, based on the incorrect evaluation of a correct observation. Actually, such writers experience their wish to be refused under the disguise of unhappy love.

"Come, come," somebody will object in support of writers, "how about normal writers?" The attribute "normal" does not suit the writer; it constitutes a contradiction in itself such as hot snow, or humanitarian Nazi. I have never encountered a normal writer, neither in my office, nor in private life, nor in studying the life histories of writers. I doubt if anyone ever has met such a phenomenon as a "normal" writer. Normal people just do not feel impelled to write. There is some truth in Macaulay's remark: "Perhaps no person can be a poet . . . without a certain unsoundness of mind." In nearly twenty years of psychoanalytic practice I have seen a great number of neurotics, in my office and outside. I admit that the most depressed and pitiful lot has been that of writers. On this score, no other neurotic can beat them. The best proof that writers are irrational people, driven by their inner conflicts, is to be found in their poverty. True, some of them achieve fame and wealth; these make up at best one-thousandth of one per cent of all writers. The majority are poor, never achieve material success, are habitually misunderstood, struggle along, either scornfully making a poor living in some

tangential profession (journalism, copy writing in advertising concerns, teaching, clerking, and the like) or as lifelong parasites. Stendhal's utterance of a hundred years ago still holds true, that the greatest injustice done by Fate to the writer is not endowing him at birth with an independent income. And still, the true writer takes all this in his stride, not knowing, of course, that because of his unconscious wish to suffer, he chooses masochistically a poverty-stricken profession, in which he will achieve neither fame nor money, nor acknowledgment or esteem. A writer sacrifices unconsciously everything else to his defense mechanism—that is his *modus vivendi*.

PSYCHOANALYSIS IN LITERATURE AND ITS THERAPEUTIC VALUE

By CLARENCE P OBERNDORF, M D (New York)

No original writing can be either entirely subjective or objective and even strictly scientific writing, which is theoretically objective, is influenced by the author's subjective attitudes. In purely technical writing this subjectivity may be so slight that it can be detected only in the frequency with which the author chooses to express himself in the active or passive tense or in his use of the personal pronoun. In the fields of narrative, dramatic, fictional, or poetic composition the writer is in the possession of the medium of words through which he may unconsciously reflect his deepest emotions and the more freely he allows his pen to follow his fantasy the more apt he is to reveal unconsciously in his literary creations that which he has often painstakingly sought to conceal in his more deliberate expressions.

One of the purposes of psychoanalysis is to uncover unconscious drives which cause disturbing conflicts in patients. Therefore the practicing psychoanalyst necessarily devotes great attention to fantasies, dreams, diaries, pet phrases, and other unconscious verbal productions, such as slips of the tongue, in the course of his daily therapeutic sessions. Freud was the first to apply his own method originally introduced for the treatment of psychic disturbances, to the interpretation of literary productions, choosing for his subject *Delusion and Dream in W. Jensen's Gradiva* (1907). Later, in 1910, he undertook the analysis of the character of a man of extraordinary genius, Leonardo da Vinci, through a

study of his dreams and memories. Indeed, Freud's last book, *Moses and Monotheism*, written shortly before his death in London in 1939, in which he seeks to prove that Moses was an Egyptian, is an outstanding example of this type of delving into some of the enigmas of the past through the application of psychoanalysis.

The little group of analysts around Freud in Vienna in the first decade of this century faced violently hostile reactions from both psychiatrists and psychologists. They regarded as a corroboration of their science the discoveries of descriptions and interpretations of soul conflicts by writers the world over, so similar to those which they postulated as responsible for the mental difficulties of their patients.¹ Thus it soon became a pleasant recreation—a busman's holiday—for medical analysts to hunt for specimens among the writings of great authors that reflected Freud's theories and to undertake studies of famous personalities through the application of psychoanalytic criteria to their works and character traits. Both these types of investigation we may in turn interpret as the analyst's own escape from the challenge, worry and resistance of patients in clinical practice to academic analyses of persons long dead. These unconsulted characters can neither contradict his subjective deductions nor desert him in case they do not approve what he asserts—to which this excursion of the present writer is no exception.

Many of these character analyses are fascinating because it is always interesting and sometimes valuable to reappraise the work of minds that have moulded our culture at one time in the light of the standards of other times. Certainly such psychoanalytic studies are frequently more enlightening and plausible in their explanation of the paradoxes of character found in some of the most beloved authors and artists than had been possible with descriptive approaches used before the advent of psycho-

1. Ferenczi, Sándor: Anatole France als Analytiker, *Zsrbbl. Psa.* 1, 1911, p. 467

analysis. The range of these observations in the first volume of the first psychoanalytic periodical ever published² is astonishing, including significant excerpts from Bulwer Lytton's *A Strange Story*, Wagner's *Meistersinger*, Anatole France, and quotations from Nietzsche, Shakespeare and Schopenhauer illustrating elements in their thinking which, needless to say, preceded Freud's formulations. Similar reports have continued to appear in the foremost psychoanalytic journals up to the present time, most recent examples of which are Hitschmann's explanation of Samuel Johnson's contradictory characteristics,³ and the study of so circumscribed and incidental a pathological symptom as *déjà vu* in the works of Proust and Tolstoi.⁴

The most common formula in these analyses is to demonstrate or sometimes assume the existence of strong instinctual drives in the author and their fixations at various levels, such as the anal or oral, and to show how in his writing he reveals them either by overcompensation, by his unconscious choice of symbols, or occasionally by permitting them to break through in tender or violent passages.

On the other hand, as the psychoanalytic mechanisms and the theories of the unconscious gradually became more generally known throughout the world (after 1910), many writers deliberately or through their indirect assimilation of the subject introduced psychoanalytic concepts into their biographic, romantic, or detective stories to illuminate or explain the motives of their characters, or to serve as the bases for their plots. Because of the intentional, almost clinical nature of the introduction of these psychoanalytic mechanisms into the theme of the story they are seldom as convincing to the reader or as effective as when they appear as the unconscious manifestation of the writer's deeper feelings.

2. *Zürbl. Psa.*, 1-2, 1911.

3. Hitschmann, Edward: Samuel Johnson's Character. *Psa. Rev.*, 32, 1945.

4. Pickford, R. W. *Déjà Vu* in Proust and Tolstoi. *Int. J. Psa.*, 25, 1944, p. 152.

One analytic theory⁵ maintains that the writer under the pressure of unconscious guilt feelings gives expression in his writing to the defenses he has developed against his forbidden wishes and fantasies and that while writing is exhibitionistic, the primary tendencies in the writer are voyeuristic and the writing is a defense against deeply repressed voyeurism (early interest in sexual observation). Some studies in this field of the analysis of literature even attempt to place the type of writing on a particular pregenital level. For example, Brill⁶ states "that some poets do not advance much beyond the earliest and later oral phases", and he believes that in the case of the artist "the pre-oedipal phase has been the most significant one for his development".

From the earliest times man has recognized that in dreams he often found himself in situations about which he dared not allow himself to think in waking life or in possession of prized objectives which he had never hoped to attain. He has also been aware that fantasy has been an escape from the bitter hardships and stern demands of reality's daily needs. Thus, for example, a patient, a young woman of twenty-seven, suffering from feelings of unreality, reported the following dream:

She came rushing into a room where several of her friends were seated. Someone asked her why she had been running. She replied: "I am running because I am cold." Immediately thereafter her friend, Mary, came running into the room in a similar manner and again someone asked Mary the same question. She responded: "I am running away from my thoughts." In her dream my patient thought: "Why can't I tell the truth like Mary because I am really running away from my thoughts."

While still in the dream it also occurred to her that the whole idea of running away from thoughts must be her own

5. Bergler, Edmund. A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalysis of Writers. *Psy. Rev.*, 31, 1944, p. 70.

6. Brill, A. A.: Poetry as an Oral Outlet. *Psy. Rev.* 18, 1931.

because she had furnished Mary's answer in the dream. In this particular instance the dream tells the story of the patient's neurosis which consisted of a fear of insanity, inability to unbend in society, conscious indifference to men and awkwardness in their presence. She had entered psychoanalytic treatment with great reluctance and misgiving because she knew that eventually it would bring her to face certain thoughts which were deeply buried and which she had avoided and also to acknowledge the existence of certain physical reactions which she correctly surmised to be sexual. The dream reflects the method by which she tried to escape from these unwelcome manifestations but is also indicative of her unconscious wish now to meet them.

Sometimes the neurotic character traits that the analyst detects in the novels or the character of an author parallel closely those with which he is very familiar in his patients. Similarly these reactions, attitudes and preoccupations can be demonstrated to repeat themselves over and over again in books written years apart. Occasionally the writer unconsciously seems to be attempting to cure his neurotic conflicts by writing, as we sometimes find patients who either write or talk endlessly about them. In most cases, however, the attempt of the author to free himself of the neurosis by writing it out is unsuccessful. Possibly the feeling which occurs to many authors from time to time, that they have written themselves out, may be dependent upon the unconscious appreciation that relief from some personal neurotic conflict through their writing has not been satisfactory and therefore no incentive remains for them to continue their literary efforts.

Writing out or writing off by an author may equate itself with the confessional or cathartic elements of the clinical analytic procedure but such self-revelation as a rule does not suffice to relieve permanently the essential conflicts of the writer any more than it does the troubled mind of the neurotic patient. The cathartic material must be appraised by the interpretative comment of the analyst which eventually brings to the attention of the

Elizabeth.⁷ These latter form the basis of his feminine identifications and of many of his conflicts.

Hawthorne was of the clearest Puritan strain. One of his ancestors, William Hathorne, was among the harshest persecutors of those who ventured to disagree with the religious or political proscriptions of the Puritan colony at Salem. His grandfather, John Hathorne, made himself conspicuous by his zeal in persecuting witches, and Nathaniel in early boyhood took to himself the shame and guilt that he felt his forefathers should have endured for their cruelties in punishing every evidence of social and religious non-conformity and deviation, no matter how slight a sin it might be.

Hawthorne's father died in Surinam when the boy was four years old. He grew up with two older sisters in a dismal household where his mother after her husband's death seldom left her room until Hawthorne had grown to manhood. His was a solitary and forlorn childhood and as a very young man he became moody of temperament, very uneasy when in groups of people, with a reservation in his manner which prevented him from making friends. After his return from college at Bowdoin to the gloomy household in Salem, Hawthorne wrote that like his mother he was "surrounding himself with shadows which bewildered him and had drawn him aside from the beaten path of life" and "had made a captive of himself and put him in a dungeon".

The feeling of attachment to and rejection of his mother did not change from boyhood until her death some seven years after his marriage, when Hawthorne himself was forty-five. "A sort of coldness of intercourse existed between us such as is apt to come between persons of strong feelings if they are not managed rightly", he wrote in his notebook just before she died. But at her death-bed he found "tears gathering in his eyes and he

7. Mather, Edward: *Nathaniel Hawthorne, A Modest Man*. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1940, p. 47. Also (12) Morris, Lloyd who is psycho-analytically oriented.

sobbed".⁸ His withdrawal from life, so like his mother's, and his feeling of inadequacy to cope with reality were accompanied by almost continuous depression and feelings of guilt. He was given to punitive self-denials for minor self-indulgences, such as refusing to drink tea because he liked it, a characteristic so typical of neurotic patients.

When he was thirty-four, the determined Miss Elizabeth Peabody, who had known him from childhood, succeeded in overcoming his diffidence, dragged him away from his somber surroundings, and induced him to visit at the Peabody home. There he met her sister, Sophia, an invalid who like his mother had been confined to her room for years, and immediately fell in love with her. They married four years later despite the opposition of his older sister, Elizabeth, and after an engagement which he had felt necessary to conceal for several years from his mother. Sophia Peabody, like Hawthorne, was also a person of delicate sensitivity and their marriage, notwithstanding some financial stringency and severe illness, is considered to have been a singularly happy and tranquil one. However, in many respects it developed into a solitude and isolation *à deux*, comparable to the psychiatric situation known as a *folie à deux*, when two persons, closely related, develop the same pathological traits.

Perhaps the periods of his life when Hawthorne's despondency reached its depth were at the age of thirty-two when he thought seriously of suicide and again at forty-two shortly before he published *The Scarlet Letter*, and then after his return from Europe in 1860 until his death in 1864 at the age of fifty-nine. His wife as early as July 1861 had become greatly distressed and alarmed to see him "so apathetic, so indifferent, so hopeless, so unstrung". No organic disease has been established as the cause of his lingering final illness which had all the characteristics of his previous depressions.

8. Hawthorne, Julian: *Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife*. University Press, Cambridge, 1884, 1, p. 347.

It is not the primary purpose of this paper to interpret Hawthorne's life and writings psychoanalytically, though few authors provide a more tempting material and setting, but to show the inadequacy of his almost compulsive concern in his works with wrong-doing and moral guilt to alter his feelings of his own criminal responsibility. He possessed not only an extraordinary insight into the problems that beset him but he also sensed the psychological method by which they might be reached and solved. For example, in *The Scarlet Letter*, in several places, he has described accurately and vividly the approach made by old Dr. Roger Chillingworth in his attempt to cure the guilty minister's, Mr. Dimmesdale's, alarming physical illness. This is so anticipatory of the psychoanalytic method developed by Freud that a quotation seems worth while.

"Chillingworth scrutinized his patient carefully, both as he saw him in his ordinary life, keeping an accustomed pathway in the range of thoughts familiar to him, and as he appeared when thrown amidst other moral scenery, the novelty of which might call out something new to the surface of his character. He deemed it essential, it would seem, to know the man, before attempting to do him good. Wherever there is a heart and an intellect, the diseases of the physical frame are tinged with the peculiarities of these. In Arthur Dimmesdale, thought and imagination were so active, and sensibility so intense, that the bodily infirmity would be likely to have its groundwork there.

"So Roger Chillingworth—the man of skill, the kind and friendly physician—strove to go deep into his patient's bosom, delving among his principles, prying into his recollections, and probing everything with a cautious touch, like a treasure-seeker in a dark cavern. Few secrets escape an investigator, who has opportunity and license to undertake such a quest, and the skill to follow it up."

Hawthorne, however, like other neurotics, including those who today are fully acquainted with modern psychoanalytic methods, found them of little use in the psychological disturbances

from which he suffered and which he described so fully in his first literary efforts. Many psychoanalysts believe that the first dream that the patient reports after beginning treatment epitomizes his entire life's conflict. So, too, perhaps the earliest writings of an author are more apt to reflect those difficulties by which he is most troubled and with which he is most familiar.

In Hawthorne's case, we find an uncommonly frank, if romanticized, autobiographical picture in his immature and boyish novel, *Fanshawe*, which he published anonymously and at his own expense at the age of twenty-four. So mortified was he at its lack of success that he recalled all the copies he could lay his hands on and burned them. Possibly his discouragement and distress may also have been influenced by a sense of shame when he saw some of his own frustrations exposed in cold print, for Hawthorne relates that Fanshawe, from an early age "had spent years in solitary study, in conversation with the dead, while he scorned to mingle with the living world or to be actuated by any of its motives". Fanshawe, like his creator, also "deemed himself unconcerned, unconnected with the world's feelings".

Fanshawe dies at the end of the novel and of him Hawthorne says: "There were many who felt an interest in Fanshawe; but the influence of none could prevail upon him to lay aside the habits, mental and physical, by which he was bringing himself to the grave." The inscription which his fellow students selected for Fanshawe's tombstone was borrowed from the grave of Nathaniel Mather—"whom in his almost insane eagerness for knowledge Fanshawe resembled".

The theme of the consequences of withdrawal from reality and denial of emotion is found in many of Hawthorne's short stories but nowhere is it more dramatically pictured than in Ethan Brand, the bleak, mysterious, terribly lonely lime burner who sought and discovered The Unpardonable Sin. This is the sin of allowing the heart to wither and contract while the intellect develops at its expense.

Hawthorne continued to deal with the consciousness of sin and similar retributions for hundreds of pages and his greatest success, *The Scarlet Letter* (1849), is a pitiful tale of self-torture and expiation. And so, too, from his second popular novel, *The House of Seven Gables*, which immediately followed the timeless story of adultery in the Puritan colony, to the *Marble Faun* (1860), his last complete novel, the same morbid ruminations recur. In *The Blithedale Romance* (1852) he continues his lugubrious musings concerning retribution, and as pointed out by Ruth Morris⁹ "is still obsessed with guilt and expiation as if he had not written his earlier works". This comment seems to refute the main thesis of Morris' article that the author who "works from an emotional need heals himself through the process". Certainly Hawthorne, with his masses of unpublished material, with utter disregard for attuning his material to the tastes and demands of his public, is a striking example of a writer who benefited little through disclosing his fears and irresolution.

Some of Hawthorne's notebooks show simple attitudes and childlike traits but his untiring preoccupation with questions of conscience led a French critic, Monsieur Montegut,¹⁰ to remark: "This habit of seeing sin everywhere; this dusky gaze bent always upon a damned world, and a nature draped in mourning; these lonely conversations of the imagination with the conscience; this pitiless analysis resulting from a perpetual examination of one's self, all these elements of the Puritan character have passed into Mr. Hawthorne, or, to speak more justly, have filtered into him, through a long succession of generations."

To the above Henry James, sometimes regarded by literary critics as strongly influenced by Hawthorne's psychological analyses, comments as follows: "Hawthorne was all that Monsieur Montegut says minus the conviction. These things have been

9 Morris, Ruth: *The Novel as Catharsis*. *Psa. Rev.*, 31, p. 99.

10. James, Henry, Jr.: *Nathaniel Hawthorne*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1880, p. 60.

lodged in the mind of a man whose fancy had straightway begun to take liberties and play tricks with them." And yet subsequently James in commenting upon the character of Hilda in the *Marble Faun*, remarks:

"She had done no wrong, and yet wrong-doing has become a part of her experience, and she carries the weight of her detested knowledge upon her heart. Finding herself in St. Peter's, she enters a confessional, strenuous daughter of the Puritans as she is, and pours out her dark knowledge into the bosom of the church—then comes away with her conscience lightened, not a whit the less a Puritan than before."

Hawthorne's efforts to adapt himself to a realistic world seem to have been aided very little by his repeated descriptions, beginning with Fanshawe, of situations and figures involved in retreat from actualities. As late as 1856 he records with great detail and emotion a personal experience of *déjà vu* while in England. He had previously described this phenomenon in his fictional characters, both in *The Scarlet Letter* and *The House of Seven Gables* from which latter the following is quoted.

"He was evidently trying to grapple with the present scene, and bring it home to his mind with a more satisfactory distinctness. He desired to be certain, at least, that he was here, in the low-studded, cross-beamed parlor, and not in some other spot, which had stereotyped itself into his senses. But the effort was too great to be sustained with more than a fragmentary success. Continually, as we may express it, he faded away out of his place; or, in other words, his mind and consciousness took their departure, leaving his wasted, gray, and melancholy figure—a substantial emptiness, a material ghost—to occupy his seat at table."

In the *déjà vu* phenomenon the person still distinguishes fantasy from reality but it is also closely akin to the feeling of unreality and depersonalization. Most psychiatrists interpret these symptoms as an involuntary reaction which permits the person

escape from some actual situation which he feels himself unable to meet, and as closely associated with difficulties in thinking.¹¹

Hawthorne's wretched final four years, from fifty-five to fifty-nine, found him in a depressed state of mind which cannot be directly attributed to worry about the Civil War, or the unfavorable criticisms of his last books, or even the illness of his daughter, Una, to whom he was intensely attached. He suffered from "something preternatural" in his reluctance to begin to write although in financial need and frequently urged by his sympathetic friend and admiring publisher, Mr. Fields. He wrote: "I linger at the threshold, and have a perception of very disagreeable phantoms to be encountered if I enter," and seemed to be desperately weary of life and to wish to die.

The sensitive, self-critical Puritan, whose dreams and fantasy life were far more real to him than actualities, had perhaps partially attained the absolution he sought in his profuse and relentless confessional writing but it had not touched the source of his need for atonement. His unhappiness, his reserve, his isolation persisted notwithstanding the most propitious external circumstances after the age of thirty-four, namely, the love of a tender woman who adored and idolized him, parenthood to three children whom he cherished, and acclaim, somewhat late in life to be sure, by the most eminent literary men of his time as the first great novelist America had produced.

Yet, with all these blessings, when Hawthorne died on May 18, 1864, Ralph Waldo Emerson,¹² returning from the funeral which was attended by the notables of the Boston intellectual group, wrote in his journal: "Clarke in the church said that Hawthorne had shown a sympathy with the crime in our nature, and, like Jesus was the friend of sinners. I thought there was a tragic element in the event—in the painful solitude of the man,

11. Oberndorf, C. P.: Depersonalization in Relation to Erotization of Thought. *Int. J. Psa.*, 15, 1934, p. 27.

12. Morris, Lloyd: *The Rebellious Puritan*. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937, p. 361.

which, I suppose, could not longer be endured and he died of it. I have felt sure of him in his neighborhood and in his necessities of sympathy and intelligence—that I could well wait for time, his unwillingness and caprice, and might one day conquer his friendship.”

These lines are indeed reminiscent of the final words which Hawthorne had selected for his prototypic hero, Fanshawe, a quarter of a century before.

At the outset of this article I pointed out that most of the large number of psychoanalytic studies of the literary compositions of famous authors have sought to trace the libidinal drives reflecting the character of the author and their conversion into various sublimated interests. They stress unconscious symbolization and the consonance of the poet's productions with the experiences of psychiatric patients. These studies have not considered what effect, if any, such creative production and artistic efforts have had in altering the writer's underlying, poorly tolerated instinctual urges which so often have shown themselves in inebriety, drug addiction, debauchery, sexual perversions, compulsion neuroses or psychoses.

Taking Nathaniel Hawthorne's writings as a basis, I have attempted to demonstrate the general inadequacy of confessional writing, in his case as in others, to change his tyrannical conscience or to lessen his characterological difficulties. Just before his death he was still longing to write a "sunshiny book", but his legendary curses, his sinister phantoms and haunting ghosts continued to smoulder in the profundity of his exhausted mind until the end came to him gently in his sleep.

Part Five

HISTORY

THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL ROOTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM¹

By RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN, M.D. (New York)

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between psychoanalysis and history is complex. Some authors applied psychoanalytic method to the study of important personalities in history,² others to the study of the influence of certain personalities on historical developments.³ Still another application of psychoanalysis to history has been based on the implicit or explicit similarity between the development of the individual, and of the group, and even humanity. This method has been followed mainly by Freud and Theodor Reik, who have applied it particularly to the realm of the development of moral and religious ideas.⁴

Freud used the psychoanalytic method of reconstructing from

1. This article is part of a book that is being prepared by the author. The article was in print when *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*, ed. by Ernst Simmel, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1946, was published.

2. For instance, S. Freud: *Leonardo da Vinci*. Gesam. Schr. 9, Vienna, Int. Psa. Verlag, 1924; E. Kris: Ein geisteskranker Bildhauer, *Imago*, 19, 1933, pp. 385-411.

3. Cf. L. Jekels: Der Wendepunkt im Leben Napoleons I. *Imago*, 3, 1917; E. Bergler; *Talleyrand, Napoleon, Stendhal, Grabbe*. Vienna, Int. Psa. Verlag, 1935.

4. S. Freud: Totem and Taboo, in: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, New York, Modern Library, 1938. *Moses and Monotheism*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1939; Th. Reik: Dogma und Zwangsidee, *Imago*, 13, 1927; *Der eigene und der fremde Gott*, Int. Psa. Verlag, Wien, 1923. See also: R. de Saussure: Le Miracle Grec, *Rev. française de Psa.*, 10, No. 2, 1938; G. Róheim; *The Origin and Function of Culture*, Nerv. Ment. Dis. Publ. Co., 1944, F. Wittels: Psychoanalysis and History, *Psa. Quart.* 15, No. 1, 1946, p. 88; H. Hartmann: Psychoanalysis and Sociology in S. Lorand. *Psychoanalysis Today*, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1944, p. 326. H. Hartmann and E. Kris: The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis, *The Psa. Study of the Child*, I, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1945, p. 1.

observed data the forgotten past of an individual's life to approach the "forgotten" pre-historic past of humanity. In his book, *Moses and Monotheism*, he applied this method to the very subject with which we are dealing. This book, which contains many penetrating ideas about the nature of Christian anti-Jewish feeling, rehearses his earlier hypothesis of the father's murder by the primal horde.⁵ He applies this hypothesis to the relationship of the Jewish people to their leader, Moses, who, according to Freud, was killed by his followers. Guilt for this deed created in their descendants a peculiar submission to God. The Christians regard Jews as the murderers of Christ. According to Freud, by loving and deifying Jesus the Christians feel relieved of the guilt-feelings common to all mankind, which arise from death wishes against one's own father. Jews who refuse to recognize Christ as God appear to Christians as unrepentant parricides.

The assumption on which Freud bases his hypotheses—the hereditary transmission of memories of the remote past from one generation to the other—offers such great difficulties that we have tried to investigate further the question of anti-Semitism and to formulate hypotheses which are not necessarily based on this assumption. We are also distrustful of the parallels between the development of an individual and that of humanity.

1. PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPERIENCE

Before beginning the historical discussion of anti-Semitism, we shall give a brief resumé of its clinical aspects. Although the experience gained from the psychoanalysis of individual anti-Semites obviously cannot explain the whole problem of anti-Semitism, it does give us very valuable clues. Psychoanalysts who have dealt with this problem have stressed the fact that Christians consider Jews uncanny beings, mysterious and terrifying,⁶ because

5. *Loc cit.*

6. S. Freud; *Moses and Monotheism*; O. Fenichel: Psychoanalysis of Anti-Semitism, *Amer. Imago*, 1, No. 2, 1940.

they do not know their language, religion and customs, and because Jews are archaic representatives of a remote past. The fact that Jews are circumcised suggests to the unconscious even more terrifying characteristics. Jews are unconsciously likened to castrated, enfeebled and impotent men, or to females; at the same time exceptional sexual power or cruel perversions are attributed to them. This contradictory image of the Jew is shared not only by avowed anti-Semites but also by the majority of Gentiles who only occasionally have anti-Semitic reactions. In these, psychoanalysis sometimes permits an almost experimental study of the outbreak of anti-Jewish feelings and thoughts. In Gentiles with latent anti-Semitic feelings this anti-Jewish outbreak occurs mainly in transference situations when the analyst begins to represent a danger to the patient, e.g., when the patient begins to defend himself against undesirable and dreaded instinctual drives such as those connected with the oedipus complex, castration fear, unconscious homosexuality, and the like. At such times the analyst is imagined to be a threatening, castrating father, a cruel and dangerous pervert, and in the case of a Jewish analyst, these peculiarities are attributed to his Jewishness.

The psychological mechanisms on which observable anti-Semitic reactions are based are mainly the generalizations, rationalizations, displacements, projections, i.e., the disposition to treat the analyst as a scapegoat.⁷ The sources and motivation of anti-Semitic reactions are manifold and cannot all be discussed here. We must refrain from describing certain psychological types who have a greater proclivity to react with indiscriminate and generalized hostility against groups which are or seem foreign to them, and who, therefore, easily become anti-Semitic.

In certain rare cases among Catholics or Protestants who have had an intense religious life and consequently strong religious

⁷ Cf. J. F. Brown, *The Origin of the Anti-Semitic Attitude*, in *Jews in a Gentile World*, ed. by I. Graeber and S. H. Britt, New York, Macmillan Co., 1942. J. C. Flugel, *Man, Morals and Society*, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1945.

conflicts, we have observed a peculiar form of ambivalence toward Jews which seems to us particularly interesting and pertinent to our problem. The religious education of these people from their childhood has taught them the peculiar and important role that the Jews played in the origins of Christianity. The religious education of Christian children starts usually at an age that coincides with the passing of the oedipus complex and the formation of the superego. We know that neither of these processes, particularly not the latter one, is complete at the onset of the latency period. On the contrary, the superego has to be built and strengthened through moral teaching and education for many years. Religious education is among the foremost means of superego building and strengthening, both by building up a conscious ego ideal and by adding unconscious elements to the formation of the superego. In Christian religious teaching both the conscious and unconscious parts of the superego are erected on the son-father-relationship which historically is the relationship of Christ to the Jewish people. The patients to whom I refer are aware of the intimate relationship existing between the Jewish people and Christ. In this relationship the Jews are those who remained faithful to their Father-God and have refused to believe that Jesus was the Son of God. Thus they become identified unconsciously with the Father-God and with the father-image of the Christian child, who, in turn, identifies with Christ in the Christian sense. This is one sort of the ambivalence, i.e., of an unconscious mixture of attachment and hostility, toward the Jew. These Christians are aware of the peculiarly intimate, though contradictory relationship between Christ and His own people, the Jews. Although the Gospel charges the Jews with the death of Jesus and condemns them for this act, these Christians feel that this implies an acknowledgment of their responsibility in the formation of Christianity. They recognize that without the crucifixion Christianity would not have existed and they realize that the Jews are responsible for the moral and psychological advantage that Christians derive from the redemption of

their sins by Christ's sacrifice. The Christian child is thus taught that the Jews were not only necessary to Christianity but also play the role of the scapegoat in it. In this peculiar role which the Jews play in the history of Christianity as well as in the individual development of many Christian youngsters, equally connected with the son-father relationship, lies the other source of ambivalence, based both on indebtedness and deep resentment. We shall come back to the discussion of this fundamental aspect of the role of Jews in the Christian mind at the end of our essay. Let us here stress one other important peculiarity of this psychological relationship between the Jews, as represented in the Gospels, and Christianity: this relationship is, as we have seen, significant for the individual development of moral forces, it is significant culturally and also historically, and lies at an intersection of all three levels.

2. GROUP PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

There are many reasons for assuming that the anti-Semitism of a given individual is not only the result of his individual life, but that it must also be understood in terms of collective or social psychology.

Anti-Semitism, or anti-Jewish feeling, has various aspects. There are many gradations of anti-Semitism ranging from that of Gentiles who are indifferent to Jews, or even quite friendly with them, to that shown by fanatical haters of Jews who entertain "delusional" beliefs about them and even act criminally against them. There is at any rate a great number of latent, or potential anti-Semites whose anti-Jewish feelings may develop under special circumstances. The major symptom of this disturbance is aggression in its various shades, varying from irony or watchful distrust⁸ to violent hatred.

8. Cf. E. Kris: *Distrust and Social Change*, Paper read at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Assn., 1943, New York.

Anti-Jewish reactions have been compared to several mental diseases. "Judeo-phobia" has been described as one form of demono-phobia.⁹ Homburger-Erikson compared it to syphilo-phobia.¹⁰ Others have compared it to paranoia.¹¹ It must be borne in mind that although there may be some analogy between these diseases and certain forms of anti-Semitism, they are not identical. A man who can credit the disclosures in the famous forgery, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, is not to be hospitalized as a paranoiac. Although there are neurotics who are anti-Semites or whose anti-Semitism is one symptom of their neurosis, there are also anti-Semites, even violent ones, who are neither psychotic nor neurotic in the usual sense of the word. Although Nazis have committed the worst crimes against humanity, not all anti-Semites are necessarily criminals. Anti-Semitism is not a common neurosis or psychosis. It is a special form of a social mental disease the symptoms, dynamics and structure of which can be studied by psychoanalysis.

General and analytic experience shows that there are people with anti-Jewish feelings who have never met a Jew in their life but have been influenced by some derogatory remarks made by others. Those who have been exposed to Christian teaching in childhood have acquired a marked disposition toward that form of reaction. However, in most of these cases anti-Jewish reactions were determined not so much by this teaching but mainly by a sudden wave of anti-Semitism enveloping a group, a country, or even an entire continent like Europe.

3. POLITICAL MANIPULATION

Let us study the example of Nazi Germany, which is in

9. L. Pinsker: *Self-emancipation*. trans. by A. A. Finkelstein, London, E. W. Rabinowitz, 1891.

10. E. H. Erikson: Hitler's Imagery and German Youth. *Psychiatry*, 5, 1942, pp. 475-493.

11. Richard M. Brickner: *Is Germany Incurable?* Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943. R. de Saussure: *L'Inconnu chez Hitler*, Les Oeuvres nouvelles; New York, Ed. de la Maison Française, 1942.

some respects the most instructive one. There, many individuals who had hardly been anti-Semites before succumbed to an epidemic of anti-Semitism. The German anti-Semitism of the Hitler regime was evoked mainly by political manipulation which served several aims in defeated, weakened and divided Germany after 1918.¹²

1. The Nazis spread the myth that the Jews were responsible for the German defeat of 1918, in order to allow the Germans to believe that their invincible army had never suffered this reverse. German youth was thus rid of its humiliation and sense of inferiority. Its belief in the invincibility of the German army in the past and the certainty of its victory in the future was restored. In propagating this myth the Nazis stimulated German national vanity and prepared Germany for her role as a predatory nation.¹³

2. By the creation of this myth they tried to overcome the deep cleavages within the German people. National cohesion was artificially and temporarily increased by proclaiming one part of the nation non-German, Jewish, and making this group the "inner enemy". This "inner enemy" was then used to channel all aggressions within the nation.

3. Upon this Jewish "inner enemy", represented as both capitalist and also revolutionary communist, was concentrated the aggression of all groups. By persecuting the Jews, the upper and the middle classes hoped to exorcize the ghost of the dreaded revolution. They also rid themselves of competitors. To the working classes the Nazis proclaimed that they had at last freed them of their exploiters. They had directed upon the Jews the workers' pre-existing aggressions against all capitalists.

4. By pretending that this internal enemy had plotted

12. John Dollard, et al: *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1945.

13. Cf. E. H. Erikson: *op. cit.*; Franz Neumann: *Leviathan*, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1942; Henri Rollin: *L'Apocalypse de notre temps*, Paris, Gallimard, 1938.

with both foreign plutocrats and communists to enslave Germany, the Nazis roused the hatred of all Germany which at that time was not yet daring and strong enough to attack foreign countries.

5. Through their anti-Semitic propaganda in foreign countries they acquired sympathizers there. By spreading the lie that there was a mysterious international organization of Jews whose alleged aim was the enslavement of the Christian world and which was responsible for insecurity, social and economic upheavals and the threat of revolution and wars, the Nazis aroused on all sides the hope that all the pressing problems of modern times would be solved by persecuting and exterminating the Jews. The anti-Jewish feelings of anti-Semites in all countries became a powerful link of identification with Nazi Germany. Once such an identification has been established, others follow readily. Nazi Germany could then easily become an object of admiration as the heroic defender of civilization against the alleged universal onslaught of the Jews. So the anti-Semitic sympathizers in other countries became potential or actual Fifth Columnists.

6. The methods ascribed to the alleged Elders of Zion resemble so much the methods deliberately used by the Nazis that we are bound to see in the propagation of this myth the projection of their own intentions.¹⁴ The obvious aim was two-fold: (1) to allay the possible suspicion of the outside world, and (2) to reassure Germans whose fear and guilt might have been aroused by a premature disclosure of Nazi plans.

7. The "inner enemy" of the people became an inner enemy within every individual member of it. Thus the Jew assumed for anti-Semites a diabolical character to whom all "the vices, sins and evil desires" that man struggles against were attributed. For his alleged responsibility for every mishap, failure and disappointment he must be severely punished.

14. Fritz Moellenhoff: A Projection Returns and Materializes. *Amer. Imago*, 3, No. 3, 1942.

8.* However, for the Nazis and also for most other anti-Semites the role of the Jew was and still is yet more complicated. He represented not only the diabolical inner enemy, but also the defenseless whipping boy, the scapegoat, against whom the oppressors could release their pent-up aggressive impulses and guilt feelings. They sensed also in the Jew the critical mind and moral force that withstands brute force, the conscience that might prevent the German from becoming Hitler's perfect Nazi: the human machine without scruple or morality. The Jew represented that other inner enemy, the conscience embodied in Israel as well as in Christianity.¹⁵

The remarkable fact is that the Nazis and other anti-Semites attributed to the Jews such disparate and contradictory characteristics. Sometimes they saw them as powerful and redoubtable, at other times weak and contemptible; sometimes foreign, at others so close and indistinguishable that special biological measures had to be taken to try to distinguish them; now the personification of evil, of Satan; now the representatives of conscience and morality.

The Jews had been the Chosen People. For the Gentiles they became a tabooed people, formidable, disquieting, impure, sacred but not holy, and involved in all the conflicts that the human ego has to face.¹⁶

a) In the conflict of the ego with outer reality: the Jews are considered either as powerful and formidable or as weak and contemptible.

b) In the conflict of the ego with the id: the Jews are cursed of God, representing evil and rebelliousness,¹⁷ i.e., the aggressive and sexual drives against which man has to struggle.

c) In the conflict between ego and superego: the Jews

15 S Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*, H de Kerillis: *Français voici la vérité*; 1942 J Maritain: *Christianisme et Démocratie*, New York, Editions de la Maison Française, 1943.

16. I owe this valuable theoretical formulation to Dr Heinz Hartmann.

17. Cf. O. Fenichel, *loc.cit* S. Tarachow: *A Note on Antisemitism, Psychiatry*, May, 1946.

believe in a severe though just God to whom they remain faithful in spite of all persecutions and tortures. Christians are unconsciously jealous of their claim of being the chosen of God.¹⁸ Their historical identity with the people of the Bible, with the prophets, their intimate connection with the events described in the Gospels and with Christ himself naturally associate them with the conscience, the superego.

This strange psychological situation obviously cannot be explained merely by the psychology of individual anti-Semites in their attitude toward individual Jews. To an anti-Semite Jews are not real people but a kind of myth,¹⁹ embodying certain traits of character. They betrayed and crucified Jesus; they are Evil; they are Money; they are the enemies of Christian civilization, all of them condemned like the Wandering Jew, cursed by God, and so on.

This explains the curious fact that so many of the most violent anti-Semites have personal friends who are Jews and whom they consider "the nicest people in the world". In the anti-Semitic mind "the Jew" is an abstract, mysterious unity, a mythological figure. How this myth has come to exist, how the reality of the Jewish people has interfered with or is involved in the formation of this mythological figure will be discussed in the following.

4. THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SEMITISM

Historians and sociologists have offered diverse explanations of anti-Semitism. One, political manipulation, has already been discussed. But the prerequisite for such political manipulation to be possible and even successful is an underlying anti-Jewish reaction whether overt or potential. The explanations for this underlying anti-Semitism can be classified under the three heads: xenophobia, economic factors, religious reasons. These three

18. See Freud: *Moses and Monotheism*.

19. See Marie Bonaparte: *Les Mythes de Guerre*, Imago Publ. Co., London 1946.

factors, usually operate simultaneously, that is to say, anti-Semitism is over-determined. We describe them separately for the purpose of clear exposition, because frequently one of them is more conspicuous than the others.

*Xenophobia*²⁰

Xenophobia, or the hatred and fear of foreigners, is a common phenomenon. Racial, national, religious or cultural minorities easily become targets for the contempt, suspicion or hostility of the majority.

The threshold of tolerance of a majority toward a minority group varies from one group to another and within a given group at different times. The more highly certain collective ideals are valued, the more vigorously are deviations from them opposed. A group in which religious belief as a collective ideal has a strong emotional value will react with hostility to differences in the religious beliefs of a minority group. We must add that this is especially true of monotheistic religions.

In groups in which racial pride plays a significant role, certain so-called racial differences, such as color, are apt to provoke contempt and hostility.

In a group whose national independence is in danger, the allegiance to the nation's interest prevails over all other ideals and alternative interests are considered hostile or treasonous.

The attitude of a majority to a minority, its threshold of tolerance, obviously depends on many other factors also. The requisites for citizenship in nations vary greatly. They may be pseudo-biological, historical, cultural or political. With certain exceptions the general rule is that anti-Semitism is intensified during periods of economic and political crisis or after a military defeat. This does not mean that these sociological factors necessarily lead to anti-Semitism but they may do so. To formulate

20. Cf. Bernard Lazare: *Antisemitism*. English translation, New York, The Intern. Library Publishing Co., 1903.

more generally: the likelihood of anti-Semitic reactions within a group increases under circumstances that evoke or intensify the pent-up aggressive impulses within that group, e.g., general dissatisfaction or a sense of insecurity on grounds of economic instability which increases aggression.

The hatred of a minority group, like the Jews, is frequently offset by factors belonging to another collective ideal which permits identification with the Jews. Hostility due to religious differences might be counterbalanced by the presence of another hated group, or by a feeling of national solidarity and is in fact very frequently kept in check by the ideal of human solidarity.

The attitude of a group toward minorities depends to a certain extent on its own characteristics, e.g., its numerical, economical and political importance within a larger whole and its attitude toward the latter. And these factors show that there are two fundamentally different types of minority groups, those who arouse contempt and hostility because they are considered inferior; and those to whom the majority feels inferior and, whom therefore, it admires and imitates. Among the latter are the governing, aristocratic and wealthy classes of a nation, or, in a country like the United States, the descendants of the oldest families settled in the country. To this type of minority group Jews do not usually belong. An inferior minority group which is ready to be assimilated may provoke contempt but not hatred; but the group which consistently maintains a certain distinctiveness while at the same time trying to overcome quickly the barriers set up by the majority against too easy assimilation may stir up violent hostility. This hostility may also arise as a result of the minority's attitude toward the majority. Thus the Jews' insistence on a certain aloofness combined with their distrust and fear of the Gentiles has increased the latter's hostility against them.

Among the many kinds of minorities, Jews belong to a

special type which Toynbee calls "fossils" or remnants of extinct societies. Along with the Monophysite and Nestorian Christians and the Parsees, Jews are "fossils of Syriac civilization". According to Toynbee, having survived in Western civilization, they have become one of the "penalized minorities," like the Levantines, Phanaritos and Armenians.²¹ Unlike the others, they are the minority "par excellence" because until recently they have not had a parcel of ground to call their own. On the other hand, they are not merely fossils, since they have made and still make major contributions to Western civilization. In the eyes of the Christian world, however, they are a people cursed by God and condemned to wander among the nations until the end of time.

They have been considered by the surrounding people, and frequently consider themselves, as a special race and lately as an inferior race. History and anthropology prove beyond any doubt that they are no "race" at all.

Intermarriage, though forbidden, always existed in Palestine.²² In the second century B.C. the reconquest of a relatively large land by the kings of the Hasmonaeen dynasty coupled with obligatory or voluntary conversion to Judaism, obviously brought into Palestinian Jewry populations of the most varied racial stock. Later on, between the first century B.C. and the end of the first century A.D. the Jewish population of the world amounted to seven or eight million, from which only one to one-and-a-half million lived in Palestine proper. "As a result of the stupendous expansion every tenth Roman was a Jew. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of Jews lived east of Italy, that part of the Empire . . . had almost 20 per cent of Jews."²³ This extraordinary expansion of Judaism was obviously

21. Arnold J. Toynbee: *A Study of History*. London, Oxford University Press Vols. 1-3, 1933; Vols. 4-6, 1939, Vol. 2, p. 236.

22. Cf. E. Renan: *Discours et conférences*. Paris, C. Levy, 1882.

23. Salom. W. Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1937. 3 Vols.; Vol. 2, p. 133.

due not only to emigration abroad of Palestinian Jewry but, to a considerable extent, it resulted from the conversion to Judaism of the various populations composing the Roman Empire, owing to the extraordinary attraction that the Jewish religion exerted on the pagans. After the crushing of Bar-Kocheba's revolt in 135 A.D., severe limitations were imposed on Jewish proselytism and intermarriage. Since then one can assume that the influx of foreign people into the Jewish community must have been reduced to relatively few. These historical facts explain why anthropologists agree in stating that the present-day Jews are the result of a mixture of different racial stocks: Mediterranean, Alpine, so-called Nordic, Central-Asiatic, Iranian. The famous Jewish nose, which anti-Semites consider a typical Jewish feature, is apparently foreign to the Palestinian Jew and is due to the admixture of foreign peoples, most likely the Hittites. The only thing that can be said with an approximate degree of certainty is that the degree of genetic continuity between the ancient Palestinians of Jewish faith and modern Jews is relatively higher than that of the non-Jewish Europeans but it is impossible to estimate this difference.²⁴

There is as little racial purity as there is racial unity among modern Jews. Indeed, in every country in which they live, they present certain characteristics taken over from the Gentile population. Nevertheless, in spite of differences, Jews present frequently, although not always, certain traits, mannerisms, gestures and expressions that often make them recognizable as such. It is certain that many of these peculiarities are culturally determined and transmitted from one generation to the other through the identification of the child with its parents. These

24. Cf. S. W. Baron: *op. cit.*; E. Renan: *op. cit.*; R. B. Dixon: *The Racial History of Man*, New York, London, Ch. Scribner's Sons, 1923; E. A. Hooton: *The Twilight of Man*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939; Melville Jacobs: *Jewish Blood and Culture*, in: *Jews in a Gentile World*; C. S. Coon: *Have the Jews a Racial Identity?* in: *Jews in a Gentile World*, J. Graeber and S. H. Britt, Editors, New York, The Macmillan Co 1942; J. Pittard, *Les Races et L'Histoire*, Paris, La Renaissance du Livre, 1930.

distinctive features, however, combined with a religious and cultural aloofness arouse anti-Semitic reactions based on xenophobia.

Certain authors reduce all anti-Semitism to hatred of the foreigner, and point to its existence as early as in antiquity. Obviously hostility of any kind of group against another involves some sense of strangeness. Anti-Semitism in classical antiquity was derived from xenophobia, but anti-Semitism in the Hellenistic world was the expression of rivalry between two cultures in equal competition. It was manifest in Greece and Alexandria as well as in Palestine where the Greeks were in the minority. Cultural rivalry was the stronger since Hellenized Jews did not hesitate to proclaim their moral and religious superiority over Gentiles, and indeed as we have just seen, great numbers of Greeks were attracted to Judaism.

No serious restrictive measures against Jews in Rome were set up during the Judaian campaign that ended in 70 A.D. with the destruction of the second Temple. They started only after 135 A.D., because the revolt of the Jews against Roman domination involved Jewish communities in many parts of the Empire even outside Palestine. But this classical anti-Semitism has little in common with that special mixture of pathological hatred, fear and contempt displayed by the Christian world, against the penalized minority, the Jews, cursed to "wander among nations".

The position of the Jews as a penalized minority deteriorated gradually in the early Middle Ages, after Christianity had become the state religion of the Roman Empire. From then on, the economic and social activities of the Jews were progressively limited. It became decidedly worse after the destruction of the Roman empire and during the Dark Ages, when Jews lost their status as citizens of the Roman Empire and became the personal property of clerical and lay sovereigns. Citizenship in the nations

forming in the ninth century was accorded only to a Christian.²⁵ Only from then on can one speak of Jews as foreigners in the modern sense of the word.

Until the American and French Revolutions placed the concept of nations above religious and ethnic differences, the Jews were the only non-Christians tolerated on Christian soil, but lived like pariahs in ghettos, periodically subject to wholesale massacres, plunder and expulsion from one country to another.

The fate of the Jews and their legal status gradually improved at the end of the eighteenth century, first in Austria, then in America and France after the revolutions, finally in most of Europe after Napoleon's conquests had forced democratic ideologies and constitutions upon the reactionary European countries. Their legal and moral emancipation from the ghetto seemed possible and impending. The only countries in which there was a lag in this movement were reactionary states like Tsarist Russia, Rumania, Prussia and Poland.

From the point of view of Jewish emancipation and genuine equality the period of Enlightenment was a failure. A violent backfire, Nazi anti-Semitism with its mass slaughter of Jews, has strengthened the impression in many Jews and Gentiles alike that the assimilation of Jews into Western civilization is, if not impossible, at least very difficult.

Indeed, nationalism—that unfortunate outgrowth of the concept of sovereign nationality, created by the two great revolutions—appears to be an important source of modern anti-Semitism; the latter, a social disease, apparently was engendered by the concomitant of nationalism, xenophobia.

An exaggerated nationalism, which is not to be confused with patriotism, creates group reactions analogous to those described by Freud. The same unconscious libidinal ties exist in

25. James W. Parkes: *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*. London, The Soncino Press, 1934.

both nations or otherwise organized masses. The violent hostility that develops in nations against other nations corresponds to the hatred directed against those groups and individuals that are conceived of as "inner enemy". As we know, the aggressive forces directed against this inner enemy had been re-directed from enmity existing between individuals of the national group. One might even assume that such exaggerated nationalism serves to overcompensate intense aggression within nations. In modern times these aggressive trends stem from numerous serious economic, social and political conflicts.

Thus xenophobia, the counterpart of nationalism, easily leads to one of its symptoms—anti-Semitism. It starts with a certain distrustful watchfulness, a Jew-consciousness. These initial symptoms can be intensified and spread only by manipulation on the part of powerful organizations or of a government. The peculiar aspect of Nazi anti-Semitism is that it was cold-bloodedly and systematically organized and executed and lacked almost completely any spontaneous outbreaks of so-called popular violence.²⁶ However, as a consequence of Nazi propaganda, a certain distrustful Jew-consciousness has developed even in those nations that suffered so terribly in the last few years, and although they most courageously opposed Nazism.

For Jews the inevitable result of anti-Semitism is to render them also Jew-conscious, i.e., self-conscious. The ties of identification they had formed with fellow citizens are loosened and those with fellow-Jews strengthened. By being kept apart their peculiarities increase and become more conspicuous. Jews like other excluded minorities become nationalistic, sometimes even super-nationalistic. This, in turn, tends to fortify and increase xenophobia in the majority group and creates a vicious circle that is difficult to break.

The peculiarity of Jews as foreigners is that they live in so many countries and have none of their own and that they

26. Cf H Hartmann On Rational and Irrational Action, *this volume*, p. 359.

are traditionally considered aliens "par excellence", condemned to wander because of their alleged sins. Moreover, the fear of being rejected and persecuted once more keeps them aloof, and the memory of unjust accusations and discriminations prevents them through feelings of guilt and moral courage, from abandoning completely the endangered and despised group to which they belong.

Xenophobia is not the only root of modern anti-Semitism. It plays an obvious part in it, but the myth of the Jew has still other sources.

The Economic Factor

The economic sources of anti-Semitism have been stressed by many sociologists. Four kinds of economic anti-Semitism can be distinguished:

1) The hatred and envy always engendered by competition in any kind of professional endeavor, especially in the field of economic competition.

2) The resentment of individuals or of groups dominated or exploited by means of economic power against those who possess it.

3) The political manipulation by governments or competitors of the resentment of the working classes against a group such as the Jews, by means of which the latter are represented as the only capitalists and exploiters.

4) The conscious or unconscious ambivalence against the possession of money involving envy, admiration, contempt, fear and hatred.

The identification of Jews with the possession of money has led to the notion that Jews are not only the leading capitalists but the inventors of capitalism.²⁷ This identification between capitalism and Jews has contributed to the delusional form of modern anti-Semitism.

27. W. Sombart. *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*. London: T. F. Unwin, 1913

All through the period of classical antiquity commerce lay mainly in the hands of Phoenicians and Greeks and in the first centuries of our era the Jews were not considered even by their enemies as being in any way different from others in the economic field.²⁸ They engaged in all professions. They were soldiers, sailors, farmers, craftsmen, land owners and merchants. Even religious teachers had some kind of profession that permitted them to earn their livelihood by manual work. Although very wealthy Jews were known, the great majority belonged to classes that nowadays would be designated as working or lower middle classes.²⁹

Economic rivalry between Jews and Greeks obviously existed but the competition was normal. Abnormal economic anti-Semitism emerged first in the Middle Ages when the economic status of the Jews became abnormal.

The war against Rome, 66-70 A.D., was a turning point in the economic activities of Jews. Through the impoverishment of Palestine, the loss of several hundred thousand able-bodied Jews, and an increase of emigration either to Mesopotamia or to the west, later under persecution, the Jewish population of Palestine practically ceased to exist by 500 A.D. This development led to a shift in the distribution of economic activities of the Jews in Europe. The shift can be described as a sharp decline in the number of Jewish farmers and a movement toward city trade. The reasons for the abandonment of farming can be explained on purely economic ground, such as the scarcity of available land in foreign countries. Nevertheless, powerful psychological reasons must have contributed to it. Aside from the need to live in compact communities for reasons of religion and security there was the unconscious relationship of men to their soil, their land, that must have played a predominant role also among Jews. One can deduce this from the enthusiasm and

28. J. Parkes, *loc. cit.*

29. Baron, *loc. cit.*

skill with which the young Palestinians threw themselves into agriculture after centuries of urban life; that is because they have re-established the deep psychological link between man and his land.

Up to the ninth century this occupational change was gradual. In pre-Carolingian France, for instance, there were Jewish farmers, landowners, famous doctors and scholars, craftsmen as well as merchants. A sharp turn occurred in the ninth and tenth centuries when, in becoming the personal property of the princes they were gradually "forced to enrich themselves".³⁰ All activities were forbidden them except certain forms of commerce, tax collection and money lending, the only banking activities then known. Lending money on interest was forbidden to Christians by the Church; but although this religious prohibition was taken over from the Jews, it was not applied to them. The rabbis had to reconsider whether Scripture forbade them from dealing with Gentiles. They decided that money might be lent to Gentiles, and thus Jewish economic life survived. During a short period of the Middle Ages, Jews became the main money lenders, but by no means the only ones. They were able to perform this vital function in the economic development of Europe because at that time they were the only group possessing the necessary equipment: the Talmud contained a complete code of laws on economic and commercial matters reflecting the semi-capitalistic society in the Roman Empire.³¹ The Jews were also an economic link between semi-barbaric Europe and the highly civilized Arabic Empire. This financially predominant position, however, did not last long as they were soon outdone by Christian usurers, mainly Italians, namely the Lombards. At the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century the Jews were expelled from England and France, and deprived of their property. In their Ghettos they played only a minor

30. E. Renan: *loc. cit.*

31. Baron, *loc. cit.*

economic role, except in Poland where they were invited to immigrate in order to advance commerce. Here, for a long time, they remained the only middle class. Nevertheless, since the Middle Ages, the Jews have been identified with usurers so that Christian usurers were called Christian Jews, and the word "Jew" has become a commonly used term for usury, greediness, cheating and extortion. Even now this identification of Jews with money is made by many Gentiles, consciously or unconsciously. Economic anti-Semitism in recent times has been ascribed to the rapid rise, in the nineteenth century, of many Jews to powerful positions in banking, commerce and industry. This curve reached its peak in the 1880's and since then has fallen.³² Anti-Semitism based on economic factors has taken various forms in different countries. In Tsarist Russia, for instance, it was encouraged in order to divert the pent-up aggressions of the people from the government to the supposedly powerful Jews, thus satisfying both the revolt against and the obedience to authority.³³ As frequently happens, the aggression of the Russian anti-Semites was released not against the powerful and rich but against the poor and helpless Jews who were in the overwhelming majority. In Poland, it was the competition of the rising Polish middle classes against the remnants of the previous middle class of Jews, now impoverished and powerless. The economic crisis through which Eastern Europe has passed since 1918 has been an important factor in this movement.³⁴

We have already seen the role of economic factors in Nazi anti-Semitism, which exhibited patterns and images that had originated in the Middle Ages and in the nineteenth century, and added to it its own pseudo-biological racial slant.

The importance of the economic factors in anti-Semitism is undoubtedly very great, and cannot be stressed sufficiently.

32. Baron: *loc. cit.*

33. O. Fenichel: *loc. cit.*

34. Anatole Muhlstein: Quo Vadis, Israel? *Renaissance*, 2 and 3, 1944-45, New York, 1945, pp. 224-258.

Money has a peculiar faculty of arousing human aggression. Man's attitude toward wealth is very ambivalent. In this field the cultural lag between the obvious importance of economic factors in modern life and the remnants of feudal ideologies in the psychological attitude of man toward money comes to the fore. The attitude is more pronounced in Europe than in North America and has existed there in capitalistic and in non-capitalistic social structures. The mixture of contempt and admiration for money and for men who possess it, a remnant of feudal ideology, makes people project their own interest in it onto an alien group—the Jews. In the United States where, for historical reasons, such an hypocritical attitude toward money is less prevalent, the Jew is reproached only for one aspect of financial usage, sharp practice.

Economic factors are fundamentally important in the realm of group psychology. We shall discuss here only one of its manifestations: the obvious and intimate connection between economic factors and group aggression, of which anti-Semitism is only one example. This relationship can be described psychologically in the following manner: Money is intimately connected with aggression because in the unconscious it takes over the value feces had in early childhood, that is to say, the role of both the precious and the despicable, dirty object, and also that of a powerful means of expressing aggression stemming from the anal-sadistic stage in the development of the child.

But there seems to be an even more general relationship between economic factors and aggressions.³⁵ The former ones are obvious manifestations of the drive for self-preservation; however, the latter, too, in our opinion, originate in the same drives.³⁶ It is well known that aggression appears regularly as a consequence of frustration or threat. This same reaction ap-

35. Cf. R. M. Loewenstein, The So-called Vital or Somatic Drives *Int. J. Psch.*, 1940

36. *Ibid.* Cf. also E. Simmel, Self-preservation and the Death Instinct. *Psychiat. Quart.*, 13, 1944, pp. 160-185.

pears, also when the individual is threatened with deprivation of property. Indeed, property is unconsciously identified with the self, as a kind of extension of the self. Thus everything owned: land, house, money, and the like, psychologically is a part of a person. Any situation in which this extended self is threatened creates powerful and immediate aggressive reactions.

The average human being is completely ignorant of the laws governing economics. He feels helpless when some unforeseeable circumstances threaten his economic security, or certain conditions keep him in a hopeless situation of economic dependence. It is unavoidable that he reacts violently against those who have been traditionally considered the authors or exploiters of human misery, the Jews—however opposite to reality this belief may be.

Religious Anti-Semitism

1) Christian Anti-Semitism

Many authors have claimed that religious motifs have been a primary cause of anti-Semitism. Parkes, a modern historian of anti-Semitism, rightly maintains that its pathological aspect cannot be satisfactorily explained until its historical roots have been traced. In his remarkable study, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*, he establishes the fact that all later forms of anti-Semitism can be found in patristic literature. The Fathers of the Church have in fact anticipated the theological notions of the Jew which have survived to the present. In order to understand this, we must go back to the origins of Christianity and its separation from Judaism, its mother religion.

The history of this split is very complicated and we cannot describe it here. Let us, however, recall certain salient facts. The ethical teachings of Jesus are almost identical with the ethical principles of the Pharisees as found, for instance, in the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs* (around 100 B.C.), and in the ethical maxims of the *Talmud* (Pirque Aboth). Even the

teachings of Saul of Tarsus, i.e., the Apostle Paul, are deeply influenced by the *Testament* just mentioned as well as by other Pharisaic concepts.³⁷ Though St. Paul lays down the principles and bases for the ultimate separation of the two religions, his loyalty to Judaism laid the foundations of that peculiar ambivalent attachment that Christianity has since then always displayed toward Judaism.

The turning point in Jewish and Christian history seems to have been the war against Rome, 66-70 A.D.

"The rise of Christianity and its separation from Judaism, as well as the destruction of the Second Temple which greatly facilitated it, checked the great expansion of the Jewish people. One of the most remarkable movements of all time thus came to an abrupt end. Precisely when Judaism seemed to be nearing the goal of its history—the reconciliation of its national and universalist ideologies, . . . it suffered a sudden reverse."³⁸

The Jews of the Christian sect outside of Palestine were mainly Hellenized Jews, whose national ties with Palestine were looser than of those with predominantly Palestinian culture. The destruction of the Temple loosened even more the national ties and strengthened the universalistic tendencies of the young Christendom. We shall not go into the theories that attempt an explanation of this split. But one has to mention, aside from the conflict between the ethnical and national cohesion on the one hand and the universalist tendencies on the other, the conflict between the Orient and the Greco-Roman world, for the Church was a compromise between or a synthesis of both. One has also to mention the theory according to which Christianity represented

37. Cf. Charles Guignbert *Le Monde Juif vers le Temps de Jesus* Paris, La Renaissance du Livre, 1935; Joseph Klausner: *Jesus of Nazareth*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1925; J. Parkes: *loc. cit.*; S. W. Baron: *loc. cit.*; R. H. Charles, editor: *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English*; in Bertrand Russell: *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945.

38. Baron: *loc. cit.*, I, p. 240.

the revolt of the proletariat against the Jewish upper and middle classes.³⁹ However pertinent these theories may be, a psychologically important fact has been stressed, namely, the fact that Christianity is the religion of the Son taking over part of the divine prerogatives of the Jewish Father-God.⁴⁰

We shall come back later to the discussion of this factor which is so fundamentally important in the explanation of anti-Semitism. The rift between Judaism and Christianity occurred in the second century. It was only then that the New Testament had been rewritten in an outspokenly anti-Jewish trend.⁴¹ The writings of the Fathers of the Church had the same tendency. Since the Old Testament was a Jewish book, since Moses, the Prophets and the Apostles were Jews, since even Jesus and the Virgin Mary were Jews of pure Jewish race, the Fathers of the Church had to establish that the new religion had superseded the old, that the "true Israel" had superseded the old one. They achieved it by re-interpreting the Scriptures in such a way as to attribute all the unfavorable passages to the Jews and all the positive passages to the Christian Church before the Incarnation.⁴² In order to enable the new religion to become independent from Judaism, they had to describe the Jews as a people cursed of God, having betrayed God and finally having been rejected by him. Soon also the Jews were described as responsible for Jesus' death and were considered the murderers of Christ. However, the theoretical hostility of the Christian theologians was put into practice only after Christianity had become the official religion of the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, the Jews, for centuries, remained protected by law. In fact, the Fathers of the Church displayed in their writings not only hostility but

39. E. Fromm: *Die Entwicklung des Christus Dogmas, Imago*, 16, 1930, pp. 305ff.

40. Cf. S. Freud: *Totem and Taboo*. Th. Reik: *Der eigene und der fremde Gott*.

41. Cf. Baron: *loc. cit.* Parkes: *loc. cit.*

42. Parkes: *loc. cit.*, p. 379.

also that attitude of tolerance, specifically toward the Jews, that later on made it possible for the latter to survive in Europe.⁴³

In the Middle Ages the Church found that, in its quest for the spiritual unification of Europe, it was opposed by a small community of Jews "stubbornly clinging to their beliefs". The Church mercilessly persecuted numerous heretical sects which were wiped out. The Jews were also persecuted, humiliated, robbed and expatriated; but they were killed only by mobs under the leadership of individual ecclesiastics. The Popes, however, even the most anti-Semitic ones, like Innocent III in the thirteenth century, while encouraging the oppression of the Jews, protected them from total destruction.

Innocent III and his successors applied principles laid down by Pope Gregory the Great in the sixth century for dealing with the Jews. Jews should be oppressed by Christians but protected by law. According to Innocent III, the theological position of the Jews in the Christian world was thus defined:

"The Jews' guilt of the crucifixion of Jesus consigned them to perpetual servitude, and, like Cain, they are to be wanderers and fugitives. . . . the Jews will not dare to raise their neck, bowed under the yoke of perpetual slavery against the reverence of the Christian faith."

Since Gregory the Great, however, it was forbidden to baptize them by force. The Jews were considered by the Church as living witnesses to the truth of the story of Jesus; the Jews were the guardians of the Scriptures, Jesus had demanded that their conversion be awaited patiently; there was a prophesy which must be accepted as a command that a remnant of them will be saved; and that, according to Saint Paul, the second coming of Christ depended on the conversion of the Jews to Christianity.⁴⁴ These theological reasons that the Popes of the

43. Parkes: *loc cit.*

44. Solomon Grayzel: *The Church and the Jews in the 13th Century*, Philadelphia, The Dropsie College, 1933; Joseph Klausner: *From Jesus to Paul*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943. Jacques Maritain, *La Pensée de St. Paul*, New York, Editions de la Maison Française, 1944.

thirteenth century had given for protecting the Jews are obviously intimately connected with the psychological factors involved in the history of the Jewish origin of Christianity.

If the Jews survived in spite of the formidable pressure they underwent throughout the centuries, they undoubtedly owe it to their faithfulness and attachment to their religion. But they could not have survived if the Church had dealt with them as with Christian heretical sects. Indeed, the Jews were never considered heretics by the Church. Greek Orthodoxy and Protestantism successfully opposed the expansion of the Catholic Church, because they were endowed with the secular power capable of resisting the secular power of Catholicism. But the dispersed Jewish communities in Europe were powerless. They survived because they were permitted to survive as the only non-Christian group on Christian soil. Thanks to that tolerance reserved especially for them from the time of the Fathers of the Church they were kept alive even by the most anti-Semitic Popes of the Middle Ages.

Though the Popes granted protection to the Jews only at their explicit request, the Popes repeatedly defended them, e.g., against accusations of ritual murder as being a part of the Jewish religion.

In later centuries, Protestantism was no more tolerant of the Jews than was Catholicism. Martin Luther first asked the Jews to join the new religious movement. After having been refused, he reacted with vituperations and threats.⁴⁵ During the religious wars both Catholics and Protestants accused the Jews of siding with the adverse party. Protestantism had indirectly a very favorable influence on the diminution of anti-Semitism insofar as it brought about a renewed interest in Hebrew and the study of Jewish religion and history. But the main merit in the more humane attitude toward the Jews of Western civili-

45. Joshua Trachtenberg. *The Devil and the Jews*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1943.

lace was on its way to free the Holy Land from the Moslems, and found in its midst other unbelievers, Jews.

The teaching of the Church has assured the Christians that God forsook the Jews, and transferred all His love and solicitude to the Christians. The existence, success and wealth of the Jews was a denial of this promise and a challenge to Christian faith. The Christians took in their own hands God's threat and they killed and robbed the Jews in His name, to prove to themselves and to the Jews that God had forsaken them. In this way, religious and economic sources of anti-Semitism have been and probably still are bound up with each other.

Nowadays religion seems to play a lesser role in the destinies of Western civilization than it formerly did. Its role in the "malady of the modern world", of which Nazi anti-Semitism is only one symptom, though an important one, seems to be a negative one: indeed one could attribute to some extent, and aside from many other factors, the discontent with present civilization⁴⁸ to the diminution of religious beliefs in man. Whatever it might be, it is certain that the national-socialist form of anti-Semitism is an expression of an anti-Christian form of anti-Semitism. Indeed, the Christian attitude which involves both hatred and tolerance is genuinely ambivalent. It follows a cultural pattern that originated in the history of Christianity, whereas Nazi anti-Semitism, quite on the contrary, aimed at the total destruction of the Jews.

2) Anti-Christian Anti-Semitism.

It has been rightly maintained that National-Socialism was a kind of anti-Christian religion. Although Nazi Germany opposed Christianity less openly than e.g., Soviet Russia, its ideology has been compared by Maritain to that of the Pagan State. The all-powerful state is the god of the Nazi religion and the

⁴⁸ S. Freud: *Civilization and its Discontents*. New York, J. Cape and H. Smith, 1930.

so-called supremacy of the Germanic race is its credo. The official theoretician of the Nazi religion, Professor Ernst Bergmann, puts it this way:

"The period of world religion draws to its close. A people which returns to race and soil, which has recognized the world peril of international Judaism, can no longer tolerate in its churches a religion which calls the sacred writings of the Jews its 'Gospel'. Germania's reconstruction would be wrecked by this inner untruth. . . . That is why the watch-word of the Germanic religion is: away from Rome and Jerusalem."⁴⁹

Nazism is anti-Christian, not only because it is pagan but because state and race are deified by it. Freud remarked that its anti-Semitism aimed in reality at Christianity. Other writers, like Maritain and de Kerillis, have pointed out that its struggle against democracy was directed in reality against this "temporal manifestation of evangelic inspiration".⁵⁰ because, by distinguishing between superior and inferior races, it denies human dignity to all those who do not belong to the master race. These principles are in contradiction to the fundamental promises of both Jewish and Christian monotheism, namely the universality of the moral law and the equality of men before God. And, though the Christian Church fought frequently against democracy, Christian ethical principles have affirmed the equality of men in the eye of the law and in the pursuit of happiness. In this respect the communistic ideologies in their insistence on the equality of men are the direct heirs of Judeo-Christian civilization. The Jews represented to the Nazis the embodiment of the superego's demand for equality, justice, and intellectual freedom which would have defeated Nazi ideologies. They represented the physically powerless whose strength lay in moral and intellectual achievements which was disquieting to the Nazi Pagan

49. Baron *loc. cit.*, II, 305

50. J. Maritain: *Christianisme et Démocratie*. H. de Kerillis: *Français voici la vérité*. New York, Editions de la Maison Française, 1942.

State. Nazi anti-Semitism permitted them to destroy the bases of Christianity without attacking it openly, that is, by destroying the Jews.

5. *THE TABOOED PEOPLE*

Why is it that the Jews embodied to the Nazi mind all these principles? Why is it that they have been considered for centuries "not like other human beings", but as strangers everywhere, wanderers, usurers, treacherous to God and man. Are they really different? Is there any reality in the reproaches made against them? Many Jews and Christians refuse to raise this question. The accusations brought against Jews have been so fantastic and monstrous, the persecutions to which they have been subject have been so terrible, that these questions might be considered superfluous and even insulting. However, psychoanalysis has taught us not to recoil from a question, unpleasant though it may seem.

We have learned when dealing with patients in conflict with their surroundings to ask how far they have unconsciously contributed to creating these conflicts. The same question must be asked about the Jews. Is there actually anything peculiar about the Jews that gives rise to so much hostility?

There are several difficulties to be met in trying to answer this question objectively. One has first to watch out for two pitfalls: either bias in favor of the persecuted or the unwitting participation in the prejudice through identification with the aggressor. Another problem lies in the difficulty of describing any kind of so-called national psychology. Social psychologists differ in their opinions as to the practicability or possibility of establishing scientific bases of national psychologies. In determining the national character of the Jews there is the danger of being influenced by anti-Semitic generalizations. As we have seen, it is difficult to define a specifically Jewish ethnos since the Jews possess no common language, nationality, ethnic or

racial attachment or religion. (There are many non-religious Jews and Jewish converts to Christianity.)⁵¹ The only factors they have in common are: (1) that they descend from ancestors who at some time held the Jewish faith and (2) they are all regarded as Jews by others. In this sense the definition of the Jews by Jacques Debré is correct: "Les Juifs sont tous ceux qui sont l'objets de l'antisémitisme."

The psychology of a group might be variously determined: (1) by the number of its members displaying a certain ratio of personality traits, as compared with the ratio in other groups; (2) by its important achievements; (3) by its common ideals; (4) by its peculiar characteristics as a group. All these could be determined statistically. To possess scientific value such studies should be based on carefully compiled data.⁵² In the case of the Jews such data are very incomplete and, as far as they exist, mainly give information about their economic status, their professions or occupations, and even less completely about their criminality and mental disorders. Because of the scarcity of statistical data we shall have to rely provisionally on the observations and opinions of intelligent observers, as long as scientifically established data do not prove that they are wrong.⁵³

One has compared Jews and Germans and has tried to find close similarities between them. Both peoples are supposed to be ambitious, tenacious, prone to dominate others, the Germans by force, the Jews by guile. The weakness of this comparison lies in the fact that similar results may be obtained by comparing other peoples. Both, Jews and Germans believe strongly in the greatness of their respective groups; yet their respective ideologies are completely opposed. The modern Germans are easily united by slogans about military greatness of the Reich and

51. Joseph Bram: The Social Identity of the Jews. *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*. Serie II, 6, 1944, No. 6, Section of Anthropology.

52. P. Kecskemeti and N. Leites: *Some Psychological Hypotheses on Nazi Germany*. Washington, D. C. Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications, December 1945, No. 60.

53. See Kecskemeti and Leites: *loc. cit.*

tend to behave like disciplined soldiers. Jewish ideals are quite opposite. The Messianic ideal of the Jews lost its temporal aim a long time ago. For centuries they have expected from the Messiah's advent the establishment of a brotherhood of nations in which justice and peace would reign.

The difference between Jews and Germans could be described from another point of view. In a recent study of German prisoners of war it was established that many of them possess compulsive characters.⁵⁴ The behavior of a great many Jews, especially religious Jews, suggests compulsive characters. The differences between these two types of compulsive characters are, however, very striking. While the Germans stress obedience, orderliness, punctuality and efficiency, the religious Jews are concerned with purity, sanctity, justice. The contemporary German compulsive character is based on "sphincter morale", the Jewish on the repression of aggressive impulses. This latter point is particularly important in the Jewish personality. Statistics concerning Jewish professional and economic life show an abnormal proportion of Jews earning their livelihood from commerce and the liberal professions (outside Palestine). Whatever the relationship between personality and occupation might be, the Jews show a relatively high ratio of individuals who do not use their physical strength and skill in earning their living. Statistics of criminality permit a similar conclusion. Ruppin⁵⁵ says that Jews do not commit crimes of physical violence but rather of cunning.

It has been held that the achievements of non-religious Jews present certain correlations with the fundamentals of Jewish religion. All believe in the equality of men, justice on earth, knowledge and understanding.⁵⁶ To these trends has been ascribed the violent anti-Semitism of the Nazis, whose

54. Kecskemeti and Leites: *loc. cit.*

55. A. Ruppin: *The Jews in the Modern World*. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1934. Liebman Hersch, *Le Juif Delinquant*, Paris, Alcan, 1938.

56. F. R. Bienenfeld: *The Religion of the Non-Religious Jews*, London, Museum Press, Ltd., 1944.

beliefs are based on the inequality of men, subordination, and the idealization of irrationality. The repression of aggression is, as Freud has pointed out, one of the main features of civilized man. This is one reason why, recently, discontent with civilization has taken the aspect of a violent revolt against Judeo-Christian civilization in Nazi Germany.⁵⁷ Jews have represented for the Nazis the incarnation of those who repress aggression and, like Christ, suffer for the faults of others. They are the incarnation of the tendency of their own superego to suppress aggression.

The importance that Jews attach to knowledge is very striking. The ratio of intellectual achievement among Jews is surprisingly high. Whether this means a higher frequency of intellectual gifts or a higher evaluation of intellectual achievement is a moot question. A concomitant of this, however, is that Jews display a higher degree of narcissism in the exercise of their intelligence. This narcissism is frequently called arrogance, conspicuous behavior, an attitude of superiority and criticism of others.

The conspicuous behavior of some Jews has been rightly compared to the typical behavior of "nouveaux riches" who through the display of their newly acquired wealth try to make up for previous privations and humiliations. There is probably a far higher rate of Jews than Gentiles who in a generation or two have climbed from a very low economic and social status to a relatively high one. But what characterizes the majority of the Jewish "nouveaux riches" and distinguishes them from the non-Jewish ones is that, by their behavior, they implicitly try to make up not only for their own humiliations but for those of all other Jews. They seem to be trying to prove that Jews are not as bad as Gentiles seem to think, but in doing so they frequently provoke irritation and hostility on the part of Gentiles.

57. Robert Waelder: *L'Esprit, L'Esbique et la Guerre*. Genève, Institut de la Coopération Internationale, Vol. 3, 1934.

The "arrogance" in the behavior of certain Jews is a compensation for an underlying feeling of inferiority, insecurity, and anxiety. These feelings, too, are usually connected with the fact of being a Jew. Feelings of inferiority, insecurity, anxiety and self-consciousness about Jewishness appear to be symptomatic of neurotic disturbances. Both, symptom neuroses and character disturbances, are more frequent among Jews than among Gentiles.

Insecurity and anxiety might to a certain extent be explained by the real or potential danger with which so many Jews have lived for generations. Through identification with the persecuted ones this concern and fear have frequently been shared by those Jews who seemed to live in complete security. Jews, like other people, identify also with their parents from their infancy. Their parents are carriers of similar identifications bearing the imprint of reactions to the persecution of centuries. Thus the imprint of past persecutions is transmitted from one generation to another by an unconscious tradition, in consciousness it is transmitted through family life and religious teaching. The personality traits of Jews are therefore determined by socio-economic and psychological circumstances under which Jews have lived and, in the present, by the accumulation of the various successive situations in the past.

Sociologists have shown the fact that minorities react similarly to similar circumstances.

The "fossil" is preserved in the shape of "penalized religious denominations, dispersed among the Gentiles. If they survive at all, they succeed in holding their own by learning to excel in the narrow field of social activity to which their Gentile neighbors and masters are apt to confine them."⁵⁸

"The tyrannical and malignant exclusion from certain walks of life is apt to stimulate them in fields which

58. Toynbee: *loc. cit.*, 2, 257.

still have been left open to them. But a penalization which truly stimulates the penalized minority to a heroic response is as truly apt to warp their human nature; as a consequence all these penalized minorities (Levantines, Armenians, Jews) have the reputation of being 'not as other men are' for worse and for better."⁵⁹

Certain minority groups like racial and cultural hybrids have a tendency to become what has been called "marginal men".⁶⁰ Marginal men display all personality traits that we have described above as occurring among Jews. Having been typical cultural hybrids for centuries, the Jews have become marginal men "par excellence". Marginal men are exceptions and react like all whose fate has been different from others.⁶¹ These men feel exceptional because in their early childhood they have experienced conditions which they sensed as unjust and to their disadvantage. They then feel that the usual laws governing human relationships no longer bind them. For centuries Jews have submitted to so much unlawful and unfair treatment from Christians and Mohammedans that they feel exceptionally mistreated. Laws have been arbitrarily broken to their disadvantage, they have been accused of fantastic crimes, even the "tacit contracts" which, aside from any laws and regulations, bind men in social life have not been kept with them. The result has been analogous to that of children brought up by unloving and unjust parents: excessive anxiety, guilt-feelings, a tendency toward revolt and direct or indirect aggression aimed at all authority and even society are found frequently among Jews. Both revolt and anxiety can be found relatively often, separately or even in the same individuals as a result of the suppression of their own aggressive impulses. One among many consequences of this has been the

59. Toynbee: *loc. cit.*, 4, 236

60. Everett V. Stonequist: *The Marginal Man*, New York-Chicago, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

61. S. Freud: *Die Ausnahmen. Gesammelte Schriften*, 10, Vienna, Int. Ps. Verlag, 1924, pp. 288-293.

anti-Semitism of Jews themselves. Two mechanisms concur in its formation: the quest for adjustment or assimilation to non-Jewish surroundings impels identification with them; the forcible suppression of aggression against anti-Semitism in the environment leads both to an "identification with the aggressor"⁶² and to hostile feelings against fellow-Jews. The result ranges from a faint shame of being a Jew and having Jewish characteristics to an artificial but sometimes violent anti-Semitism. That these various reactions depend on neurotic factors in individual Jews is obvious.

It has been frequently pointed out that Jews consider themselves superior to other nations. Indeed, in their own eyes they are the Chosen People, the elect sons of God. One should not forget, however, that the belief in one's own superiority is common to all peoples. Narcissism is present in individuals as well as in groups and peoples.

Only at a certain moment of history has the exceptional character of the Jews become a reality for the outside world and for themselves. The loss of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple in 70 A.D. led in a short time to their unique and therefore anomalous social situation: that of a human group, a sort of nation, having no soil nor state of its own. In surviving, Jews achieved involuntarily a peculiar and vulnerable form of universality, that of dispersion. Though their expansion suffered a reverse, their God Jahveh attained universality by becoming the God of the Christian and Mohammedan worlds. By this latter exceptional influence on civilization, Judaism has aroused resentment on the part of the daughter religions from which Jews have suffered hitherto in the form of anti-Semitism.

The destruction of the Temple and its consequences can therefore be compared to a pathogenic, traumatic event in the life of the Jewish people. The reaction to this loss was one of

62. Anna Freud: *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*. New York Int. Univ. Press, 1946.

mourning that seems to have never ceased. And yet of the three aspects of the trauma: the loss of political independence, of soil and country, or that of Jerusalem and the Temple, the last only became the main object of mourning and grief. To this catastrophe Jews reacted by renewed and even stronger attachment and submission to their religion and God. They had learned to do so for centuries. Did not the Prophets teach them that their military defeats on the part of the powerful surrounding empires were trials sent onto them by God for their sins? In contrast to pagan peoples who would accept in their pantheons the gods of the victors, the Jewish people remained faithful to their "only true God". And since there is no possible open revolt against God in a monotheistic religion, the unconscious revolt against the severe Father-God was turned against themselves. In order to maintain the faith in Jahveh, the victorious empires were treated by the Jews like dummies in a play which actually took place only between God and themselves, His Chosen People. This notion minimized and disdained temporal power and violence. Through centuries this repression of aggression led the Jewish people gradually to replace "violence by gentleness". In 70 A.D. Jochanan ben Zaccai, the Pharisee, fled from besieged Jerusalem. The only thing he demanded from the victorious Romans was permission to open a school in Jabneh. He taught his broken-hearted pupils that "God desired kindness and not sacrifice".⁶³ Thus religious and ethical teaching of the Jews survived the formidable oppression of the Roman Empire.⁶⁴

After centuries of progressively harder restrictions, e.g., no use or carry arms, to possess and cultivate land, and the like, the Jews learned to renounce physical aggression in order to survive. When in the Middle Ages their only economic activities became trade and money-lending, their aggression found an outlet which for the individual meant regression to the anal-

63. Sacrifice in the sense of the Zealots' suicidal defense of Jerusalem.

64. Toynbee: *loc. cit.*, 5, pp. 75-76.

sadistic stage, but for the development of Western civilization was essential to economic progress.

The Middle Ages with their persecutions, pogroms and expulsions, and the seclusion of the ghettos constituted the second great traumatic experience of Jewry. It reacted once more by withdrawing from the outside world and by strict obedience to the minutest details of the religious laws. The Jews succeeded in surviving by acquiring not only an economic anomaly but also a predisposition to neurotic personality traits. By renouncing physical aggression they acquired a sense of insecurity and anxiety and compensated by regressing to anal and oral modes of sadism, such as an exaggerated interest in money, and a tendency to "biting" irony and to "destructive" criticism. They have also acquired exceptional human qualities which impartial observers agree in acknowledging.

The higher rate of neurotic personality traits among Jews is based on the disturbance of the economy of aggression. Their peculiar situation, namely, the facts that they do not have a country and that only a relatively small number earn their living by physical labor contribute to the disturbances. The aggressive drives are intimately connected with the self-preservation of the individual. Men like all animals (and in contrast to plants) feed themselves by destroying and consuming organic matter. In our opinion, destructive drives belong philogenetically to the vital impulses (Freud's *Lebenstriebe*).⁶⁵ When man learned to cultivate the soil and to breed cattle, he also learned to postpone the immediate destruction of plant and animals. Man even learned to transform his attitude into an attachment to and interest in domesticated animals and cultivated plants. What remained from the previous stage was the manual work, the use of the muscles as instruments of aggressive drives. Among other peoples as well as among the Jews many individuals do not earn

65 R. M. Loewenstein: *The Vital or Somatic Drives*, *loc. cit*

their living by their hands' work. However, Americans, French, and others, can at least identify with their soldiers', sailors', farmers', and workers' national traditions implying such activities. Only the Jews since the Diaspora have had to do without any identification of this kind. The changes in the personality of modern Palestinian Jewry can be considered an indirect confirmation of this hypothesis.

In modern times, after the hopes placed in emancipation had been disappointed, the reaction of the Jews followed the old pattern only in part. They were confirmed in their Jewry but no longer looked to Zion as a religious center, but to Palestine as a country, the ancestral soil. By reacting in this way they followed the general pattern of all contemporary national or cultural minorities. Nationalism of all minority or marginal groups must be considered from a psychological point of view as "identifications with the aggressor". Jewish nationalism has taken over the nationalism of various countries where Jews have been persecuted as foreigners. Whatever the underlying mechanism might be, Zionism is among the most serious attempts to normalize their social status.

6. *ISRAEL AND CHRISTIANITY: A CULTURAL DUALITY*

Can the tragic destiny of the Jewish people be explained in the same way as psychoanalysis explains the fate of neurotic individuals? Moral masochism to which is frequently attributed failure in life should not be used as a blanket statement to explain all cases. If unconscious tendencies and especially unconscious masochism were the reasons for all the failures and catastrophes in human life, millions of human beings, civilians and soldiers, Jews and Christians, killed during this war died of their moral masochism. On the contrary, we believe that the fate of human beings depends only occasionally and only to a

small extent upon their unconscious, much more on other human beings who act under the influence of various complicated social and psychological factors. It depends also on natural causes altogether independent of human beings.⁶⁶

It is likely that the rate of moral masochism among individual Jews is higher than among Gentiles. The fate of some Jews might be accounted for by these tendencies but to explain the tragic history of Jewry solely on these grounds is to oversimplify the problem. The survival of Jewry has to a great extent been based on the renouncing of violence in favor of gentleness.⁶⁷ No doubt that since the Middle Ages certain neurotic personality traits have played a minor role in arousing hostility against them, but the bases for medieval and modern anti-Semitism were laid long before, in the first centuries of our era.⁶⁸ From then on, from the Chosen People the Jews, in the eyes of Christendom, have developed into the tabooed people: uncanny and contemptible, sacred but not holy.

Jewry has survived and has been a factor only in the two civilizations which Judaism has deeply influenced: Islam and Christianity.⁶⁹ After the loss of Palestine, Jews needed Islamic or Christian countries in order to survive. In their turn, they have performed a specific function in these civilizations. We have seen that in the last century-and-a-half they have been innovators and intellectual leaders and revolutionaries in many fields. They have paid for this role by becoming the scapegoats for the sufferings and discontent engendered by the "malady of the modern world". In the Middle Ages, as we have seen, their function was equally important. They were permitted to do "a dirty job" that the Church forbade Christians. By accepting it in order to survive, they acquired the odium attached in medieval Europe and in the

66 R. M. Loewenstein: *Origine du Masochisme et la Theorie des Pulsions*, *Revue Française de Psychoanalyse*, 10, 2, 1938

67 Cf. Toynbee: *loc. cit.*, 5, pp 75-76

68 Cf. Parkes: *loc. cit.*

69 Joseph Klausner: *From Jesus to St. Paul*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943.

modern world to money and its use. They have been considered the usurers and cheaters par excellence. They have been the scapegoat, in the eyes of both poor and rich, for the aggression and guilt aroused by the possession of money.

Thus, if Jewry needed the Christian world for its survival, the latter needed Jewry for certain useful functions, for which the Jews would later have to suffer. Throughout the centuries, Jewry and the Christian world have formed a cultural duality for which the foundations were laid when Christianity separated from Israel. They have continued complementing each other up to the present because originally, in spite of their differences, they were a unity. As a consequence of their incomplete separation and of Christianity's incomplete victory, and thanks to the latter's indebtedness to Israel, the role and the functions of each of them have taken specific shapes. The role of Israel in the Judeo-Christian civilization has been set once and for all by the religious teaching given to every successive generation of Christians. This teaching represents a solution on a spiritual level of common historical, moral, and psychological problems, particularly since this teaching is given at the age when, after the passing of the oedipus complex, the superego is being built up. Solutions on the spiritual level have, as we have seen, been complex. Jews have become, for the Christians, people cursed of God, like Cain and Satan, yet they have been the only non-Christian people tolerated on Christian soil, guardians of the Scriptures, whose existence is a proof of the story of Jesus and to whom the extraordinary power is ascribed of being able to bring about the final salvation of the universe.⁷⁰ This conflict between the scapegoat role of the Jews and their fundamental importance for Christianity, however, has significant psychological consequences.

For the Christian philosopher, J. Maritain,⁷¹ "the role

70. S. Graysel: *loc cit.* Rom. 9-11.

71. John M. Oesterreicher: *Racisme-Antisemitisme-Antichristianisme*. Documents et Critiques Preface de J. Maritain. New York, Editions de la Maison Française, 1943.

of the Jews . . . the passion of Israel . . . is ordained to the stimulation of temporal life of the universe. . . . The world retaliates on the Jews for the wounds of its history (. . . sur lequel le monde se venge des plaies de son histoire . . .)."

Commenting on the fate of the Jews, Jacques Maritain says:

"The central fact which, from the point of view of the philosophy of history and of the destiny of mankind, has the most important significance, and of which nobody seems aware, is that, nowadays, the passion of Israel takes, more and more distinctly, the shape of the Cross."

For the believing and thinking Christian there should be no longer condemnation, hatred or persecution of the Jews if he does not forget that "no Christian can partake in Jesus Christ's forgiveness if he does not feel himself conjointly with the Jews guilty of His death."⁷²

The psychological counterpart⁷³ and basis of this can be found in the reaction to these problems of certain Christians under analysis. When dealing with the problems of guilt for the unconscious death wishes stemming from the oedipus complex and when they have recourse to Christ as the Redeemer of their sins and guilt, they suddenly become aware of the benefit they derive from Jesus' crucifixion. The similarity and the inner relationship between the unconscious death wishes against their father and the advantage they draw from Jesus' crucifixion becomes very obvious to them and they understand how this conflict is unconsciously solved by Christians, i.e., instead of feeling themselves "guilty of Christ's death conjointly with the Jews", they blame the Jews for the crucifixion, an act without which Christianity would not have existed, and from whose redeeming function every Christian benefits. They remember St. Paul's words:⁷⁴ ". . . Have they (the Jews)

72. Marc Boegner: *L'Evangile et le Racisme*. Paris, Editions "Je sers", 1939

73. In a discussion on the relationship between faith and psychoanalysis of religious concepts a believing Christian stressed that they were perfectly compatible since "man can grasp God with his human faculties only and consequently man's religious concepts must have a human aspect that can be object of scientific, psychoanalytic study."

74. *Rom.* 11: 11.

stumbled that they should fall? God forbid: but rather through their fall salvation is come unto the Gentiles . . ." and ⁷⁵ "As concerning the gospel, they are enemies for our sake: but as touching the election, they are beloved for the Father's sake."

In Christ's passion the Jews are the scapegoat that permits Christians to be relieved of guilt. If, on the spiritual level, Christ is the Redeemer, on the psychological level, for the unconscious Christ is a "divine scapegoat".⁷⁶ Thus the relationship of opposition and identity between Jews and Christ is even more deeply linked in the function of scapegoat common to both.

This basic identity of functions is historically and psychologically the foundation of the cultural duality. In subsequent centuries at different periods, the Jews, in order to survive, were forced into roles that were at first useful to the Christian world. By accepting these functions, and their sociological and psychological consequences, they have become easy targets for hostile reactions which, in turn, have all the more made them scapegoats.

The unfortunate or pathological consequences of Jewry's function in this cultural duality is anti-Semitism.

75. *Rom.* 11: 28.

76. James Frazer: *The Scapegoat*, in *The Golden Bough*, London, Macmillan & Co, 1911. S. Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, J. C. Flugel, *Man, Morals and Society*.

Part Six
SOCIOLOGY

ON RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL ACTION

By HEINZ HARTMANN, M.D. (New York)

Since its beginnings psychoanalysis has made important contributions to the psychology of action that clearly reflect the consecutive levels of analytical experience and thought. The approach became more explicit once a solid foundation was laid in analytical ego-theory. However, we still have no systematic presentation of an analytical *theory of action*, to which I could refer here as to an accepted or at least generally known body of facts and hypotheses. This paper is primarily concerned only with certain aspects of rational and irrational behavior. However, it will also have to deal with a number of topics that would be parts of such a general theory.

From the standpoint of an older concept of psychoanalysis, which had limited its scope to an auxiliary science of psychiatry, questions like those I want to present here seem peripheral. However, in an implicit way from its beginnings, and quite explicitly in the last two or three decades, psychoanalysis has set out to lay the groundwork for a general psychology, including normal as well as pathological behavior. Psychoanalysis has its origin in the clinical investigation of what one generally calls "irrational" behavior, of the instinctual drives and their development, and of the role they play in mainly pathological phenomena. As long as it was centered around the psychology of the id, it dealt with a field of observation neglected by non-analytical psychology. By developing ego-psychology, analysis has more and more come to

include in its scope phenomena that previously had been studied by other methods. However, in this broad field of encounter of the analytical method with others, it is the specific nature of this method, and the insight into the unconscious processes, that frequently lets the common object of observation appear in a different light; and, above all, analytic knowledge allows one to assign the observed facts their proper place in the structure of personality.

The problems of rational and irrational behavior are located on a cross-road of various branches of science. Not only psychology, but also history, sociology, and economics have their share in it. It is when faced with the borderline questions of analysis and social science, that the necessity of extending and clarifying our knowledge of these problems most definitely appears. One has not yet succeeded in giving the various sociological and economic studies of human action the psychological basis they need. Many theories of action, as introduced, for instance, by economists, tend to reduce the motivations of action, and the rather complex relationships of action with other aspects of behavior, to a few isolated cases considered as typical; but as a rule they neglect the basic facts of the personality structure, of the driving forces, and of the adaptive capacities of man. However, in limiting the psychological foundations to those model situations one may endanger a full comprehension even of those few behavior patterns these theories take into consideration. I do not want to delineate here the possible influence of psychoanalysis on the social sciences. However, it seems probable that a theory of action based upon the knowledge of the structural aspects of personality and of its motivations is the most important contribution psychoanalysis will one day be able to make in this field.

What, then, to begin with this side of the multiform problem, is the position of action in the *structure of personality*, as described by psychoanalysis? The systems of personality (ego, id, superego) are defined in analysis on the basis of their functions, the concept formation here being somewhat similar to that

used in biology, and more especially, in physiology. Normal action in all of its varieties, even instinctual or emotional action, is formed by the ego. But between action and the ego there exist manifold relationships. In action we have an intention toward a goal; and the motor and other phenomena used to reach this goal are controlled and organized accordingly (the presence of the goals and this control and organization may be more or less complete and may take place on a great variety of different levels, as we shall see later). Freud has shown how the partial replacement of merely reactive motor outlet, and of instinctual breakthrough, by directed and organized action is an important part of ego-development and an essential step in replacing the pleasure-principle by the reality-principle. Objectivation, another function we attribute to the ego, in helping to develop our knowledge of the outside world, is also instrumental in the organization of action. Or rather, there is an interdependent relationship between the two processes: insight into the structure of reality guides action, but action is also one of our most efficient instruments for the development of insight, or knowledge.

A few sketchy remarks about the *developmental aspect* of at least some of the factors involved may prove useful. If the wants of a child exceed a certain degree without being satisfied, and if they can no longer be satisfied by fantasy either, the child feels himself driven toward the outer world, in perception and in activity, in order to search it for pleasure and to avoid pain. This behavior may also mean a protection against fantastic fears; it can serve the mastering of anxiety. In both cases the turning to the outer world comes under the pleasure principle; it is its continuation by other means. There is, however, another decisive factor involved in establishing the reality principle: "A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain in the new way an assured pleasure coming later."¹

1. Freud, S. Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning, *Coll. Papers* 4, 18

This step cannot, as I have shown elsewhere, be derived from the pleasure principle alone. The *anticipation of the future*, one of the most important achievements of early ego-development, enters the process as an independent variable. Now, anticipation is also another prerequisite for the development of action and participates in every action to some degree. We know of many anticipating activities of the ego, the one that has been most thoroughly studied by analysts being the anxiety signal, which from a certain level of development on is used by the individual in danger situations. I think there can be no doubt that this special form of anticipation, because it safeguards the stability of the psychic apparatus, is also paramount among those forms of anticipation that make organized action possible.

In the psychoanalytic literature of the last years there has been a tendency to speak of a partly *autonomous development of the ego*, which cannot entirely be traced to manifestations of the instincts.² Here I only want to mention that this area of ego-development is partly based on the function of somatic or psychic apparatus which, as a consequence of maturation, become available to the ego. This is a close parallel to the libido development, the consecutive levels of which we partly link with anatomical and physiological growth (of the teeth, of the sphincter muscles, and so forth). Now, the functions of the ego-area just touched upon, including those underlying controlled and directed action, often have the character of inhibiting the immediate gratification of the instinctual drives; postponement or displacement of gratification is frequently the consequence of their activity. On the other hand, the development of new ego functions, like, for instance, that of acting in the outer world, may open up new avenues for direct and indirect (sublimated) gratifications of instinctual tendencies. Changes in the distribution of psychic energy, in

2. Cf. f.i., Freud, S.: *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, *Int. J. Psch.*, 18, 1937.

the direction of a stronger investment of the ego functions, go parallel with these developments.

In stressing the importance of factors like anticipation, postponement of gratification, and the like, in the development of action, we at the same time give action its place in a general trend of human development, the trend toward a growing independence from the immediate impact of present stimuli, the independence from the "hic et nunc". This trend can also be described as one toward "internalization".³ The danger signal is an example in question. The signal helps in many cases to master "inner" danger before it may become danger threatening from outside. Directed and organized action (organized as to its motivations and as to the way it is brought about) is gradually substituted for the immediate reactions of motor discharge, as mentioned above. Trial activities with whose help we attempt to master a situation, to solve a problem, are gradually internalized: thinking is, in this sense, trial action with small quantities of psychic energy (Freud). Finally, the internalizations that are essential to the formation of the superego lead to a growing independence from the outside world, insofar as a process of inner regulation replaces the reactions and actions due to fear of the social environment (social anxiety).

As to the use of psychic energy in action, a few words may suffice. We work in psychoanalysis with the hypothesis, that once the three psychic systems are formed each of them disposes of psychic energy. (I do not want to go here into the question of the origins and of the probably specific forms of this energy.) Action certainly uses energies of the ego. This, however, does not imply that it might not also find energies of the id or the superego at its disposal. The separation of the ego from the other systems is as a rule not complete. Thus action will frequently draw on the energy reservoir of the other functioning units of personality.

3. Hartmann, H.: Ichpsychologie und Anpassungsproblem. *Int. Ztschr. Psa.*, 24, 1939.

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Analytical observation has taught us that human behavior is essentially overdetermined; and that in every cross-section of behavior (upward of a certain age) we can trace the influence of all three psychic systems. We call this the *principle of multiple function* (Waelder).⁴ According to this principle, the result of the activation of, let us say, an ego-function, will be co-determined by the state of affairs in the id and the superego; we have learned to realize the multiplicity of interdependent factors that every analysis of actual behavior has to take into consideration. However, this complexity does not make it unnecessary or impossible to correlate functions with systems, in a way that in some instances might be more, in others less definite. If in this sense we have called action an ego-function, we have to add now that it is possible to describe a variety of types of action, first of all from the point of view of the influence the other systems exert upon it. While the formation of the action is normally accomplished by the ego, other of its characteristics may derive from the id or the superego. The stimulus that sets action going may be found in one of the other systems as well, and the driving force of action may be supplied by any one of the systems. The configuration of action is different in instinctual from what it is in rational action. Action may predominantly serve the ego; or it may predominantly serve the gratification of instinctual needs; it may also be mainly in the service of the superego, for instance when it is promoted by a strong unconscious guilt-feeling. These types of action as a rule differ also as to the clarity of motivation, the degree of explicitness in the presentation of the object, and the somatic phenomena that accompany them.

From the point of view of the participation of a variety of ego functions in the action and of the degree to which they participate, we may say: Differences in the type of action correspond

4. Waelder, Robert: The Principle of Multiple Function, *Psy. Quart.*, 5, 1936.

to differences in the ego level (level of integration, of differentiation, and so forth) that directs it; to differences in the organization of the motives; in the type of goals; in the organization of the means; to whether these factors act on a conscious level or not; to the degree of automatization, and so forth. Action may satisfy certain tendencies of the ego while it is rejected by others. Action may be more or less under the influence of the rational elements of behavior. Thus one point of view from which action has to be described is also the one we are mainly to be concerned with in this paper, i.e., its rational or irrational character⁵ (about definitions see later).

About what we call the *aims, goals, or ends of action*, very few entirely unsystematic remarks will have to suffice here.⁶ There is a distinction to be made between them and what we call the aim of an instinctual tendency. In speaking of the latter having an aim, we point to nothing else but the fact that these tendencies, if not inhibited, will take their course toward satisfaction. However, of the aim, or goal, of action we speak in the sense that the anticipation of the action's outcome plays a role in its set-up.

The goals of an individual's actions mirror his relationships with the outer world, but also his instinctual drives, his interests, his moral demands, the state of his mental equilibrium, and so forth. To the many questions involved here, every analysis gives us a rich material of answers, but these answers have never been made the object of a special study in analysis. We emphasize the

5. It has been suggested, that the concept of irrational action be dropped completely (L. v. Mises: *Philosophy and Phenomen. Research*, 4, 1944). The argument runs as follows: since psychoanalysis has shown, that the behavior of neurotics, and even of psychotics, is meaningful, can be understood, and that mentally ill people no less than the normal basically strive toward satisfaction (though by using other means), what previously was thought to be irrational action is proved to be not irrational at all, and the term, therefore, is misleading. However, for us, neither the statement that pathological as well as normal action strive toward satisfaction, nor that both can be understood and explained by analysis, does imply that they are, or in how far they are, rational. We refer to rational and irrational as to empirical psychological characteristics of action that may be present or absent. In this sense the terms are meaningful and useful.

6. For one important aspect of the problem see French, Th.: *Goal, Mechanism and Integrative Field*, *Psychosom. Med.*, 3, 1941.

complex nature of these goals, the fact that they are over-determined, and also, that in the goal structure contradictions frequently occur. However, normally a mutual adjustment of the different sets of aims takes place in the ego, so that the aims connected with moral demands are compatible with those connected with adaptation to the environment, or with those representing the ego-interests, and so forth. The basic goals of human action have been described by Aristotle as "profit, pleasure, morality". This classification, while not exactly coinciding with, is somewhat similar to an analytical one, based on the distinction of the ego, id, and superego functions, that have influence on the formation of the goals. We realize that there is a close interrelationship between these three sets of goals. Goals that are formed under the influence of the superego, may at the same time be goals of the ego, and of the id. The value systems, originating in the superego, are something the individual shares with many others and their acceptance facilitates the ego's task of social adaptation; and we know that the superego-functions, in an indirect way, also gratify instinctual tendencies. We may add, that, for instance, the aim of the superego to repress instinctual demands leads to changes of the ego and the ego's aims in relation with the environment. Also, as in the case of intellectualization, we see that a function that has (partly) been developed as defense against the instincts, may become an independent aim of the ego.⁷ We must indeed realize that a great many of the ego's aims originate in such a way. This is a special case of *change of function*, a term familiar to biology. On the other hand, aims of the ego actually take influence upon superego demands. This happens normally in the course of the elaboration and unification of these demands that take place in the latency period and in adolescence. Special conditions in the formation of the superego, a high tension of unconscious guilt

7. Freud, A.: *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1946.

feelings, weakness of the ego traceable to a variety of factors, are often responsible for the ego's failure in elaborating the aims of the superego. These, then, ask for rigid compliance and are considered as "absolute ends". However, this is a question of degrees, since even with the average person who has developed a superego, its demands, or some of them, tend to be considered as more absolute than other aims, other goals are supposed to be sacrificed to them, and they are kept more independent from practical considerations. Dewey⁸ has frequently stressed the points, that the ends only function within action, that they are merely turning points in activity, and that the acceptance of "fixed ends" is just an aspect of man's devotion to an ideal of certainty. His theory of ends, means, and values I will not discuss here. I just want to mention, that the fact that human beings actually do set more or less fixed aims, or "absolute aims", beyond their actions, and that action is partly determined by factors of this kind, can, in analysis, actually be traced to the functioning of the super-ego.

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In his clinical work, the analyst is constantly confronted with rational as opposed to irrational action, but also with other phenomena commonly classified as rational or irrational. He learns about the factors that may handicap the development of rationality, or inhibit the rational functions. He sees irrational elements of behavior first of all as they interfere with healthy behavior, with adjustment, with progression, and in a more or less definite positive correlation with pathology, maladjustment, and regression. This clinical experience has found its classical expression in Freuds' theory of the neurosis and psychosis. There is, of course, also a wealth of observations that point to the positive role that irrational, for instance affective, behavior may actually play in normal adjustment. But this side of the problem, being part of

8. Dewey, J.: *Human Nature and Conduct*. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1922; and *Theory and Valuation*, Chicago, Univ. Press, 1939.

an analytical psychology of the normal person has so far been formulated less explicitly and less completely than the theory of neurosis. Difficulties also arise from the fact that the terms "rational" and "irrational", while being widely used by analysts, are used inside as well as outside analysis in a rather loose way.

A few words about *use and abuse of these terms* prove necessary here. The word "rational" is frequently used as a synonym of "guided by reason", or of "reasonable". As far as "reason" is meant to be just another word for "intellect", and "reasonable behavior" another word for behavior based on insight and thinking, this terminology comes close to the one we shall introduce later. However, "reason" and "reasonable" have also many other meanings and are generally rather poorly defined concepts. Of course, we all use these words frequently in evaluating a person's behavior; still, we should not forget that they are equivocal, unless we add further specifications as to the points of view from which such evaluations are derived. What is called reasonable is actually frequently based in part on a set of implicit or explicit value judgments, the validity of which is taken for granted, and its meaning varies accordingly. If it is considered a legitimate aim of the individual to place certain personal interests above other considerations, an activity that serves this aim will no doubt be called reasonable; while, looked at from the viewpoint of a different system of values, to sacrifice those interests will be considered the very essence of reasonable behavior. Obviously, in these cases the statement that behavior is reasonable is not a purely psychological statement, but there is an element of moral judgment inextricably merged with it. This subjective element, implied in the formation of the concept, makes it inadvisable to use the word "rational" in this sense, if we want to consider it as a psychological term.

In the history of philosophy many attempts have been made to link the concept of *reason* with definite psychic functions. However, the rationalistic approach did not get very far in this

direction because of various reasons, for instance, because rationalism, at least in some of its implications, is opposed to empiricism. Also, the high evaluation of "reason" led many philosophers to believe in the actual near omnipotence of intellect and to scptomize the true strength of the irrational factors. On the other hand, romantic irrationalism shed some light on unconscious mental functions and on the dynamic importance of irrational forces. But romanticism, even more than enlightenment, fell short of developing our empirical knowledge of personality structure to a point where it might become possible to assign places to rational as well as irrational functions and to understand their mutual relationships. Today "reason", "unreason", "reasonable", "unreasonable" are less used as scientific terms.

However, if there is still so much confusion about meaning and function of rationality, this is at least partly due to the fact that this concept has so many connotations whose origin leads back to the philosophical schools of the past. But other factors have their share in this obvious lack of clarity. It may be worthwhile to digress here in order to see how implied value judgments, of which we did speak before, influence concept formation and our insight into the connection of facts. There is a strong tendency to more or less identify rational behavior with healthy behavior and with behavior we judge to be "good" or "right", and irrational behavior with the opposites. Even analytical authors find it difficult to realize that rational behavior may be put into the service of destructive or self-destructive aims. Now there is no doubt a positive correlation, for instance, between rational behavior and adapted behavior, between rational behavior and healthy behavior and these correlations have long been realized. However, the value factor implied makes it difficult to recognize the fact that the interrelationship of rational and irrational behavior is actually far more complex than these simple correlations let it appear. In studying the effects of those implied value judgments we find a tendency of considerable generality that I should suggest we call a tendency toward *agglutination of values*. If we attach to, for

instance, an element of behavior a positive value accent, our thinking will tend to have other elements valued in a positive way more easily identified with it, considered part of it or in causal relation to it, than elements that have a negative value accent. The same agglutination takes place in the realm of behavior elements that are negatively valued. Thus for the real connections of the facts, connections according to their common evaluation will be substituted and insight into the structure of reality will be interfered with. A second tendency in question we may call *irradiation of values*. It follows the laws of affect irradiation. If an element has a positive value accent those other elements we know to be somehow or other in contact with it, may come to participate in this value accent (the case in which means derive value from the ends is more complex and cannot be included here). According to the first principle we put together what we value in the same way; according to the second we value in the same way what we know somehow to belong together. Both tendencies point to regressive elements in our thought (and child observation shows us somewhat similar phenomena to an even more impressive degree). Still, they do influence our psychological thinking, they are frequently found at the base of errors in judgment in political thought, and generally wherever highly invested value judgments come into play. Their character of shifting accents, of establishing and severing connections of facts with disregard of the object structure makes us think of the primary process. While the irradiation of values takes place according to what we know about emotional thinking in general, in the case of the agglutination of values also other factors may come into play. Here we may sometimes be confronted with the interference of a superego function with an ego function: reality testing (other instances of such an interference have been described in analysis);⁹ it is a mixing up of superego schemes with ego schemes. Now it is well known that the superego, the source of at least part of our value judgments, has its roots in layers of the personality governed by the primary

9. Freud, S.: A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, *Int. J. Psch.*, 21 1941.

process. The common fact that reality testing is impaired where the objects have got a strong value accent (moral, esthetical, and the like) may be partly accounted for along these lines. I should like to add that I do not believe the explanation given here of value agglutination to be complete. Other factors will have to be taken into consideration, for instance, a tendency toward isolation ("good" things must not be contaminated with "bad" things—as a consequence of which the causal nexus between the facts may be disrupted, may not appear, and so forth). Also it would be worthwhile to describe the influence of ambivalence on value agglutination. But I cannot discuss here the manifold implications of this problem.

After this long digression let us come to the *strictly psychological meaning of the terms* rational and irrational: irrational behavior, to start with, can be defined in a negative way, in the sense of absence of rational control, or of being governed by principles different from those that govern rational behavior. In a positive characterization, we call behavior irrational that is predominantly emotional or instinctual. There is also an attempt toward a more definite positive characterization of the laws governing at least a considerable part of irrational behavior: part of it certainly follows the laws of the primary process. The instinctual drives are irrational in the first and in the second sense; and so are all unconscious functions in general. It is just a statement about the actual usage of the word and does not imply any addition to these definitions (or characterizations), when we mention that in analysis the word is used with preference to describe behavior that allows also of a rational alternative. Cases in question are irrational (instinctual or emotional) action as opposed to rational action, and irrational as opposed to rational thinking.

The term rational, when applied to thinking, means logically correct thinking. But it does not only mean that (except in the case of logic and mathematics). It also implies the consideration

of available facts, and the checking on these facts and their connections according to commonly accepted rules.

As to *rational action*, I may start with a definition by the sociologist M. Weber:¹⁰ "An individual that is directing his behavior according to ends, means, and subsidiary consequences, and in doing so rationally balances the ends against the means, the means against the subsidiary consequences, and finally the various possible ends against each other" acts in a purposively rational way. We add that this process of calculation can be on a conscious, but also on a pre-conscious level. Obviously here, as in rational thinking, a consideration of reality (in many cases inner as well as outer reality) is implied. A thorough insight into the reality structure may be found together with a strong tendency toward balancing the ends against the means; but these factors vary partly independently from each other. Thus, a variety of types can be observed. For clarification's sake it might also be useful to introduce here a distinction between two forms of reality-syntonic behavior.¹¹ Behavior may fit into the reality situation in the sense that it actually helps to reach a certain aim, but without being calculated to this purpose; in this case we may call it *reality-syntonic in an objective way*. Or behavior may attain a given aim as a consequence of being calculated to reach it; this form we may call *reality-syntonic in a subjective way*. "Instinctual" or emotional behavior is frequently fitting a reality situation in the former sense (objectively). The highest degree to which behavior can be reality-syntonic in a subjective way is represented by purposive rational action.

I hope that from what I have said here it also clearly appears that we do not think of rational and irrational action as always being rigidly separated from each other in real behavior; also, between the extreme cases we described, a variety of transitions can actually be observed.

10. Weber, M.: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen J. C. B. Mohr, 1925.

11. Hartmann, H.: Ichpsychologie und Anpassungsproblem, *Int. Ztschr. Psa.*, 24, 1939.

We have discussed the psychological meaning of the term rational action. But we have made no attempt to define as rational any set of goals. Actually, the setting of an aim may or may not be based on rational thinking; but the goals in themselves, that is to say as long as we consider them as goals and as distinct from the other elements of action, cannot be called rational or irrational in the sense of psychological description (while we may of course say, that they agree or disagree with a person's value system, mental equilibrium, chances of adaptation in a given situation, and so forth). On the other hand, if we consider the goals in a larger complex of ends and means in which the goal in question might be regarded as a means to further ends, the terms rational and irrational may apply. If to be socially successful is a goal, from one point of view, but from another is a means to gain wealth, its use to that purpose may be or not be rational; but here again it is not its functioning as a goal that may be correctly called so. I mention this fact mainly in order to stress again the necessary distinction between "rational" and "reasonable"; actually, when the words rational aims, or goals, are used, what is really meant, as a rule, is that the goals are reasonable in one of the various meanings of the word. However, in making our point, we shall not forget, that there are no doubt psychological connections between the aims of a person and the means he chooses in order to reach them; also, looked at from an objective viewpoint, certain goals will be reached easier than others by, for instance, rational means.

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I said before that our insight into the interrelationship of rational and irrational behavior is overshadowed by simplifying dichotomies and is rather incomplete. Our understanding of the actual complexity of the problem may be helped by discussing an example which we choose from the borderlines between psycho-

12. Freud, S.: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. London, Hogarth Press, 1940.

analysis and sociology. Freud's theory of *group formation*¹² is so widely known that I may be allowed to point to only some of its elements which are of special interest in this connection, without attempting anything like a complete presentation. In describing and trying to explain group psychological phenomena, Freud thought of a type of behavior that is not limited to definite epochs of history, but that under certain conditions will repeat itself, so to say, over and over again in the history of mankind with essential elements remaining unchanged. The irrational character of the individual's behavior in a group is contrasted with the comparatively rational behavior of the same individual outside the group situation. The changes we observe in an individual who is a group member can partly be described as regressive phenomena. Furthermore, a splitting of the superego takes place, and as a member of the group the individual accepts moral standards that as a private person he would reject; killing, prohibited by his private superego, may be required by his group superego. This feature of the "superego cleavage" is characteristic enough to be considered by Waelder¹³ as a basis for defining the groups in question here (as against what may be called "associations", that is stable and more or less lasting social organizations). Where the group has a personal leader, the member of the group substitutes him for his superego; and on this basis a mutual identification of the group members takes place.

All these phenomena have frequently been described. In elaborating on these premises, we may briefly comment on an example from the history of our times, namely, group formation in totalitarian societies. Obviously, a variety of types can be observed. In some of them we see as a decisive factor a definite tendency to regress, to abandon individual freedom for dependence on the leader, and moral autonomy for the group codex. Violent aggressive outbreaks and extraordinary cruelties which have an entirely irrational character occur. These forms come

13. Waelder, R.: *Psychological Aspects of War and Peace*. Geneva, 1939

close to the scheme outlined above. Analysts as well as social scientists have repeatedly given a correct account of them. However, there are more complex forms that disclose other aspects of totalitarian group formation. If we look into the factors that actually bring about these forms, which frequently are no less virulent than the others, the importance of purposive rational tendencies in the sense defined above soon becomes apparent among the determining factors of group formation. We also see that social formations, the regressive character of which we emphasize, have increased the "rationalization" of the individual's life, including the details of daily routine, beyond the limits of what we know of any other social system; however, we will not discuss the relationships that exist between "rationalization" in this sense, a term widely used in sociology, and "rational behavior". Here we are interested in the fact that not only in the formation of collective mythologies planning can participate, but that the break-through of instinctual drives can also be the result of planning. Of course, I do not, by any means, want to assert that regressive phenomena are not involved; what I want to state is that the threshold for their manifestation can be lowered, and in the cases in question is actually lowered partly by purposive calculation. The members of that part of society that does the planning may accept for themselves those mythologies; but not all of them do.

To begin with, there appears a certain degree of rationally calculated action in the organization and development of that subgroup that actually does the planning; but, in some instances, it also appears in the selection of the group members who are supposed to freely act out their aggression. The tendency toward "rationalizing" and controlling of ever more fields of everybody's life, also includes purposive attempts to perpetuate in the group members, even when not in immediate contact with the group, certain characteristics which according to the classical description of group psychology manifest themselves only in the group situa-

tion; for instance, the superego split and the attitude toward the leader, as mentioned above, the aim, in this special case, being clearly twofold: to have these individuals stick to certain values of social cohesion so far as the maintenance of the system in power is concerned, and on the other hand to have them freely live out their aggression against the outsiders—as a consequence of the induced changes in the ideal formation.

In an extremely elucidating contribution to this subject Kris¹⁴ has emphasized how totalitarian propaganda much more than democratic propaganda uses broadcasts from mass-meetings for its purpose; the listener "is made to share the emotions of the many who react to the spell of the mass-situation". In other cases, social reality is made to provoke or to strengthen certain characteristics of "mass-psychological behavior", even in the physically isolated individual, by putting a premium on it, as we shall see later. In these cases the distinction between mass psychology and the psychology of associations is more or less obliterated.

Somewhat similar conditions may well be found in many political parties and also in some cases of religious group "fanatization". However, there are also striking differences. In the case we study here, an infinitely more intense and more direct expression of aggression than in political parties in general is expected. Also the purposive factors are more predominant here than in the formation of religious groups. There is a difference in the structure of the goals, insofar as in totalitarian societies, at least vis-à-vis the outsider, a nearly complete sacrifice of human values to a very lowly structural political end is demanded. In the case of religious systems, a set of values, characteristics of the system, is included into the structure of the goals which under no condition must be sacrificed to ulterior ends.

Emotional regimentation for the purpose of subordinating a vast field of other goals to the one that appears most important

14 Kris, E.: The "Danger" of Propaganda, *Amer. Imago*, 2, 1941.

ror the time can also be observed in non-totalitarian systems, for instance, in time of war. Still, the narrowing of the goal structure and the debasement of all other values to means calculated to serve that single end goes so much farther in the totalitarian set-up that this might be considered a characteristic of the systems in question. Besides, this sacrifice of values is intended there not to be a temporary measure but to become a constant feature of man. This, too, presupposes deep changes in the structure of the superego.

To what degree all these changes could be achieved, and what subsidiary psychological consequences this would imply, I do not want to discuss here. I shall merely mention one characteristic feature that can be described as a vicious circle: in reducing the structure of the individual's aims, in decreasing his moral autonomy, an appeal is made to regressive tendencies which then, on their part, intensify the individual's readiness for cooperation with the groups in question and for letting his behavior be planned according to the aims of the leaders.

I here want to emphasize a third factor, beside the planned break-through of instinctual drives and the intended changes in the formation of the superego, which appears in this type of group formation. We shall not forget that social institutions and a psychological climate develop, or are created, in such a way that when action takes place in agreement with the changed attitudes toward the instinctual drives and the superego, it will tend to gratify interests of the ego (for social status, influence, wealth, and so forth) at the same time. Rewards and punishment are distributed accordingly. Now an appeal is made no longer toward the regressive tendencies only, but also to the ego interests and the rational behavior of the individual. Acting according to the lowered threshold of aggression and the changes in the structure of the superego may fit into this social reality and be expedient (objectively); obviously it would not fit as well into another type of society. But the individual will also use this type of behavior

in the social field affects the rational or irrational behavior of the individual has been frequently described, one of the best studied examples being the psychological changes that accompany the process of industrialization.¹⁷ But I suggest to leave the subject of group formation here in order to turn to a study of these interrelationships in fields closer to clinical analytical observation.

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I have mentioned the fact that in analytical literature we find the contradistinction of rational and irrational behavior most frequently paralleled to that of adjusted versus non-adjusted, and normal versus pathological behavior. We may ask now, what the *relations between rationality*, as we have defined it, and *adaptation* actually are. We take for granted the positive value of rational thinking and action for the individual's adjustment to the environment. This is a matter of common psychological knowledge and added emphasis has been rightly put on it as a result of analytical experience; Freud's attitude toward the adaptive value of rationality was that of a cautious optimism. I shall not try to contribute toward a better understanding of this side of the problem. Still, evidence supports the thesis that the relations between rational behavior and adaptation are often more complex than we expect them to be. Some cases in question I shall discuss, taking into consideration what the structural approach of psychoanalysis has taught us about this subject.

First of all, there are activities that can be adequately performed only if the higher ego functions, rational thinking and action among them, are temporarily kept in abeyance. The impossibility of transitorily switching off these functions may have the character of a neurotic symptom and interfere with successful adaptation. Examples in question, clinically well known, are certain sexual disturbances, and also difficulties in falling asleep, both due to a pathological fear of loss of ego control.

17. Cf. Mannheim, K.: *Man and Society*, London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940.

So far as our problem is concerned, things are somewhat similar, though not identical, in the case of what we call the pre-conscious automatized activities. It is no doubt true that this type of behavior, as has been stressed by analysts, does in many cases serve a tendency away from reality; also that difficulties with 'de-automatizing' might interfere with adjustment. This clearly appears with personalities of the obsessional type. On the other hand, automatized behavior does actually serve adaptation in a wide range of activities (by providing standardized methods for the solution of problems, and for the switching of psychic energy; also, if we look at the economic side of the question, by saving psychic energy). It will even, in many instances, be of greater help than the calculation in each case anew of every intermediary phase of behavior, as is done in rational action. Moreover, it is generally accepted that interference of rational action with automatized activities frequently impairs the latter's adaptive value. Of course, this is not to deny that the opposite case is of probably even greater importance: the rigidity of automatized action needs frequent readjustment provided by rational thinking and action; however, in this connexion the former case deserves our special interest. It reminds us of the fact that the various ways of adaptation are generally only appropriate for a limited range of situations; and that successful adaptation to one set of situations may lead to an impairment of adaptation to another one. Also, achievements of adjustment as to one function may be disturbances of adjustment so far as the other functions are concerned. "Each of the mental differentiations that we have become acquainted with represents a fresh aggravation of the difficulties of mental functioning, increases its instability, and may become the starting-point for its breakdown, that is, for the onset of a disease."¹⁸ On the other hand, disturbances in adaptation may well develop into adaptative achievements. Not only pathological

¹⁸ Freud, S.: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. London, Hogarth Press, 1940, p. 103.

development but also development to a state of successful adaptation leads over conflicts, not only occasionally, but of necessity.

The fact that the fixation of super-annuated ways of problem-solving frequently interferes with successful adaptation is familiar to all analysts; increased rational insight and rationality of action will often be helpful in overcoming such a lag in adaptation. In certain historical epochs we also often see, as a typical phenomenon, that failure in adaptation is due to the increasing demands made on the ego from the side of the rapidly changing structure of the environment. We may briefly mention a situation, rather widely discussed in our days:¹⁹ I am thinking of the individual in a world in which traditional goal structures and standards of conduct have collapsed. He is confronted with the task of substituting purposive rational calculations and a new organization of his aims for behavior organized along the lines of traditional patterns. In this situation, the demands on the integrating function of the ego to secure stable forms of adaptation grow; and the ego is not always able to cope with them. As a consequence, a kind of ataxia may develop between different tendencies as expressed in the goal structure; and also in the distribution of purposive rational and irrational behavior in the various fields of adaptive processes. In the transitory phase of increased trial and error in the use of rationality, before the ego can re-establish a balance among the goals, and between the ends and means, adaptation may suffer. However, as the end result there may appear a strengthening of the ego and a widening of its field of action and it may be enabled to integrate not only a higher degree of rationality, but also directing tendencies that had previously been active in the superego.

Our next example concerns the means-ends calculation, the very characteristic of purposive rational action. As long as the child overrates momentary pleasure gains as compared to future

19. Cf., for instance, Loewenfeld, H.: Some Aspects of a Compulsion Neurosis in a Changing Civilization. *Psy. Quart.* 13, 1944.

gains, rational planning of his actions will be impossible or incomplete. This stage is normally overcome in the course of development and if we find it in an adult, we know it to be pathognomonic. However, the extreme opposite is also to be considered as pathological. We find it in people who immediately withdraw the character of a goal from the aim, as soon as they have reached it, or even before they have reached it, and shift it on to ulterior ends. Thus they postpone to an ever more remote future the gratification normally connected with the reaching of a goal. Each step in this unending sequence is markedly experienced as incomplete and provisional. The difference between the real and the possible is lost. On the other hand, the process of rational calculation may have become an aim in itself. However, I do not want to go into any details; the instinctual elements and the defenses involved in this picture are rather well known from the analytical study of neuroses. What matters here is that we realize how the calculation of means and ends, given certain conditions, may, as it were, run wild.

In summarizing much of what has been said, and collating it with experiences from other fields of observation, we may say that highly differentiated functions, as, for instance, rational behavior, though their value for adaptation is obvious, do not of themselves guarantee the optimum of adjustment; they need to be co-ordinated with and supplemented by other systems of regulation, some of which may even function on a much more primitive level of organization.²⁰ Therefore, the picture of a "totally rational" human being is a caricature; it does certainly not represent the highest degree of adaptation accessible to man. It points in the same direction when Freud, in one of his last papers, says that we could not expect the result of even the most complete analysis to be an individual above passion.²¹

20. Hartmann, H.: Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health. *Int. J. Psa.*, 20, 1939.

21. Freud, S.: Analysis Terminable and Interminable, *Int. J. Psa.*, 18, 1937.

Another aspect of the problem has a claim upon our interest. Every progress of growth and development in man can be viewed from the angle of changing the conditions under which adaptation takes place and of changing the methods used in complying with the demands of reality. Even those defenses that are not primarily directed against the outside world but brought about to check instinctual drives, will at the same time modify the individual's attitude toward reality. Psychoanalysis has particularly emphasized the developmental aspect of adaptation. Thus, in the realm of the instinctual drives, the attainment of the latest stage of libidinal evolution, the genital stage, has been recognized to be one of the most important prerequisites for the adult person's adaptation; and we are familiar with the fact that the mature ego is more adjustable than the infantile ego. Also, clinical experience has taught us in a most impressive way the role regression plays in pathogenesis. However, I want to add here that there exists beside this much more general parallelism between progression and adaptation, phenomena that have the character of *regressive adaptation*. These are the cases in which adapted, and normal, behavior of adult persons is actually achieved by way of regression. I am not here thinking so much of facts like the one well known to every analyst that pregenital sublimations may supplement or be substituted for sublimations on the genital level, in order to provide adjustment to reality. I rather stress the fact that even in productive scientific thinking the detour over irrational elements, the use of visual imagery in general and of symbolic elements, far from being a handicap, may actually be helpful. In every form of artistic activity this regressive detour has been recognized as an important prerequisite for achievement. To label these phenomena, we may adopt the term "regression in the service of the ego", introduced by E. Kris.²² These phenomena too have to be looked at from the viewpoint that to achieve optimal

22. Kris, E.: The Psychology of Caricature. *Int. J. Psa.*, 17, 1936.

adaptation more primitive functions may be needed to supplement the highly differentiated ones.

There is still another fact we have to take into consideration, if we try to check on what relations actually exist between developmental level and adaptation. The idea of a disharmonious precocity in the development of certain tendencies is familiar to us from the pathogenesis of neurosis. Reaching forward, ahead of ego development, of instinctual drives, as a result of maturation or of developmental sequences, is known to us as a frequently pathogenic factor. We have also to consider the possibility that precocious development of certain ego functions, among which the rational ones, might be a causative element in the genesis of obsessional neurosis. Facts like these and some others mentioned before make us inclined to formulate conditions of health in terms of the equilibrium that exists between the substructures of personality on the one hand, and between these and the environment on the other hand.

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I hope that as a result of the foregoing remarks we have, without losing sight of the paramount role rational behavior plays in human adaptation, gained a better understanding of some less obvious ways in which rationality and adaptation are actually interrelated. If we look at the problem from a biological viewpoint, which is in accordance with at least one basic trend of psychoanalytic thinking, we may say that the word "rational" ought not to be used as a magic word above and beyond consideration of the conditions under which the various forms of rationality have adaptive value; the general criteria of adaptation have to be applied to them. It is equally misleading to call "rational" all behavior that serves self-preservation, and "irrational" that which runs contrary to it. It is, of course, true that rationality is typically used for the purpose of self-preservation, but we shall not forget that it can also be used in the service of, for instance,

self-destruction. Besides, self-preservation in man is based on an interaction of rational and irrational ego functions, but also ego apparatus, instinctual drives, and so forth. If we call this whole ensemble rational, we again obscure the specific psychological meaning of the term.

From our discussion of some typical situations it became also evident that the adaptive value of rationality is partly determined by whether it fits into the state of balance that at a given time exists between the functions of the different psychic systems. I have mentioned that what is an adaptive achievement in the mastering of one set of situations may very well impair adaptation in the mastering of another. This fact plays a considerable role in biological thinking and has been thoroughly studied also in analysis. Acceptance of reality demands beyond a certain individual threshold may lead to conflicts with the instinctual drives and consequently, given certain conditions, to the development of phenomena that will interfere with successful adaptation. To comply with the outer world, as required by the ego, is favorable for the individual insofar as in doing so he does not overtax the situation in the other systems. The way in which incongruities that may arise are prevented and/or settled is analogous to the processes that in biology have been described under different names, as for instance, "*organization of the organism*". This co-ordination of the parts of the organism, and of their function differs on the various levels of development: and in the adult several layers of it can be distinguished. In the field psychoanalysis is dealing with, one expression of the coordinating tendencies is known to us as the synthetic function. It is not the most primitive regulating function we know from analytical experience; it develops only gradually, parallel to the development of the ego. In the course of its development as a specialized form of ego activity, the synthetic function is partly substituted for more primitive regulations. Freud found that the element of synthesis enters the formation of psychic structure itself, as is clearly seen

in the development of the superego. Once the superego has developed and psychic structure can be described in terms of three centers of functioning, the constant balancing of these three systems against each other as well as the checking of demands of the outer world against the needs of the psychic systems is done by the synthetic function.

Though, as a matter of nomenclature, it does not seem to be too important, I should like just to mention that I wonder whether the use of another term instead of synthetic function, the one commonly used in analysis, might not be preferable here. In the phenomena under consideration, what might be called synthesis no doubt plays an important role. However, an element of differentiation and something that could be compared to a "division of labor" are frequently part of the picture. Nunberg²³ has correctly described the elements of synthesis in the development of causal thinking and of the tendency toward generalization. But both these phenomena are at the same time clear indications of differentiation taking place in the development of thinking. The superego formation, one of the most portentous results of synthesis, also includes differentiation, in the sense of specialization of function. Therefore, the term *organizing function* may be more fitting to the facts than *synthetic function*, because in the concept of organization we include elements of differentiation as well as of integration. As to the hypothesis, particularly elaborated by Nunberg, that attempts to link the synthetic function of the ego to the "binding" characteristics of the libido, it would have to be widened to comprise not only libidinal, but also non-libidinal tendencies, stemming from the aggressive drives, as the ultimate basis of the integrating and differentiating aspects of organization.

In adding these remarks about the organizing function, our aim still remains to describe the relation of action to the set-up of psychic structure. We have said that action develops

23. Nunberg, H.: The Synthetic Function of the Ego, *Int. J. Psch.*, 12, 1931.

on the basis of, and parallel with, the acceptance by the child of the reality principle. It means a definite further step in development, beyond the acceptance of the reality principle, when the more complex regulations of the psychic systems and of their relations with reality we have dealt with just now (and also the ways in which they may react to the intended action), can be included into the plan of action. In his attempt to master reality in an alloplastic way, the older child's ego learns also to consider, to utilize, and to develop autoplastically the state of affairs in his psychic systems.

Concepts of organization, of equilibrium, of harmony have been used in explaining human behavior since Socrates, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Certain of these concepts seem to come rather close to those of analysis. However, the relevance of the psychoanalytic concept of organization is due to the fact that it is neither a philosophical principle nor a moral demand, but that it refers to empirical findings only. The analytical concept of organization actually covers part of the ground of what philosophers refer to when they speak of "reason"; and, in speaking of reasonable behavior, one often refers to phenomena that in analysis we should describe as behavior guided by the organizing function. This psychic function is closer than rationality to what commonly is called reason; still, because of what we have said before, I prefer not to use "reason" as a psychological term.

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Basing the theory of action on the structural concepts of analysis, we may try to sketch one type of action that is widely supposed to be dominant in man and is of paramount importance in the "utilitarian" schools of social science. It is actually normal and adaptive in a wide range of situations. Here we discuss it in order to show that despite this fact it cannot be judged without insight into its structural position. The form of action I have in mind is another one of those that have been indiscriminately

called rational. Its aims are what is commonly called usefulness. Striving toward what is "useful", however, does not delineate the goal in an unequivocal way. From the point of view of psychological description we can characterize these strivings as a certain group of what in psychoanalysis we call *ego-interests*, as for instance, those concerned with social status, influence, professional success, wealth, comfort, and so forth. Genetically we can trace the origin of many ego-interests more or less completely to tendencies of the id. However, once structuralization has taken place, they become partly independent in the service of the ego and this development is, under normal conditions, not wholly reversible; therefore psychoanalysis has to describe them as a separate group of phenomena. The weight that the group of ego-interests we have pointed at carries in the dynamics of individual behavior, and in social life, is a matter of common knowledge. However, they represent one part of the ego only and to make a distinction between these and other tendencies of the ego becomes important when we try to characterize various types of action. Here I should like to refer to but one point on which our clinical experience can shed some light.

The form of behavior under discussion we often see exaggerated to a kind of caricature with some of our patients. I am thinking of that well-known type of persons who constantly emphasize the matter-of-fact view they have of life, their realistic attitude, and the high degree of so-called rationality they have reached. Every piece of behavior that does not visibly serve a "useful" purpose is discarded as archaic, as based on superstition or on prejudice; where it occurs it is unmasked as hypocrisy. Sexual activities these patients force themselves to consider from the viewpoint of being expedient for an ulterior purpose (for instance: mental hygiene), and they try to act accordingly. Their characteristic reaction to death is to suppress mourning.

These attitudes are obviously rather complex as to their origin and as to their structure. For our purpose we stress the

preferred type of action that is part of it; and also how that action is correlated with a specific sort of relation to reality, in the sense that while parts of it are emphasized, other parts, mainly of inner reality, get scotomized. We soon discover that this type of behavior is full of self-deception. It starts from a highly limited concept of "reality", as a policy that takes pride in calling itself realistic often does. We understand this behavior to be an attempt to deny inner conflicts and protect oneself from fear; its defensive character is obvious. Of course, this does not imply that it is invariably pathological. With some individuals we find it as a more or less central element of their neurosis. But with many others a lesser degree of it is obviously part of normal behavior and proves very valuable for adjustment in a large field of situations; even with them, though, it often serves the purpose of defense. We shall not forget that its adaptive value varies with the social set-up in which it occurs.

From the point of view of the various systems of valuation, which develop on the basis of the superego demands, the type of action in question is evaluated in different ways. Frequently it is found to be in conflict with the moral demands of the individual. This may be worth while mentioning, since the psychoanalytic approach has mainly investigated that side of the moral demands that forms a barrier against the instinctual drives. But ego-tendencies of various kinds, action according to the ego interests, also the very element of calculation in purposive rational action, are actually in many situations evaluated in a negative way by various ethical systems; and by no means only as a consequence of possible instinctual implications. I think that these evaluations as well as those condemning instinctual behavior can in the last instance be traced to the conditions under which the superego is formed. But this is a special matter, beyond the scope of this paper.

Analysis clearly reveals the manifold genetic and structural interrelationships of the ego interests with other driving forces.

No analyst doubts that the picture of man as guided only by this or that group of his ego-interests falls short of psychic reality. However, it still plays a role where standards or health, aims of therapy, and pedagogical problems are discussed. Thus it is often maintained that the freedom of the individual to subordinate other tendencies to what is useful for him makes the difference between healthy and neurotic behavior. Actually this is too small a basis to build upon it a definition of health. The ego-interests are only one set of ego-functions among others; and they do not coincide with that ego-function that also considers the demands of the other psychic systems and that we have described as the organizing function; their prevalence in an individual does not warrant that the drives are harmoniously included in the ego, nor that the superego demands have been integrated into it.

Obviously, even a type of action commonly judged as "normal" cannot be properly evaluated without structural analysis. There is no reliable correlation with health if the three systems and their interrelationships are not included. If we speak of subordination of other psychic tendencies not under the ego-interests but under ego-control, and particularly under the organizing function, this will better help to describe what we call healthy behavior; though even then the characterization remains incomplete.

It also shows up quite distinctly why the many attempts toward planning human existence that have been based on an appeal to a certain group of ego-interests only will be handicapped; from the psychological viewpoint they are likely to prove defective, and eventually to lead into unforeseen conflicts, where a structurally central and complex sector of human behavior is aimed at. I shall not try to delineate here the field in which they are most likely to be successful.

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What changes the psychic systems of a patient undergo during a psychoanalytic treatment, and the role the organizing func-

tion plays in it, has been often described. In this connection I want to point to the fact that the psychoanalytic process in itself can be considered as a model of how purposive rational action can, often successfully, use irrational elements of behavior. Here, obviously, in the plan of a rational technique, devised to alter the patient's behavior, irrationality as a fact is included. Rational means are even used in order to mobilize irrational forces that as we know from experience will finally get integrated into a new state of balance. The ego is strengthened, and a synthesis of the tasks set by itself, by the instinctual drives, the claims of moral conscience, and by reality is made possible; the individual learns to coordinate his aims. In the psychoanalytic procedure, rational insight takes itself into account as a partial function, besides and in relation to other psychic functions. Thus, this method of "planning" intentionally leaves a certain degree of freedom to the instinctual and emotional forces. The possibilities and limitations of rationality are empirically tested in every analysis. In this approach, "rationalism" and "irrationalism" have both been integrated.

Freud's sentence "where id was, there shall ego be" indicates in a general way the aims of psychoanalytic therapy. It certainly does not mean that the rational functions, or the ego-interests, and so forth, could or should ever totally replace the functions of the other systems. He mainly thought of guidance by the ego, of supremacy of its organizing function, as we have described it. However, there is no doubt that the strengthening of the ego, one consequence of analysis, if it has been successful, may also result in the ego's taking over in its own organization certain functions that had previously been executed by the other sub-structures of personality. This case is very different from that discussed above, in which an attempt is made to substitute certain ego-interests for the functions of the other systems, often as an act of defense against the latter. What I have in mind here is the successful integration of those functions into the ego; this pre-

supposes ego-strength, relative freedom from anxiety, and 'intactness of the organizing function. How far one may have the right to hope that this degree of reorganization may be achieved by any methods other than psychoanalysis, I shall not discuss here. However, we do hope that what analysis, and also what more particularly our insight into the analytical procedure itself, have taught us about the dialectics of rational and irrational behavior can be useful as a model for the understanding and the handling of social phenomena on a larger scale.

TRENDS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY PROPAGANDA

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In speaking of propaganda, we refer to the political sphere and not to promotional activities in general. We define acts of propaganda, in agreement with H. D. Lasswell (1927, 1946) as attempts to influence attitudes of large numbers of people on controversial issues of relevance to a group. Propaganda is thus distinguished from education which deals with non-controversial issues. Moreover, not all treatments of controversial issues of relevance to a group fall under the definition; they are not propaganda if they aim at the clarification of issues rather than at the changing of attitudes.

In the following, we deal mainly with propaganda by agents of government and exclusively with propaganda using the channels of mass communication, i.e., principally print, radio and film.

However, neither the potentialities of any one medium, nor the variety of promotional devices used by all will be discussed here. We are concerned with the place of propaganda in Western civilization. Our general hypothesis is that responses to political propaganda in the Western world have considerably changed during the last decades; and that these changes are related to trends in the sociopsychological conditions of life in the twentieth century.

We shall not be able to offer conclusive proof for the points we wish to make. We do not know of the existence of data com-

prehensive and reliable enough to demonstrate in quantitative terms broad hypotheses about changes in responses to propaganda. We start out from changes in content and style of propaganda, assuming that they reflect the propagandist's expectation as to the response of his audience. The propagandist may be mistaken in his expectations, but finally he will be informed to some extent about his audiences' response, and adapt his output, within limit, to their predispositions.

We choose two situations in which propaganda was directed towards comparable objectives: the two World Wars.

Wartime propaganda is enacted in a situation with strictly limited goals. Under whatever conditions, the objective of propagandists in wartime is to maximize social participation among members of their own group and to minimize participation among members of the enemy group. Social participation is characterized by concern for the objectives of the group, the sharing of its activities, and the preparedness to accept deprivations on its behalf. High "participation" is therefore identical with high "morale". Its psychological dynamics are mutual identifications among group members, and identification of individual members with leaders or leading ideals of the group, strong cathexis of the goal set by the group, and decreased cathexis of the self; processes that at least in part are preconscious and unconscious. Low participation may manifest itself in two ways: first, participation may be shifted partly or totally from one group to another. In this case, one may speak of a split in participation. Second, low participation may manifest itself as a withdrawal of individuals from the political sphere; in this case, we speak of privatization (H. Speier and M. Otis).¹

The psychological dynamics of a split in participation are

1. Two kinds of decreased participation in the direction of privatization can be distinguished: first, a decrease of active attitudes towards the political sphere, in favor of passive or merely adjusting attitudes; in this case, one must speak of a decrease of attitudinal participation; second, a decrease of the actual sharing in political action; in this case, one might speak of a decrease of behavioral participation.

obvious; one set of identifications and objectives has been replaced by another. The only dynamic change consists in the fact that, as a rule, the old group has not lost its cathexis, but has become the target of hostility.

The dynamics of privatization are more complex: withdrawal of cathexes from the group and its objectives leads to a process comparable to, but not identical with a narcissistic regression. Concern with the self becomes dominant. Since the striving for individual indulgence is maximized, the individual becomes exceedingly vulnerable to deprivation.

Modern warfare is distinguished from older types of warfare by the fact that it affects larger numbers of individuals. In total war "nations at arms" oppose each other with all their resources. Hence participation becomes increasingly important. To the extent that preparedness for war infringes upon life in peace, the problem continues to exist in peacetime.

Participation of whole nations was more essential during World War I than during any previous war; and yet it was somewhat less essential than during World War II; the first World War, especially at its onset, was "less total" than the second. On the other hand, the media of mass communication were less developed; radio and film had hardly been tested. Three areas of difference between the propagandas of the two wars seem particularly relevant in our context:

1. Propaganda during the second World War exhibited, on the whole, a higher degree of sobriety than propaganda during World War I; the incidence of highly emotionalized terms was probably lower.

2. Propaganda during the second World War was, on the whole, less moralistic than propaganda during the first World War; the incidence of preference statements as against fact statements was probably lower.

3. Propaganda during the second World War tended to put a moderate ceiling on grosser divergences from presently or subsequently ascertainable facts, divergences that

were more frequent in propaganda during the first World War. Also, propaganda during the second World War tended to give fuller information about relevant events than propaganda during World War I.

In summarizing the psychological aspects of these differences, we might say that propaganda appeals were less frequently directed to id and superego, more prominently to the ego.

In this respect, these areas of difference are representative of others. At least two qualifications to the points mentioned above are essential: first, most of the differences we stress became ever clearer the longer the second World War lasted; second, they were more accentuated in the propaganda of the Western democracies than in that of Germany and Russia²

The use of emotionalized language was, at the outset of World War II, almost completely absent in British propaganda. When, in the autumn of 1939, Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, referred to the Nazis as "Huns", thus using the stereotype current during World War I, he was publicly rebuked. Basically, that attitude persisted throughout the war in Britain and the United States. "We don't want to be driven into hate" was the tenor of opinion. There were modifications of this attitude: in the United States in regard to Japan, in Britain after the severe onslaught of bombing. However, hate campaigns remained largely unacceptable. In Germany, a similar attitude persisted: attempts of German propaganda to brandish the bombing of German cities by British and later by American planes as barbarism, to speak of the crews of these planes as "night pirates" and of German raids against Britain as retaliatory largely failed to arouse indignant hate.

The waning power of *moral* argumentation in propaganda is best illustrated by the fact that one of the predominant themes of propaganda during World War I played no comparable part in World War II. The theme "Our

2. In the following, we shall in the main limit ourselves to examples from American, British and German propaganda, and some data on response; information on reactions of Russian and Japanese audiences is not accessible.

cause is right; theirs is wrong" was secondary in the propaganda of the Western powers; its part in German propaganda was limited; only in Russian propaganda was its role presumably comparable to that it had played in World War I propaganda. In the democratic countries and in Germany, the moral argumentation was replaced by one in terms of indulgence and deprivation (profit or loss): "We are winning; they are losing;" and: "These will be the blessings of victory; these the calamities of defeat." There is evidence indicating that both in the democracies and in Germany this type of appeal was eminently successful. In other words: success of propaganda was dependent on the transformation of superego appeals into appeals to the ego.³

The third area of difference, the increased concern for some agreement between the content of propaganda and ascertainable facts, and the increased concern for detailed information was to some considerable extent related to technological change. Thus, during the first World War, the German people were never explicitly (and implicitly only much later) informed about the German defeat in the battle of the Marne in September 1914. A similar reticence during the second World War would not have proved expedient, since in spite of coercive measures, allied radio transmissions were widely listened to by Germans. However, technological progress was not the only reason for the change. The concern with credibility had increased, independently of the technology of communication. The tendency to check statements of one's own against those of enemy governments existed both in Germany and in the democracies; while it was limited in Germany, it was widely spread in Britain and the United States.

The differences of propaganda during World Wars I and II are epitomized in the treatment of a theme related to all three areas discussed—enemy atrocities. As far as we know, only Russian propaganda on German atrocities, and German propaganda on Russian atrocities gave to this theme about the same importance

3. See Jules H. Masserman, p. 219, who makes a similar point. He speaks of "resonance with personal incentives".

in World War II that all propagandists had given it during World War I. But German reports on allied atrocities were rather timid, if compared to the inventiveness of German propaganda in other areas; and German propaganda about Soviet atrocities was largely designed to create fear and defensive combativeness rather than hate and indignation. In the democracies, however, the "playing down" of reports on enemy atrocities was a guiding principle of propaganda, at least until 1945. While during World War I, allied propagandists did not refrain from exaggerating and even inventing atrocities, uncontested evidence of enemy atrocities was, for a long time, withheld during World War II. It is needless to say that the atrocities to which this documentation referred and which, at the end of the war and after the war became manifest to the soldiers of armies traversing Europe, were of a kind totally different in horror from anything the world of the earlier twentieth century had known. The purposeful reticence of the democratic governments becomes thereby even more significant.

No adequate understanding of these propaganda trends is possible, unless we take two closely related trends in the predispositions of the public into account. Our thesis is that the differences between the propaganda styles during both World Wars are largely due to the rising tendencies towards *distrust* and *privatization*—tendencies that we believe to have existed in the Western democracies as well as in Germany.

Distrust is directed primarily against the propagandist and the authority he represents, secondarily also against the "suggestibility" of the "propagandee". (E. Kris, 1942, 1944)

The first mentioned manifestation of distrust can be traced back to the last war. Propaganda operated then on a new level of technological perfection; the latent possibilities of the mass communication media became suddenly manifest; in all belligerent countries, outbursts of enthusiasm for war occurred. Propagandists, like children playing with a new

toy, charged their messages with many manufactured contents. After the war, they reported on their own achievements—sometimes exaggerating the extent to which they had distorted events. These reports helped to create the aura of secret power that ever since has surrounded propagandists. In Britain and the United States, some of this prestige was transferred from the propagandist to the public relations counsel; some of the men who had successfully worked in government agencies became pioneers of modern advertising. Beliefs in the power of propaganda led to a phobia of political persuasion: propaganda became "a bad name", an influence against which the common man had to guard himself.

The political and economic failures of the postwar era, the futility of the idealistic appeals which had helped to conclude the first World War, reinforced this distrust. Its spread and influence on the political scene, however, was sharply different in different areas. In Germany, the distrust of propaganda was manipulated by the nationalist, and later, the national-socialist movement. Propaganda was identified with those allied propaganda efforts that had accompanied German defeat.⁴ While distrust was directed against one side, nationalist and national-socialist propaganda could operate more freely under the guise of anti-propaganda. In the Western democracies, the propaganda phobia rose during the Great Depression. It became a lasting attitude both in the United States and possibly to a lesser degree, in the United Kingdom; and it took years of experience to discover a propaganda style that would at least not provoke distrust. While the disdain of propaganda had been initiated by the upper strata, it was during the second World War more intense with lower socio-economic groups.

At this point, it becomes essential to supplement our analysis of the distrust of propaganda by a discussion of contem-

4 For the question of the actual contribution of propaganda to this defeat and generally for the question of the limited influence of propaganda on warfare, see E. Kris, H. Speier and Associates.

porary privatization tendencies. Many motivations contribute to such tendencies. Some of them are not taken up here.⁵

Individuals in the mass societies of the twentieth century are to an ever increasing extent involved in public affairs; it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore them. But "ordinary" individuals have ever less the feeling that they can *understand* or *influence* the very events upon which their life and happiness is known to depend. (Mannheim, K.; Kecskemeti, P. and Leites, N.) At the same time, leaders in both totalitarian and democratic societies claim that decisions ultimately rest upon the common man's consent, and that the information supplied to him fully enables him to evaluate the situation. The contrast between these claims and the common man's experience extends to many areas. Thus in economic life ever more depends upon state interference. But, on the other hand, people increasingly regard economic policy as a province in which the professional specialist is paramount and the common man incompetent. The increasing "statification" of economic life has been accompanied by a rising mass reputation of scientific economics as a specialty. The emotional charges of simple economic formulae such as "free enterprise" or "socialization of the means of production" seem to have decreased (one might speak, at least in certain areas, of the silent breakdown of "capitalism" and "socialism" as ideologies). While the economic specialist is to fulfill the most urgent demand of the common man, that for security of employment, the distance between him and his beneficiary grows; he becomes part of a powerful elite, upon which the common man looks with a distrust rooted in dependency.

This is but one instance of the experience of disparity—of insight as well as power—between the common man and the various political organizations into which he is integrated. That disparity counteracts the feeling of power which accompanies the manipulation of increasingly effective machinery, whether of production or destruction: the common man is usually acutely aware of the fact that the "button"

5. For instance, we do not propose to discuss how privatization is related to changes in values.

he is "pushing" belongs to an apparatus far out of the reach of any unorganized individual.

This feeling of disparity greatly affects the common man's attitude to foreign policy. The potential proximity of total war produces situations that not only seem inherently incomprehensible, but that he, the common man, feels cannot be made comprehensible to him by his government. "Security considerations", he infers, are the reason why the "real dope" is kept away from him. Thus the distance between the common man and the policy maker has grown to such an extent that awe and distrust support each other.

The common man feels impotent in a world where specialized skills control events that at any moment may transform his life. That feeling of impotence bestows upon political facts something of the solidity of natural events, like weather or hurricane, that come and go. Two attitudes result from this feeling: First, one does not inquire into the causation of the events thus viewed; second, one does not inquire into their morality.⁶

The feeling that politics as such is outside the reach of morals is an extreme form of this attitude. Probably moral indignation as a reaction to political events has been declining since the turn of the century. One may compare the intense reactions to injustice against individuals under comparatively stable social conditions—the Dreyfus affair, the cases of Ferrer, Nurse Cavell, Sacco and Vanzetti—with the limited reactions to Nazi terror and extermination practises as they gradually became notorious. In the case of the Nazis, public reaction went through a sequence of frank disbelief, reserved doubt, short lived shock and subsequent indifference.

The psychological dynamics operating the interplay of distrust and privatization can now be formulated more sharply. We here distinguish in the continuum of distrustful attitudes, two

6. American soldiers during the second World War were frequently explicitly opposed to discussions of its causation: going into its pre-history was frequently regarded as futile and somewhat "out of this world"

cases: One we call critical distrust; the other projective distrust.⁷ In the child's development, the former arose not independently from the latter. Critical distrust facilitates adjustment to reality and independence; it is at the foundation of scientific thought, and is an essential incentive in the battle against what Freud called the prohibition of thinking in the individual. Critical distrust has gained a decisive importance in modern society, since technology has played havoc with many kinds of magic. Projective distrust, on the other hand, is derived ultimately from ambivalence; it is an expression of hostility, in which aggressive tendencies against others, frequently against authority, are perceived as tendencies of others, frequently as attitudes of authority.

We allude to these complex questions only in order to round off our argumentation: in the world of the twentieth century, the exercise of critical distrust by the common man meets with many obstacles; it is at the same time increasingly stimulated and increasingly frustrated. He therefore regressively turns to projective distrust: He fears, suspects and hates what he cannot understand and master.

Privatization is, amongst other things, a result of the hostility between the individual and the leadership of the group: We mentioned that it is comparable to what is known as a narcissistic regression. In order to maintain this attitude in which self-interest predominates over group interest—the self in this case may include “primary” groups such as the family—projective distrust is set into operation. Scepticism becomes the guarantor of privatization: scepticism here acts as a defense. If the individual, for instance, were to accept available evidence on atrocities, his emotional involvement in politics might rise; he might hate or experience enthusiasm. Thus privatization could not be main-

7. We do not propose here to discuss in detail their genetic interrelation, nor their pathological manifestations, especially in obsessional neuroses and paranoid syndromes (See H. Deutsch's classical expositions.) A fuller treatment would also have to consider the question of retaliatory and self-punitive distrust.

tained. The propagandist's concern in wartime is therefore to reduce such scepticism.

That concern, we said, was more clearly expressed in the democracies than in Germany or Russia. In order fully to understand this difference, we turn to a more detailed discussion of the relationship between propagandist and "propagandee". Every propaganda act occurs in such a relationship; in the case of propaganda by agents of governments, it is the relationship between the individual and his government.

We discuss this relationship in regard to two types of political organization: the totalitarian state with the charismatic leader and democracy. In both cases, the propagandists speak for the leaders, who are the chief propagandists. In both cases, propaganda presupposes, and attempts to strengthen identifications of the propagandees with the propagandists. These identifications, however, have a different character under the two regimes.

In a totalitarian state these identifications concern, to a large extent, id and superego functions. These identifications facilitate the gratifying completion of impulses, as superego functions have been projected upon the propagandist, and as he is idealized in an archaic sense: omnipotence, omniscience and infallibility are attributed to him.

In democratic states, the corresponding identifications concern, to a large extent, ego functions which are delegated to the propagandist. Amongst these functions, the scrutiny of the existing situation and the anticipation of the future are of predominant importance. While the propagandee relies upon the propagandist for the fulfillment of these functions, he retains a critical attitude in relation to him.

Superego and ego identifications, of course, constantly interact. The distribution of their intensities, however, is clearly dependent upon the institutionalized relationship between propagandist and propagandee. In this sense, we may say that the one

is typical of totalitarian, the other of democratic propaganda relations.

That difference is reflected in the devices of propaganda. Totalitarian propaganda tries to sway the audience into participation; its preferred setting is the visible leader talking to the masses; it is modeled after the relations between the hypnotist and his medium. Democratic propaganda gives greater weight to insight as basis for participation; it is to a greater extent modeled after the principles of guidance or education.

The nature of the two propaganda situations accounts for the fact that for each of the two kinds of propagandists different goals are difficult to reach. The totalitarian propagandist finds it arduous to stimulate initiative among his followers. When German propaganda was faced with the task of stimulating cooperative action "from below" among the citizens of bombed towns, that difficulty became apparent: the devices then adopted were plain imitations of the techniques of British propagandists in a similar situation. Democratic propagandists meet a comparable difficulty when faced with the task of manifestly denying information on reasons for government action, that is, of demanding implicit trust for a limited time. The impasse in which allied leadership found itself when faced with a public demand for the opening of a second front, especially in 1943, is an example.

The two types of propagandists react to the impact of distrust and privatization in different ways; these tendencies show a different incidence under the two political orders. In a totalitarian state, privatization grows with deprivation. Then the latent cleavage of the totalitarian state becomes manifest, the cleavage between the faithful, from whose ranks elite and sub-elite are recruited, and the indifferent, who are controlled by the faithful. Their mounting privatization renders this control more difficult. Superego identifications cease to function with ever more individuals, and finally they function only with the fanatics. When that situation crystallized in Germany with the

approach of defeat, two devices were adopted: First, a gradual revision of propaganda policy. Appeals to superego identifications became less and less important and increased weight was given to the stimulation of fear: ego interests should now motivate continued allegiance. But this did not prevent further privatization. Thus the central method of all totalitarian social control was applied ever more consistently: violence. In its last phases, Nazi propaganda hardly fulfilled the purpose of gaining participation in the present; building the Nazi myth, it addressed its appeals to future generations.

Democratic propaganda is better equipped to deal with the tendency towards privatization, since it puts greater emphasis on the creation of insight. Its appeals are better in tune with a high level of distrust. In totalitarian regimes, there is a polarization between the politicized and the privatized, which is, however, difficult to perceive from the outside. In democratic states, tendencies towards privatization are clearly perceptible but their distribution within the society is less clear cut.

There are periods when this tendency decreases: in America after Pearl Harbor, in Britain after May 1940. While enthusiasm was kept at a low level, determination prevailed and sacrifice was willingly sustained.

What was the part of the propagandist in such situations? It may be illustrated by turning to one specific situation, in which democratic propaganda reached its greatest success.

We refer to Churchill's propaganda feat during the spring of 1940. The series of speeches he made in May, June and July of 1940 are remembered for the singular depth of feeling and the heroic quality of language. But these qualities were only accessories to the major political impact of these speeches. Their function was a threefold one—to warn Britain of the danger, to clarify its extent, and to indicate how everyone could help to meet it. In order to illustrate this point, we refer to one topic only: the announcement of the Battle of Britain.

The first intimation was made on May 12th, three days after Churchill's appointment, when the Battle of Flanders had not yet reached its climax. After having described the battles on all fronts, Churchill added that "many preparations had to be made at home". On May 19th, after the surrender of Holland, and during the climax of the Belgian battles, he devoted well over one-third of his speech to announcing "that after this . . . there will come the battle for our island". And after demanding full mobilization of production, he gave for the first time the "box score": he reported that the R.A.F. had been downing three to four enemy planes for each of their own. This, he inferred, was the basis of any hope. On June 4th, in his famous speech after Dunkirk, the theme was taken up anew and an elaborate account of the chances of the fighter force in a battle over the homeland was given. Churchill went into technical details; at a time when France seemed still vigorously to resist, he acquainted the British people with the chances of their survival. While the enemy had broken through the allied front with a few thousand armored vehicles, he forecast the future by saying: "May it not also be that the course of civilization itself will be defended by the skill and devotion of a few thousand airmen." And while he discussed the necessity of ever increasing production, he spoke at this time of imminent defeat of "the great British armies of the later years of war".

In the later speeches of that unforgettable spring, he elaborated on the subject. Every one could understand how his own behavior was related to the total situation, and how this situation was structured; how supplies were needed for the repair and construction of fighter planes, and how in this matter every detail, even the smallest one, could contribute to the final result. All this information was released well in advance of any German attack.

Thus Churchill had not only given the "warning signal" and mobilized "emergency reactions". His detailed analysis of the situation also contributed to the prevention of an inexpediently large and rapid increase in anxiety: unknown danger was transformed into a danger known in kind and extent. He fulfilled those functions of leadership that can

- be compared to those fulfilled in the life of the individual by the organization of the ego (E. Kris, 1944). At the same time, Churchill offered his own courage as a model: "If you behave as I do, you will behave right." He not only spoke of Britain's "finest hour" but was careful to add that in this hour "every man and woman had their chance".

The propagandist thus seems to fulfill a double function: first that of structuring the situation so that it can be anticipated and understood, and second, that of offering himself as a model.

It is essential to understand the difference between the democratic leader who functions as a model and the charismatic leader (F. Redl). The latter offers himself as an object that replaces superego functions in the individual. The model function of leadership implies that in identifying with the leader, the individual will best serve the ideals he shares with him. But the understanding of the situation is a precondition for such moral participation.

The general problem which we here finally approach concerns the relation between ego and superego functions. One might tentatively formulate the hypothesis that in a situation in which the ego functions smoothly, the tension between ego and superego is apt to be low. In fact, we find in the study of superego formation in the child some evidence in support of such a formulation (K. Friedlander). However, other evidence is contradictory. Frequently, successful ego performance is accompanied by intense conflicts between ego and superego. We therefore reject this formulation and substitute another: unsuccessful ego functions endanger the positive relationship between ego and superego. They tend to encourage regressive trends. Individuals who feel impotent in the face of a world they do not understand, and are distrustful of those who should act as their guides, tend to revert to patterns of behavior known from childhood, in which an increase of hostility against the adults and many neurotic or delinquent mechanisms may develop. The incidence of such

maladjustments may increase in a society in which privatization tendencies have become dominant.⁸

Little can be said here about what conclusions can be drawn for the future of democratic propaganda from these considerations. They clearly point to the desirability of sharp and wide increases of insight into events in the world at large among the citizens. Briefly, the trend towards distrust and privatization among the audience of the propagandist should be turned into a trend towards increase of insight. That trend would find a parallel in changes of related techniques: psycho-therapy and education, largely under the influence of psychoanalysis, have substituted or are substituting insight for pressure. If the appropriate education, on a vast enough scale and at a rapid enough rate is not provided for, the distrust and privatization of the masses may become a fertile soil for totalitarian management.

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8. We here note that the traditional discussion of the applicability of "individual" psychological hypotheses to "social" events lacks substance, since events dealt with in the empirical analysis of human affairs, "psychological" or "sociological", occur in individuals. We deal with frequencies of incidence.

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SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN NEGRO RACE HATRED AND IN ANTI-NEGRO RIOTS

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In this paper I shall make no attempt to explain fully the phenomena of race antagonism and of race hatred, since I feel myself inadequate to this task. A complicated and deeply rooted phenomenon such as that of race hatred has multiple causes, many of them in the sociological and economic fields and I am not able to deal with this problem from these angles. The excellent study by Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, shows the complexity of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of those factors that produce it and illuminate its importance. My contribution will be limited to the psychological field. The material was gathered from patients, particularly during the Negro race riots in Detroit during June of 1943. This clinical material obtained from analyses, together with well-known facts concerning the race riots, made it possible to draw conclusions as to some deeper and unconscious motivations which lead to the constant antagonism against Negroes on the part of many white people, as well as to its exacerbation into the form of the group-psychological phenomenon of the Negro race riots. The results fitted so well into the hypothesis that psychoanalysis, or rather Freud, had developed with regard to the origin of human groups that the communication of these observations and thoughts seemed further justified from the theoretical standpoint. From a practical viewpoint, with

regard to the prevention of such unhappy events as occurred in Detroit during June of 1943, as well as from an explanatory viewpoint, this paper may be a valuable contribution, since our findings and conclusions are not mentioned in the literature on the subject with the emphasis that, in our opinion, they deserve.

From the clinical material obtained in our practical analytic work we are forced to conclude that the negative attitude toward Negroes has a twofold origin, and that it therefore manifests itself in two different forms of hatred and aggression. The first form is the constant and general antagonism against the Negroes, and includes all members of the race. It is expressed in the general trend of many white people to "draw the color line", i.e., either to keep or to drive the Negro out of the community, of the social circle, of particular jobs or of certain localities. Negroes are considered, or better, experienced emotionally, as unwelcome intruders. The mere idea that they could be accepted by members of the social group, to which the antagonistic white person belongs, creates horror and most irrational and violent reactions, which, through their very violence and lack of reason, betray their origin in parts of the mind that are not controlled by reason, consideration and altruism, but by vehement, impetuous desires such as we find in the unconscious, or the id, that "cauldron of seething excitement" (Freud, *A New Series of Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*). Locked up through repression, and preserved through the lack of participation in the development of the rest of the personality, these desires retain in the unconscious their infantile character and aims, since the main repressions take place in early childhood. The primitive mechanism of displacement, i.e., the substitution of another object for that originally tied up with the infantile emotional desire, enables the repressed tendencies even in the adult person to find some outlet with the substitute object. The irrationality and impetuosity of the emotional reaction, and the flimsy rationalizations by which

it is explained are indications of its infantile origin in the unconscious.

We know of a specific infantile reaction that shows this characteristic of intense hostility and this tendency to keep out or to drive out, which is re-enacted with Negroes as substitute objects. It is the reaction to the arrival of a newcomer into the family, an infant brother or sister. The older child develops extreme jealousy of the younger sibling, often openly shows his disapproval, or his hatred and disgust, and has only one desire: to do away with the newcomer, or to shut him out from acceptance by the family. Whoever has observed children, or has analyzed adults and their infantile reactions to younger siblings as they are preserved in the unconscious, is deeply impressed by the intensity of the negative reaction of the older child to the new member of the family. It often expresses itself in direct aggression against the baby, and only gradually and not without repeated relapses is this jealousy overcome and replaced by more friendly feelings. The hostility is repressed, but preserved in the unconscious, and then directed against the Negroes as a substitute object. In this respect the Negroes signify *younger siblings*. As such they are unwelcome, and every attempt is made to keep them out of the social group of white people, which represents an enlarged family. Out of many dreams of patients I choose two which are very revealing in this respect. The first patient's dream occurred at a time when his hostility against his younger brother was the main subject of the analytic investigation, and it ran as follows:

The patient is in his parents' house. A group of Negroes are attacking the house, and are ready to set it on fire. This danger is all of a sudden removed by a magical procedure: the Negroes are all transformed into small balls of protoplasm which are contained in a bottle, so that they can easily be disposed of by emptying the bottle into the sink.

It can easily be recognized that the Negroes are re-converted into ovula in the womb, and the dreamer indicates that in this

way he can get rid of them, in that the womb is emptied. Their significance as younger siblings is clear from the dream and from the analytic material of sibling rivalry during which the dream occurred.

The second patient's dream occurred at a time when the patient had signed affidavits for a refugee family in Europe, who were distant relatives of his, so that they could obtain immigration visas for the United States. He felt obliged to do this at the request of his family, but inwardly resented it and was afraid that his dominating position in the family might be threatened, since this refugee family consisted of certain prominent personalities much admired by the American members of the patient's family. After signing the affidavits the patient dreamed:

A big boat approaches New York harbor. The patient is on a small raft nearby. Some Negroes jump from the port-hole of the boat into the water. The patient drives his raft toward them and crushes the Negroes between his raft and the side of the big boat.

The patient, who was the oldest of six children, had in his childhood reacted with violently aggressive wishes against each of his newly-arrived siblings. The big ship symbolizes the mother's body, while the jumping into the water typically signifies giving birth to younger siblings, represented in the dream by Negroes. The patient was a violent Negro hater. The newcomers, his younger siblings and Negroes can easily be recognized as identical in this dream.

Some very characteristic features of the attitude of anti-Negro white people can be explained from the recognition that Negroes represent younger siblings in the unconscious of such white people. The main trend to keep them out of the family of white people is an exact repetition of the older child's attitude toward the younger child. This jealousy often flares up again in the older child when the younger makes a new step forward in his development. Thus, it may manifest itself again when the

younger sibling begins to walk, when his speech develops, when he plays with toys more skillfully, when he goes to school, begins to read, and so on. The older child often attempts to deny the younger child's achievement, or to belittle it: since the younger child is there at all, he should at least remain stupid, immature and a permanent infant, from whom the older child need not fear too much competition. Many of these reactions have to be repressed in childhood under the influence of education. They find expression with substitute objects. The attitude of anti-Negroes toward Negroes mirrors exactly the attitude of the older child toward his sibling rivals: Negroes should be kept in their place, as inferior members of the social group to which they are hardly allowed to belong. They are considered immature, incapable of development, and eternal children. Every attempt at, or actual achievement of a Negro is resented with furious anger and with fear. The reaction of fear is noteworthy, and in its nature is very similar to the fear of dethronization which the older child experiences with regard to his growing rival. Every attempt is made to prevent the Negro's integration into the social structure of the white. He should remain outside, unwelcome, untrained and undeveloped. The greatest horror is therefore expressed about intermarriage, because this would really mean complete acceptance into the family.

White persons who express pro-Negro sentiments and attitudes are met with violent hatred and hostility, as is the member of the family who pays attention to the younger child and expresses affection for him. The derogatory term "nigger-lover" for white people who have contact with Negroes shows that it is the *emotional* component which causes the negative reaction, as we think, in a repetition of childhood jealousy of younger siblings.

The *general negative reaction* to and hostility against the Negro race is directed equally against both sexes. Male as well as female Negroes are to be kept out of the family, since in the unconscious they represent unwanted younger siblings. Here lies

It is interesting that religious systems reveal the original duality of our feelings toward our father very clearly. In our monotheistic religion God is endowed with definite father attributes. He is omnipotent and omniscient, as we believed our father to be when we were small children. He gives us moral laws and promises us protection if we are obedient. We recognize him as our "Father in Heaven", and only positive feelings are directed toward him. Our highly developed monotheistic religion does not allow any kind of negative feeling toward God. Primitives, on the other hand, are still capable of expressing their negative feelings against their God. If things go wrong they scold their God, whom they make responsible for their misfortune. They even beat him, or the idol that represents him, burn or throw him into the river. In our highly developed monotheistic system our negative feelings against God the Father have to be displaced onto a substitute figure which is created for this purpose, and that is the devil. Psychologically God and Satan were originally one and the same. The myth of the Fall of the Angels betrays that originally the two belonged into the same locality; Satan wears horns, which are the attributes of gods in many other religions: Agni in the Hindu religion, Yama in Buddhism, Asur in the Babylonian religion, Dionysus in the Greek religion; many American Indian gods had horns, usually of bulls, as their attributes. Satan is therefore the substitute for God as the object of our negative feelings, which derive from our original emotional ambivalence toward our father in childhood. The devil has one significant feature in common with the Negro: both are black. In the unconscious of many people the two are identical, both being substitutes for the father insofar as he is hated and feared. The violence of the hatred against the Negro, the lack of justification for this hatred in many individuals who have never had unpleasant experiences with Negroes, and the mass-psychological implications, can be partially understood if we consider the un-

conscious origin of these strong emotions in the infantile hatred against the father.

Originally all infantile relationships are of an ambivalent nature. Infantile wishes and desires are so intense and are so often opposed to educational aims that disappointments and frustrations are unavoidable. These disappointments and frustrations create hostile feelings against the educator who, at the same time, remains the love object. The negative component in the feeling toward the father is particularly enforced in the little boy during the emotional constellation that we call the oedipus complex. At the age of from four to five years the little boy's love for his mother shows definite erotic characteristics. He desires to do with his mother what he has observed or imagined his father doing with her during the night. Stimulated by pleasurable genital sensations during this period of his sexual development, he has a vague idea that the man's penis plays an important role in sexual relations. His sexual advances are rejected by the mother, and he is forced to recognize that his big rival, the father, is more successful and is accepted by the mother. Violent hatred against his father flares up at this time, and intense wishes either to kill him or to do away with him in some way or other are present even in his conscious mind. Particularly violent are the aggressive tendencies against the father's penis, the larger size of which the boy thinks, makes his mother prefer his father to him. These wishes and feelings find their physical expression in the little boy's masturbatory activity. When discovered at this the little boy is usually threatened by the anxious parents with loss of his penis: it will be cut off, or will rot away if he continues to masturbate. This threat to his highly valued organ is of far-reaching consequences. The little boy stops masturbating, not without much inner struggle against the temptation, and abandons, or better, represses his oedipal strivings. His infantile sexuality comes to a sudden stop, and he enters the latency period, with relative quiet in the field of sexual manifestations. But his

oedipal strivings, mother-love and father-hatred, continue to exist in his unconscious, and when in puberty new currents of sexuality flow into his psychophysical system, the oedipal strivings are renewed, although in a more disguised form. Masturbation is then resumed, and only gradually with progress toward maturity and under the pressure of renewed anxiety is the oedipus complex abandoned for the second and final time. But in the unconscious the infantile tendencies are still charged with energy, and many of the otherwise unintelligible actions and emotions of men can be recognized as displaced and disguised expressions of the oedipal strivings. Even for the experienced analyst it is amazing what driving forces these repressed tendencies of childhood represent. Their energies are stupendous, and are manifested in many socially positive and negative reactions.

Psychologically, Negro race riots are violent outbreaks of infantile father hatred. Negro hatred has its origin in the South, where many white children were and are brought up by a Negro "mammy", toward whom they often develop feelings like those toward a mother. Due to the development of the oedipus complex, the male Negro is then naturally brought into the position of the hated father. The South furnishes the classical example of the race riot in the form of lynching. The rebellious sons unite against the hated father substitute with the aim of killing and castrating him. The inhumanity, cruelty, and brutality with which they proceed reveals the origin of this conduct in the most primitive and barbaric layers of our minds, where it is otherwise buried in the unconscious and is brought forth only under the mass-psychological conditions of the riot. The fact that the Negro riot regularly breaks out through the rumor that a Negro has raped a white woman confirms our opinion about its patricidal origin. Almost without exception the riot is then the revenge for the alleged sexual assault upon a white woman by a Negro. We have mentioned that the original father hatred of the little boy in the oedipal situation is the reaction to the sex relations between the parents, which

the child considers as acts of violence on the part of the father against the mother. The little boy's aggression against the father's penis and his castrative tendencies are the expression and result of his inferiority feelings concerning the smallness of his own penis. The larger size of the Negro's penis and legends about it seem to play an equally important role in the unconscious emotional reactions leading to race riots. It was interesting to observe that among the most embittered white participants in the race riots in Detroit were adolescents, many of southern origin. Their own sexual immaturity and insecurity made them particularly vicious in their patricidal impulses. The castrative tendency expresses itself either in a direct way during the process of lynching in the South, where not infrequently the genitals of the lynched Negro are cut off,¹ or more often it finds symbolic expression: in the South the victim of the riot is tarred and feathered, which means that he is turned into a bird, and then killed. The bird is an ubiquitous penis symbol (cf. the vulgar term "cock"; or the vulgar German term for intercourse, "vögeln", which literally means "to bird"). In northern parts of the country in accordance with the higher degree of technical development and the higher standard of civilization, the aggression against the Negro's penis is expressed against a penis symbol detached from the victim, namely against the automobile, which stands for the penis in numerous dreams and jokes. The burning automobiles of Negroes on Woodward Avenue during the race riots in Detroit were a ghastly picture of primitive aggression directed against symbolic substitutes at a time when automobiles were not produced due to war-time restrictions, and their loss was irreparable.

A non-analytic patient's dream reveals the underlying psychological forces in Negro riots very clearly. He was not a participant

1. In one of the stories about the technique of lynching the castrative tendencies are very obvious. It is said that the victim is brought into a hut, where his genitals are tied to a part of the hut with a wire. He is then left with a razor while the hut is set afire, so that he has choice of burning to death or freeing himself by cutting off his genitals.

in the riots, although he favored the aggression against the Negroes to some extent.

He dreamed at the time of the race riots that a Negro was trying to climb into the window of his bedroom on the second floor, while he was lying in bed. The patient grabbed his favorite shot gun, which was lying beside him, and shot at the Negro. He shot his head off, the body fell down outside, and the head rolled onto the floor of the room, where it began to cry: "What did you do to me? I can't go home without my body."

The patient knew in the dream that "home" meant his own mother's home. The castration in the form of decapitation is obvious in the dream.

An analytic patient, a very liberal man, who was deeply shocked by the Detroit events and sincerely opposed to the persecution of the Negroes, nevertheless had the following dream during the riots: "He is hunting and shooting down a few white birds." He immediately recognized after waking that white had to be replaced by *black*, as frequently in dreams elements are presented by their opposites, and that the black birds were Negroes and their penes. The riots occurred at the time when his father hatred was particularly intense and active in his analysis. It is an interesting factor in these dreams that even in the manifest picture the aggression against the Negro is connected with *hunting*. Psychologically Negro riots represent manhunts, and are obviously a form of group hunting. It may be revealing in this connection to throw some light of psychological insight on the sport of hunting. Group hunting has the same depth-psychological origin as Negro rioting: it is collective father murder.²

In order to explain the psychological significance of hunting, we shall first have to present parts of the psychoanalytic theory about the primitive group and the processes within it in archaic

2. Marie Bonaparte: Über die Symbolik der Kopftrophäen, *Imago*, 14, 1928.

times.³ According to this theory, men originally lived in small groups, each of which was dominated by a strong male who kept the women of the group to himself, and who forced the other males either into celibacy or into substitute gratifications in the form of homosexuality. In many instances he may even have deprived them of their sexual organs. We call this strong male individual who ruled the group with brutal force and cruelty the primal father, and the suppressed males of the group the sons. In many of our legal and social institutions we still find a residue of this state of affairs, such as in the institution of kingdoms, in the supremacy of the Pope, and in the absolute dictatorship of leaders of peoples.

One day, according to Freud's hypothesis, the sons considered their common strength sufficient to overwhelm their tyrannical father. They killed him, and being cannibals, they ate him in order to incorporate his strength. The women were then free, and general sexual promiscuity followed the murder of the primal father. The original deed had the most profound psychological effects; the sons developed a deep and lasting guilt feeling about it, and an intense longing for the father. They chose a substitute for him in the form of a totem, which became sacred and taboo. Originally all totems were animals, usually strong and fear-inspiring ones. The clan claimed that the animal was their ancestor, and that they all took their origin from it. The women of the clan were taboo and belonged to the totem animal. The men had to get their women from another clan (exogamy). In this way the strong male who was the primal father was continued psychologically by a substitute object in the form of the totem animal. Once a year, however, the totem animal was killed and eaten; this repetition of the original deed was followed by a sexual orgy. It was the great festival of the year.

Totemism is the forerunner of religion. In religion the father

3. Sigmund Freud: *Totem and Tabu*. New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1918
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. London, Internat. Psa Press, 1922

regains his original human shape, but the animal attributes which many gods still show reveal their derivation from animal totems.

This theory of the development of totemism subsequent to the slaughter of the original father corresponds in many features with the development of the little boy in our own civilization. In the psychological field, too, ontogenesis is an abbreviated form of phylogenesis. The animal phobias which most children develop for a while are the main expression of infantile totemism, although in a negative form. Animal phobias appear during the stage of the oedipus complex, and the feared animal can through analysis easily be recognized as a father substitute. Castration anxiety causes the repression of the oedipal strivings, as we have already pointed out. But patricidal impulses are continually pressing forward even in mature persons to find discharge upon substitute objects, and in substitute actions. *Hunting*, particularly hunting of big animals in groups (parforce) is an expression of such patricidal tendencies. The animals usually chosen for group hunting are the deer, a typical father symbol, with its proud and showy antlers as his male characteristic, and the fox, whose penis significance is obviously derived from his slipping into the fox-hole. Father murder and castration are then the unconscious aims of group hunting. The rituals which have to be observed during parforce hunting and when the deer is killed by hounds and hunters repeat in many details the rituals that accompany the slaughter of the totem animal in primitive society.⁴ But even deer hunting of the single hunter with a rifle reveals this same underlying unconscious motive. Many instances and customs reveal the derivation of deer hunting from the yearly slaughter of the otherwise sacred and tabooed totem animal, the first father symbol. The original deed of father murder and its later substitutes

4. A fairly recent issue of *Life* magazine (March 13, 1944) told of group hunting, fox hunting with clubs, a very cruel method still prevailing in our "civilized" country. It is revealing for the similarity between hunting and Negro riots to compare these pictures of group fox hunting in this issue with those in the issue on Negro riots in Detroit (July 5, 1943).

in the form of the annual slaughter of the totem animal were done with the participation of all male members of the tribe. It was a group action. Hunters still form groups in which they travel to their hunting places and remain there in a close relationship to one another, even if they hunt separately. The latent homosexual ties between them are obvious in their attitudes, such as drinking, telling of dirty jokes and greater intimacy. Women are excluded. Nothing can show more clearly the aggressive-castrative impulses in hunting than the following custom, which at least Michigan hunters observe most carefully: when the deer is killed, the very first thing that the hunter does is to cut off the animal's genitals and hang them up, as a trophy, on a tree on the road nearby the place where the buck was killed. The explanation, or better rationalization, for this strange behavior is that the genitals would spoil the meat and make it inedible. I heard this explanation even from a physician hunter who should know that there is no substance in the genital tissues that would spoil the meat, and that the cessation of circulation after the animal has been killed would prevent any such substance from coming in contact with the meat of the deer. In Europe, when the deer has been shot by the lord, the game warden tears a little three-pronged fir twig from the nearest tree, dips it into the deer's blood and presents it to the master of the hunt, who fixes it on his hat. (The number "three" is a very common symbol for the male genitals.) The next ritualistic act which the game warden or the lord has to perform is to cut off the deer's penis and testicles, and then he has to disembowel it according to strict ritualistic rules. The antlers, common penis symbols, are kept as a trophy. The trophy taken from the fox is his tail, a typical penis symbol that hangs on many cars of juvenile persons.

The phenomenon of buck-fever, where a hunter all of a sudden begins to tremble and shows all the signs of an anxiety attack when he sees the buck and should shoot him, is another proof of the unconscious patricidal significance of deer hunting.

A patient who was an excellent hunter developed buck-fever for the first time in his life when he went hunting shortly after his father's death. Although up to this time he had cold-bloodedly killed many deer, he began to shake all over when he saw the buck, was unable to shoot, and the gun froze in his hand so that his companion had difficulties in taking it from him. He developed a severe anxiety attack which marked the beginning of his neurosis. He became unable to sleep, developed severe headaches and turned into a "nervous wreck", so that he had to undergo treatment. The actual death of his father had mobilized his oedipal guilt feelings to such an extent that he was incapable of committing another father murder in the form of shooting a deer. Another white patient's dream, which occurred during the race riots in Detroit, was as follows:

The patient is up North hunting. He is lying in wait for the game, and hears the crackling of twigs as the animal approaches him. He expects it to be a moose, and is all ready to shoot it when it appears. But when the leaves of the brush part as the animal steps out, it is not a moose but a large, powerful Negro. The dreamer sees that he has a scar on his right cheek.

He then woke up. He immediately recognized the scar as that which his father had on his right cheek.

This and the other dreams related above make the psychological identity of group hunting and Negro race riots obvious. People who observed the race riots in Detroit from their downtown office windows above the streets where the riots occurred had the definite impression that the Negro was hunted. When he attempted to escape in one direction he was met by a group of white people who chased him back to his first persecutors, or in another direction where he met a third group of "hunters", until he was cornered like an animal and knocked down. The way in which the persecutors shouted at one another, such as "There's one! Get him!" definitely reminded the spectators of hunting scenes.

It corresponds to the hunting rituals and to their archaic origin that no Negro women were attacked, and that only males were allowed to be the victims.⁵ Hunting and Negro riots, therefore, have the same unconscious origin in patricidal impulses. They both represent repetitions of father murder as it occurred among archaic tribes.

The mass psychological phenomena of the race riots in Detroit are those described as characteristic of short-lived groups by LeBon and Freud.⁶ The Detroit race riots showed all the earmarks of regression from individual to most primitive group psychology. Temporary and fleeting leadership was exercised by individuals. In the short-lived groups that were formed during the race riots in Detroit it was noteworthy that they lacked strong leadership, which is otherwise so characteristic of group formations, even of a temporary kind. It may be that the innermost emotional motives for the group formation, namely collective father murder, influenced the structure and character of the groups. It was precisely this fleeting character that contributed to the nervousness and excitement in the city during the riots.

Some pictures taken during the riots and reproduced in newspapers and magazines (*Life*, July 5, 1943) showed very clearly the man-hunting character of the riots, the intensity and viciousness of the aggression and the satisfaction over the injury or slaughter of the victim. Groups standing around a Negro lying on the ground, their faces still wild with aggressive excitement, can easily be taken as revivification of the sons of the primitive group standing around the primal father whom they had murdered.

According to Freud the guilt of the sons after the original deed was the starting point of cultural development in the form of totemism. We would like to hope that man in modern cities

5. We assume that the same unconscious motives were active in Negroes persecuting white men during the riots, but we have no material available to prove this assumption.

6. S. Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.

has still the possibility of progress towards civilization which the members of the most primitive group manifested in archaic times, and thus will be able to make up through cultural achievements of a progressive nature what he is ready to lose so quickly through mass regression to archaic primitivism.